

ESSAYS, ARTICLES AND LECTURES

1957 — 2005

BY

VICTOR SEGESVARY

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PUBLISHER'S PREFACE

Today we publish a collection of essays, articles and lectures of Victor Segesvary from the period 1957 through 2005. They represent an overall view of his wide ranging interests and ideas concerning contemporary subjects, including his writings and discourses from the very first years after he had left his beloved Hungary.

The texts included in this volume are in three languages – English, French and Italian – and to facilitate the reading of the volume, the author divided it in thematic sections, clearly separated from each other. Nevertheless, those parts of the book which concern all collected writings, such as the preface, the table of contents as well as the author's introduction and the notice about him, are reproduced only in English.


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The Hague (Holland), December 1, 2005

MIKES INTERNATIONAL

To Jacques Freymond,
professor and friend



Victor Segesvary

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INTRODUCTION

This volume contains all my writings – studies, articles, academic papers and texts of my lectures – in French, English and Italian from the period 1957 through 2005, that is, since the time I live in the Western world until today. Writings in Hungarian as well as documents concerning my quarter of a century work in development cooperation and assistance will be offered to the public in later volumes.

Many of the earlier pieces present – I believe – a historical interest, especially those which deal with the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the situation of the Reformed Church of Hungary under Communist rule. They are witnesses of a past age, of the state of mind of many Hungarian youth in those days, but, at the same time, they also reflect thoughts and convictions which are still valid – in particular the ones emphasizing the moral grandeur and the world historical importance of the 1956 Revolution.

Other writings stand as proofs of my everlasting interest in discrimination, human rights and the protection of minorities given the fact that Hungarian populations separated from the mother country represent the largest minorities in contemporary Europe. This interest is natural for someone the land of whose ancestors, Transylvania, belongs to another State since the end of World War I, and whose attachment to the lands taken away from his country and to Hungarian minorities living on them, never weakened.

My twenty-five years long career with the United Nations in promoting development of African and Asian countries made me profoundly aware of civilizational differences and of the richness and beauty of other cultures without, of course, relinquishing the strong embeddedness of my existence in the Christian faith and our wonderful European culture. For this reason, the greatest part of the writings included in the present volume, deals with civilizational differences and the globalizing process as an effort by Western man to extend his own culture and way of life to other parts of the globe, the major issue for decades to come in world politics. Here I have to express my thanks to Signor Pierò Bassetti, former governor of the Province of Lombardia and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the 'Alta scuola dell'economia e relazioni internazionali' of the University Sacro Cuore of Milan, for having invited me to lecture in the course of four seminars on the subject: 'The dialogue of civilizations and the United Nations Organization.'

It was my old friend, the former Italian Senator Angelo Bernassola, President of the 'Fondazione Alcide de Gasperi,' who asked me to participate in two meetings organized by the 'Fondazione:' the first, which took place in Lecce, on problems related to the large scale immigration in Europe, and the other on human persons and communities in the swirl of globalization, organized in Rome. I made several contributions to the debate in both cases, and in Rome chaired the final, wrap up meeting at the end of the conference. My friendship with Angelo lasted more than forty years and I learned with great sorrow the he suddenly departed from our world two years ago.

The lecture given on the theme: 'The influence of culture on our theological thinking' represents a special case in the sense that it was given in the chair of Auguste Lemaître, professor of dogmatic and ethics at the Theological Faculty of the University of Geneva, with a view to obtain the degree of Doctor of Divinity. I would like to express here, at the distance of almost half a century, my thankful memories of the late Professor Lemaître.

It was a great event in my life to put my feet on the soil of Africa when I participated, as a free-lance journalist, at the Conference of African Head of State in Addis Ababa in 1963. It was an exceptional experience from every point of view, especially to meet personally the first generation of African leaders, those who led the fight for their countries' independence. My trip, at the same epoch, to the Arab countries of the Middle East – Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria (Iraq, ruled by Colonel Kassem in those days, refused to grant me a visa as I was a Hungarian refugee) where I searched for material and made some interviews for my doctoral thesis in political science – was also such an exceptional experience; I made my first visit to the Muslim world and to the historic lands of the Arab people, verily an enthusiastic opening to a long lasting relationship.

The destiny of some studies in this volume – for example, 'Individualism Re-Visited' or 'Universalism Re.-Appraised' reflect my fundamental character of a man 'in revolt' borrowing the expression of Albert Camus. I was always a rebel, born a rebel and parting from this world as a rebel. could, therefore, never give in to the contemporary 'mainstream' thinking, to follow in the steps of dominating ideologies or play according to the rules of evanescent fashions and fads, -- I wrote what I thought and what I believed to be true. In consequence, some studies or articles, like the ones mentioned above, were never published, although I submitted them to many journals. Sometimes I even got ridiculous or hostile criticisms from editors.

As the writings published here trace back my intellectual journey since I left Hungary, they also show the coherence and consistency of my views. In fact, they pinpoint in some cases a particular sensitiveness in specific problem areas, anticipating developments written about decades later. This happened in respect of inter-civilizational relations because I have foreseen thirty years earlier than Professor Samuel P. Huntington the coming age of inter-civilizational confrontations, of which the Iraq war is the first occurrence.

Finally, I included in the present volume some documents such as my report as the first Secretary General of the International Federation of Students in Political Science or my proposals concerning the program of the Geneva-Africa Institute of which I was as well the first Secretary General. In a last piece I tell about joyous memories of my student life in the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, recalling the personalities of some of my professors whom I particularly respected as Wilhelm Röpke or Paul Guggenheim and, in the first place, Jacques Freymond, Director of the Institute and director of my doctoral dissertation who left us just five years ago.

This remark leads me at the end of this introduction to express my attachment, respect and friendship to Professor Jacques Freymond to whom I dedicate this volume. He was for me much, much more than a professor, -- he was an intellectual guide, a friend to whom I could always go when I was in trouble or when I needed something -- a job or a financing for a trip like the one in the Middle East – and whom I have met with the greatest pleasure whenever I returned from Africa or Asia or when he visited New York. I owe to Jacques Freymond a sincerely felt gratitude for his gracious support and exceptional friendship.

The 1956 Hungarian Revolution

*MENE, MENE, TEKEL, FARES**

A la mémoire de la Révolution hongroise de 1956

Des siècles se sont écoulés déjà lorsque cette vieille histoire de Belschatsar a eu lieu. A un festin prodigieux auquel il avait invité dans son palais les grands de son pays, se produisit l'événement qui nous est raconté dans le livre du prophète Daniel. Au milieu de la gaîté et des plaisirs effrénés « apparurent les doigts d'une main d'homme, et ils écrivirent, en face du chandelier, sur la chaux de la muraille du palais royal. Le roi vit cette extrémité de main qui écrivait. Alors le roi changea de couleur et ses pensées le troublèrent ; les jointures de ses reins se relâchèrent, et ses genoux se heurtèrent l'un contre l'autre ». Il fit venir les astrologues, les Chaldéens et les devins de sa cour, en voulant avoir l'explication de ces mots mystérieux — *Mene, Mene, Tekel, Fares*, — il était prêt à tout sacrifice pour qu'il puisse comprendre le secret de ces signes. Mais personnes n'était capable de lui fournir la solution. Enfin, il appela le prophète Daniel et par la voix de celui-ci Dieu jugea le roi et son pays. « Et voici l'explication de ces mots. Compté : Dieu a compté ton règne, et y a mis fin. Pesé : Tu as été pesé dans la balance, et tu as été trouvé léger. Divisé : Ton royaume sera divisé, et donné aux Mèdes et aux Perses ». « Cette même nuit » — continue la Sainte Écriture — « Belschatsar, roi des Chaldéens, fut tué. Et Darius, le Mède, s'empara du royaume étant âgé de soixante-deux ans ».

Des automnes passent et laissent à peine du temps de se réveiller de l'ambiance et des impressions de cet autre automne miraculeux et tragique et on est déjà arrivé au deuxième anniversaire de la Révolution, de notre Révolution de 1956. Il n'y a pas d'analogie entre l'événement qui nous est transmis par Daniel de la distance des siècles et les jours agités de l'automne pluvieux il y a deux ans. Il n'y a même pas de traits communs qui pourraient nous offrir la possibilité d'une comparaison, — mais quand nous cherchons avec désespoir et avec notre dernière force le sens le plus profond de tout ce qui s'est passé alors, nous le trouvons dans le message prophétique d'une lutte glorieuse et échouée, qui reflète la même vérité que l'ancienne, citée du livre de Daniel. « Mene, Mene, Tekel, Fares » — avec ces paroles Dieu jugea le roi coupable et son royaume corrompu ; ces mêmes mots étaient inscrits dans l'histoire contemporaine de notre civilisation par l'héroïsme et le sang d'un peuple.

Tout le monde accepte aujourd'hui que la Révolution hongroise de 1956 a été une action d'un peuple entier pour les plus hautes valeurs humaines. On reconnaît qu'elle portait en elle les germes d'une vie politique et sociale nouvelle et qu'elle a tracé le chemin qui peut mener l'humanité des deux formes sociales existantes vers une société entièrement nouvelle. Révolution antitotalitaire, révolution nationaliste, révolution expressément socialiste, — on lui donne des épithètes diverses qui expriment, toutes, un aspect de la vérité qu'elle représente.

Naturellement, personne n'ose nier son caractère primordial : qu'elle était la lutte d'un peuple opprimé, d'une nation colonisée par le pire des impérialismes, — mais on ne se rappelle pas volontiers l'autre trait qui la caractérise : qu'elle était aussi la révolte de l'homme contre une civilisation dégénérée. Dans l'atmosphère étouffante d'une idéologie qui est née au sein de la civilisation contemporaine et dans l'étreinte mortelle d'un régime qui sert à la réaliser, l'homme a essayé de retrouver soi-même et la vérité perdue. La devise des jeunes allant périr devant la force cruelle : Nous mourons pour la Hongrie, mais aussi pour l'Europe et pour l'humanité, signifiait beaucoup plus qu'on ne lui prête à l'Occident. Elle a exprimé tout d'abord que cette jeunesse était conscient du danger que représente la puissance immense de l'Union Soviétique pour l'autre partie du monde. Il s'agissait, en premier lieu, de la liberté du peuple lui-même, mais par cela aussi de la vie libre du monde entier. Car personne n'a douté que cette force tendait à subjuguer tous les peuples des cinq continents, même si elle paraissait de relâcher de temps en temps ses efforts tout en s'efforçant vers ses buts par des moyens frauduleux et déguisés.

* Discours prononcé à la commémoration de la Révolution de 1956 à Genève le 23 octobre 1958.

Mais derrière les expériences amères de l'heure actuelle et derrière le sentiment du danger imminent, — il se trouvait dans l'âme de beaucoup de jeunes une conviction plus ou moins consciente, plutôt un pressentiment lointain, que l'existence et la force du régime communiste n'est pas la source extrême de toutes les souffrances et de toutes les injustices qu'ils devaient subir. Au delà de tout cela ils ont aperçu les antagonismes de la vie d'aujourd'hui, de l'évolution moderne. Ils ont senti que cette évolution, qui prétend d'avoir libéré l'homme et d'ouvrir des perspectives jadis invraisemblables, pose de nouvelles entraves à cet être libéré et va de plus en plus le dépouiller de ses valeurs fondamentales. L'homme, l'ensemble de sa personnalité s'est révolté pendant ces jours fiévreux que nous nous rappelons maintenant, il s'est levé contre ce monde qui le dégradait et qui allait le perdre malgré le progrès accompli et les chances qu'il semblait lui offrir. Toutefois, en premier lieu, il se révolta contre la forme la plus dangereuse et la plus ravageuse : contre le régime de la contrainte et du mensonge, contre l'oppression d'une puissance totalitaire.

C'est dans ce double sens que le message de la Révolution hongroise de 1956 se présente au monde contemporain ; il signale la crise de la société et de la personnalité humaine, met en évidence la menace imminente dérivée de cette crise et s'élève, avec conscience et désespoir, contre celle-ci.

Le message avait été fait ; ses derniers mots avaient été noyés dans le sang dans une aube nuageuse de novembre. On ne peut l'entendre désormais que par la voix de plus en plus faible des pays opprimés. Mais, par ce message, dans les cris qui fendent encore quelques fois dans les consciences résignées des peuples occidentaux, la question de la liberté humaine, de l'être et de l'effondrement de la civilisation européenne, est posée. Qui sera plus fort : l'oubli confortable, mais mortel, ou les cris d'alarme se pénétrant par le rideau de fer ?

Au moment de la Révolution des nouvelles sont arrivées en relatant les manifestations, les massacres, l'héroïsme des enfants devant les chars blindés. Pendant ces semaines tourmentées, en quelque sorte l'Occident s'est trouvé en face de ses propres problèmes ; les antagonismes de notre époque se présentaient en leur forme propre ; il était effrayé par les perspectives en même temps qu'il était témoin d'une éclatante manifestation de l'amour et de la liberté.

« Le roi changea de couleur et ses pensées le troublèrent ; les jointures de ses reins se relâchèrent, et ses genoux se heurtèrent l'un contre l'autre ». Les événements ont secoué le monde, qui, lui, n'était que spectateur. Le mouvement de sympathie se développait, et la consternation se traduisait, enfin, dans les actes d'une véritable charité quand des pays plus heureux accueillaient les masses croissantes des réfugiés.

Et depuis lors ? L'enthousiasme, la compassion, l'indignation et l'horreur disparaissaient lentement. La résignation saisit les hommes et les responsables, et le message de l'automne 1956 allait se plonger dans l'oubli. On écrit, on parle encore beaucoup de la Révolution, on s'y réfère peut-être trop, mais le monde ne la comprend plus. Elle est sujet de recherches historiques, on en tire des conclusions théoriques, et, surtout, on s'en sert, s'il le faut, comme d'un des plus puissants arguments politiques. La Révolution hongroise qui à l'origine s'inscrivait dans la réalité est devenue un fait historique, — comme si un peuple et ses autres frères en Europe de l'Est ne souffraient et n'essayaient plus, d'un jour à l'autre, de maintenir leur existence digne.

Au deuxième anniversaire de la Révolution hongroise de 1956 nous rendons hommage aux martyrs de la liberté, aux hommes qui se sont élevés pour pouvoir être ce qu'ils doivent être, et à tous les peuples qui se débattent contre l'oppression d'une puissance étrangère. En même temps, nous nous tournons vers l'Occident, avec angoisse, en nous demandant s'il a compris le message de 1956.

MARS ET OCTOBRE*

Commémoration de la fête nationale hongroise

Le 15 mars, partout dans le monde, les hongrois fêtent l'un des plus grands jours de leur histoire nationale. Dans les prisons et dans les coeurs pleins d'amertume, dans le pays comme dans les petites communautés des réfugiés dispersés sur cinq continents, on se souvient de ce jour printanier où la jeunesse révolutionnaire a proclamé la liberté de l'homme et l'indépendance nationale du pays.

Le 15 mars de 1848 Budapest, la capitale hongroise, était pleine d'hommes venus de la campagne à la grande foire printanière. L'air était chauffé, déjà les jours précédents des rumeurs s'étaient répandues concernant les événements de Vienne, la capitale impériale, et les jeunes, les étudiants s'étaient réunis aux petits cafés en discutant, en écoutant les orateurs, parmi ceux-ci le célèbre poète hongrois, Sándor Petőfi. Le soir du 14 mars est arrivé la nouvelle que la révolution éclata à Vienne. Sous l'influence des événements viennois l'excitation des esprits montait et un enthousiasme s'est emparé de tout le monde. On a décidé d'agir le jour suivant.

Le matin du 15 mars la foule dont les vagues inondait les places et les rues se dirigeaient vers le Musée National pour assister à une réunion organisée par les jeunes intellectuels. Là, devant le front monumental du Musée, des milliers et des milliers attendaient en silence que l'un de ces jeunes révolutionnaires donne lecture des revendications nationales rédigées en douze points. Ces points exprimaient, en premier lieu, l'exigence de la liberté de pensée et de religion, la liberté de la parole, de la presse et du rassemblement, l'égalité de tous les citoyens devant la loi et la formation d'un gouvernement responsable et national, — donc les idées de la grande révolution française et les objectifs d'un mouvement lequel visait à la libération de la patrie d'une dynastie étrangère et despotique. Mais l'enthousiasme n'avait atteint son apogée qu'au moment lors le jeune poète d'un regard fiévreux, Petőfi, déclama son poème « Le chant national ». Il a touché les hommes au fonds de leur âme, en confessant toutes les péchés commises et toutes les souffrances éprouvées dans l'histoire de la nation, et en priant Dieu d'accepter comme punition pour les péchés du passé le sort tragique du peuple hongrois pendant les siècles de son histoire. La foule dans les rues, dans les jardins, sur les balcons et aux fenêtres des grandes maisons répétait, avec lui, les mots du refrain, et jurait, au nom de Dieu, qu'elle se libérera de l'esclavage pour toujours. A la fin de cette réunion, tous les participants marchaient vers une imprimerie pour imprimer tout de suite les douze points ainsi que « Le chant national », comme les premiers nés de la liberté de la presse. Ensuite, on avait délivré les prisonniers politiques, parmi lesquels se trouvait un écrivain, Mihály Táncsics.

C'est l'histoire brève du 15 mars 1848. Après le déclenchement de la Révolution, au cours du même mois, un gouvernement responsable de la nation s'est formé, mais l'empereur Franz Joseph et la camarilla de Vienne, ne l'ont pas accepté. La cour a dirigé ses troupes contre la Hongrie en révolte ; en réponse, Lajos Kossuth, président du Conseil des ministres, appela en armes tout le pays. Ainsi, la révolution s'est transformée en guerre d'indépendance. Le 15 mars est devenu le symbole de la liberté hongroise en réalisant l'unité nationale afin de se débarrasser du joug étranger et de former un nouvel Etat indépendant.

* Discours prononcé à la fête genevoise du 15 mars 1957.

Pour notre génération le 15 mars, le symbole de notre liberté, est étroitement lié au 23 octobre, et nous ne pouvons pas fêter l'un sans mentionner l'autre. Cent ans plus tard, nous nous sommes livrés avec la même exaspération et le même espoir dans la lutte comme nos aïeux, sous notre tricolore national nous avons chanté les chants de la guerre de 1848, et devant le Parlement, ohm les torches ont jeté leur clarté sur des visages heureux, intrépides, c'étaient les hongrois de 1956 qui ont prêté serment avec les paroles de Petőfi sur la liberté de l'homme et de la patrie.

En plus de cette harmonie entre les jeunes générations porteuses des deux grandes Révolutions hongroises — une harmonie bien naturelle puisque les descendants puisent à toute époque dans l'héritage des ancêtres — il y a une frappante similitude entre les événements des deux tentatives, surtout en ce qui concerne la fin tragique. A cause de la situation internationale désavantageuse, l'écroulement était inévitable dans les deux cas, et c'était la même force qui a emporté la victoire contre nos troupes en 1848 et en 1956 ; alors l'armée du Tsar de toute la Russie, le principal soutien de la Sainte-Alliance, maintenant les troupes blindées d'une puissance totalitaire, la Russie Soviétique.

En dépit de ces analogies, il y a aussi une grande différence entre le mars et l'octobre hongrois, une différence qui est d'une grande importance. Tandis que en 1848 la Hongrie était dans un état arriéré du point de vue économique, social et politique, et elle a rattrapé, justement par la Révolution, les pays développés de l'Europe, — en 1956, la Révolution hongroise d'octobre est parmi les premières grandes tentatives qui cherchent la solution à nos problèmes contemporains, et elle a grandement contribué à l'évolution future de notre civilisation. En 1848, l'Europe avait enseigné au peuple hongrois comment réaliser le progrès économique, social et politique, en 1956 ce peuple a montré à l'Europe quelle est l'importance des valeurs humaines et comment faut-il lutter et mourir pour celles-ci.

En nous souvenant de la « jeunesse fiévreuse » du 15 mars 1848, nous nous tournons vers les jeunes — morts et vivants — des jours d'octobre 1956, tout en commémorant le glorieux héritage du siècle précédent, nous nous attachons à notre seul devoir : monter la garde jusqu'au bout pour défendre la foi, la liberté et la justice sociale, les valeurs fondamentales de la vie humaine. N'importe quelle sera l'issue, car elle nous échappe, nous devons respecter ce devoir qui nous est imposé par notre peuple et notre conscience.

L'OPINION PUBLIQUE ET LE GOUVERNEMENT EN HONGRIE*

Monsieur le Professeur, Mesdames, Messieurs,

J'ai l'honneur de vous présenter ici un aspect de la situation actuelle en Hongrie en analysant les relations existant entre l'opinion publique et le gouvernement. Dernièrement, nous avons entendu l'excellent compte rendu de Monsieur. Joël Taylor qui nous a parlé du livre de M. Inkeles dont le thème était « L'opinion publique en Union soviétique ». En dépit des grandes différences qui rendent impossible une comparaison de la situation entre l'URSS et la Hongrie et d'arriver à des conclusions semblables en fin d'analyse — il est, en effet, essentiel d'établir une distinction entre l'Union soviétique et les pays satellites, — il me faut admettre que les constatations de M. Inkeles sont, dans une grande mesure, valables pour mon pays également. Il va sans dire que le régime communiste étant une dictature, une tyrannie, il découle partout les mêmes conséquences de son caractère totalitaire, de son fondement homogène.

Néanmoins, j'ai eu le très fort sentiment que les détails indiqués par M. Inkeles ne correspondent pas à la réalité. J'ai éprouvé ce sentiment parce que s'il s'est rendu compte, d'une part, de la dualité entre l'opinion publique et l'immense effort officiel dans le but d'influencer cette opinion; d'autre part, il accorde, tout de même, une certaine confiance aux chiffres fournis par les statistiques officielles, et n'a pas déceler, derrière elles, la vie, les faits tangibles dont tout le monde peut se convaincre qui y a séjourné.

Pour cette raison, avant d'aborder mon sujet, je dois attirer votre attention sur les difficultés que doit inévitablement rencontrer quiconque n'ayant pas vécu dans l'orbite soviétique, mais qui entend pénétrer les secrets d'une région se situant, malheureusement, au-delà du rideau de fer.

Tout en respectant, les grands efforts déjà accomplis et qui le seront encore dans l'avenir pour parvenir à une connaissance certaine de cette partie du monde, si différent, si étranger, parce qu'en contradiction complète avec celui dans lequel nous vivons ici en Europe occidentale, il faut, toutefois, constater qu'il existe un danger inéluctable lequel menace la véracité des résultats de toutes les recherches. Ce danger consiste dans la nature de la méthode scientifique appliquée et dans la sociologie, et dans l'histoire politique. Ces méthodes — et je me réfère à celles qui sont les plus modernes — ont pour point de départ un milieu déterminé, un contexte qui est totalement différent des circonstances de la vie qu'on étudie. Donc, si on voulait analyser avec les mêmes méthodes des phénomènes produits dans des conditions totalement différentes, on devrait connaître à l'avance le milieu, le monde dans lequel les hommes vivent, c'est-à-dire il faudrait créer *a priori* un cadre social et politique jusqu'ici inconnu par les chercheurs.

Ainsi, par la logique des choses on se détachera de la réalité, et l'aspect obtenu ne refléterait pas les faits comme ils sont.

* Exposé fait à l'Institut de Hautes Internationales de Genève en 1957.

