Tétel adatlapja
CÍMLAP
Hegedűs Loránt
Neo-Kantian and value theology in Hungary

CONTENT, INTRODUCTION



Content

Publisher's preface

Introduction

Part one:
The forerunners of value theology (Prehistory)

Ödön Kovács (1844-1895)
József Keresztes (1846-1888)
György Bartók senior (1845-1907)
Albert Molnár (1849-1901)
Károly Nagy (1868-1926)

Part two:
Value theology and its Hungarian representatives (History)

A Hungarian philosopher: Károly Böhm (1846-1911)
László Ravasz (1882-1975)
György Bartók junior (1882-1970)
Béla Tankó (1876-1946)
Sándor Makkai (1890-1951)

Part three:
The closing phase of value-theological aspirations

József Vásárhelyi (1892-1916)
Lajos Imre (1888-1974)
Sándor Tavaszy (1888-1951)
Imre Révész (1889-1967)
The rear-guard

Summary:
From seeking certainty to the certainty of the Word



Introduction

In this essay we are going to discuss a period of the history of Hungarian reformed theology of which the spiritual roots, in the course of its prehistory, reached down to the ideas of liberal theology, and in which, conforming to the neo-Kantian trend of theological thought, value theology became the defining power of spiritual, church, and salvation history, and in the finishing period of which the dawn of the neo-Reformational theology of Logos (or the Word) was breaking.

Theological liberalism, uniting the spiritual heritage of Kant, Schleiermacher, and Hegel into a specific theological way of thinking, was the first theological trend to receive into itself Kantian influences that were to revive with fresh vitality in neo-Kantianism to gain fundamental significance for neo-Kantian and value theology.

In German and European thinking in the middle of the 19th century the exaggerations of the absolute idealism of Schelling and Hegel, and the pushing forward of Marxism partly rooted in the latter, started a crisis and fermentation. Among the political, economic and social problems of the period philosophy, though having lost its leading role, got again into vital motion with great shocks and turns. One system of speculation failed after another, and through the ruins a new world-view, scientific materialism, strove with full force towards its final goal. Hegel's philosophy, with the support of the Prussian government, seemed to preserve its first place among the philosophical systems, but after its leader's death it broke down just because of the ambiguity of its religious world view. On the one hand theologians and theologically interested thinkers made efforts at more clearly elaborating the Christian character of the system, and finding more and more followers they changed its internal structure under the influence, naturally, of modern science (e.g. Rosencranz, Erdmann). On the other hand, the dialectic method itself was rendered absolute by the removal of the transcendent element from the Spirit and by the transformation of the Idea to be completely immanent in a world conceived of as ever more in accordance with the scheme of science, and so the denial of the idea of a personal God and of personal immortality was attained (Feuerbach).

When Marx, noticing the regularities of economic life, showed the history forming significance of economic factors, and so called attention to social contradictions, forged his theory into the weapon of the working class. But the way leading to socialist revolution was still very long. So theoretical materialism which originated from the radical synthesis of enlightenment and Hegelianism and which professed scientific rationalism, got a clear road only theoretically for the time being (Czolbe, Vogt, Moleschott, Büchner).Their vulgar, simplifying method that disregarded dialectics elicited a counter effect in those carrying on German idealism, as well as in those who opposed speculative philosophy for scientific reasons, and a need for the renewal of Kantian critical transcendentalism was felt. It was thought that microscopes and laboratory preparations can not be used as philosophical tools until the epistemological bases are disclosed, for between fact and (natural) law there is a powerful third one: the human brain, which is the carrier of both. This trend got its first impetus from Bruno Fischer's highly influential lecture on Kant (1860) followed by Eduard Zeller's inaugural address in Heidelberg (1862), and O. Liebmann's essay entitled Kant and His Epigones (1865). Later on it was Helmholtz who proved that Kant's Critiques were congenial to strict natural science. But already before him those representatives of idealism that felt the crisis of their spiritual trend and the necessity of its renewal reached back to Kant: he had been the originator of idealistic philosophy, so perhaps a better and more faithful application of his thoughts might help to overcome the philosophical upheaval. Already Fries and Schleiermacher, as regards their proficiency in exact sciences, were close to Kantian epistemology. And in late idealism Immanuel Hermann Fichte started his philosophy again with epistemological self-interpretation. Herbart wanted exact philosophy in opposition to any speculation or romanticism. Beneke, joining up with Kant and starting out from experience fought against speculative philosophy: he founded his theistic philosophy on emotional experience. Schopenhauer's system referred to the critical idealistic core of Kant's philosophy: he used transcendental idealism for depriving the worlds of nature and history of their power by turning them into illusion and dream.

The real world, however, presented itself with its problems and forces ever more urgingly. Positivism was renewed in France (Comte) and England (Mill, Spencer, Buckle) to transgress the borders into Germany and to free psychology, biology, and sociology everywhere from the shackles of spiritual sciences. Haeckel got much applause for declaring before a scientific society that God, if he existed, must be, according to the standpoint of science, a vertebrate animal with a gaseous body.

Neo-Kantianism was also renewed: together with positivism it fought against all dogmatic metaphysics, but in the sense of strict epistemological interpretation it safeguarded the rights for a normative and creative understanding of the Spirit. It remained faithful to Kant not only in the critique of dogmatism, but also in that of empirism. Its new representatives were Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp of Marburg. On their side were Stadler, Buchenau, Kinkel, Cassirer, Vorlander, Görland and others. This further development of neo-Kantianism was first of all fruitful from the aspects of ethics and religion. Owing to its connection to the scientific method, however, it remained blind to any real transcendency, or to the historicity of living faith. Another branch of critical philosophy was leading on from just these points. Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert set the spiritual sciences free from the spell of the method of natural science. On the other hand, by referring to Lotze's phenomenology of value and validity, they developed their philosophical interpretation of standing value which exists in the sphere of a higher spiritual reality above the changing interests of ages. Thus they created value philosophy.

Neo-Kantianism, as briefly outlined above, was a spiritual trend asserting itself not only in philosophy but also in theology. The task we have taken on is to point out the foreign roots and domestic achievements of neo-Kantian and value theology in Hungary which grew out of neo-Kantianism and was inseparable from it. Neo-Kantianism in this wider sense can be ascertained in Hungarian theology throughout three generations: these three periods represent its prehistory, history, and final period.


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