Donc, — et c'est la conclusion de ces considérations préliminaires — il est important de se montrer très circonspect dans l'emploi des méthodes de recherches qui ont déjà apporté et apporteront certainement encore de grands succès, ceci, dans des domaines où, en raison des conditions qui y prévalent, elles produiront des résultats qui ne pourraient être pas valables. En voici un exemple : des chiffres statistiques servant de base à une analyse et desquelles sont tirées quelques conséquences, si ces chiffres devaient être fausses, en raison de manipulations par le gouvernement, serait-il possible d'en déduire des résultats correspondant à la réalité ?

Après ces propos préliminaires, je tourne maintenant au problème que je dois traiter, en précisant tout d'abord que mes réflexions portent sur la Hongrie seulement et que je n'ai nullement l'intention d'en tirer des conclusions générales concernant les autres pays du camp socialiste. Les constatations que je ferai sont strictement étayées sur des faits de la vie actuelle en Hongrie, ne connaissant pas du tout les conditions régnant dans les autres pays de l'Europe centrale.

Si nous cherchons une réponse à la question : « Quelle est la relation entre l'opinion publique et la politique poursuivie par le gouvernement hongrois » ?, il nous faut transformer immédiatement cette question de la façon suivante : Y a-t-il, au fond, une relation entre les deux ? Existe-t-il une compréhension par les dirigeants de l'Etat, c'est-à-dire par les dirigeants du Parti des Travailleurs — le Parti Communiste, — de la volonté, du désir du peuple, sont-ils des dirigeants qui respecteraient ce que leur auraient appris l'opinion publique ? La réponse est incontestablement : Non.

Selon Lénine, la dictature du prolétariat signifie la dictature de la majorité sur la minorité — mais, en Hongrie, c'est juste l'inverse : la dictature d'une infime minorité qui s'appuie sur la force des armées étrangères opprimant la grande majorité du peuple. Il existe donc, sur la surface une opinion publique, que l'on peut qualifier « officielle », qui prétend représenter la volonté du peuple et prend la parole au nom de ce dernier. Mais, il y a aussi se forme, se manifeste une opinion publique, l'opinion d'un peuple condamné à la silence qui observe, avec mépris, les petits jeux inélégants des leaders dans la politique intérieure et les grosses manœuvres de la politique internationale à laquelle se vouent tous ses dirigeants sous l'égide des chefs soviétiques. Ainsi, contrairement à des démocraties de type occidental, où l'opinion publique possède les moyens — par exemple, à travers les organes de la communication des masses — d'exprimer sa volonté, ses vœux, sa confiance ou sa réprobation, réalisant, peut-on, peut-être, dire, dans l'interaction avec son gouvernement le principe de la souveraineté du peuple, en Hongrie cette même souveraineté est méprisée, et ne peut pas parler d'une telle interaction, car une couche mince de la société dirige seule la vie et la politique du pays. Sous contrôle total des forces de la police, la majorité est tenue de donner son accord à des décisions sans qu'il soit tenu compte de ses vœux, de sa volonté. Gouvernement et peuple, politique et opinion publique sont totalement séparés, déconnectés : les uns détiennent tous les pouvoirs, tandis que les autres, opprimés, étouffés, cherchent vainement le chemin par lequel ils pourraient se libérer et ne parvient pas à faire entendre leur voix.

Cet aspect de la situation détermine — à mon avis — tout ce que nous allons dire ultérieurement parce qu'il modifie notre démarche. D'une part, il faut analyser la structure et la fonction de la propagande communiste, de cette technique du parti et du gouvernement au moyen de laquelle ils veulent influencer l'opinion du peuple, d'autre part, nous devons suivre les tentatives d'expressions de l'opinion publique à cette époque stalinienne, cette période la plus sombre de notre histoire, et essayer de voir quels échappatoires l'opinion publique a réussi de trouver au cours de ce qu'on appelle communément la période de déstalinisation qui, finalement, avait amené le pays aux jours d'octobre 1956 et à l'explosion d'une tension si longtemps comprimée.

Afin de vous montrer comme se présente le centralisme démocratique — principe léniniste de l'organisation du parti et de l'Etat — je m'efforcerai de vous exposer pratiquement, en quelques mots, les traits essentiels de ce centralisme qui lance tous les mots d'ordre et actionne la machine de propagande du régime. Le centre du parti est composé de certaines de sections comme l'agriculture, l'éducation, etc., et, finalement, la fameuse « agit-prop », l'agitation et propagande. Ces sections correspondent exactement aux sections similaires existant au sein du Kremlin et sont constamment en communication avec ces dernières. Elles reçoivent leurs instructions directement du Comité Central du Parti Communiste de l'Union Soviétique et sont chargées de leur adaptation au contexte local et à leur mise en œuvre en Hongrie. Des départements ministériels sont créés et correspondent au nombre et dans leurs caractères respectifs aux sections de la centrale du Parti et constituent leurs organes exécutifs.

Mais, à côté de sa centrale et de l'organisation gouvernementale, le parti a aussi établi des sortes de « filiales », dans tous les départements des différentes régions de la Hongrie, subdivisées en sections semblables existant à la centrale de Budapest. Ces sections sont indépendantes, et dans un certain sens superposé aux organismes régionaux de l'Etat.

Bien entendu, ces réseaux avec leurs divisions correspondant à celles de la centrale du Parti à Budapest, se retrouve jusqu'au dernier échelon de l'administration publique ainsi que dans tous les secteurs de la société, sous forme de cellules du Parti. Le secrétaire du parti, représentant ce dernier a, partout et toujours, le mot final.

Ainsi, par cette pénétration de toute la population sur le territoire national, le parti tient entièrement sous contrôle la vie nationale jusqu'aux plus petits recoins de la société, et c'est ça qui apparaît à nos yeux comme le véritable essence du pouvoir totalitaire.

Cette organisation parfaite est donc capable à même d'assumer la réalisation de toutes les directives émanant de Moscou et de mettre en marche les forces du pays au service des buts poursuivis, fussent-ils contre l'intérêt et la volonté du peuple.

Nous devons, maintenant, nous arrêter quelque peu pour faire allusion à un fait qui me paraît remarquable et décisif. C'est, le rôle prépondérant de Moscou dans la vie hongroise, car les Soviétiques non seulement dominant l'économie et la politique, mais tend à graduellement détruire la culture nationale, à effacer de l'âme des hommes le sentiment patriotique et à contrôler tous les sentiments et toutes les pensées les plus intimes de l'individu.

Que signifie cela ? Qu'en Hongrie, le peuple n'est pas seulement en face d'un groupe d'hommes obéissant à quelques idées, des tyrans qui, ayant accaparé le pouvoir le veulent, à tout prix, le garder, mais c'est une confrontation entre une petite nation qui a sa propre identité et une grande puissance colonisatrice. Là réside l'énorme abîme qui rend impossible de discuter simultanément du problème du régime communiste en Union Soviétique et en Hongrie. Pour les Russes — et spécialement pour les jeunes générations — la gloire et la puissance de l'Union Soviétique signifient, malgré toutes les souffrances et les traitements inhumains subis d'une dictature, la gloire et la puissance de la Russie. L'Union Soviétique, en réalisant les anciens rêves de l'empire russe, est l'héritière de la Russie tsariste. Aux yeux des Hongrois, au contraire, l'Union soviétique n'est qu'une puissance étrangère qui entend juguler leur nation en usant de toutes ses forces et de tous les moyens les plus barbares, visant à réduire leur pays au rang d'une colonie. Pour y parvenir, elle a formé une horde de serviteurs dociles recevant pour prix de leur obéissance et de leur dévouement tous les avantages qu'offre le pouvoir.

La révolution hongroise de l'an dernier fournit la preuve éclatante de cette vérité : parmi les revendications la plus fréquente, celle qui unifiait toutes les tendances, était : « Russes, rentrez chez vous » ! Ainsi, tout ce qui s'est passé l'année dernière à Budapest, dans les villes et les petits villages des diverses régions du pays, était pour nous plus qu'une révolte, plus qu'une révolution contre une idéologie destructrice, c'était une lutte pour la liberté et l'indépendance nationale de la Hongrie. Le pouvoir central dont tout à l'heure nous avons examiné la structure et les caractéristiques les plus importantes, possède, à un degré inimaginable dans les démocraties occidentales, tous les moyens de propagande destinés à former l'opinion publique. Toutes les possibilités de diffusion, tous les moyens d'action sur les masses sont le monopole de ce pouvoir, c'est-à-dire qu'il n'y aucun émetteur de radio, aucun journal privé, aucune imprimerie ou maison d'édition qui ne soit la propriété de l'Etat, du parti ou d'une organisation contrôlée par le parti. A la radio, le contrôle est si strict que nul, excepté les leaders, n'a accès aux micros, pour s'exprimer en une émission directe. Chaque discours, représentation ou nouvelle doit être préalablement enregistré sur un magnétophone, ce qui permet d'éliminer toute possibilité d'utiliser l'air dans le but de fomenter une action contraire à la politique du parti.

La presse est absolument « synchronisée » — sur le mot allemand employé chez nous « gleichgeschaltet ». Ce qui veut dire qu'en un jour donné, les colonnes des divers journaux se trouvent les mêmes nouvelles, reproduisant les mêmes thèmes, avec des considérations offrant peu de variations entre elles. Aux journalistes qui, parfois, tenteraient de se montrer quelque peu ingénieux, il ne reste que de suivre les directives émises par la centrale du parti. Les journaux sont, tous, publiés par les diverses presses officielles, celles du Comité Central de l'organisation du parti à Budapest, du comité central des syndicats, du Conseil du mouvement de la paix, etc. Naturellement, les masses préfèrent le journal central du parti, elles y trouvent de première main l'opinion officielle, bien que certaines nouvelles aient parfois été publiées par d'autres journaux avant que celui-ci n'en fasse mention. La possibilité de la publication d'un livre dépend de son acceptation par une maison d'édition officielle ; les manuscrits doivent être soumis à l'approbation de deux contrôleurs désignés par la direction de la maison editrice et à celle du rédacteur qui est responsable, de tous les points de vue, pour les vues qui sont exprimées dans le livre.

Considérons maintenant le fonctionnement des organes de la propagande dont nous avons déjà entendu parler lors du compte-rendu de M. Taylor. Les réunions hebdomadaires dans les usines ou les bureaux où se discutent les éditoriaux du journal central du Parti, les brochures distribués comme moyens de répandre la « bonne parole », les séminaires organisés dans ces mêmes usines, bureaux, ou dans les unités de l'armée, jouent le rôle le plus important dans la formation idéologique.

Nous n'avons pas l'intention de nous occuper ici des détails du fonctionnement de cet immense mécanisme. Je dois cependant encore faire remarquer que toutes les grandes organisations de masses, — les syndicats, le Front Patriotique du Peuple, l'organisation de la jeunesse travailleuse, la Fédération démocratique des femmes hongroises, furent créées dans l'unique but, en conformité avec la technique mentionnée précédemment et selon le mot d'ordre reçu, d'assurer des liens étroits entre le Parti et le « peuple travailleur ». Leur importance s'est accrue au fur et à mesure que devenait évidente la profondeur de l'abîme séparant le parti du peuple.

A propos de la propagande, il conviendrait particulièrement parler des mots d'ordre. En fait, il vaudrait la peine d'essayer de trouver les motifs de cette abondance des mots d'ordre à laquelle nous assistons en Hongrie. Certainement, les trouverions-nous dans la psychologie sociale de l'époque et dans la crise de notre civilisation qui domine cette phase historique. Les mots d'ordre furent, en tous temps, les compagnons de la vie publique, mais jamais l'histoire ne connut le flux effroyable des slogans comme au XX^e siècle. Ce phénomène

est surtout devenu le propre du régime communiste et sa pratique est caractéristique de tous les pays socialistes.

Le système soviétique, ou appelé également socialiste, est une dictature sous la forme de démocratie. Lénine avait l'intention de réaliser sa théorie de l'élite en formant le parti, dépositaire de la doctrine sacro-sainte, c'est-à-dire qu'il voulait organiser un parti d'hommes libérés des préjugés qu'ils ont hérités de l'évolution historique, des lois apprises du fonctionnement de l'économie, etc., mais il lui sembla également nécessaire de convaincre les gens de la vérité de sa conception, de la justesse de son idéologie, et cela par l'éducation, par la technique de la propagande. Pour parvenir à son but, il a justement apprécié le rôle du film, des journaux, de la littérature dans l'endoctrinement du peuple, une sorte de démocratisation de la pensée de l'élite. Cette tendance fut complètement renversée par Staline qui a marqué — et comment ! — l'évolution du système et de l'idéologie depuis la mort de Lénine. Il a retenu, lui, ce mécanisme précieux parce qu'il le pouvait utiliser en vue de la poursuite de ses propres buts, mais en le dépouillant de l'idéalisme et d'une certaine honnêteté propres à son prédécesseur. A tout prendre, la tâche de l'agitation et de la propagande consiste, depuis Staline, à faire comprendre aux hommes une théorie qui ne considère nullement la nature de l'être humain, qui représente un point de vue largement dépassé et avec laquelle la réalité, la pratique suivie est diamétralement en opposition.

Ceci s'est avéré d'être une tâche impossible. Une telle propagande doit échouer partout, malgré la force brutale sur laquelle elle s'appuie. Le parti et ses dirigeants afin de faciliter l'agitation et la propagande, ont créé, et créent continuellement encore, des mots d'ordre. Ces derniers sont destinés, d'une part, de résumer, de manière frappante et aisément compréhensible, les thèses qui, au moment même, ne sont pas connus, mais qui résument les devoirs futurs de la population ; d'autre part, ils facilitent le travail des agents et des propagandistes qui, dans la plupart des cas, ne possèdent pas une culture suffisante pour comprendre le marxisme-léninisme et pour l'expliquer avec l'habileté nécessaire à la population.

L'opinion publique réagit naturellement de façon très vive à ces mots d'ordre, car ceux-ci la provoquent et, au fur et à mesure qu'elle réalise que toutes les promesses et toutes les vérités ne sont que des mensonges, elle apprend à détester d'emblée les mots d'ordre. Et pourtant, malgré l'aversion qu'on ressent à l'égard de ces « agents » de la propagande communiste, il est avantageux pour les hommes de les connaître parce qu'ils indiquent une certaine orientation en ce qui concerne la politique actuelle du gouvernement et les événements survenant derrière les coulisses.

D'après mon expérience, on peut classer les mots d'ordre en trois groupes. Les premiers sont ceux qui ont cours dans toutes les périodes, car ils expriment des thèses générales du marxisme-léninisme ou des revendications ne perdant pas leur caractère d'actualité ; par exemple: « C'est ton pays, tu le bâtis pour toi-même »!, ou « Produis davantage, à ton profit »! Ceux-là sont sensés de stimuler au travail dans tous les domaines de la vie. Ils prétendent remplacer le véritable moteur du travail qui n'existe pas dans les pays socialistes, celui de l'intérêt personnel. Le mot d'ordre lancé par Staline se rattache également à ce groupe : « Le travail, c'est chez nous, l'objet de l'honnêteté et de la gloire ». Une autre catégorie est liée à la politique étrangère du pays : « Nous ne sommes pas une brèche sur le front de la paix, mais un bastion fort »!. Ceci tend à souligner la nécessité des efforts en vue de l'unification du bloc soviétique et son renforcement. (Il faut dire entre parenthèses qu'après octobre 1956, le régime Kádár ne fit pas usage de ce mot d'ordre !). A propos de l'agriculture le principal mot d'ordre est : « La terre est à celui qui la cultive ». J'en pourrais encore en citer pendant des heures.

Le deuxième groupe est constitué par les mots d'ordre qui révèlent la tendance dominante au sein du parti, donc ayant trait à l'avenir, et pour cela ils sont très importants. En voici un exemple : depuis l'été 1954, pendant

le dernier gouvernement prérévolutionnaire d'Imre Nagy, Rákosi, le secrétaire général du Parti, staliniste convaincu, avait, avec une intensité toujours croissante, attaqué le premier ministre derrière les coulisses, bien entendu. Le peuple en ignorait tout et ne connût l'influence croissante du tyran haï qu'à la réapparition de mots d'ordre tels : « L'industrie lourde, c'est la base de la révolution socialiste », ou « La collective, c'est le camion à suivre ». Le développement de l'industrie lourde et le renforcement de la gestion collective dans le domaine de l'agriculture ayant été les principes fondamentaux de l'orthodoxie staliniste, ces mots d'ordre avaient donc indiqué le signe d'un retour aux anciens temps, d'une nouvelle poussée vers la gauche. Sur le plan moral, la libertinage durant la dictature de Rákosi se manifesta dans cette phrase : « Mettre au monde un enfant, c'est la gloire pour une jeune fille, le devoir pour une femme ». Après maintes constatations d'effets néfastes de cet encouragement au libertinage, on a commencé à rétablir d'anciennes conceptions morales en les intitulant « morale socialiste ».

A la troisième catégorie des mots d'ordre appartiennent ceux qui soulignent la grande importance de quelques devoirs actuels. Ils s'avèrent précieux en ce qu'ils renseignèrent l'opinion publique sur les déboires et les préoccupations du gouvernement. Je vous en citerai deux : « Tournez-vous vers le chemin de fer ». Celui-ci n'a pas donné lieu à des explications politiques car, après 1945 la reconstruction du pays, et celle des voies ferrées notamment, était parmi les tâches les plus urgentes et les plus importantes. Quand, au contraire, on a entendu proférer : « Avec l'unité du parti pour la démocratie socialiste », chacun comprit qu'au sein de l'avant-garde de la classe ouvrière des scissions s'étaient produites et que peut-être déjà sévissait la lutte entre adversaires.

Concernant les mots d'ordre, il me faut mentionner aussi les « épithètes permanentes » qui avaient également pour but la formation de l'opinion. Pour mémoire, je vous rappelle seulement que selon ces constantes du langage officiel, tout ce qui est américain est entaché d'impérialisme ; sur le plan culturel, cela devient cosmopolitisme ; toute référence aux choses ecclésiastiques courent le risque d'être qualifiées de cléricalisme, etc.

Au cours de « l'année de la tournure » (ainsi qu'on a coutume de nommer l'an 1948, selon le titre d'un livre de Mátyás Rákosi), le parti communiste a réussi à s'emparer totalement du pouvoir. On a étatisé les usines et autres établissements productifs, les banques et les institutions financières, on a transformé le système de l'éducation en mettant fin à l'activité pédagogique des Eglises. On a commencé l'attaque dans tous les domaines de la vie culturelle contre ces dernières et mené une politique de restriction progressive de leurs activités. Ce sont là seulement les faits les plus saillants du début de régime, qui fut suivi d'une période de terreur indescriptible, au cours de laquelle furent effectuées des arrestations innombrables et des déportations, par milliers, des gens de Budapest et d'autres grandes villes vers les recoins perdus de la campagne hongroise. Ce fut aussi une période marquée par des erreurs fatales pour l'économie nationale, une période d'activité combien efficace du point de vue de l'exploitation colonisatrice de la Hongrie, au profit de l'Union soviétique. A cette époque, alors que se poursuivait la destruction des forces saines de la société, l'opinion publique ne parvenait pas à trouver des moyens, admis par le pouvoir, pour s'exprimer, cependant que, de jour en jour, elle était saturée par la radio, les journaux et les brochures, des mensonges de la propagande, la fausseté des contrevérités et des mots d'ordre, propagés les agents sans aucune culture du parti. Il faut, toutefois, reconnaître qu'en ce temps-là avait encore existé une minorité, certes très infime, qui se montrait favorable au parti et au régime communiste. Cette minorité était composée d'anciens membres du parti illégal (des ouvriers principalement) et d'intellectuels, communistes convaincus, qui s'étaient laissés convertir entre 1953 et 1956, par conséquent, des idéalistes en quelque sorte. On devait aussi compter sur un grand nombre d'opportunistes qui n'étaient pas de réels partisans du régime, mais entendaient jouir des avantages matériels que celui-ci pouvait leur procurer.

Ainsi que je l'ai déjà mentionné, l'opinion publique, représentant la volonté et les vœux de la grande majorité du peuple, était étouffée, voire supprimée. L'effet de cette répression barbare était que l'homme de la rue — l'artisan, l'employé, le commerçant ou le paysan — a cherché des possibilités, jadis tout à fait inconnues, d'exprimer leur opinion. Dans la plupart des cas, ils agirent sans réfléchir, sans but déterminé, seulement suivant des réactions psychologiques. En voici quelques exemples : ainsi que dans tous les domaines culturels, le gouvernement a orienté les préférences de la population vers les œuvres artistiques russes. Dans ce but, on a établi le pourcentage des films soviétiques parmi le total des importations cinématographiques. Le chiffre atteignit 60 % environ. Les films américains étaient interdits alors que ceux de l'Europe occidentale n'étaient admis que dans un nombre très restreint. Bien entendu, les salles dans lesquelles on projetait des films russes étaient la plupart de temps vides, alors que celles où on pouvait voir des œuvres françaises, italiennes, suédoises, avaient devant leurs guichets de location des files interminables. Des centaines de personnes attendaient patiemment, pendant de longues heures, de pouvoir parvenir à prendre des places. L'opinion publique répondait ainsi à la politique officielle. Les faits se reproduisaient d'une façon similaires lors des représentations au théâtre, à l'opéra, aux concerts étaient annoncés et que les affiches mentionnaient des artistes étrangers.

Les artistes russes, à l'exception des ballets et de quelques musiciens vraiment doués, se produisaient devant un public officiel, c'est-à-dire convié officiellement (donc présence obligatoire), tandis que pour les manifestations auxquelles participaient des artistes occidentaux, il fallait retenir des places plusieurs semaines à l'avance.

Dans les bibliothèques, les sommes destinées à l'acquisition de nouveaux ouvrages servaient à l'achat de publications soviétiques, mais les lecteurs qui n'y étaient pas contraints ne perdaient pas leur temps à lire ces auteurs idéologiquement importants, à l'exception des classiques.

Moi-même, ayant été, pendant trois ans, bibliothécaire à Budapest, je puis affirmer que je n'ai pas eu plus de cinq fois l'occasion d'inscrire comme prêt à des lecteurs de la littérature soviétique.

Par tous ces faits, l'opinion publique s'est sans doute manifestée. On pourrait également citer des bons mots, les moqueries, comme preuve de l'opinion des masses. Ceux-ci se sont répandus dans l'ensemble du pays, émanant de toutes les couches de la population. En maintes circonstances, ils ont valu à des victimes de dénonciation, des condamnations à des peines de deux ou trois ans de prison, sanctions facilement adjugées par les tribunaux. On pourrait également évoquer un autre aspect du problème, en citant la vie des Églises, infiniment plus remplies qu'avant la guerre ; les ouailles manifestaient de cette façon leur opinion en prenant position contre la politique outrancière du gouvernement.

En abordant la période des années 1953-1954, qu'on appelle généralement le « cours nouveau » sous le régime de Imre Nagy, je me bornerai à vous en signaler brièvement que les caractéristiques. Cette phase a été un temps de préparation des réformes à l'époque qui suivit le XX^e congrès du Parti Communiste Soviétique, mais également le prélude à la révolution, à la lutte nationale.

Les années où, pour la première fois, Nagy a dirigé les affaires de Hongrie, ont signifié un grand soulagement pour l'ensemble du pays, mais principalement pour la paysannerie. L'effervescence débuta déjà parmi les intellectuels ; le processus ne pouvait, toutefois, pas se développer, comme le cours nouveau lui-même, car l'activité hostile des staliniens l'avait étouffé dès son début. Ces temps sont pourtant d'une grande portée, car dès lors l'intelligentsia communiste ou opportuniste est définitivement devenue désabusée, elle qui joua un grand rôle dans les jours du printemps et de l'été 1956.

Pour vous en donner une impression je vous citerai quelques lignes de Tibor Tardos, condamné, la semaine passée, à un an et demi de prison. Il y décrit son état d'âme pendant la période qui précéda celle où il devait reconnaître la réalité :

« Avec discipline, et fièrement, je me suis arraché de l'habitude de lire un vrai journal, d'écouter une vrai radio qui auraient nourri ma pensée avec des informations véridiques. Et je me suis également déshabitué d'avoir des connaissances multiples ... Et j'ai commencé à oublier qu'il existe de par le monde des films où se meuvent des hommes qui vivent, où les rues sont des vraies rues, où le bon n'est pas toujours récompensé, où le méchant n'est pas toujours puni. — Et j'ai désappris la vraie conversation. Je suis allé dans les usines, et dans les cours des écoles de villages — et si j'ai entendu de quelques-uns des plaintes, j'ai expliqué que c'étaient des exceptions et des exagérations, et parfois, j'ai pensé même : 'C'est la voix de l'ennemi'. Et le temps est venu où, tout d'un coup, nous avons expulsé de notre âme le respect morne de la vie humaine, et où nous l'avons sacrifié à la croyance. Et nous, qui avons parié jadis du pouvoir vertigineux de la pensée, nous nous sommes retrouvés avec un cœur pur comme le cristal, mais la tête vidée, comme les amphores desséchées dans les vitrines des musées. Et les amphores hochaient la tête à tout ». (Le peuple hongrois contre le communisme. *L'Est et l'Ouest*. Octobre 1957, p. 75.)

En mars 1955, Rákosi avait repris le pouvoir et cela ramena des couches d'air suffoquant. Il ne put, toutefois, pas arrêter le courant qui a survécu et mûri clandestinement. Avant le XX^e congrès déjà, tenu en automne 1955, les écrivains hongrois ont remis un mémoire au Comité Central du Parti. Ils y exprimaient les idées de l'opinion publique, et demandaient plus de liberté dans le domaine de la culture, dans celui des créations artistiques ainsi que l'abolition des mesures administratives. En réponse, ils reçurent du Parti une décision condamnant l'activité hostile de quelques écrivains, les excluant immédiatement, et appelaient l'attention du peuple sur les symptômes nuisibles dans la littérature.

Après le XX^e congrès du Parti Communiste russe, le commencement de la déstalinisation — on peut dire aussi de la libération — l'opinion publique s'exprima de plus en plus par l'entremise des écrivains communistes désillusionnés. Ici nous voyons la différence énorme que distingue l'effervescence de ces mois de l'époque du cours nouveau des années 1953-1954. Alors l'opinion publique n'a pas trouvé par quels moyens à s'exprimer, c'était tout juste que les yeux des écrivains et des intellectuels communistes s'étaient ouverts, tandis qu'au printemps de 1956 une équipe, avec la force et l'élan des enthousiastes convertis, était prêt à faire entendre la voix supprimée du peuple. A ce phénomène, j'ajoute encore une explication, comme une réponse à une question non posée, pourquoi parle-t-on toujours des écrivains, des intellectuels communistes en traitant cette époque de la réforme, sans mentionner les autres, les non communistes ? N'existaient-ils pas ? Mais oui ! Il y en avait beaucoup plus que les communistes, toutefois — en dépit de la libération — le printemps n'est pas encore arrivé. Les écrivains et les intellectuels qui étaient membres du Parti, bien qu'hérétiques, avaient reçu les plus hautes distinctions nationales, justement pour cela ils avaient le droit de parler franchement, de critiquer les fautes du passé et du présent, tandis que les intellectuels non communistes, soi-disant bourgeois, n'ont pris la parole seulement pendant les jours de la Révolution. Je vous cite un exemple. István Bibó, ancien professeur de l'université, puis bibliothécaire de la Bibliothèque universitaire de Budapest, le plus connu et le plus riche penseur politique de la Hongrie du XX^e siècle, ministre d'Etat au gouvernement révolutionnaire d'Imre Nagy, n'a pas eu l'occasion de s'engager dans la vie politique du pays qu'au moment de l'explosion, vers la première moitié d'octobre. Maintenant, ces jours-ci, il se tient devant les juges du gouvernement Kádár, et la Hongrie risque de perdre l'un des hommes portant le plus grand espoir pour l'avenir.

Afin que vous puissiez percevoir ce processus, auquel l'opinion publique s'est manifestée de plus en plus au cours des mois de mars en octobre 1956, j'appellerai votre attention sur quelques manifestations retentissantes au Cercle Petőfi, le foyer de la Révolution.

Les dirigeants du parti dont Mátyás Rákosi, avaient envisagé de transformer ce cercle comme une soupape des tensions de l'opinion publique étouffée. Ils ont élargi ce cercle de la jeunesse, à chaque séance un groupe déterminé d'intellectuels avait été invité, mais avant toute discussion un envoyé du Parti y exposa l'évaluation, par ce dernier, du thème à débattre, et — on était sûr — que le débat suivra les directives déjà données. Mais les événements ne se sont pas déroulés selon ces espoirs. Déjà le 1er juin, à la réunion des historiens, Madame Elisabeth Andics, professeur de l'université et stalinienne convaincue, chef omnipotent de toutes recherches historiques en Hongrie, quand elle a annoncé : « Nous avons commis quelques erreurs », un jeune historien, écarté pendant quatre ans pour ces idées dites titistes, l'interrompait : « Ah vraiment ! Dites-nous ces erreurs » ! Quand elle a continué son discours, en admettant que les erreurs commises concernaient l'histoire de la Hongrie, des cris fusaient : « Donnez-nous des détails ! Dites-nous vos erreurs » ! La réunion se termina dans un chahut général. Le 14 juin, le grand théoricien marxiste, Georges Lukács, fit un lourd réquisitoire contre les dilettantes de la science, spécialement de la philosophie, « contre les œuvres fabriquées à la chaîne » et « leurs auteurs ne possédant ni connaissance ni culture ». De la part du gouvernement il n'y avait aucune réaction, et les « perturbations » n'entraînèrent aucunes représailles. Le parti et son chef prirent conscience du ton dangereux des débats seulement le 19 juin, lorsque la veuve de László Rajk, ancien communiste, l'un des leaders du Parti et ministre de l'intérieur, qui a été exécuté comme traître et titiste, a demandé la parole. Madame Rajk avait exigé la réhabilitation de son époux assassiné et la disparition des assassins de la vie politique. Une émotion profonde s'empara des assistants. Pour la première fois dans l'histoire d'un pays communiste, on attaquait ouvertement le chef du régime. La veuve Rajk décrivit aussi les conditions des prisons avec des couleurs les plus sombres, affirmant que les prisons de la République Populaire Hongroise étaient pires que sous le régime fasciste de Horthy.

Par la suite, les événements se déroulèrent avec une cadence accélérée provoquant une tension croissante dans l'opinion publique. Les écrivains convertis ont senti derrière eux le public et ils ont fait entendre avec un courage jusque-là inconnu la voix du peuple, et à la réunion du 27 juin ils ont déjà parlé avec franchise. Cette dernière était présidée par Márton Horváth, rédacteur-en-chef du journal central du Parti, fidèle absolu de Rákosi. La grande salle et les couloirs du Club des officiers étaient pleins, et dans une air humide et étouffante, sans manger, sans boire, sans fumer, tout le monde resta jusqu'à la fin de la réunion, vers 4 heures du matin. Horváth a fait une autocritique sur un ton nerveux, car le programme prévoyait que la ligne du parti soit examinée par des écrivains et des journalistes à la lumière des décisions du XX^e Congrès. A la suite des discours et des applaudissements habituels, se leva, vers 9 heures du soir, l'écrivain Tibor Déry, romancier populaire et communiste depuis toujours, et je vous cite ici l'article de mon cher ami ci-présent, László Nagy, en continuant la description de l'histoire de cette soirée inoubliable : « Vers 3 heures du matin quelqu'un s'écria : 'A bas le régime ! Vive Imre Nagy !' — c'était déjà la voix de la Révolution. Au jour suivant éclatèrent en Pologne les émeutes de Poznan. Rákosi a vu arriver le temps d'agir. Il alléguait le danger 'contre-révolutionnaire', — le même mot d'ordre qu'on utilise maintenant après la Révolution, — il a exclu du parti les orateurs les plus véhéments et lança une grande campagne contre le Cercle Petöfi ».

Mais, si une fois le peuple se met en mouvement, on ne peut pas l'arrêter qu'avec la plus grande force brutale. Et, de tous temps, les tyrans avaient peur de recourir à cette force. Ainsi, les réunions se multiplièrent au cours des mois suivants, surtout parmi les étudiants, et l'opinion publique s'est ouverte un chemin de plus en plus libre. On a mis en question tous les traits fondamentaux de la démocratie et de la politique, en cherchant les possibilités de créer une vie nationale indépendante, et un ordre social et économique équitable. Les réunions des étudiants de mi-octobre étaient décisives, les exigences du peuple ont pris forme. Le gouvernement n'a pas compris combien grande est la tension parmi la jeunesse, il n'est pas réussi à trouver des solutions pour réduire les tensions explosives, il n'a pas montré aucun signe d'initier des réformes réelles, — ainsi, la Révolution, la lutte nationale avait commencé.

La Révolution hongroise d'octobre 1956 est la preuve la plus évidente quelle est l'opinion publique en Hongrie, quelles sont les idées dominantes du peuple, et qu'il veut réaliser. A l'encontre de toute la propagande de l'Union Soviétique et de son gouvernement docile en Hongrie, cette question est déjà décidée; c'est le peuple lui-même qui l'a résolu. De résumer et d'apprécier les thèses de la volonté du peuple hongrois qui étaient proclamées pendant les jours glorieux de la lutte, c'est le devoir d'un essai particulier. Ne m'occupant pas du contenu des revendications nationales, je voudrais seulement vous indiquer comment l'opinion publique, l'opinion des masses radicales, a dépassé pas à pas les leaders du Parti et du gouvernement qui n'a pas accepté et réalisé les exigences. Il faut constater qu'à ce moment-là, la plupart des écrivains et des intellectuels communistes étaient consternés en voyant les effets de leurs propres agissements. Ils ont essayé l'impossible pour retenir les masses. Dès cet instant, la direction glissa de leurs mains, le peuple les surpassa. Le Parti et le gouvernement, même Imre Nagy, ont joué également le rôle du frein jusqu'au 1^{er} novembre. Cette question qui nous paraissait et paraît si préoccupante, il faut que nous devrions l'analyser dans l'avenir sans retard.

Donc, l'opinion publique, la volonté des masses a fait avancer de pas en pas la Révolution avec sa fermeté et son intransigeance. Le soir du 23 octobre, le peuple a déjà exigé la démission de Gerő, et d'avoir Imre Nagy comme premier ministre. C'était deux jours plus tard, jeudi, quand — enfin — Gerő et Hegedüs ont démissionné. On a revendiqué les 29, 30 et 31 les limogeages des anciens stalinistes du conseil des ministres, mais Nagy a seulement transformé son gouvernement le 2 novembre. Parallèlement, il était avec ses collaborateurs en retard de commencer les délibérations avec les Russes concernant le retrait des troupes soviétiques de Budapest et de négocier avec eux quelques exigences économiques. Par conséquent, il est incontestable que la Révolution d'octobre était le mouvement de l'ensemble du peuple hongrois.

Ainsi, je suis arrivé à la fin de ma conférence. Peut-être m'était-il possible de vous donner une impression sur la situation de la Hongrie, sur l'opinion publique, cachée derrière les murs et dans les âmes.

Je vous remercie de votre attention et demande votre pardon, si la conférence n'était pas très scientifique, très objective, c'était plutôt un témoignage.

Protestant Churches in Communist Hungary

L'EGLISE EN HONGRIE*

La vie de l'Eglise protestante s'est toujours identifiée en Hongrie avec celle du peuple. C'est à cause de cela que son histoire est aussi tragique que celle de la nation.

Au XVI^e siècle, la Réforme a rapidement connu le triomphe sur sol hongrois. A la fin de ce même siècle et au début du suivant, la plus grande partie du pays était protestante.

A l'époque de la Contre-Réforme, les jésuites, mais surtout le plus grand cardinal de Hongrie, Péter Pázmány, réussirent à ramener le pays à l'Eglise de Rome. Pour cela, ils firent spécialement usage du principe « *cujus regio, ejus religio* », c'est-à-dire que les paysans avaient l'obligation de pratiquer la religion qui était celle des seigneurs dont ils dépendaient. Jusqu'à la fin du XVII^e siècle, la principauté de Transylvanie, indépendante de la Hongrie à cette époque, assumait la défense des protestants résidant dans la partie occidentale du territoire, où régnaient les Habsbourg.

Notre histoire des XVII^e, XVIII^e et XIX^e siècles, jusqu'à notre guerre d'indépendance de 1848, fut une succession de luttes contre la puissance royale des Habsbourg, en faveur d'une Hongrie indépendante et pour le libre exercice de la religion.

Tartares, Turcs, les Habsbourg, combats de plusieurs siècles pour la liberté et pour la foi, réduisirent la Hongrie (une des plus grandes et plus puissantes nations d'Europe jusqu'à la terrible bataille de Mohács, en 1526), à n'être plus qu'une petite unité territoriale de l'Europe centrale, le point de choc des grands courants politiques, économiques, culturelle et nationaux. Et après la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, notre histoire se poursuit de la même façon, toute remplie de tragédies comme auparavant.

La Hongrie devenait un des pays « satellites », c'est-à-dire un des pays soumis à l'oppression des Russes, du panslavisme renforcé par le communisme et le matérialisme.

La question que vous vous posez certainement est de savoir quelle peut être la vie de l'Eglise protestante — calviniste et luthérienne — dans cette atmosphère, en butte aux attaques de l'athéisme, et dans une société qui se détruit totalement ?

Après le second conflit mondial, le renouvellement de la foi avait produit des fruits très précieux. Bien sûr, ainsi que tous les mouvements idéologiques ou spirituels, celui-ci avait aussi eu des côtés répréhensibles, par exemple, le rejet de la vie culturelle considérée comme l'apanage des chrétiens obéissant à toutes sortes de préjugés. Cependant, parmi les fruits précieux nous trouvons que, sous un régime de domination exercé par des athées, sous la menace d'attaques sans cesse renouvelées, la foi se renforce ! Les hommes apprennent à en connaître le prix. Les églises sont pleines maintenant, ils le sont davantage qu'avant la guerre. C'est là, comme partout dans le monde, une manifestation de la grâce de Dieu et l'oeuvre du Saint-Esprit. A ce point de vue, nous pouvons considérer les Russes et l'idéologie communiste comme Nabuchodonosor, ennemi d'Israël, mais étant un instrument de Dieu.

* Conférence donnée à différentes reprises dans les paroisses de l'Eglise protestante romande en 1957.

Depuis 1949, il a été défendu de baptiser les enfants des fonctionnaires; toutefois, leurs enfants ont été portés à plus de 100 kilomètres de la capitale ou d'autres villes, pour y recevoir, malgré tout, le baptême.

Il est faux de prétendre que la foi se meurt, les Eglises se dépeuplent et qu'il n'y a plus de chrétiens en Hongrie !

Si nous sommes à même de contempler le tableau d'une Eglise triomphante nous voyons, par contre, aussi une Eglise luttant, une Eglise protestante qui se débatte dans la plus tragique situation qu'ait connue son histoire.

Il nous faut aussi constater qu'en Hongrie, la vraie Eglise, c'est-à-dire l'ensemble des croyants, et l'Eglise officielle, celle des dirigeants, se séparent l'une de l'autre (l'institution de l'épiscopat dans une Eglise de type presbytérien n'est due qu'à une nécessité née de l'histoire du protestantisme hongrois, et reflète les circonstances politiques).

L'Etat communiste a trouvé une manière très habile d'affaiblir l'Eglise de l'intérieur, en y introduisant aux postes importants, aux postes de commande, des hommes qui ne sont pas honnêtes, des hommes qui, avec leurs charges ecclésiastiques, cumulent les fonctions d'employés de l'Etat. Les chefs de l'Eglise ont un comportement de dictateur, et vont jusqu'à utiliser la police secrète pour parvenir à leurs fins. Ils ont pratiquement transformé notre système presbytérien en un système de dominance, semblable à celui de l'Eglise de Rome.

La vie courante de l'Eglise connaît les pires restrictions :

- Seuls sont autorisés les cultes du dimanche et quelque réunion des groupes bibliques ;
- Les travaux d'évangélisation, les activités de jeunesse, les actions missionnaires sont interdites ;
- Les pasteurs ont pieds et poings liés : ils doivent demander une permission spéciale des dirigeants de l'Eglise pour prêcher dans une paroisse autre que la leur. Une fois par mois, ils ont l'obligation d'envoyer la préparation écrite de leurs sermons à une commission ecclésiastique de contrôle ;
- Les paroisses n'ont plus la liberté d'élire leurs pasteurs. Les autorités de l'Eglise placent à leur tête des ministres ayant prouvé leur attachement au régime politique. Les ouailles ne peuvent donc continuer à mettre leur confiance dans l'Eglise officielle ;
- Aux laïques, toute activité est interdite au sein de leurs paroisses. Par toutes ces circonstances, le gouvernement officiel de l'Eglise envisage intentionnellement et systématiquement de faire échouer toute activité de la mission intérieure.

Le gouvernement ne tolère aucune opposition au sujet de ses décisions. Si quelqu'un se risquait à faire une critique, ou même une remarque, il serait déclaré sectaire, fauteur de désordres ou même ennemi de l'Etat. A l'occasion des rencontres internationales (Evanston, Princeton, Galyatető), les comptes rendus de l'activité de l'Eglise de Hongrie qui doivent y être présentés sont préparés par la minorité — les dirigeants de l'Eglise. Aussi, en Occident, les vrais problèmes des protestants ne sont-ils connus que superficiellement.

Le traitement de la majorité des pasteurs atteint à peine le minimum vital. Pendant ce temps, certaines personnalités de l'Eglise reçoivent des émoluments surpassant démesurément ceux des serviteurs du Christ. Les bénéficiaires sont pour la plupart des hommes dont la conduite immorale, antérieure et récente, est bien

connue dans tout le pays. Rien ne justifie les gaspillages commis lors de réceptions, festins et voyages officiels effectués par le gouvernement actuel de l'Eglise. Cet étalage de luxe est le fait de ceux de nos dirigeants qui se donnent, en plus de leur tâche ecclésiastique, à servir des intérêts politiques pour le compte de l'Etat.

Revenons aux pasteurs des paroisses rurales : ils doivent chercher des emplois en plus de leur ministère pour pouvoir assurer à eux et à leur famille le pain quotidien. Ils n'en ont pas honte. Un est charpentier, l'autre fabrique du fil métallique pour clôtures. Quelques-uns élèvent des volailles, engraisent des porcs, etc. etc.

L'un d'entre eux m'a raconté qu'il a dû participer en automne de 1954-1955 à la coupe des branches des saules, travail pénible et ingrat, pour lequel plusieurs mois plus tard il n'avait pas encore reçu le salaire dû. Ses paroissiens en étaient profondément peiné et humiliés. Afin de lui venir en aide, ils ont rassemblé 1'000 forints (environ 140 francs suisses) pour qu'il puisse s'acheter un vêtement. Malgré de telles difficultés, tous restent courageux.

En 1945-1946, la Hongrie a connu une déflation telle qu'aucun pays d'Europe n'en a connu de semblable, par la suite beaucoup d'institutions avaient disparues. Il fallait reconstruire. C'est à ce moment qu'intervint la loi de 1946 sur le partage des terres et, en 1948, l'étatisation de l'enseignement. La plupart des paroisses possédaient des terres, vivant du revenu de celles-là. Les protestants, une minorité dans le pays — un tiers environ de la population — avaient toujours envoyé leurs enfants dans des écoles protestantes, mais désormais leurs enfants aussi devaient aller aux écoles étatiques.

Les nouvelles lois avaient dépouillé les paysans et petits propriétaires ; on leur avait, tous les 5 ans, arraché un peu plus de leurs biens, de façon à ce qu'en 20 ans, il ne leur en restât plus rien, tout ayant été étatisé.

Pour que l'Eglise puisse continuer à exister en tant qu'institution, il importe que les croyants de l'Eglise confessante, déjà presque tous réduits à la misère, assurent son maintien en s'imposant des sacrifices pour ainsi dire surhumains. Ces sacrifices, ils sont d'accord de les faire pour l'Eglise confessante, mais ne veulent pas en entendre parler de soutenir une Eglise officielle aux ordres de l'Etat. Ils refusent d'entretenir un pasteur qui leur est imposé ; donc, la situation est devenue tragique.

Sur le plan matériel, l'Eglise protestante, en tant qu'institution, est vouée à un avenir sans issue.

Les croyants repoussent l'idée de l'oecuménisme parce qu'ils savent que leurs dirigeants y adhèrent pour des motifs politiques et tactiques. Ils savent que ceux-ci cachent à leurs frères d'Occident les vrais problèmes de l'Eglise hongroise. Les protestants connaissent la situation matérielle de leurs pasteurs et sont indignés du contraste qu'elle offre par rapport aux opportunistes qui sont leurs dirigeants, des hommes politiques plutôt, militant en faveur de l'Etat, que des vrais leaders chrétiens.

Bien des protestants hongrois de Transylvanie mériteraient l'auréole des martyrs avant même que ne se révélât le sort du cardinal Mindszenty et de l'évêque luthérien Lagos Ordos. Ainsi, l'évêque unitarien hongrois de Transylvanie, Mikaël Jan, avait été battu dans les rues de Kolozsvár, et il avait succombé sous les coups reçus. Dans le village de Kendilona, on avait cloué le pasteur réformé Arthur Tompa à la porte de son église. Dans les villages hongrois, on décapite à la hache, sur des bûchers, des paysans calvinistes, membres de conseils de paroisse. Le pasteur luthérien le plus ancien de service à Kolozsvár, Andor Járosi, a été enlevé, ainsi que les personnes appartenant à la Théologie de la foi unitarienne de Kolozsvár. On avait également emprisonné une cinquantaine de pasteurs réformés et de conseillers de paroisse dans les régions de Transylvanie habitées par les Hongrois.

Tout ce que je viens vous dire vous aidera peut-être comprendre mieux l'état d'âme des réfugiés vivant maintenant parmi vous. Ce sont des gens qui, pendant plus de onze ans, ont dû, s'ils voulaient subsister, « d'avoir l'air » d'adhérer au régime, qui ont dû dire « oui » alors que tout en eux disait « non ».

Onze ans d'oppression ! C'est long !

Il leur fallait de trouver l'occasion de gagner leur vie, tout en gardant leur personnalité. Ils ont retrouvé leur liberté chez vous, cette occasion de vivre décemment, mais ils ont laissé tout ce qui leur est cher. Dans le pays qu'ils ont du quitter.

Aidez-les à se retrouver eux-mêmes — c'est depuis si longtemps qu'ils ont perdu cette habitude — et à réaliser qu'à nouveau ils sont des hommes libres dans un monde libre.

LA SITUATION ACTUELLE DES EGLISES PROTESTANTES EN HONGRIE*

INTRODUCTION

Les Eglises protestantes de la Hongrie comprennent deux grandes églises historiques, l'Eglise réformée (calviniste) hongroise et l'Eglise luthérienne hongroise, et un nombre considérable d'Eglises libres parmi lesquelles l'Eglise baptiste qui compte le plus grand nombre de fidèles parmi ces dernières.

Dans cette étude nous nous bornerons à donner un tableau de la vie et des problèmes actuels des deux grandes Eglises dites historiques, car les données concrètes nous manquent concernant les autres. En outre, ces deux Eglises, et l'évolution qui se manifeste en leur sein, caractérisent certainement tous les courants du protestantisme hongrois contemporain.

L'Eglise réformée hongroise compte environ deux millions de fidèles dans les régions abritant une population d'une souche exclusivement hongroise. Les 1'200 congrégations avec leurs 1'500 pasteurs sont organisées en quatre districts à la tête desquels se trouvent des évêques et des présidents laïques. L'existence des évêques s'était justifiée pendant les siècles de persécution, car ils assuraient une unité en face des attaques du pouvoir, et l'institution des évêchés resta même après l'avènement de l'époque libérale comme une institution héritées de l'histoire, malgré le système de gouvernement qui était presbytérien-synodal dès les débuts.

Une grande partie des fidèles de l'Eglise luthérienne est issue des couches d'origine germanique de la population. Elle a subi de grandes pertes par l'émigration de 1945 et ne compte aujourd'hui que 450'000 âmes réparties en 323 congrégations avec 450 pasteurs. Ses deux districts sont dirigés par leurs évêques et par des inspecteurs laïques, tandis que l'Eglise entière à sa tête l'évêque le plus ancien en service un inspecteur général.

En examinant la situation actuelle des Eglises protestantes de la Hongrie, il nous faut retourner vers le passé et considérer d'abord les développements d'après-guerre, donc les événements de 1948-1949, la vie de ces Eglises entre 1950 et 1956, et, ensuite, le renouveau au moment de la glorieuse révolution de 1956 ainsi que la réaction qu'elle a suscité ensuite dans la vie de ces Eglises.

1. LA THEOLOGIE PROTESTANTE HONGROISE D'APRES-GUERRE

Au lendemain de la guerre, une nouvelle conception théologique est apparue au sein de l'Eglise réformée hongroise créée, ou, plutôt, annoncée à son Eglise, par l'évêque Albert Bereczky. C'était une prophétie pour ceux qui l'ont acceptée et suivie, et c'était aussi la seule tentative de donner une base théologique à la nouvelle orientation des Eglises réformée et luthérienne. En effet, et devons le dire tout de suite, cette nouvelle « théologie » n'avait pas été autre qu'une adaptation artificielle de la vie et de l'activité de l'Eglise aux exigences du régime communiste et un détournement non admis, mais réel, des bases essentielles de la théologie chrétienne.

* Etude préparée à l'intention de l'Eglise Nationale Protestante de Genève en 1961. Elle n'a jamais été publiée auparavant.

La conception de Bereczky n'avait jamais encore été développée dans un système cohérent, ainsi elle reste parfois très confuses ; toutefois, elle peut être décelée dans ses sermons, ses articles, ses lettres pastorales et ses conférences, données en Hongrie et à l'étranger, de cette personnalité dominante du protestantisme hongrois des années d'après-guerre.

Le point de départ de la théologie de Bereczky est l'affirmation du jugement de Dieu sur le peuple hongrois. Dans la débâcle qui a suivi la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, il a pensé de reconnaître jugement de Dieu qui a jugé le pays pour ses péchés, en particulier économiques et sociaux. Ce qu'il y a d'humain dans cette intuition profonde est certainement vrai et sincère et avait constitué la toile de fond à toutes ses pensées et à toutes ses paroles prononcées ultérieurement. Il était convaincu que ce n'est pas accidentel que la Hongrie devait se trouver en face d'un tel abîme de son histoire millénaire obligeant notre génération à envisager tous les aspects, jusqu'aux moindres détails, de la vie nationale de ce point le plus bas de son existence. Dans sa perspective, celui qui n'accepte pas ce point de départ doit être aveugle, et être aveugle n'est pas une excuse, mais un péché, ou, plutôt, un péché et un châtement à la fois. Celui dont le regard ne se lève pas de cet abîme de l'existence nationale vers l'avenir comme décrit par le nouveau pouvoir, ne reste pas seulement redevable de la contrition requise, mais aussi de la gratitude que nous devons à Dieu pour ce grand acte qui était la libération de la Hongrie (libération du passé accablant par l'arrivée des troupes de l'Armée Rouge).

Ce simple raisonnement est la charpente de la nouvelle théologie. Sa genèse tout à fait humaine (en opposition à la genèse divine du vrai christianisme) est évidente du premier moment ainsi que la technique très délicate psychologiquement, qui amalgame, consciencieusement ou non, dans cette argumentation ce qui est vrai avec ce qui est faux. En effet, cette succession des idées que nous avons évoquées plus haut se compose de deux éléments différents : l'un est la vision sombre du péché, du châtement, de la contrition, par lesquels le profond bouleversement humain de Bereczky explique le cours de l'histoire et la situation de son peuple, — c'est sincère et probablement authentique. L'autre est l'ajoute de la « gratitude » et des paroles de reconnaissance concernant le « grand événement de la libération », principes qui sont faux, artificiels et affectés, découlant plutôt du désir de s'adapter aux exigences de l'extérieur — le pouvoir imposé par l'Union Soviétique — que de la conviction éprouvée dans son for intérieur. Donc, dans la perspective de Bereczky, l'année 1945 signifie une grande apocalypse, une débâcle : c'est le juste jugement de Dieu qui a définitivement détruit le vieux monde hongrois ; la libération par les troupes soviétiques représente la grâce divine qui ouvre la voie à une vie selon Sa volonté. Et Dieu — dit Bereczky — veut faire ressortir le peuple hongrois de l'énorme souffrance qui lui a été infligée par les efforts de renouvellement et de reconstruction du nouveau pouvoir politique.

Ce raisonnement met aussi en évidence que l'emphase n'est jamais sur la rédemption de la personne humaine, mais toujours sur la collectivité — le concept abstrait du peuple (en opposition à la communauté des chrétiens) — un trait de cette « nouvelle théologie » qui dévie beaucoup de la doctrine classique chrétienne, surtout ce qui concerne les relations entre péché et le châtement. La conception de Bereczky est plus proche de celle de l'Ancien que de celles exprimée par le Nouveau Testament. Il veut surmonter les difficultés découlant de cette extraordinaire conception par une explication sophistiquée assez confuse, en prétendant que peuple, société, église font tous partie d'une seule et même univers. Le caractère principal de cette personnalité composée de trois éléments est qu'il est lié au péché, car l'homme est toujours un pécheur. Donc, s'il y a des péchés collectifs, il doit y avoir aussi des pardons, des jugements et des grâces collectifs.

D'abord, c'est seulement le peuple hongrois qui est le sujet, la victime et l'élu de cette apocalypse extraordinaire. Ensuite, dans la pensée de Bereczky, elle embrasse graduellement toute l'époque, l'humanité et,

finalement, toute l'histoire humaine. Il reprend à son compte la vision optimiste du XIX^e siècle, — qui était d'ailleurs également incorporée dans la théorie marxiste-léniniste, — concernant le progrès, le développement rectiligne de l'humanité, et il répand l'idée que les époques historiques successives constituent, depuis la création, une évolution toujours en progrès, car c'est la volonté de Dieu. Ainsi, l'histoire est déterminée par une sorte d'« horaire divin » préétabli.

Dans cette perspective, l'histoire du salut et l'histoire humaine se trouvent en étroite corrélation et la grâce divine universelle qui se manifeste dans la création et dans la Providence est, en effet, identique avec la grâce particulière de Dieu qui prenait corps en Jésus Christ et oeuvre parmi les hommes par le Saint Esprit. Donc, le royaume de Dieu, étant plus vaste comme défini par la théologie classique, embrasse l'histoire profane, les événements contemporains aussi. Pour comprendre quelle est la volonté de Dieu aujourd'hui, quel est le sens du règne de Jésus Christ à notre époque, nous devons écouter la Parole ; c'est elle qui nous transmet les commandements concrets divins concernant le présent et l'avenir, car — selon Bereczky — le Dieu réel et vivant parle toujours à l'homme réel et vivant, c'est-à-dire à l'homme existant hic et nunc, sinon la Parole lue et annoncée ne pourrait être la Parole de Dieu. Il est de notre tâche d'étudier quelle est la voie de l'avenir pour que nous puissions l'emprunter et nous conformer ainsi à la volonté divine.

Voilà, nous sommes arrivés au point d'application particulière : Bereczky se dit d'être sûr de comprendre la Parole s'adressant *hic et nunc* aux Eglises hongroises contemporaines selon laquelle l'ancien régime social, économique et politique avait été condamné par Dieu et remplacé par un nouveau système d'impulsion révolutionnaire ordonné par Lui. Par conséquent, le devoir grandiose de nos générations, de nous et de nos contemporains, n'est autre que de réaliser une vie humaine commune plus juste que la précédente. Toutefois, la solution est déjà donnée par le commandement de Dieu annoncé par son « prophète » Bereczky : c'est le socialisme, le nouveau régime instauré en Hongrie et dans une grande partie du monde. Nous devons donc promouvoir le dessein de Dieu et collaborer avec le système socialiste dans ses intentions parfaitement bonnes et justes.

Mais, parallèlement à l'idéologie officielle du régime, la théologie de Bereczky commence aussi édifier le nouveau monde par une critique amère de l'ancien. Il condamne les Eglises qui ont servi, pendant des siècles, des intérêts contraires à ceux du peuple et à la volonté de Dieu et qui se sont identifiées aux puissances d'alors. Plus concrètement, il critique le rôle qu'ont joué les Eglises protestantes hongroises par le passé en acceptant un régime exploitant les pauvres, les travailleurs et maintenant la domination des privilégiés. Il condamne donc les Eglises pour avoir cherché les faveurs d'un système politique rétrograde. Cette critique de Bereczky était, certes, correcte sur plusieurs points ; toutefois, son défaut essentiel est qu'elle n'ait pas été prononcée à l'époque où les Eglises se sont éloignées de leur véritable mission prophétique, quand une telle attitude pouvait attirer les foudres du pouvoir, d'une part ; d'autre part, qu'elle était faite à un moment de l'histoire nationale où le pouvoir ne demandait mieux d'un évêque que de prononcer une telle critique en l'accompagnant de sa bénédiction.

Il est aussi évident que, selon différentes écrits et des paroles de Bereczky, pour lui, le socialisme n'est même pas une idée, un système idéal, mais une réalité terrestre, un phénomène tout à fait concret. Le régime politique et économique socialiste est désormais celui dans le cadre duquel la Hongrie et les pays limitrophes vivent et doivent vivre depuis que l'Armée Rouge les a occupés. Il considérait que l'injustice sociale traîne en longueur toute l'histoire humaine comme un fil rouge et s'est dit convaincu que Dieu a confié à l'Union Soviétique la tâche d'éliminer ce fléau de la vie commune des hommes. Que l'oppression, l'arbitraire et l'exploitation existaient en Union Soviétique et dans les démocraties populaires, lui avait échappé, ou, plutôt, il voulait les ignorer volontairement. Au lieu de coupler les critiques du passé avec la critique à l'adresse du régime actuel, en remplissant ainsi la mission prophétique des Eglises de toujours, il constate *ex cathedra* que

le communisme n'offre pas seulement une solution juste aux problèmes sociaux et politiques, mais que le premier grand Etat socialiste, l'URSS, donne déjà un exemple éblouissant en ce qui concerne la justice sociale réalisée dans un pays donné et dans les relations entra nations — dans le cadre du système dénommé de coexistence pacifique.

Selon János Péter, l'évêque du district oriental de l'Eglise réformé jusqu'en 1956, actuellement ministre des affaires étrangères de la République Populaire Hongroise, « L'Eglise ne peut rester muette à l'époque, où il sera décidé que le système d'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme soit maintenue ou abolie définitivement par des institutions propres désignées. L'Eglise doit clairement prendre position et dire non à la première éventualité, oui à la seconde. Nos peuples sont dans les grandes questions d'intérêt mondial de la guerre et de la paix aux côtés de l'Union Soviétique, car cette dernière prend au sérieux la volonté de paix des peuples. Il ne s'agit pas à ce moment d'une simple prise de position verbale de la part de l'Eglise, mais d'occasions réelles pour ses prières et pour ses services ».

Dans cet ordre d'idées et en essayant d'être « concret », le « message prophétique » est submergé par les mensonges de la propagande et l'Eglise devint le porte-parole des gouvernants. On parle de l'admission de la Chine Populaire à l'Organisation des Nations Unies, de l'armement de l'Allemagne et du Japon fasciste, etc.

Toutes les prises de positions politiques doivent être acceptées par les fidèles protestants en leur âme et conscience en vertu de leur foi chrétienne et non seulement comme les thèses de la théologie officielle. Foi et politique sont donc confondues ; la foi n'existe que dans la mesure où elle s'exprime par une approbation de la politique du pouvoir dans le for intérieur de chacun.

2. L'EGLISE ET L'ETAT

Les régimes dits socialistes veulent, en général, atteindre un triple but dans le domaine des relations entre les Eglises et Etat :

- (a) Soumettre les Eglises à un contrôle sévère de l'Etat et les pousser à une dépendance matérielle et politique vis-à-vis du pouvoir ;
- (b) Limiter graduellement les activités des Eglises, plus particulièrement leurs activités d'évangélisation et de transmission de leurs messages prophétiques, en vue de les éliminer de la société et de la vie nationale après une période de transition ;
- (c) Utiliser l'influence large et incontestée des Eglises parmi les masses populaires afin de promouvoir l'acceptation et l'exécution par ces derniers des objectifs sociaux, économiques et politiques du gouvernement.

Bien entendu, tout doit se passer dans le cadre formel du principe de la séparation de l'Eglise et de l'Etat.

Les relations entre les Eglises protestantes hongroises et le nouvel Etat socialiste avaient été placées sur de nouvelles bases par les concordats conclus séparément entre l'Etat et les Eglises réformée et luthérienne. Ces concordats datent de l'année 1948, l'année du grand tournant comme l'avait appelé Mathias Rákosi, leader à l'époque de la Hongrie, parce que c'était l'année de la prise du pouvoir par les communistes. La mise au pas des Eglises protestantes faisait partie intégrante de cette prise de pouvoir.

Les conclusions des concordats peuvent être résumer autour de trois thèmes principaux :

Tout d'abord, la séparation de l'Eglise et de l'Etat est devenue une réalité. Cette séparation ne porta pas un coup vraiment ressenti par les Eglises protestantes, puisque elles n'avaient été que « tolérées » jusqu'à il y a cent ans, et étaient seulement « reconnues » au milieu du siècle passé. Après cette reconnaissance, les évêques protestants devenaient *ex officio* membres de la Chambre Haute du Parlement hongrois ; les articles de la foi réformée et luthérienne sont devenus protégés par le pouvoir étatique ; un impôt obligatoire a été perçu par les autorités pour les Eglises ; l'enseignement de la foi protestante avait été admise dans les écoles étatiques ; les Eglises n'ont pas étaient soumises à l'imposition sur les biens matériels, peu nombreux à vrai dire, qu'elles possédaient ; et, enfin, l'Etat a, dans une large mesure, contribué à la rémunération des pasteurs et à l'entretien des écoles ecclésiastiques. La contrepartie de cette reconnaissance étatique était la loyauté des Eglises vis-à-vis du régime politique de chaque époque.

Parmi les faveurs de l'Etat, la contribution à la rémunération des pasteurs et à l'entretien des écoles ecclésiastiques avait été, naturellement, la plus importante, étant donné que les Eglises protestantes ne possédaient pas de fortunes comme l'Eglise catholique romaine. Toutefois, cette nouvelle relation — relativement nouvelle en comparaison aux trois siècles précédents — entre les Eglises et le pouvoir politique n'est pas devenu une tradition dans les yeux des masses protestantes, particulièrement parmi les paysans calvinistes au-delà du Tisza, pendant les quelques décennies précédant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale. Ainsi, la séparation de l'Eglise et de l'Etat n'avait pas été fortement ressentie à cause du fait qu'elle faisait partie de la prise de pouvoir communiste et était donc considérée comme une nouvelle manœuvre de Moscou en vue d'affaiblir la résistance du peuple.

Le deuxième point important des concordats avait été pour Eglises protestantes d'une beaucoup plus grande gravité — c'était la question des écoles. Pour le protestantisme hongrois ses écoles, les collèges et les académies existant depuis des siècles, étaient des citadelles de la foi et de l'enseignement de la vraie doctrine au cours de l'histoire — l'occupation turque, les guerres civiles et les guerres de libération, et aussi en face de la persécution. Elles produisirent de génération en génération une élite intellectuelle qui jouait, bien au-delà de la proportion des protestants à la population totale, un rôle de premier ordre dans la vie politique et culturelle du pays.

Du point de vue matériel, les concordats contenaient des clauses fatales pour l'avenir des Eglises protestantes. Ils prévoyaient que la subvention étatique accordée aux Eglises devait être réduite de 25% tous les cinq ans, c'est-à-dire qu'à la fin d'une période de vingt ans ces subventions devaient cesser d'être payées. Les conditions définies par le régime communiste en vue de la co-existence de l'Etat et des Eglises, contenues dans ces clauses, signifiaient une restriction complète des activités des Eglises ; il a été considéré que celles-ci — quoique vivant par le passé de la subvention de l'Etat — ne pouvaient se référer à une tradition séculaire en la matière et que leurs fidèles devaient les soutenir dans tous les domaines. Toutefois, l'Etat communiste n'a pas procédé en réalité à la réduction des subventions, mais les Eglises perdaient définitivement leurs espoirs d'indépendance matérielle.

Les chiffres démontrent quelle était l'importance des écoles ecclésiastiques dans l'éducation nationale. En chiffre rond, 70% de l'enseignement primaire se faisait dans les écoles ecclésiastiques et 50% de l'enseignement secondaire (les écoles de l'Eglise catholique y compris). De 4'500 écoles appartenant aux Eglises, 2'981 étaient catholiques, 1'117 réformées et 406 luthériennes. En Hongrie, tout le monde savait donc qu'avec l'étatisation des écoles des Eglises le pouvoir s'attaquait aux bases de la culture nationale tout entière.

L'Eglise réformée et ses dirigeants, y compris le futur évêque Albert Bereczky qui était entre 1945 et 1948 à la tête d'un mouvement de réveil, n'ont jamais pensé à l'abandon des écoles ecclésiastiques ; il en fut de même pour l'Eglise luthérienne. Toutefois, dans le contexte politique de 1948 la cause était perdue d'avance. Aucun argument de la théologie officielle, ne montrant d'ailleurs pas beaucoup d'enthousiasme concernant ce

bouleversement, ne pouvait convaincre les Eglises protestantes et leurs membres de la nécessité d'une telle mesure, sinon l'argument le plus puissant, la peur. L'organisation répressive de l'Etat, en particulier la police secrète, était déjà à l'œuvre ; l'intimidation des gens avançait à grand pas, et par ses moyens l'opposition, au sein des Eglises même, avait été brisée. En ce qui concerne l'Eglise réformée, Bereczky et son équipe se sont employés à faire accepter « volontairement » le concordat et l'étatisation des écoles par les membres de différents organes de l'Eglise, — synode, assemblée générale des districts, etc. — sous le prétexte d'éviter une collision frontale avec le pouvoir. Ils y sont parvenus par l'emploi des moyens d'intimidation de l'Etat, et le synode vota l'acceptation, à une infime majorité, à la fois du concordat et de l'étatisation des écoles. En ce qui concerne l'Eglise luthérienne, le changement d'équipe au pouvoir n'est intervenu qu'en automne 1948, lorsque l'évêque Ordass fut éliminé avec deux de ses collaborateurs ; ainsi ses organes officiels ne se sont pas prêtés à un tel jeu auquel l'évêque Bereczky et les siens ont obligé le synode réformé. Néanmoins, la loi votée par le Parlement, déjà entièrement aux mains du parti communiste, a aussi privé les luthériens de leurs écoles.'

Le troisième thème du conflit entre les Eglises protestantes et l'Etat communiste était justement la relève des dignitaires ecclésiastiques dirigeant ces Eglises, — un fait qui précéda, au sein de l'Eglise réformée, le débat sur l'étatisation des écoles. A cette époque, il est devenu clair que le gouvernement et le parti communistes avaient réalisé qu'il leur était inutile et impossible de mener de front une attaque contre les Eglises, car le remplacement de leurs dirigeants par des pasteurs et laïcs accommodants, — tous les régimes trouvent, et partout, des opportunistes — de pair avec les puissants moyens d'intimidation de l'Etat mis à leur disposition, était suffisant.

En mai 1947, l'évêque László Ravasz, président du synode réformé et de son exécutif avait dû démissionner sous les attaques de l'opposition au sein de l'Eglise menée par Albert Bereczky, et sous la pression des autorités de l'Etat. A sa place, le même Albert Bereczky était élu comme évêque du district danubien ; le président laïc de ce district est devenu, au lieu de l'ancien bâtonnier János Kardos, Roland Kiss, un homme de confiance du régime. Ce dernier s'est déjà distingué en 1919 comme communiste, car il avait participé à l'époque de Béla Kun à la prise de pouvoir de ce dernier. Au moment de l'élection de Bereczky, il était secrétaire d'Etat au ministère de l'Intérieur, et a joué ensuite dans l'Eglise réformée le rôle d'un véritable dictateur. Toutefois, son élection en face de Kardos ne réussissait qu'au quatrième tour, quand ce dernier avait été arrêté par la police secrète. Parallèlement, le ministre de l'agriculture, Ferenc Erdei, est devenu le président laïc du plus grand district de l'Eglise réformée, au-delà de Tisza, où l'évêque Imre Révész, faisant de graves concessions aux dépens de son Eglise, n'était remplacé que quelques années plus tard par János Péter. Le troisième district de l'Eglise, appelé d'en deçà de Tisza, avait été aboli et annexé à celui d'au-delà de Tisza après le démission forcée de son évêque, Andor Enyedi. Seul le quatrième district, le trans-danubien, avait pu gardé à sa tête l'évêque Elemér Győry qui s'est plus ou moins accommodé à la nouvelle orientation de l'Eglise et aux exigences du pouvoir. Bereczky et Kiss sont aussi devenus les présidents du synode (qui avait toujours une double présidence : un pasteur et un laïc), c'est-à-dire les chefs virtuels de l'Eglise réformée hongroise.

Dans l'Eglise luthérienne, la relève a commencé en septembre 1948 quand l'évêque Lajos Ordass, le secrétaire général de l'Eglise, le pasteur Sándor Vargha, et l'inspecteur général laïc, J. Radvánszky, ont été arrêtés pour trafic de devises. En même temps, des autres pasteurs renommés avaient aussi été arrêtés ou obligés de démissionner. L'évêque Ordass, qui s'est vu infligé un emprisonnement de deux ans, avait été libéré après quelques mois à la suite des interventions des Eglises occidentales et de la Fédération Luthérienne Mondiale. A la fin de la même année, où Ordass et ses proches collaborateurs ont été éliminés, Lajos Vető devient l'évêque du district luthérien sur le Tisza, remplacé en 1950 par l'ancien aumônier des étudiants, László Dezséry, comme évêque du district du Sud, remplaçant Zoltán Turóczy.

La prise de pouvoir de l'Etat communiste dans les Eglises protestantes a été achevée par la création d'un Office de l'Etat chargé des affaires ecclésiastiques. Il avait été créé entièrement sur le modèle soviétique, existant depuis 1943 déjà ; l'importance de son activité s'avérait, toutefois, beaucoup plus grande qu'en URSS,

car le pouvoir politique n'avait jamais joué un tel rôle dans les Eglises hongroises, protestantes ou catholiques, que dans l'Eglise orthodoxe russe. Cet Office gouvernemental détient le plein pouvoir concernant les affaires ecclésiastiques, rien ne peut se passer sans son autorisation. Il a, en effet, un triple rôle. Tout d'abord, il représente le pouvoir du régime ; son président est le lieutenant du gouvernement athée dans les Eglises soumises, donc cet Office est le moyen principal de l'intimidation psychologique. En deuxième lieu, sa fonction est économique, c'est par cet Office que l'Etat met les fonds, fixés dans les concordats respectifs, à la disposition des Eglises, et c'est lui qui examine les budgets soumis à l'approbation des autorités. Ces fonds n'ont pas une importance capitale à l'échelon inférieur de la hiérarchie ecclésiastique, car ils assurant seulement un supplément (le soi-disant congrua) aux traitements des pasteurs et aux autres employés des paroisses, séniors, districts etc., mais ils couvrent la totalité des traitements et des dépenses effectives à l'échelon supérieur, donc les traitements des évêques, des professeurs aux Académies théologiques, des fonctionnaires aux offices des évêchés et au bureau du Comité Exécutif du synode, ainsi que les différentes activités de tous les offices, y compris les frais d'édition des journaux, des hebdomadaires et d'autres publications. Cette situation financière assure donc un levier de commande très efficace pour le régime. Le troisième rôle de l'Office de l'Etat chargé des affaires ecclésiastiques est nettement politique. Les concordats conclus en 1948 stipulent que les lois votées par les synodes des Eglises protestantes ne peuvent entrer en vigueur qu'après l'approbation gouvernementale. Ceci signifie, en effet, le droit de veto du pouvoir politique dans la législation des Eglises. L'Office de l'Etat exerce ainsi ce droit du gouvernement, et son président doit être présent *ex officio* à toutes les réunions des synodes, de la conférence des évêques, etc. Ce contrôle ne s'effectue pas seulement à cet échelon élevé, mais aussi au niveau paroissial. Par exemple : si un pasteur veut commander un sceau, il doit demander et obtenir une autorisation écrite de l'Office de l'Etat pour les affaires ecclésiastiques.

Cet Office se trouve dans la capitale, à Budapest. Dans les différentes régions du pays des responsables chargés des affaires ecclésiastiques, attachés aux Comités Exécutifs de l'administration départementale respectifs surveillent tout ce qui se passe dans les Eglises ayant une activité sur le territoire appartenant au département. Leur fonction est, d'une part, le contrôle en général des activités des Eglises ; d'autre part, l'utilisation de ces dernières sur le plan local dans toutes les actions fixées par la Centrale du Parti communiste. Par exemple la lutte contre les kulaks, ces paysans qui étaient riches auparavant, la propagande pour une production agricole accrue, etc.).

3. LES ACTIVITES DES EGLISES

Dans les différentes activités des Eglises la centralisation est devenue le mot d'ordre principal. Selon Imre Kádár, l'un des plus puissants commissaires politiques dans l'Eglise réformée hongroise, lequel malgré le fait de ne jamais avoir étudié la théologie, devint, il y a quelques années, professeur de théologie œcuménique : « En général, on est arrivé au point aujourd'hui que n'importe quelle activité de caractère religieux ne peut être exercée que par l'Eglise ». Ce principe extrêmement dangereux ouvrait la voie à un contrôle centralisé et total, et devait ensuite être appliqué avec rigueur. Toutes les institutions, organisations et mouvements avec lesquels le protestantisme hongrois a enrichi la vie sociale et culturelle du pays, sont tombés victimes de cette centralisation politique dévastatrice qui visait à éliminer toutes les sources de valeurs traditionnelles et toutes les activités authentiquement nationales.

Le domaine le plus touché par cette action était le travail des Eglises ou des mouvements protestants parmi la jeunesse. Toutes les organisations actives parmi les jeunes avaient été dissoutes, entre autres l'Association Chrétienne des Jeunes Gens (YMCA). S'il était nécessaire, on demandait l'assistance des autorités du régime. Ainsi, le dernier secrétaire général de la YMCA hongroise, István Pógyor, fut arrêté par la police, jeté en prison, où il terminait tristement ses jours. L'enseignement de la foi réformée ou luthérienne dans les écoles a été aussi presque éliminé. Aux termes des concordats de 1948, l'enseignement religieux scolaire était encore obligatoire.

En outre, ces documents ont précisé que l'étatisation des écoles publiques ne touche en rien aux institutions d'enseignement purement religieux comme les académies théologiques, les instituts formant les diaconesses, les missionnaires et les autres travailleurs des Eglises. Tous ces principes sont rapidement tombés dans l'oubli. Après quelques années, on ne parla plus de l'enseignement religieux obligatoire, celui-ci devint, en principe, facultatif. Les parents devaient annoncer leur intention d'inscrire par écrit leurs enfants à cet enseignement, ou verbalement au cours d'une demi-journée fixée par les autorités. Les pressions politiques, l'impossibilité de quitter la travail pendant les heures d'inscription, ont donné pour résultat qu'une proportion très inférieure à l'habituelle des écoliers et des étudiants avaient suivie un enseignement religieux déjà extrêmement restreint. Les Ecoles de Dimanche montraient, elles aussi, une participation en régression à la suite d'intimidation des parents. Le nombre des académies théologiques avait diminué de moitié : elles étaient « volontairement » fermées par les Eglises, ou, comme d'autres établissements d'enseignement, telles que les écoles secondaires laissées entre les mains de ces dernières afin de former les jeunes se préparant aux études théologiques, elles étaient transférés à l'Etat.

Le moyen le plus radical pour contrôler les activités ecclésiastiques, — mais sans avoir produit les effets escomptés, — était la prise en main des pasteurs, des hommes qui ne devaient que servir la Parole de Dieu. On a tendu un filet aux jeunes qui se préparaient au service pastoral. A partir du moment où un jeune homme entra à l'Académie théologique, les autorités ecclésiastiques, avec l'aide de l'Office de l'Etat pour les affaires des Eglises, essayaient tout pour le mettre au pas. Les différentes faveurs pouvant être acquises, — bourses, hébergement aux internats des académies, etc. dépendaient entièrement de ces autorités. En plus, et c'était le coup le plus ressenti, on a même voulu priver l'étudiant en théologie de cette relative indépendance matérielle que lui signifiait la coutume traditionnelle de « légation ». Celle-ci consistait en ceci : les étudiants en théologie allaient, depuis des siècles, pendant les trois grandes fêtes de l'année — Noël, Pâques et Pentecôte — dans des congrégations de leur districts pour y présider aux services solennels ensemble avec le pasteur local. Ces occasions ne leur ont pas seulement signifié des prises de contact avec les paroisses, mais aussi un soutien matériel, car les congrégations recevant un étudiant lui ont fait une collecte spéciale pouvant assurer ses études pendant les mois à venir. La centralisation a mis une fin à cette coutume séculaire. Les étudiants en théologie devaient désormais payer dans une caisse centrale les fonds collectés, et recevaient de ces sommes des autorités des faveurs déjà mentionnées dans les conditions que l'on sait.

La dépendance des pasteurs devait aussi être comblée : leur liberté spirituelle était véritablement limitée par le système des soi-disant « cercles des pasteurs » qui consistent en des réunions régulières dans le cadre d'unités régionales, en présence des commissaires des autorités ecclésiastiques, et quelquefois même du responsable des affaires ecclésiastiques du département. Donc, ces cercles se retrouvèrent sous un contrôle complet et les pasteurs ne peuvent se récuser sous aucun prétexte, d'autant plus que le programme des discussions est, en principe, tout à fait admissible. Il n'y s'agit que des études bibliques, des préparations aux sermons, des examens de questions d'actualité, — des sujets dont seul le dernier peut être suspect à première vue. En fait, la discussion des problèmes actuels ne signifie autre chose que la lecture des articles importants de la presse quotidienne à la suite de laquelle tout le monde doit prendre position, et on devine quelles sont les normes appliquées pour juger les opinions exprimées. Les études bibliques, les préparations aux sermons présentent déjà un caractère beaucoup plus grave. Dans ce cadre, la signification des paroles de la Bible devait être déformée à un tel point qu'une « sagesse » politique en sorte. Ainsi, les études bibliques ont des thèmes revenant comme des refrains, par exemple : « La réforme agraire et la Bible », « La paix voulue par l'Evangile », ou « Le christianisme primitif et la propriété privée », etc. La technique que l'on devait acquérir est évidente : placer les grands thèmes de la propagande politique actuelle à des bases bibliques. En ce qui concerne la préparation des sermons, beaucoup plus de précautions sont prises. La centrale prépare des schémas convenables et la préparation se fait sur des lignes indiquées d'en haut. Ces schémas conduisent le pasteur à partir du texte biblique, par les phases successives de leur développement, jusqu'aux conclusions à tirer. En principe, les pasteurs doivent suivre les lignes de méditation fixées de dimanche à dimanche, — jamais, vraiment, une telle uniformisation de la prédication, soumise à un contrôle central, n'a été auparavant réalisée.

Ces mesures avaient été complétées par d'autres, plus formelles. Un pasteur, un étudiant en théologie ou un quelconque travailleur des Eglises ne peut aller, sans autre, prêcher dans une paroisse qui n'est pas la sienne qu'avec une autorisation officielle. Par cela, on peut empêcher les gens, ne s'alignant pas sur la ligne officielle, d'aller transmettre un message authentiquement chrétien.

La centralisation au sein des Eglises protestantes s'étendait aussi aux publications. Tous les périodiques, hebdomadaires et autres publications qui paraissaient dans les différentes communautés, dans les divers secteurs de la vie sociale et culturelle hongroise avant la prise du pouvoir par les communistes, ont été réduits au silence forcé, par les difficultés matérielles ou par une fusion imposée par les autorités, car le principe prévalait que cette presse et ces publications étaient, certes, de caractère religieux, mais n'étaient pas celles de l'Eglise, c'est-à-dire n'étaient pas contrôlées directement par les autorités de l'Eglise. En outre, on a reproché à leurs responsables qu'elles étaient maintes fois financées par des capitaux privés et devaient ainsi servir obligatoirement des intérêts bourgeois. A la suite de cette pression centralisatrice, il ne restait, après une courte période, que seulement deux publications de l'Eglise, publications éditées par les autorités, donc considérées officielles. Dans l'Eglise réformée c'étaient « Az Út » comme hebdomadaire et « Református Egyház » paraissant bimensuellement ; dans l'Eglise luthérienne « Evangélikus Élet », aussi un hebdomadaire et « Lelkipásztor », un mensuel pour les pasteurs. Cette presse officielle ne reflète aucune autre opinion que celle des dirigeants ecclésiastiques ; leur influence est plutôt restreinte, car l'hebdomadaire réformé n'avait en 1956 que 6'000 abonnés, le bihebdomadaire « Református Egyház » 1'800 abonnés, — des chiffres extrêmement bas en comparaison au nombre des fidèles (2'000'000). Le tirage du l'hebdomadaire luthérien était, selon des observateurs allemands, environ 10'000 en 1961, et celui du mensuel autour de 1'000. Ces données constituent — sans aucun commentaire — une critique éloquente de ce que les Eglises protestantes « étatisées » de la Hongrie produisent à l'intention de leurs fidèles.

Il est extrêmement regrettable que les Bulletins publiés en anglais, en allemand et en français par l'Eglise réformée, informant le monde extérieur de tout ce qui se passait dans la vie des Eglises protestantes hongroises, soient reproduits, sans critique et sans commentaires, dans les organes d'information du Conseil Oecuménique des Eglises, de l'Alliance Réformée Mondiale et de la Fédération Luthérienne Mondiale — tout simplement à cause d'un certain opportunisme politique — qui n'a rien à voir avec l'impartialité chrétienne.

4. L'AUTOMNE DE 1956

L'année 1956 a apporté de changements fondamentaux dans la vie des Eglises protestantes hongroises. Parallèle aux événements sur la plan national, une certaine ouverture s'est manifestée parmi leurs dirigeants en face des problèmes urgents, et ces développements avaient été accélérés par la réunion en Hongrie du Comité Central du Conseil Oecuménique des Eglises dont les membres avaient fait état, devant les responsables hongrois, de l'opinion publique internationale quant à certains sujets très précis. Les changements consistaient surtout en une réévaluation de la situation, dans l'élimination de quelques personnalités compromises et en une réhabilitation spectaculaire de l'évêque luthérien Lajos Ordass.

La révolution qui éclate le 23 octobre interrompt cette évolution lente et apporta de brusques transformations parfaitement justifiées. Ces événements avaient été, toutefois, précédés dans l'Eglise réformée, par une effervescence intérieure produisant une « Déclaration de l'Eglise Confessante ». Ce qui se passait dans cette Eglise, la révolte « religieuse », peut être seulement comparée à la révolte des intellectuels, des écrivains, qui s'élevaient depuis le printemps 1956 contre les abus, les cruautés, les inégalités et les injustices du régime totalitaire. Les prises de position de la « Déclaration Confessante » de l'Eglise réformée hongroise de 1956 peuvent être résumées en quatre points (voir le texte intégral en Annexe) :

(a) En premier lieu, ses auteurs considèrent que la doctrine, selon laquelle les forces de rédemption oeuvrent dans l'histoire humaine au sans d'une évolution progressive et permanente, est fausse. C'est une sanctification de la foi optimiste en un progrès, liée au marxisme historique, et est en contradiction complète avec la Parole de Dieu. Ils précisent aussi que, en désaccord avec cette Parole, les dirigeants de l'Eglise voient l'ordre social existant en Hongrie comme un résultat positif menant au salut.

(b) Deuxièmement, ils soulignent que la mission de l'Eglise est, avant tout, d'apporter le message évangélique au monde, elle ne peut y renoncer en aucun cas, même si le monde n'en veut pas, même si le pouvoir étatique s'y oppose. La renonciation à cette mission signifierait la perte de sa raison d'être.

(c) Le troisième point de la Déclaration traite de la relation entre l'Eglise et l'Etat. Les confessants reconnaissent les droits des autorités du monde immanent, et se déclarent de les respecter et de les obéir. En plus, ils se prononcent contre les forces réactionnaires politiques, contre n'importe quelle tentative de restauration de l'ancien régime et se soumettent, à coeur ouvert, aux obligations des citoyens. Ils condamnent aussi toutes les fautes commises par l'ancien régime, mais ne peuvent reconnaître, à la lumière de la Parole de Dieu, que le régime actuel ne comporterait pas les signes du péché humain, et ne serait pas condamnable pour des faits auxquels l'Eglise ne peut, en aucun cas, donner sa bénédiction. Les auteurs de cette Déclaration constatent avec angoisse que le gouvernement de l'Eglise réformée ne remplit pas entièrement la mission prophétique de l'Eglise, car il condamne le passé, mais ne voit pas et ne rejette pas les fautes commises dans le présent. Ils attirent l'attention des dignitaires sur le fait que par cette attitude l'Eglise perd sa véracité aux yeux des fidèles.

(d) Dernièrement, la Déclaration souligne l'importance du principe du gouvernement presbytérien synodal de l'Eglise. Elle repousse toute domination dictatoriale d'une clique, — prévalant aux temps présents dans l'Eglise réformée hongroise, — tous les moyens d'intimidation employés contre les pasteurs ainsi qu'à l'encontre des congrégations, et le fait que par cette domination toutes les relations avec la chrétienté du monde soient déformées et exploitées à des fins politiques.

A la suite de toutes ces raisons, les auteurs de la Déclaration des Confessants mettent en évidence que l'Eglise ne peut en tout cas pas s'identifier à toutes les décisions prises par ses dirigeants,

« Nous ne considérons pas que l'obéissance soit à tout prix obligatoire, et reconnaissons que la possibilité existe que l'obéissance absolue vis-à-vis de notre gouvernement de l'Eglise peut être, maintes fois, une désobéissance envers Jésus Christ ».

Cette déclaration est devenue la base fondamentale d'un renouvellement qui a commencé à partir d'octobre 1956.

Pendant la Révolution, les deux Eglises protestantes commençaient à se réorganiser. Les évêques et les dirigeants laïcs, ayant fait tant de mal, avaient démissionné ou étaient forcés de donner leur démission. On a reconduit dans leurs positions ceux qui devaient les quitter par l'intimidation et la terreur. La vie spirituelle chrétienne reprenait ses droits. Il n'y a pas de doute que les Eglises protestantes, particulièrement l'Eglise réformée, se sont jointes à la Révolution suivant la tracée de leurs ancêtres qui luttèrent toujours pour la liberté nationale et religieuse. Les discours prononcés à la Radio Budapest par les évêques Ravasz et Ordass pendant ces jours glorieux, n'en laissaient pas d'équivoque. Et c'est à cause de cette attitude, qui n'était qu'inévitable en étant conforme aux traditions séculaires des Eglises protestantes hongroises, qu'elles étaient persécutées après l'écrasement du soulèvement du peuple hongrois par les troupes russes quand une restauration complète suivit. La restauration signifiait le renvoi de tous les dirigeants authentiques et la réinstallation à leur poste des précédents serviteurs dociles de l'Etat.

Le nouveau gouvernement Kádár portait vraiment à cœur le sort de ces anciens compagnons, même s'ils étaient recrutés dans les cercles ecclésiastiques. Déjà à la fin de novembre, l'Office de l'Etat chargé des affaires des Eglises a déclaré qu'il ne peut pas considérer comme valables les concordats conclus avec les dénominations protestantes que sur la base de la situation existant avant la révolution de 1956. En outre, une déclaration gouvernementale affirmait plus tard qu'on ne peut tolérer que n'importe qui parmi les dignitaires ecclésiastiques puisse utiliser l'un des organes de sa dénomination contre l'ordre légal de la démocratie populaire afin de faire triompher les forces réactionnaires. De même, le gouvernement ne pouvait pas tolérer non plus que quiconque parmi les membres des Eglises se voit infliger un traitement désavantageux à cause de ses vues progressistes. Tous les moyens de pression ont été mis en œuvre afin de faire fléchir les fidèles des Eglises protestantes à partir des menaces concernant la révocation des subventions financières de l'Etat jusqu'à la menace physique. De nombreux pasteurs ont été incarcérés, condamnés, et un décret-loi de 1957 stipula que pour remplir les postes vacants dans les Eglises ou par voie de nomination, ou par voie d'élection, ainsi que pour les transferts et les relèvements de fonction, une autorisation préalable des autorités étatiques est désormais nécessaire. Par ce geste, les Eglises protestantes hongroises avaient perdu les derniers vestiges de leur autonomie. Dans leur analyse des raisons de la révolution de 1956, les dirigeants des Eglises, remis à leur poste par l'Etat, suivent docilement le raisonnement du parti socialiste des travailleurs, en mettant l'explication politique sous une forme théologique formulée dans un langage piétiste. Le Mouvement de Renouveau et tous ceux qui ont produit la Déclaration des Confessants ont été qualifiés de « contre-révolutionnaires » et les lieutenants fidèles du régime, ont liquidé, par des « mesures administratives », tous ceux qui avaient un lien quelconque avec l'opposition au sein de l'Eglise.

L'EPILOGUE

Depuis 1961, et parallèle au développement de la crise sino-soviétique, une évolution intéressante inspirant, quoiqu'en certaines limites, beaucoup d'espoir, se manifeste en Hongrie. L'amélioration de la situation économique, l'augmentation du niveau de vie de certaines couches de la population, une liberté politique relativement plus grande, une liberté de communication restreinte avec les pays de l'Occident, auparavant inimaginable, sont, entre autres, les signes des changements extrêmement importants. Cette évolution est généralement connue dans les cercles ecclésiastiques du monde européen, ensemble avec ses manifestations, donc il n'est pas nécessaire de s'étendre plus longuement sur les détails caractérisant ces changements.

Il est, au contraire, moins connu que cette évolution ne s'étend pas aux Eglises protestantes hongroises au sein desquelles encore très peu de changements sont à noter et dont les dirigeants actuels se permettent de suivre une ligne plus dure que le gouvernement du pays lui-même. Cet ostracisme de la position des gouvernants des Eglises est le résultat d'une situation particulière où la mise au pas intervenue en 1948, n'était pas réalisée entièrement, c'est-à-dire la liberté relative qui restait, malgré tout, dans un espace restreint pour les dirigeants des Eglises, joue actuellement en faveur des forces opposées à la libéralisation, en opposition au courant dominant dans le bloc soviétique. Dans une perspective sociologique, cette situation est facilement explicable par l'autodéfense des groupes d'intérêt qui prenaient une certaine distance vis-à-vis du gouvernement et luttent, en effet, pour leur peau, pour leur existence. Car les hommes politiques qui amorcent la tournure vers une libéralisation limitée de la vie publique, peuvent se reprendre d'une manière ou d'une autre, mais les serviteurs de second rang, comme les dirigeants ecclésiastiques, sont inévitablement perdus.

ANNEX

L'EGLISE CONFESSANTE EN HONGRIE EN 1956*

« Jésus-Christ est le même hier, et aujourd'hui, et éternellement ».

Hébreux, 13:8.

La confession est toujours née dans le feu des combats de l'Eglise.

Ces heures décisives forgent l'histoire.

Aujourd'hui, Dieu a donné à l'Eglise Réformé de Hongrie de vivre une telle période.

A cette lutte actuelle de l'Eglise confessante, participent certains pasteurs, certains conseillers de paroisse, certains fidèles qui, vivant l'Evangile et s'appuyant sur les principes théologiques des réformateurs (basés aussi sur les Ecritures), se trouvent en contradiction, et avec la théologie du gouvernement de l'Eglise, et avec la pratique de celle-ci.

Notre Eglise confessante n'a pas d'organisation, mais la solidarité de ses membres, née d'une foi, d'une mission, d'une responsabilité, d'une lutte commune, est un lien plus puissant que n'importe quelle organisation.

En réalité, cette Eglise confessante existe. Le nombre croissant des pasteurs et membres de l'Eglise, victimes de relégations, en témoigne. Il en est qui, parce que confessants, perdent leur situation, d'autres sont même emprisonnés, ou détenus dans des camps de concentration.

Nous allons maintenant brièvement résumer les vérités évangéliques sur lesquelles, avec l'aide de Dieu, nous nous basons dans la lutte engagée que nous menons aujourd'hui au sein de l'Eglise Réformée de Hongrie.

1. **« Celui qui croit au Fils a la vie éternelle ; celui qui ne croit pas au Fils ne verra point la vie, mais la colère de Dieu demeure sur lui ».** Jean, 3:36.

L'action de Jésus Christ, qui crée l'homme nouveau, se réalise par la Parole dans la vie humaine, mais c'est seulement par la foi personnelle, engendrée par le Saint-Esprit, que cette action devient une réalité fructueuse.

Nous admettons, nous aussi, qu'en ce monde corrompu jusqu'à la moelle par le péché, Dieu, dans la plénitude de Sa grâce, accorde certaines réponses provisoires. Nous confessons néanmoins que seule la rédemption nous apporte une solution radicale. Mais — selon les Ecritures — seuls participent à cette nouvelle naissance ceux qui, par leur foi personnelle, acceptent leur rachat par Jésus-Christ.

Il est donc erroné, selon nous, l'enseignement qui prétend que les forces de la rédemption agissent dans l'histoire profane de manière à y constituer une évolution constante et positive.

Cette sanction sotériologique de la foi optimiste en évolution, engendré par le matérialisme historique, est donc en contradiction avec la Parole. Ainsi, cette philosophie de l'histoire s'oppose aux Ecritures, et dissimulée sous un aspect théologique, qu'adoptent les dirigeants de l'Eglise officielle dans maintes déclarations par lesquelles ils entendent faire admettre notre actuel système social comme une conséquence historique positive de la rédemption, affirmation découlant pour eux de la foi chrétienne..

C'est dans l'Eglise qui se renouvelle continuellement que nous trouvons pleinement le sens de la nouvelle création en Christ, et non pas dans certains changements des formes politiques et économiques. La Rédemption n'est pas le résultat de histoire profane, développant graduellement jusqu'à devenir le Royaume de Dieu : bien au contraire, la Rédemption c'est, de plus en plus, le salut divin qui déploie ses effets dans l'histoire séculière.

2. « **Allez par tout le monde, et prêchez la bonne nouvelle à toute la création** ». Marc, 16: 15.

Nous confessons que l'Eglise existe dans le but d'évangéliser le monde. Il lui est donc impossible, en n'importe quelle circonstance, de renoncer à ses tâches d'évangélisation. Ce faisant, elle nierait le sens même de son existence. Sa mission consiste à annoncer la Parole vivante de Dieu, centrée sur la Crucifixion et la Résurrection de Jésus Christ.

L'Eglise se doit d'accomplir cette tâche indépendamment des aspirations ou des objections émises par le monde. Elle se doit de remplir sa mission même si le monde (en l'occurrence, les autorités séculières) lui imposait des entraves ou lui opposait des interdictions formelles. Dans cette dernière situation, l'Eglise se verrait entraînée à vivre dans l'illégalité et, bien que contre son gré, amenée à suivre la voie de l'Eglise sous la Croix, le chemin du martyr. :

Chaque fois qu'au cours de l'histoire, l'Eglise a pris au sérieux sa tâche d'évangélisation, elle a subi persécutions et souffrances, tel est l'enseignement que nous donnent, simultanément, les Saintes Ecritures et les événements historiques. C'est pour elle un privilège que de participer à la souffrance du Christ. Il ne lui eût été possible d'éviter son sort qu'en imitant le comportement de Judas dans sa trahison du Christ.

Ce n'est pas notre moindre inquiétude que de constater l'interdiction par le gouvernement de l'Eglise des colonies d'évangélisation, toute activité étant défendue par les autorités ecclésiastiques aux agents laïques, et les possibilités comprises dans l'accord conclu avec l'Etat en 1948, sont ainsi laissées inexploitées. Ce fait inclut, soit la suspension totale, soit une restriction étendue des diverses oeuvres missionnaires d'édification : missions en faveur de l'enfance, de l'adolescence, et en terres païennes.

Par toutes ces circonstances, le gouvernement officiel de l'Eglise d'aujourd'hui envisage intentionnellement et systématiquement de faire échouer les services de la mission intérieure.

Le plus inquiétant est qu'une justification, prétendument théologique, étant donnée par le gouvernement de l'Eglise, ces faits sont triomphalement accueillis comme le renouveau de la conception de l'Eglise dans le domaine des oeuvres des missions intérieures.

Tout cela nous empêche d'adhérer à une semblable position de l'Eglise. Obéissant aux seuls commandements de Jésus-Christ, nous déclarons que tous les membres de l'Eglise, les pasteurs surtout — malgré les avertissements intimes — ont l'obligation morale de poursuivre avec hardiesse l'oeuvre d'Évangélisation.

3. **« Que toute personne soit soumise aux autorités supérieures; car il n'y a point d'autorité qui ne vienne de Dieu, et les autorités qui existent ont été instituées de Dieu ».** Romains 13, 1

« Il faut obéir à Dieu plutôt qu'aux hommes ». Actes, 5: 29.

Nous croyons que nos autorités politiques actuelles sont, elles aussi, instituées de Dieu. Nous leur devons donc l'estime due, ainsi que nos prières pour elles. Nous leur devons obéissance dans toutes les circonstances ne contredisant pas la loi de Dieu. Nous ne sommes donc point, les adeptes de l'idée d'une réaction politique, nous ne sommes même leurs adversaires. Nous nous prononçons contre n'importe quelles tentatives de contre-révolution, éventuellement envisageant le rétablissement du passé. Nous accomplirons nos devoirs de citoyens d'un coeur sincère et joyeux. Nous estimons que l'ordre social de notre passé a été condamné par un juste jugement de Dieu. Mais, à la lumière de la Parole, nous confessons que l'ordre social ainsi que l'Etat actuel — comme tout un chacun — porte aussi en lui les stigmates du péché. Beaucoup de ces caractéristiques ne peuvent donc être sanctionnées par l'assentiment de l'Eglise.

L'attitude prophétique d'une Eglise, réalisant les principes de sa foi en pratique, a, de tous temps, été de soutenir et d'encourager les autorités civiles dans leur activité ayant pour but le bonheur des citoyens et la garantie de la justice. Mais, cette Eglise a également pour mission de constamment dénoncer les manquements de cet Etat, comme des plaies qui doivent être soignées et guéries.

Nous constatons avec inquiétude que le gouvernement de l'Eglise d'aujourd'hui n'accomplit que la première partie de sa tâche prophétique. Quant au second point, elle le néglige totalement. Par cela, l'équilibre de sa mission est inversé de telle manière que l'Eglise servante devient une Eglise servile. La situation est encore aggravée du fait que l'Eglise donne son approbation à de telles situations qu'elle devrait flétrir.

Ainsi, non seulement le service de l'Eglise se montre en déséquilibre envers le monde, mais plus encore, avec son comportement elle semble limiter la notion de sincérité. Par là, elle oublie la prière sacerdotale de son Seigneur : « Sanctifie— les par ta vérité ; ta parole est la vérité ». Jean 17: 17.

Pour ces raisons, nous éprouvons la nécessité de faire savoir à tous nos frères que lorsque nous nous trouvons devant nos autorités civiles et ecclésiastiques, nous obéissons sans crainte à la volonté de notre Seigneur, étant prêts à confesser sans fausseté ni ambiguïté, notre « oui » ou notre « non », aussi bien par nos paroles que par nos actes.

4. « *Il a tout mis sous ses pieds et Il l'a donné pour chef suprême à l'Eglise* ». Ephésiens 1: 22.

Quant à la vie intérieure de l'Eglise, nous confessons que Jésus-Christ est son chef unique. Seule, Sa parole fait autorité. Nos aïeux réformateurs ont eu pour préoccupation d'exprimer et de réaliser ce précepte important par le système de gouvernement presbytérien-synodal.

Nous tenons donc à déclarer illicite au sein de l'Eglise tout règne dictatorial de clan, parce qu'il est une sorte de violation du règne de Christ.

Notre gouvernement ecclésiastique a prouvé qu'il fait fausse route par l'emploi de méthodes en usage dans le monde pour imposer ses décisions dans l'Eglise. En reniant tout le patrimoine hérité des réformateurs, en ne tenant pas compte de la résistance des communautés paroissiales, il use de toute son autorité pour imposer à celles-ci des dirigeants qu'il a choisis lui-même. Sous le prétexte de fausses accusations, ou par la violence, certains responsables de paroisses se voient ou écartés ou déplacés, ou privés de leurs postes, parce qu'ils n'approuvent pas, ou critiquent parfois les directives émises par le gouvernement actuel de l'Eglise. Ce gouvernement ne tolère aucune opposition au sujet de ses décisions. Si d'aucuns s'y risquaient, ils seraient déclarés sectaires, fauteurs de désordres, ou même ennemis de l'Etat.

Fait plus grave : il ne s'agit pas seulement d'imposer des décisions dictatoriales d'ordre administratif, mais les autorités vont jusqu'à prendre l'engagement d'imposer aux pasteurs une théologie nouvelle, ambiguë de plusieurs points de vue, comme étant l'explication valable et actuelle des Saintes Ecritures ; elles rendent l'exercice des ministres de l'Eglise dépendant de leur obéissances à ces ordres.

L'état de nos relations avec nos frères de la chrétienté universelle est aussi défini par ce régime de coterie de l'Eglise Réformée de Hongrie. Toutes les relations sont exclusivement l'apanage de ce clan restreint. C'est pourquoi les études effectuées en vue des rencontres mondiales des Eglises ne reflètent que les opinions de cette minorité du régime de terreur. Ainsi, ne peuvent-elles être considérées comme des témoignages de l'ensemble des chrétiens réformés de Hongrie, bien qu'elles passent pour telles.

En conséquence des choses mentionnées ci-dessus, les visiteurs de nos Eglises-soeurs de l'étranger n'ont guère la possibilité d'évaluer pleinement la situation réelle et véridique de notre Eglise, Notre organisation, soi-disant « œcuménique » loin de pratiquer un esprit communautaire fraternel vis-à-vis de la chrétienté mondiale, use plutôt de faux témoignages dans le dessin de leurrer cette dernière:

Il nous faut aller plus loin encore. Ce système de coterie commet, à l'occasion, des abus de pouvoir même dans le domaine matériel, aboutissant à la situation suivante : tandis que le traitement de la majorité des pasteurs atteint à peine un minimum vital, des personnalités importantes reçoivent des émoluments démesurément superflus. Les bénéficiaires sont, pour la plupart d'entre eux, des hommes dont la conduite immorale antérieure et récente est notoire dans le pays. Les gaspillages, commis lors de réceptions, festins et voyages officiels effectués par le gouvernement actuel de l'Eglise, ne sont aucunement motivés. Cet étalage de luxe est accordé à ceux de nos dirigeants qui se chargent de promouvoir les intérêts politiques de l'Etat, mais il est impossible d'accepter ce fait par les témoins de Jésus-Christ dont certains ne disposent parfois d'aucune place où reposer sa tête, et qui ont consenti de vivre dans la misère dans notre intérêt commun.

Ceci dit, nous nous sentons obligés de déclarer que nous ne sommes pas en mesure d'accepter sans exceptions les décisions de l'Eglise. Nous ne nous considérons pas comme astreints à obéir sans conditions. Nous ouvririons par là le chemin à des possibilités d'obéissance au gouvernement actuel de l'Eglise, qui, en maintes occasions, deviendraient des désobéissances à Jésus Christ. Cette constatation aura toute sa portée surtout si ces « ordres » visent à soumettre au contrôle la prédication de la Parole pour servir des buts, des programmes suggérés de l'extérieur, procédant ainsi à sa corruption.

Outre le veto le plus absolu que nous opposons à une coopération avec nos autorités à de semblables occasions, nous nous sentons obligés d'élever également la voix pour réclamer la restauration des principes du système presbytérien — synodal, l'intégrité dans les questions matérielles et la liberté de la prédication. Que nous puissions oeuvrer pour l'Evangile selon les possibilités et la force qui nous sont données par Dieu.

Nous prions instamment tous nos frères d'agir de même au sujet des décisions de politique ecclésiastique, et, au besoin, informer tous ceux qui leur demanderaient conseil.

***« Le solide fondement de Dieu reste debout, avec ces paroles qui lui servent de sceau :
Le Seigneur connaît ceux qui Lui appartiennent, et quiconque prononce le nom du Seigneur, qu'il
s'éloigne de l'iniquité ».***

II Timothée 2:19.

Civilizational Pluralism or Globalization?

POSSIBILITES DE CONTACTS AVEC LE MONDE MUSULMAN*

1. REMARQUES PRELIMINAIRES

Pour mieux saisir le problème que nous nous posons aujourd'hui dans le cadre de ce bref exposé, il faut le situer dans un contexte plus large de l'histoire contemporaine.

L'époque dans laquelle nous vivons, n'est pas seulement l'ère éblouissante du miracle nucléaire, mais aussi *l'âge de la confrontation des civilisations*.

En effet, par la suite des événements de ce 20^{ème} siècle, et, surtout, des années d'après-guerre, notre optique doit subir une transformation radicale. Eucken, le grand philosophe allemand, avait justement remarqué que ces derniers mille ans de l'histoire européenne, qui semblaient aux gens du 19^{ème} siècle et aux historiens de jadis comme constituant le « tout », ou la phase essentielle de l'histoire universelle, n'apparaissaient guère aujourd'hui comme tel, mais plutôt comme un simple composant d'un ensemble beaucoup plus vaste. « Nous savons maintenant, nous autres civilisations que nous sommes mortelles », disait Paul Valéry, en franchissant ainsi un pas décisif dans la prise de conscience de notre temps.

Donc la question de notre rapprochement à l'Islam doit être envisagée sous cet angle — dans la perspective de la confrontation des civilisations, c'est-à-dire dans le dialogue et dans l'interaction de notre civilisation européenne et celle de l'Islam. Ce dernier a un aspect que nous ne devons pas oublier, son caractère « totalitaire ». Cet épithète n'a rien en commun sous ce rapport aux expériences sinistres et tragiques que nous avons vécu et nous vivons encore en Europe (nazisme et communisme), mais signifie tout simplement que l'Islam est une conception de vie, une idéologie, qui englobe toute la vie humaine, domine toutes les activités de ce dernier jusqu'aux moindres détails. Dans ce sens, l'Islam va plus loin et apparaît plus exigeant que le christianisme.

2. LES CARACTERISTIQUES SAILLANTES DE L'ISLAM CONTEMPORAINE

En analysant l'Islam contemporain on trouve trois caractéristiques essentielles qui le définissent par rapport à d'autres civilisations.

(a) *Tout d'abord, l'Islam est, incontestablement, une force vivante.*

Je m'en suis rendu compte, personnellement, lors de mon voyage au Moyen-Orient en 1962. J'y ai vécu, entre autres, une scène des plus touchantes, en me promenant vers six heures de l'après-midi sur les collines de Jérusalem, entre la Ville Sainte et Ramallah, une jolie petite localité jordanienne. Soudainement, j'ai aperçu

* Exposé fait à la Conférence annuelle de l'Union Européenne des Jeunes Démocrates Chrétiens en 1963.

devant le bâtiment de la Radio Jérusalem un soldat de la Légion Arabe, montant la garde. Il était l'heure de faire la prière. Le soldat prenait son tapis, le posait sur le sol — et, sous les lumières hallucinantes du coucher du soleil, s'agenouillait, touchait le sol avec sa tête et commençait à faire la prière, selon le rite millénaire, et avec une sincérité et une simplicité captivantes.

L'Islam, par sa force réelle et par son emprise totale sur l'homme, crée une communauté cohérente. Cette communauté devenait le cadre naturel de la vie du musulman croyant, et s'il en est arraché, il se sent inévitablement dépaycé. Les musulmans vivant en Europe ou ailleurs, en dehors de leur environnement naturel, offrent, presque dans tous les cas, l'exemple de ce déracinement fondamental, et la réadaptation à une nouvelle mode d'existence n'est pas seulement difficile, mais n'est pas toujours couronnée de succès.

(b) *Toutefois, le monde musulman n'est pas homogène, mais divisé.*

Les différences de race (arabe et non-arabe), de traditions, de caractère, de mode de vie, qui séparent ses adhérents, sont difficilement surmontables. Cet état de fait est compréhensible si on regarde la carte géographique et on réalise que le monde islamique s'étend de l'Afrique Noire et de l'Afrique du Nord (le Maghreb), par le Proche- et le Moyen-Orient et le sub-continent indien jusqu'à l'Extrême-Orient. En rencontrant un musulman du Niger, ce pays périphérique du Sahara avec sa très belle race de touareg, ou de la Guinée, d'une part, et des musulmans arabes du Moyen-Orient, d'autre part, la différence saute aux yeux de celui qui approche ce monde de l'extérieur. La même chose pourrait être dit des Égyptiens et des Syriens, d'un côté, et des Pakistanais ou des Indonésiens, de l'autre. L'adaptation de l'Islam aux conditions et aux peuples divers était faite au cours de l'histoire avec beaucoup d'ingéniosité et de succès, même s'il fallait, au début de l'islamisation, sacrifier certains principes fondamentaux. Ainsi, l'Islam a réussi à introduire une certaine unité de vue dans la diversité, sans pouvoir écarter les forces de séparation qui s'accroissaient encore avec l'évolution historique différente des peuples et des régions qu'il englobait.

(c) *La troisième caractéristique est la plus importante : les difficultés de la modernisation dans le monde musulman.*

L'Islam est aujourd'hui une civilisation aux prises avec les forces du monde moderne, c'est-à-dire aux prises avec les forces du développement technique, économique et social du monde occidental. Il se pose pour lui le problème de l'adaptation la plus difficile, il doit trouver des véritables formes nouvelles d'existence dans la vie de la communauté des croyants. En comparant cette gestation douloureuse à celle de l'Europe du 17^{ème} et du 18^{ème} siècles, force est de constater que le décalage énorme existant entre le monde musulman et la civilisation occidentale impose un rythme beaucoup plus accéléré que l'Europe devait suivre à l'époque, car les gens veulent acquérir le plus vite possible, sinon immédiatement, les avantages dont jouissent les peuples de la partie riche de notre globe (ce qu'on appelle en économie l'effet de la démonstration).

Comme symptômes de la confrontation apparaissent des excès modernistes ou conservateurs, ainsi que le phénomène des 'générations perdues' dont le sort a été décrit par le professeur d'Oxford, d'origine syrienne, Albert Hourani. En effet, déjà avant la deuxième guerre mondiale, mais en nombre toujours croissant depuis, de jeunes musulmans arabes ou autres, qui avaient reçu une éducation occidentale et ont été imbibés des idées modernes, rompirent avec les traditions et conceptions de leur environnement islamique et adaptèrent une vie tout à fait à l'européenne. En quelques cas, cette opération délicate a bien réussi, mais pour la majorité l'assimilation dans un monde nouveau s'est traduite par un échec et s'est restreinte, au plus, à l'adoption d'un

comportement et des manières, donc une mode de vie extérieure (en ajoutant, éventuellement, une profession nouvelle, comme, par exemple, ingénieur ou médecin), sans l'absorption de la conception intellectuelle, du système des valeurs et de l'éthique qui sont à la base spirituelle de notre culture occidentale. Donc, des gens vivant 'entre' deux mondes, se sont coupés du fondement indispensable de l'existence, sans en trouver un autre, et ont créé un vacuum spirituel et humain autour d'eux-mêmes. C'est pour cela qu'on peut les appeler des 'générations perdues'.

La civilisation islamique présente aussi des difficultés d'adaptation aux conditions modernes, qui lui sont propres, en comparaison aux autres civilisations du Tiers-Monde. Tandis'en Afrique, par exemple, la création de nouvelles structures se fait sans se heurter à une organisation sociale déjà existante et rigide, dans les pays de l'Islam il s'agit plutôt d'une re-structuration ou de remplacement des anciennes structures par des nouvelles.

Ainsi, à l'heure actuelle, la tâche à laquelle la civilisation islamique doit faire face, est la suivante : se hisser au niveau de développement technique moderne de l'Occident, en adoptant non seulement les innovations matérielles de ce dernier, mais aussi l'attitude sociale et les valeurs morales qui sont à la base de ses résultats éblouissants, tout en sauvegardant sa propre personnalité, ses traditions et sa base spirituelle authentique.

3. LES POSSIBILITES DE RAPPROCHEMENT

Sur le plan religieux, le premier pas consiste à cette époque postmissionnaire, de souligner la base commune des deux religions : *notre foi monothéiste*.

Mais la reconnaissance de ce fait ne suffit pas : elle prend son sens véritable seulement si on accepte que notre époque, cet âge nucléaire ou âge de la confrontation des civilisations, est à l'instar des premiers siècles du christianisme l'ère de l'apologétique (à l'opposé des siècles passés qui peuvent être qualifié de ceux de la polémique), c'est-à-dire nous devons réaliser que l'âge nucléaire est aussi l'âge du front commun des religions monothéistes face à l'athéisme contemporain. Bien entendu, sous l'étiquette de l'athéisme contemporain, on découvre autant le conformisme dans notre société chrétienne (une attitude inconsciente) que les idéologies athées systématique dont le plus agressif est la doctrine communiste. Il semble, par conséquent, qu'aujourd'hui le front commun chrétien-islamique doit se dresser surtout contre cette forme communiste de l'athéisme qui dispose d'énormes et puissants moyens, non pas de la conviction spirituelle, mais de la contrainte physique et intellectuelle.

Toutefois, une condition *a priori* d'une telle entreprise, d'un côté comme de l'autre, est l'abolition de la pratique missionnaire qui ne peut que créer des frictions. On doit éliminer de nos esprits toute influence de la théologie missionnaire des siècles passés qui faisaient jusqu'à nos jours partie intégrante de la foi chrétienne.

Sur le plan politique, économique et social, les démocrates-chrétiens devraient appliquer les principes suivants :

- La non-immixtion dans les intrigues et dans les luttes locales et nationales, car l'instabilité dans les régimes politiques et les affaires publiques, amène maintes fois à des volte-face et à des renversements les plus inattendus ;

- L'appui sans réserve aux aspirations fondamentales des pays islamiques :

- (i) au nationalisme ;
- (ii) à la transformation sociale, ce qui signifie l'abolition des structures féodales ;
- (iii) à un 'socialisme' modéré.

A première vue, il apparaît que l'universalisme de l'Islam et le nationalisme arabe, pakistanais ou autre, sont en contradiction fondamentale, et que l'un exclut l'autre. En réalité, ce n'est pas le cas, d'autant plus qu'au cours des années depuis la grande guerre, le nationalisme se dressait avant tout contre le colonialisme étranger et visait l'accession à l'indépendance des pays islamiques, ce qui était entièrement en ligne avec la doctrine qui exige la libération des terres islamiques de la domination étrangère. Le problème devient plus compliqué actuellement quand tous les pays islamiques ont déjà acquis leur indépendance politique, et, par conséquent, des conflits peuvent surgir effectivement entre les régimes nationalistes du Tiers-monde, en général, et entre des pays islamiques, en particulier. Toutefois, ils ont encore des ennemis communs ainsi, par exemple, le communisme athée, auxquels ils doivent faire face ensemble. Etant donné la tâche primordiale des pays récemment émancipés, c'est-à-dire leur développement économique et social, à la réalisation duquel la contribution de l'Islam — pour l'ajustement indispensable de la civilisation aux exigences de l'époque moderne) est aussi nécessaire qu'une politique gouvernementale correspondante, une confrontation hostile entre le nationalisme et l'Islam ne semble pas se dessiner dans l'avenir proche. Bien entendu, il y a aussi des impondérables, des facteurs qui exercent une influence considérable sur ce problème, parmi eux le plus important est le rythme de la sécularisation de la société et de la mentalité des pays musulmans. En tout cas, l'histoire européenne prouve, elle aussi, que l'universalisme de la foi n'exclut pas le nationalisme justifié — seulement ses abus.

En ce qui concerne la transformation des structures sociales — et ceci signifie avant tout l'abolition des structures féodales — il n'y a pas lieu d'argumenter sur cette question, car, indiscutablement, il est impossible d'implanter une économie industrialisée dans le cadre de ces structures, l'évolution européenne en a donné les preuves.

Le 'socialisme', pris au sens que les divers pays du Tiers-monde lui donne et non pas au sens doctrinaire européen, semble actuellement être la voie à suivre pour la plupart des pays qui veulent améliorer les conditions dans lesquelles vit la population. C'est un fait et ne signifie nullement que qu'avec cette constatation on s'embourbe dans la querelle idéologique infructueuse occidentale. L'application d'un certain 'socialisme' est d'autant plus justifié dans l'orbite de la civilisation islamique que cette dernière comporte un sens communautaire plus aigu que notre civilisation, et même en vue d'un développement économique et social moderne, il est essentiel de bâtir sur cette donnée, enracinée profondément dans l'esprit musulman.

4. QUELQUES PROBLEMES CONCRETS

En conclusion, voici quelques problèmes que l'Islam, les pays ou la société islamiques, sont obligés de résoudre car ils influencent l'avenir de leurs efforts présents et futurs :

— Dans l'organisation étatique : le très fort penchant vers la théocratie, reste-t-il un constant de la civilisation islamique, ne freinera-t-il pas la modernisation ? L'idée théocratique peut-elle être abandonnée en sauvegardant le rôle directeur de l'enseignement du Prophète dans la vie de la société ? Est-ce que l'Islam va trouver des formules spécifiques remplissant toutes les exigences et de la foi, et de développement moderne ?

— Organiquement lié à ce problème se trouve la question de la future organisation de la vie publique dans les pays islamiques (qui se pose d'ailleurs dans les mêmes termes à tous les autres pays récemment accédés à l'indépendance en Afrique comme en Asie) : est-ce qu'une démocratie parlementaire serait capable de fonctionner dans les conditions actuelles, ou un système souple du parti unique doit être accepté qui assure la centralisation des efforts et de la direction des affaires, tout en garantissant une certaine démocratie au sein du parti, ou mouvement national ?

— Sur le plan économique, la tradition islamique pose des problèmes particuliers, parmi lesquels l'un des plus importants est l'interdiction d'intérêt (c'est-à-dire l'argent gagné par l'argent et non par la production ou des services rendus) par le Coran, étant donné qu'une vie économique à l'occidentale n'est pas imaginable sans notre système de financement, basé sur l'emprunt de l'argent qui rapporte un intérêt à son détenteur et stimule ainsi l'épargne. Comment l'Islam va-t-il surmonter cette difficulté ?

— Du point de vue de l'éducation, non seulement l'importance de la formation des cadres techniques, scientifiques, administratifs, etc. doit être soulignée, mais encore l'éducation civique qui inculque dans la mentalité des gens la notion de la responsabilité civique, indispensable à la réalisation des objectifs économiques et sociaux des peuples du Tiers-Monde.

L'expérience en cours dans divers pays serait-elle concluante ? L'avenir nous le montrera.

DIALOGUE OF CIVILIZATIONS*

THE OTHER FACE OF THE GLOBALIZING PROCESS

A Concept Paper

by

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* This concept paper, never published, was used by the author as a basis for discussion with possible partners in organizing civilizational dialogues.

THE NEED OF CIVILIZATIONAL DIALOGUE

We live in a pluralistic world. This pluralistic world is characterized by the phenomenon of globalization, and the two phenomena complete each other. Globalization, in accordance with the definition given by Roland Robertson, stands, simultaneously, for a universalization of certain features of different sorts of particularisms and the absorption into particular contexts of certain features of universalism. Thus, in the specific dialectics of our age globality is pluralistic and pluralism is globalized through information and communication technologies.

The highest level of our pluralistic world is constituted by the interface of different civilizations. By highest level I mean that civilizations are above the system of nation-states and above the interstatal structure of international organizations, especially the United Nations Organization. They are above the interstatal level because civilizations such as the Islamic, the Western, or the Buddhist cover endless territories composed of sovereign states, members of international institutions, and an infinite number of human beings who are moving across state frontiers in what we call 'transnational' movements. On the other hand, the populations of these States despite their diversity, despite their movements from region to region, are all living in a globalized world, though they all are conditioned by the beliefs, values and ways of life of the civilizations in which they were born and brought up. The world created by these civilizations determines their identity whether they want it or not. It is, therefore, justified to speak about 'human worlds.'

Globalization does not eliminate civilizational characteristics; on the contrary, it makes them visible for everybody because modern technologies 'compress' the world in the sense, and in this sense only, that they bring close to all of us images and discourses characterizing these particular human worlds, though, at the same time, they also create a feeling of space and time 'distanciation' as the local is transformed in the infinite spatial and the moment, the present moment, becomes a planetary time-perspective. As modernity's geographic presence is felt all over the world because it has become intermeshed with life almost everywhere, the geographic congealment of civilizational alternatives truly became impossible.

It is important to point out that, in addition to technological developments, the real point of departure of globalization as universalization of the particular and particularization of the universal was the decolonization movement after World War II as civilizations, other than the West, entered the world scene as partners and actors of the former metropolitan powers. They became known as specific human worlds, and their features are diffused through the media and through instruments of communication like the Internet in all parts of the planet.

However, the globalizing trend did not create, as some would have us believe, a 'world culture,' a sort of syncretistic amalgamation of different cultural characteristics, because a Muslim Arab is still a Muslim Arab, a Chinese with a Confucian or Taoist background remains still a Chinese, and a Hindu, belonging to whichever branch of the Hindu belief systems and ways of life, still remains a Hindu. Globalization in a plural world of civilizations does not destroy their identity and does not unify them, but necessitates their communicating with each other in order to reach a consensus on matters of importance in the global context.

THE CONCEPT OF CIVILIZATIONAL DIALOGUE

Civilizational pluralism is quite different from all other kinds of pluralism, like those existing within civilizational worlds themselves. The presence of pluralism since the dawn of history constitutes what some call an 'ordered heterogeneity,' representing, in its late modern forms especially, an authoritarian or media-imposed cultural uniformity, a sort of homogeneity fatal for a pluralistic world. Pluralism is a self-explanatory term, but is used in

multiple ways. In my usage, it means civilizational pluralism which also stands for cultural pluralism. The distinction is important because it distinguishes this usage from the concept of multiculturalism which means the co-existence of different cultures in one state, and is linked to the defense of minority rights and the freedom of expression. *Civilizational pluralism stands for the co-existence of several different civilizations on the world scene.* There is only one world if the entity designated by the concept 'world' is the totality of things, objects, phenomena; but there is a 'plurality of worlds' if 'world' stands for the perspective of human totality. Civilizational pluralism, the fact that different civilizations co-exist on our planet, is a celebration of difference.

It is evident that civilizational pluralism is the opposite of universalism of which the contemporary belief in the 'one world' is a particular, time-bound manifestation. Yesteryear's universalism represents an outmoded perspective in a world in which a plurality of great civilizations co-exists and communicates in the same space. It is, therefore, not adequate as a framework to settle problems which emerge on the world scene because actions of the international community cannot be derived from irrelevant foundations. It is thus inevitable to return to the principle of *contextuality*, implying a considerable degree of relativism. Contextualism in my understanding means that each question, each problem has to be considered, has to be placed in its proper context, that is, in its cultural framework and in the social and economic circumstances prevailing in the civilizational world in which it emerged. On the one hand, universalism, in contrast to globalization, intends to grasp the world as a whole in the sense that it affirms presumably universally held beliefs, values, identities and characteristics as well as to establish presumably universally applicable institutional structures. On the other hand, globalization, in contrast to universalism, recognizes the importance of contextuality and, through this recognition; it embraces its bipolar opposite, localism. Localism and contextualism are, in my eyes, identical terms. Localism, by its inner logic, gives priority to particularism as much as does contextualism; both eliminate abstract, formalistic approaches or preconceived principles for the sake of the contingent particularity of things and the contingent particularity of events. Thus, globalization absorbs certain aspects of localism and frequently reflects contextual realities, whereas particular situations incorporate a certain number of global traits or instrumentalize such traits for their own purposes.

Culture patterns and environmentally and historically conditioned relationships may constitute cross-cultural regularities, either simultaneously – contemporaneity – or on a temporal continuum – history – without implying either a diffusional linkage or a developmental sequence. Civilizational pluralism poses, therefore, the problem of how to ensure communication and how to achieve mutual understanding between people belonging to different civilizations. Inter-civilizational encounters imply a civilizational dialogue all the more that the pluralism of civilizations presupposes inter-civilizational relativism (within the bounds of a given civilization pluralism, partial or global, may or may not exist). Such relativism means that different reasoning patterns, that is, a different rationality prevailing in a different culture is accepted, and it also means that varying social practices – ritual, institutional, social, or political – are acknowledged without endeavoring to prove that the rules governing such practices in our lifeworld are superior to those in other civilizations.

The concept of 'styles of reasoning' constitutes perhaps the best approach to understanding other cultures and civilizations. This concept relates the difference between cultural worlds to the fact that a style of reasoning may determine the very nature of the knowledge and worldview it produces. Different styles of reasoning cannot be sorted out by an independent criticism, because "the very sense of what can be established by that style depends upon the style itself" (Ian Hacking). Different styles may determine possible truths which can be objectively true in the framework of a given style of reasoning. That means that styles of reasoning open up new possibilities for reflection, or offer new types of possibilities. As styles arise from historical events, their possible being true is a consequence of historical and cultural developments. A style is not a way of thinking that confronts reality, but is part of reality itself.

The extraordinary scientific achievements which took place in the Western cultural world led to the belief in the idea of progress, evolutionary or cultural, with two results. First, that humanity is progressing in every aspect of life

from lower to higher stages, grades, or levels of capacity, competency, activity or achievement. Second, that man is the highest, complete, and final product of natural evolution, and Western civilization represents the highest, complete and final stage of the cultural evolution and the progress of mankind. The key word, therefore, to characterize the present state of Western civilization in relation to other cultures is *disjunction*. The concept of disjunction between distinct civilizational worlds denies the existence of a global culture. This concept is a chimera. Global culture is without time, forever pursuing an elusive present, an artificial and standardized universal culture that has no historical background, no sense of time and sequence. Such a culture is stripped of any sense of development beyond the present, it is fluid, ubiquitous, formless and historically shallow because without memory. In contrast, the cultures we live in are built around shared memories, traditions, myths and symbols of successive generations, of cultural and political groups of a population. Unlike the demythologized and ambivalent cosmopolitan, global culture, our cultures are told, retold and re-enacted by successive generations of each community. A timeless global culture answers to no life needs and conjures up no memories. If memory is central to identity, we can discern no global identity in the making, or aspirations for one, or any collective amnesia to replace existing cultural memories with a cosmopolitan orientation.

CONCLUSION

The interface of civilizations in our time does not mean that a confrontation is inevitable between them as some people would like us to believe. A mutual awareness of the other's existence; a profound sensitivity towards what people living in the orbit of other civilizations are thinking, feeling, believing and valuing; and, above all, an attempt to interpret and evaluate the beliefs and acts of others on their own, not our terms, would make it possible to reach a peaceful co-existence between these great traditions and systems of beliefs and morals. Such an effort would not inevitably require the relativization of our own cultural tradition, but it certainly presupposes that all sides show readiness to learn from the others, and to integrate in their own contextual, local world elements from other civilizations whenever the latter appear to be necessary for the realization of particular human projects. It is a condition of a dialogue between civilizations that the participants should be entirely open to the worldview and ethos of the Other, without believing that one's own reasoning pattern, one's own value hierarchy, or one's own way of life is the best for all people and in all times.

ORGANIZATIONAL MODALITIES

Institutional Framework

Beside the openness of the participants to each other's convictions, worldviews, and characteristic way of life, the most important condition of the organization of encounters initiating a dialogue of civilizations is that *it has to take place between intellectuals, representatives of religions and cultures in the institutional framework of civil society*. Civilizational dialogue is not a matter for diplomats, bureaucrats, or leaders of States or political parties representing particular interests or following orders given at higher state levels.

Participation

Participants in a civilizational dialogue, always in limited numbers (not more than 20 to 30 per occasion), can be representatives either of two, or more civilizations. They have to be independent in their opinions, autonomous in relation to whatever political or economic powers that may try to intervene in the dialogue, and entirely sincere in their dialogical intentions reflected in their discursive communications. For this reason, it appears that the best solution is to invite participants individually but, in cases where it is appropriate, through the institutions they belong to. Such institutions could be from churches or religious establishments to universities and other educational institutions to cultural associations (like, for example, writers' or artists' federations) and social entities (like, for example, women's and youth's organizations, foundations, etc.).

However, it should be emphasized that the most important aspect to invite a participant must be his or her personal qualities.

Categories of Civilizational Dialogues

A civilizational dialogue is a long term enterprise and it has to be carried on through a series of symposia convened (i) either with the aim of discussing one or another specific perspective of civilizational disjunction, as, for example, the role of the sacred in everyday life, or the political formula of nation-states imposed on all members of the world community; or, (ii) a dialogue can embrace the totality of a civilization's main spiritual and intellectual tenets and civilizational aspects in comparison to those of other civilizations.

GLOBALIZATION, WORLD POLITICS AND THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES*

Some aspects of the evolution of international relations during the last couple of years show a disturbing incongruence between developments in our contemporary culture, on the one hand, and world affairs, on the other. No symmetry exists between the evolutions which occurred in all other spheres of the modern world and the events in world politics. Suffice it to refer to disruptions between changing cultural and political realities at worldwide level such as:

- i) The difficulties encountered and unsolved problems left behind in international peacekeeping operations (Cambodia, Somalia or Bosnia) or in the treatment of regional as well as local conflicts (Angola or Rwanda);
- ii) The very slow progress of economic and social development in most Asian and African countries; and, finally,
- iii) The unsatisfied expectations of world public opinion in respect of the hoped-for progress of international cooperation, expectations deceived because based on a fundamental misrepresentation of contemporary international relations conceived according to the democratic model as practiced in domestic state policies.

I believe the best way to analyze the evident disjunction between evolving culture patterns and structural/institutional realities in international relations is to consider them in the perspective of *globalization*. However, in order to do that it is necessary to define what we mean by globalization and to determine the character of this concept in comparison to universalism. This is especially useful as the term 'globalization' was hitherto widely used but without much care given to the precise meaning of the concept, except in some academic debates, whereas universalism is still an important feature of the dominating, modern worldview since the Christian Middle Ages and the *Siècle des lumières*.

It is all the more necessary to examine globalization in the perspective of world politics that it does not constitute a smooth evolution of events and mentalities; it can be foreseen that the first century of the next millennium will be fraught with dangers – conflicts, confrontations, natural catastrophes, or increasing terrorism – if no measures will be taken to avoid or circumscribe these potential disorders. There is, consequently, an urgent need that the United States, more than ever the leading power in the world community, initiates a series of actions in order to adjust the configuration of international relations and the outcome of political interaction on the world scene to the rhythm of the globalization process. Solving global issues like the problem of inter-civilizational relations, the worldwide ecological crisis, or the planetary acceptance of the human rights regime, becomes more and more urgent with the accelerated passage of time which characterizes modernity.

* This study was not yet published.

1. GLOBALIZATION VERSUS UNIVERSALISM

Globalization can be defined, in accordance with Professor Roland Robertson,¹ as the view that the world is 'a single place', that the 'conjunction of different forms of life' has become real, and that a consciousness of immediate and global involvement with the world-at-large has developed. The concept does not correspond to the idea of 'global village' launched in the fifties by Marshall McLuhan because it describes a process reflecting not only worldwide communication facilities but, most importantly, the 'compression' of phenomena, of the sequence of events. It thus includes 'space and time distancing' (Anthony Giddens) distinguishing the modern world from all pre-modern periods, but it comprises as well the overcoming of such distancing by the irresistible spread of concepts, views, customs, and lifestyles to the remotest regions of the world.

Being a process, globalization penetrates all aspects of contemporary life; the lives of, and interaction between, individuals, nation-states, local and regional communities as well as the spheres of international and inter-civilizational relations. Being a process, globalization is a framework for dialogues and confrontations; for all contemporary currents of ideas, intellectual endeavors, economic, social and political activities, or encounters between widely differing human cultural groups; but because it is a process, it is not bearer of any particular ideas, intellectual accomplishments, specific cultural traditions and values, economic or social developmental objectives, or political ideologies. Pluralism and a certain degree of relativism – implying diversity, fragmentation and sharp discontinuities – are indispensable correlates of globalization and constitutive of the so-called 'global circumstance'. Therefore, it would be a mistake to consider globalization as an autonomous movement operating independently of specific evolutions in the particular social, political, international or inter-civilizational spheres; it cannot be autonomous because it is constitutive of these various spheres.

In one word, *the process of globalization is a typically modern,² relationally all-encompassing phenomenon* that incorporates all occurrences, events and actions concerning individual human beings or existing entities, institutions, cultures and civilizations. It highlights interdependence between all these elements and the concomitant global consciousness of this interdependence.

In Robertson's apt formula, globalization stands for "the interpenetration of the universalization of particularism and the particularization of universalism,"³ this means, that the concept of globalization simultaneously admits universalistic tendencies like the worldwide spread of Western consumerism, and orientations to particularistic self-affirmation like the revival and global valorization of national consciousness or collective civilizational identities. The world as a single place represents the universalization of the particular and culturally conditioned humaneness, whereas relativistic pluralism affirming the limitless existence of otherness, of the multiple differential perspectives, stands for the particularization of the universal. The above formula therefore expresses the double aspect of contemporary reality, the concurrent expectation and experience of universalism and particularism.

¹ In the conceptual definition of globalization I follow the presentation of Professor Robertson, though in some important respects I deviate from his line of arguing.

² "Modernity is inherently globalizing," writes Anthony Giddens in his *The Consequences of Modernity*. Stanford, Cal., Stanford University Press, 1990, pp. 63 and 177.

³ ROBERTSON, Roland (1992), *Globalization. Social Theory and Global Culture*. Newbury Park, Cal., SAGE Publications, p. 100 .

In contrast to globalization, *universalism* is foundational, intending to grasp the world as a whole in the sense that it is promoting 'universal' beliefs, values, human identities and characteristics as well as collective, institutional structures. The dominant, secular universalism evidently represents the Western civilization's scientific and technological beliefs and values combined with the precedence given to individualism, instrumental rationality, market-oriented economic orientation, and consequent consumerism. It is probably true that this universalism played a crucial role in the intensified globalization which took place in our century; for example, the worldwide, universalistic supply responds to local, particularistic demands, and thus market conditions correspond to the above characterization of globalization.

To give in this perspective an example of the difference between universalism and globalization I refer to the concept and practice of democracy. *Democracy* has, in the Western eyes, a universalistic value; it is considered to be the best available form of a political regime, assuring the rule of the majority and applicable in all parts of the world, in all civilizational frameworks. Consequently, the democratic idea should be universally accepted not only within particular states but in international relations as well. However, despite all hopes and pronouncements such as Fukuyama's about the 'end of history', following the disappearance of the greatest totalitarian empire, democratization is not taking hold worldwide and, especially, not in inter-state relations. Democratization is, at least in the present, not part of the globalization process, and it certainly is not practicable in international relations. The 'logic of Westphalia', as Richard Falk so well pointed out some twenty years ago, the 'logic of sovereignty' of states, basically unequal in their status, still prevails and is admitted and reflected by the Charter of the United Nations, too.

On the other hand, to give a counter-example, the bureaucratic form of administration is globalized as it corresponds to geographic, demographic, technological and societal realities of our contemporary world. Bureaucracy is not only reigning supreme at State level but dominates the international scene as well, precisely because it is part of the globalization process. It can, nevertheless, not be considered as a tenet of the universalistic credo as it does not represent as such a value in the liberal-democratic or social-democratic belief-systems.

As against universalism, globalization emphasizes the overall importance of *contextuality*. Contextuality, in a sense, gives priority to the particular over the universal; it eliminates abstract, formalistic approaches ('pre-conceived principles') for the benefit of the contingent particularity of things and the contingent flow of events. Globalization encompasses contextuality, and contemporary contextual situations incorporate a certain number of global traits; for example, in fundamentalist worldviews, especially in Islamic fundamentalism, globalization is present in the form of discourse, in the valuations employed and in the use of some arguments. In such cases, choices are not imposed, but correspond to prevailing circumstances though they are made in globally recognized categories of thought and action which constitute the framework of fundamentalist discourse. Put in another way, contexts may be globalized and globalizing tendencies may be contextualized.

Finally, the theme of contextuality leads us to point out, with Clifford Geertz, what is already clear from the above consideration of globalization as constitutive element of all aspects of human life today, that it penetrates the inner life of particular societies and States strengthening, for example, certain effects of modernity, awakening old conflicts or creating new confrontations. To adapt old concepts to new situations, expressions are coined such as ethnicity-within-humankind instead of speaking simply of nationalism, or states-and-nations and quasi-states instead of speaking of the nation-state.

2. PROBLEMS OF GLOBALIZATION IN WORLD POLITICS

It is rather curious that the impact of globalization was much more spectacular in most other fields of our contemporary world than in the realm of world politics. Though it would be a mistake to speak of 'world culture', it can be said that there is a 'culture of globalization' which spread widely through the societal, economic and, especially, scientific spheres, without having such an extensive impact in the domain of world politics. The main reason for this probably is that the established and slowly evolving structures of international relations, – inspired after the Second World War by the reigning universalistic outlook limited, though, to the orbit of the Western civilization and disturbed by the recurrent crises due to bipolarization, – suggested that the universalistic trend reached its apogee with the establishment of the United Nations and a series of other international bodies. However, this picture was completely modified in the course of the following decades, and it now appears for an impartial observer that just the opposite is true: in the field of international relations, specifically, the universalistic trend lost its momentum, whereas globalization progressed in an incomparably faster pace in other domains of the life of mankind, for example communications, trade, the movement of persons across state boundaries, or the widespread interaction between terrorist groups.

The globalization process means that specific constraints are imposed upon the actors in the international field as well as new possibilities of empowerment are emerging for them; more importantly, however, new actors enter the scene and new lines of action are defined precisely because globalization forces entities such as civilizations, States, nations, social groups, or economic organizations and international bodies, to define their situation in respect to the overall global circumstance as much as they are led to determine, from their own point of view, the global circumstance itself. Such self-identification and determination of the global as seen from a particular vantage point, coherent with modernity's basic requirement of reflexivity and free choice, create, in most cases, confrontational situations, for example between States and nations (or national minorities), or conflicts between existing societal arrangements in a given country, region, or civilizational orbit. Pluralism, an inevitable corollary of globalization, always carries within itself the possible resurgence of old and new conflicts, though it is also a manifestation of the fundamental fact, namely, that diversity is beneficial for the global process; multi-dimensionality, implying contending principles, attitudes and action-patterns is, consequently, legitimized by the globalization process itself.

The six principal phenomena that emerged in the globalization process during the last decades, and which were ignored by actors in world politics and international relations, can be grouped in three categories: inter-civilizational relations and related problems; questions pertaining to the viability and efficiency of the inter-state system; and, last but not least, the environmental crisis:

a) *Inter-civilizational encounters* have a double impact on world politics. As a result of the decolonization movement after the Second World War and the continuous extension of the communications/information network on the planet earth, the encounters, dialogues or confrontations between world civilizations became unavoidable. These inter-civilizational encounters, as Benjamin Nelson called them already in the seventies, introduced a completely new element in international relations, though formally and substantially nobody, not even representatives of different civilizations, recognized this novelty. What I mean by this statement is that world politics is carried on, as before, between nations-states in accordance with the 'logic of state sovereignty' in vigor since the Westphalia accords in 1648. The inter-state system functions as if nothing would have changed since the appearance of non-Western civilizations on the world scene. It incorporates the new States born out of the decolonization movement, even if these States do not satisfy all the basic requirements normally qualifying a State to be a State. Suffice it to refer here to the fact that political independence obtained by the new states (in Robert Jackson's words *quasi-states*) does not make them really sovereign without effective economic independence. The 'standard of civilization', of which Gong gave a detailed analysis, governing international relations until the Second World War, gradually lost its validity precisely because it represented but the standards-to-be-universalized derived from the tenets of the Western civilization.

In the future, international relations will have to be adapted to the increasing weight on the world scene of different, but in their own world dominant, civilizational approaches. It may be foreseen that the nation-state system will have to undergo substantial modification in many parts of the world, though it will probably be kept as a formal framework. These changes were heralded by the constitution of such groupings of non-Western States as the Group of 77, or by the North-South negotiations, which expressed common interests in opposition to the industrialized world, but covered up, for strategic reasons, the deep civilizational differences between non-Western States. These differences, when they erupted in open clashes and violence like the confrontations between Hindus and Muslims on the Indian subcontinent, were dealt with as 'communal' or 'nationalistic' oppositions due to poverty or the malfunctioning of democratic institutions. It seems today evident that in the coming century the principal issue involved in inter-civilizational encounters will be the incommensurability between the Western and non-Western civilizations, whether supposed or real. World politics will be dominated, in the globalization process, by a dialogue or by a confrontation between these civilizations (as Samuel Huntington already referred to them); either the co-existing world civilizations will reach a mutual understanding through concessions (that is, adopting some aspects of each others' belief- and value-systems or ways of life), or the outcome will be a conflict, frequently violent, between uncompromising positions, as in the case of the Muslim fundamentalists in Middle Eastern and North African countries. One exception in respect of this prevision must, however, be made, namely the improbability of the prospect that the worldwide spread of Western technology and science will be slowed down as a result of the inter-civilizational rift.

b) *Totally insufficient results of the modernizing process.* Closely linked to the importance gained by non-Western civilizations on the world scene are the totally insufficient results obtained in the modernization processes of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Three decades of developmental efforts and the spending of huge amounts of tax payers' money of countries which contribute to these efforts, did not produce the expected improvement in the economic and social conditions of the so-called developing countries. Today, it could be said in retrospect, that the main cause for that inefficiency and, let's not hesitate to say, failure, probably is the approach imposed by Western donors and multilateral institutions of lending and technical assistance. This approach is still based on concepts and methods of economic development which were undoubtedly successful in circumstances in which Western countries had been striving, in the course of so many centuries, to reach their present highly developed economic status, – but which cannot produce the same results in countries which are part of an entirely different civilizational framework. Unfortunately, – and this statement of fact concerns leaders and intellectuals of non-Western countries as much as Western economists, 'development administrators' and governmental decision-makers, – no effort whatsoever was made to adapt the 'imported' Western economic and social concepts to the civilizational worlds of the countries assisted. The root of this attitude is surely to be found in the universalistic trend adhered to by Westerners and non-Westerners alike, as the globalization process, the 'universalization of particulars and particularization of universals, in given contexts was not yet set in motion.

Blueprints elaborated out of context were applied without any attention to new and totally different circumstances; existing social habits and ways of life were destroyed in order to implant structures, habits and ways of life borrowed from Western theory and practice. This resulted in a perfect incongruence between developmental thinking, methods and operations, on the one hand, and cultural 'givens', that is, inherited, traditional perceptions, customs, habits, and basic beliefs and values, on the other hand. Though much time was lost, it is not too late, to correct past mistakes, but an overall effort should be made, together by all those involved, to re-think and re-formulate developmental programs taking into account the respective civilizational contexts and diverse other local constraints, as well as the environmental consequences of any action undertaken.

c) *Progressive, worldwide acceptance and application of human rights.* It is, first of all, necessary to clarify that what is meant here by the concept of human rights carries a much wider connotation than that usually understood in contemporary discourse. I understand by human rights:

i) The rights of the individual human being to anything which is required for safeguarding his dignity involving the satisfaction of his basic physical as well as intellectual and spiritual needs; and

ii) The rights of human groups whose particular identity is a major component of the identity of their individual members as individual identity is founded on, and shaped by, creative interaction with the group to which the individual belongs.

Acceptance and application of human dignity is not contrary to any of the world's major civilizational frameworks if it is not linked to some other concepts which are placed, in our Western culture, at the same high level as human dignity; for example, social or economic equality, or the freedom of choice in all avenues of life. However, no conscious effort was made yet to bring out and consolidate the human rights aspects in each civilization, and to harmonize them with human rights conceptions in other civilizations. In fact, as in other matters, it was not recognized until today that global efforts aiming at the protection of individual and group-oriented human rights cannot succeed if the concept of human rights itself is not 'fitted in' in a given civilization's framework; respect for human rights cannot be imposed, even less imported from alien value-systems, but has to be culturally, that is, contextually validated. This does not mean, of course, that human rights – those of individuals and those of their communities – are not to be sharply delimited from the powers of the State and from the prerogatives and privileges of social strata, and protected from the abuses of powerful political and economic groups. This has to be done, however, in the accepted terms of the symbolic order and justified in accordance with prevailing belief- and value-systems.

Human rights not only represent entitlements but also make imperative some duties, and this has as well to be taken into account when the human rights regime, of which the West is the protagonist, is validated and justified in other civilizational contexts. The globalization of human rights depends, beside its incorporation into varying civilizational contexts and precisely because of that 'fitting in', on the recognition that to human rights correspond duties as well; duties towards the individual's own physical or spiritual existence, and duties towards the welfare of the individuals' respective community and society.

d) *Widening democratic legitimization deficit.* After the disappearance of the totalitarian state-system and the consecutive 'euphoria' in democratic states, there is little recognition of the fact that in most democracies today an increasing legitimization deficit became apparent. This means, in the terms of David Beetham's analysis of legitimacy's foundations, that the formally established, constitutional procedures are respected, though *a growing gap in convictions and expectations separates the democratically elected regimes from the constituents*. The reasons for such a dangerous evolution are:

i) The shrinking congruence of beliefs and values between those held by the people and the power holders (including the entire political class and not only those at high levels in government and administration), which also implies that minorities refuse to accept the 'dictates' of democratic majorities, and

ii) The limited consent expressed by constituents in the democratic framework, perhaps because the parties in competition do not offer a real choice, or simply because people lost the belief in the capacities of those who govern to be able to solve the overwhelming difficulties encountered in our contemporary societies.

The widening of the legitimization deficit has many causes in the Western world. Such are the inefficient functioning of the nation-states which are not able to master the complex social problems in present circumstances, proving that this institutional form is not adapted anymore to conditions reigning in today's world. Or, the near-exhaustion of culture patterns in democracies, meaning that a renewal of their institutions and of predominant mentalities is inevitable. In most non-Western societies, even if formal procedures are respected and seemingly a large consent is obtained by those in power, the States' legitimacy suffers from the basic incongruence between an institutional form borrowed from abroad and the entirely different civilizational context.

The repercussions of domestic legitimacy deficits on international relations appeared very recently. Their symptoms are, for example, the discrepancy between governmental actions carried out on the international scene and their acceptance or refusal by smaller or larger parts of the concerned States' population, entailing, frequently, social upheavals or spreading of inter-state forms of resistance; or the open questioning of the democratic legitimacy of international or regional institutions like in the case of the Commission of the European Communities.

e) *Multiplication of decision-making structures.* The present context of international relations, especially the traditional inter-state system, does not reflect the recent evolution on the economic scene, of crucial importance, namely, the globalization of economic decision-making and of worldwide management of the market through multinational enterprises, as already acknowledged at the beginning of the seventies by people such as C.W. Jenks or Richard Falk. It is a well-known fact that the activities of large enterprises 'exploded' national frontiers and that their structures and powers are not coincidental anymore with the world-map of nation-states. It is also well known that as a result of globalization of the multinationals' producing and distributing operations they take decisions not only without regard to the national interests of a State, but frequently enough to the detriment of those interests. Suffice it to refer to cases when enterprises, under market pressures and with full justification of their own logic, transfer jobs abroad from a country which suffers from severe unemployment, or that management of companies, responding to contextual factors, shift production activities from one country to another and from one region to another, thereby aggravating the concerned countries' or regions' foreign trade imbalances.

The multiplication of decision-making structures at international level (including the international agencies) means that, in fact, there are two such structures simultaneously existing and not coordinated in any way as a consequence of the respect of two sacred principles: the sovereignty of the nation-state and the absolute freedom of economic enterprises. The first represent societal organization at the highest level and, therefore, are free to act in the interest of their populations; the second follow solely their own rationality, instrumental in the realization of their objectives, that is, the maximization of profit. The complexity and importance of economic structures at international scale and the power represented by those who are steering them practically 'dwarfs' inter-state relations. The transnational identities of economic entities and of other organizations by definition elude State control. What is problematic is the delimitation of public from private interest at global levels, as one can, without doubt, raise the question whether the power holders of the State or the top managers of worldwide economic activities really represent the public interest?

The double decision-making structure on the international scene resulted in an evolving 'economic diplomacy' of the nation-states, and in the inauguration of the age of worldwide international trade negotiations, etc., but all these efforts do not change the basic fact that the so-called multinationals' power and influence on matters of world politics is not taken into account in international relations. Such a recent phenomenon, for example, that representatives of large firms accompany a country's highest officials on their visits to other states which offer a sizable market for the firms' products or with which problems regarding fair competition have to be settled, should not be considered as a rapprochement between the parallel structures of decision-making at worldwide level because these joint visits of political and economic leaders is nothing but a pure promotional effort.

Representatives of economic power are not integrated in international bodies such as the United Nations (the example of the International Labor Office where employers as well as workers are participating in the organization's work, is not relevant here). It is for this reason that a former United Nations Under-Secretary General, Sir Bryan Urqhart, proposed already some years ago in the columns of *The New York Review of Books*, that a way should be found to incorporate representatives of multinational corporations in worldwide international organizations.

f) *Environmental problems and the global ecological crisis.* The fact that environmental problems are by definition global in nature is not debatable. Though this is generally recognized, some initiatives taken by the inter-state system try only to deal with particularly urgent environmental degradations in the international or regional institutional frameworks, with very limited success. Even the beginning of a solution to worldwide ecological deterioration is opposed in most areas:

i) By industrialized countries, because of general economic difficulties of all sorts, especially unemployment and the inevitable need of economic re-structuration, and

ii) By developing countries, because these countries justly feel that the reparation of environmental damages is not their responsibility (though the damages caused by industrialization in the present will burden the life of their future generations, too).

Environment is only tangentially treated in world politics though it constitutes a clear-cut example of an issue which is undoubtedly global in its effects as much as in the solutions it requires. It appears, however, that the health of our planet earth will become a priority of priorities only if ecological devastation will assume much larger proportions than it happened until today as possible remedies necessitate a degree of international goodwill and cooperation that is not yet readily available.

The reasons of such an attitude toward our natural environment are two. First, the fact of approaching the critical level in the extent of environmental deterioration and its inevitable consequences for the human race, are only slowly penetrating the consciousness of people and their governments. Transitory measures are taken offering some relief, giving the impression that fundamental difficulties are really dealt with but do not, however, modify those technological realities or aspects of everyday life which must be changed if the natural environment is to be saved. *The main obstacle is that mankind followed a path of development during the last two hundred years completely ignoring nature as the overall framework of human life.* As a consequence, all economic and social activities must be totally and globally re-structured. This involves such an overhauling of functional tasks in society – for example, the occupational distribution of populations – and of ways and styles of life that it will inevitably engender large-scale suffering as well as necessitate complete re-direction of mentalities and of intellectual orientations.

But this is not the most important reason for the contemporary attitude. Crucial is a fundamental bias in our perspective of the universe the correction of which is a pre-condition of the new orientation. *We have to renounce of our man-centered view* and return, without abandoning wholesale all the achievements of modernity, to the cosmic worldview of other civilizations and of our own past. That means that we accept to consider man and its culture, together with our science and technology, are part of the *cosmos* in which other beings have also universal and morally significant interests. This mental change implies, then, a reversal of our attitude by recognizing the moral aspects of nature, and the applicability of moral values and judgments on natural events and processes. As Paul Taylor put it almost a decade ago, "the material condition for valid moral norms in the domain of environmental ethics is *respect for nature*"⁴. The respect for nature has to become an integral part of our beliefs, our valuations and attitudes, on which a globally elaborated system of rules and standards can be based. Environmental ethics and politics therefore are one of the indispensable aspects of the globalization process.

⁴ TAYLOR, Paul W. (1986), *Respect For Nature. A Theory of Environmental Ethics*. Princeton, Princeton University Press. p.26 (emphasis in original).

3. GLOBALIZATION AND THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

The above indicated problems in world politics, of global nature each, can be regrouped under three headings:

- i) Inter-civilizational dialogue, economic and social development, and human rights,
- ii) International relations globally conceived and not limited to inter-state relations (but excluding legitimization problems which are of domestic origin), and
- iii) Gradual but resolute adaptation of all human activities, including our life-styles, to the ecological imperatives of our natural environment.

The globalization process will run into great difficulties if these problems are not taken care of as urgently as possible. In searching for solutions to them, the United States must assume the leadership of the international community for a number of reasons. Most importantly, though the United States is the most advanced country in Western civilization, it also is a country with a multi-ethnic population possessing different, sometimes conflicting, human and cultural characteristics⁵ and, therefore, particularly competent to promote inter-civilizational dialogue and understanding. A first practical step could be for launching the inter-civilizational dialogue to deal with two concrete problems mentioned above:

a) To re-formulate overall strategies of economic and social development taking into account the fundamental tenets of each civilization, – involving countries located in a specific civilizational orbit as well as multilateral and bilateral institutions of cooperation and technical assistance;

b) To examine the relevant features of the belief- and value-systems of each civilization in order to consider how the human rights doctrine – individual as well as group rights (for example, minorities' rights) – could be incorporated in their respective cultures, symbolic orders, ritual expressions, and everyday attitudes, without forgetting to emphasize the necessary correlation between rights and corresponding duties.

The United States is also the home of most transnational corporations or other representative institutions of civil society which are actors on the international scene and which represent parallel decision-making structures to national governments. The Government, therefore, together with representatives of these organizations, may be willing to set up a deliberative body in order to formulate recommendations to be submitted to the members of the international community in respect of possible solutions to this problem. This would mean to unify the public space, at international level, in which political, economic and social issues are considered and decided, through a gradual transformation of the inter-state system into one which encompasses the greatest number of actors possible. It is evident that these proposals will encounter strong opposition on behalf of governments and even from international institutions, raising questions, for example, concerning democratic legitimization of the presence and the disinterestedness of the transnationals or other institutions of civil society. Nevertheless, launching the debate on this subject will be better than to ignore the problem, especially in a situation in which economic difficulties such as unemployment and the inevitability of re-structuring of national economies in many countries will probably increase in the medium-term.

⁵ I do not refer here to the problem of multiculturalism so much debated in various circles in the US, as it is much more limited in its nature and linked to a particular context in American life. The subject of inter-civilizational relations, and the role of the United States in their development, is by definition a worldwide issue, not comparable to problems at national level.

Finally, in respect of the environmental crisis, although many initiatives were already taken, not even the first small but fundamental changes can be discovered on the world horizon. The reason for this is, to a large extent, that ecological problems will not be solved by legal procedures, governmental commitments and international agreements (who, anyway, would sanction the non-respect of commitments and agreements?), but only through a change of mentalities and of the life-styles of our contemporaries. The main task therefore in this domain is ever more information, supported by evidence, to convince everybody, in a sincere and wholehearted way, of the unavoidable necessity to change environmentally-related public and private attitudes. In addition, all concerned parties in the United States (in which country if not here?) could examine possibilities to replace present technological solutions with those more adequate to reduce ecological risks, and permitting to keep unchanged some of the habits and life-styles rooted in modern life. This could help to achieve a gradual modification of people's mentalities – because such a change of mentalities is the only hope to avoid an environmental catastrophe.

In 1995, the United Nations is celebrating its fiftieth anniversary. It would be a good occasion to start the second half century of the international organization with searching for solutions to the fundamental problems of globalization in world politics, which are the problems of the United Nations themselves.

SEMINAR ON THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION
AND
CIVILIZATIONAL DIFFERENCES*

ALTA SCUOLA DI ECONOMÍA E RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI

Università del Sacro Cuore, Milano

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by

Victor Segesvary

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FIRST SESSION

Conceptual Analysis: Universalism, Globalization and Pluralism

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Examining the problem of *The United Nations Organization and Civilizational Differences* we have first to clarify a series of concepts implied by our topic. In fact, one cannot deal with aspects of international organization or with the interface of coexisting civilizations in our contemporary world, if we do not distinguish in an appropriate way what are the basic bipolar concepts describing these phenomena. On bipolar concepts I understand that each of the concepts reviewed has to be considered together with its opposite because only taking into account the relationship between the two throws sufficient light on their nature. The concepts to be discussed are:

- i) Universalism versus particularism;
- ii) Globalization versus localism, and
- iii) Pluralism versus a unified vision of the world.

Before entering upon the analysis of such bipolar concepts I shall, however, briefly state my understanding of the notions of culture and civilization. I use culture in Cicero's sense who wrote about *cultura mentis* assigning to the concept a spiritual, mental, moral and social meaning which encompasses religion and worldview, scientific and artistic creation, patterns or styles of reasoning, and ethical principles of behavior and action. Thus, culture is a spiritual and intellectual creation of a group of human beings, of a community; it gives meaning to existence and to the world, and it is always at the core of a civilization. Civilization stands for a whole way of life, including technology, living conditions, social practices, political systems and institutions, economic organization and methods of production, as well as all other material aspects of our earthly life, which are all conditioned by the cultural context. This distinction does not correspond to the classical distinction used in German historiography between culture and nature; in my perspective culture, as a human creation, is part of nature from which we come and to which we return.

Cultures and civilizations therefore simultaneously have spatial and temporal dimensions. They have to be always understood in a plural sense because they are constituted by, and are at the same time constitutive elements of, every aspect of particular human existences. It is, of course, true that any definition of culture – mine included – reflects a certain representation of one's own culture, formulated with reference to what one knows of other civilizations in the world.

Culture and civilization, therefore, are not human activities defined by economic parameters, nor 'socially constructed' or 'socially organized'. Culture and civilization are not produced but are autonomously created by individuals and their communities in constant interaction¹. Such a creation is a long-term historical process not confined to concrete, social contexts of an epoch, because it is not an entirely intentional act, but an unforeseeable outcome of a multiplicity of interactions. The imponderable element is due to this multiplicity which reflects

- i) Enviromental influences,
- ii) Inherited traditions transmitting cultural creations from generation to generation, and
- iii) The effects of unknown actions by other humans. Creation implies unavoidable human ignorance and reveals the limited nature of different cultural worlds.

¹ In comparison with old-style anthropologies : diffusion is only one modality of such a creation process.

The world's great civilizations are designated either by an ethnic qualifier (Chinese and Indian), by a religious one (Islamic), or by a geographic connotation (African). Such distinctions usually cover different cultural features which, nevertheless, can be grouped together as they possess shared elements, if not for anything else but because of a shared physical and human environment. The designation of our contemporary civilization as Western represents a special case in the sense that it cannot be ranged into any of the above categories. In our globalized world it extends to several continents, to diverse ethnic or religious groups; its unity and its distinctness from other civilizations is, therefore, indicated by the qualifier 'modern'. There is no phenomenon such as modernity in the orbit of any other civilization, in the specific sense that most people understand under it: a scientific, secularized ('disenchanted' or 'de-sacralized') and, consequently, materialistic culture, centered on the dominant idea of the individual. Instead of using the description 'post-modern,' because modernity's dominant ideas still influence our thinking and action, I prefer to use the term 'late modern,' that is, modernity as we know it at the end of the twentieth century. If modernity as a civilizational form is applied to the entire world, it is precisely because of the contemporary manifestation of a new type of hegemony, the results of which are crystallized through globalization. Late modern globalization is specifically intertwined with trends towards civilizational hegemony.

1. UNIVERSALISM VERSUS PARTICULARISM

The age-old concepts of universalism and particularism were subject to innumerable descriptions and discussions in Western philosophy since classical Antiquity through the Middle Ages to modern times, from Aristotle to Saint Thomas to Georg-Friedrich Hegel. The universalistic vision of the human world became dominant only in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as a result, first, of the scientific worldview and, second, as an outcome of the rationalism of the Enlightenment. International organization as such which came into being in the present century, and the United Nations Organization which represents its present form, are entirely linked to the universalism of the modern age.

Universalism is a worldview based on the belief that humankind is a unified, compact ensemble; that all human beings are the same and, therefore, represent the same beliefs, values, and desires. It also pretends that differences are superficial because, and here enters the scientific component of the universalistic worldview, a human being is part of the universe and as the life of anything else human existence is also governed by universal laws. Thus, human beings are equipped with the same mind and, consequently, reason, following the same rules, logical, ethical, or whatever. Rationalism and universalism, belief in progress and universalism are inextricably interwoven. And rationalism and human progress are based on the scientific outlook.

Universalism and generalization, a usual way of proceeding of our thinking, are not the same. The first means that a truth and a worldview are valid all times, whereas the latter describes states of affairs generally perceived in nature or in the human world alike which, therefore, are invested with a law like character. It is nonetheless true that such cognitive and empirical generalizations can imperceptibly be transformed into an element of universalism.

Universalism appears in our thinking in two forms, pure or genuine, and auto centric or instrumental. In my categorization, genuine or pure universalisms are, first, the ontological-biological as well as the cosmic. The latter, in turn, has to be divided into two groups, religious and scientific universalisms. Auto centric or instrumental universalism constitutes a distortion of the genuine forms of universalism responding to specific cultural features of a given age, or to definite social, political or economic interests.

Ontological-biological universalism is based on the concept of Being – with a great B – which appears in multiple and innumerable forms. In the universe Being refers to what exists, and expresses the fact that everything what exists hangs together in an inextricable relationship. For this reason, the ontological can also be designated as biological universalism, embracing all 'biotas' – living organisms – of the world. The latter, though, is more restricted because it does not include, as philosophical ontology does, all nonliving entities as well as mental and spiritual aspects of the human world.

Whereas the ontological or biological universalisms emphasize, in whatever form, what exists on our *Gaia*, – on our Earth, – cosmic universalism refers to the interconnectedness of everything what exists in the world, – it is a holistic perception of our environment. Religious universalism is a logically unavoidable conclusion of the faith in an omnipotent God – as in the monotheistic religions; or, it can be deduced from a metaphysical idea of the universe and man's status in it, as in Buddhism or some forms of Hinduism.

[For Buddha, the universe is an eternal process in which worlds and individuals rise and disappear in an endless succession and in infinite numbers. Present, immanent reality is the only reality, but this reality is one of Becoming, nor Being or non-Being. There is no permanent empirical self, and one thing is dependent on the other (this is the doctrine of dependent origination). In the momentary flux-in-process which is life, there is no central purpose, no transcendent or immanent goal, but regularities, uniformities, and tendencies. In the religious core of Hinduism, on the other hand, the transcendental nondualism of the Vedic tradition is constituted by the symbolism of the eternal yet immanent Brahman, whose reality represents the eternal Being. The *Hymn of the creation* (verse 4), of the oldest Vedic texts *Rg Veda*, speaks of "the bond of being and nonbeing"². The more materialistic philosophies (such as *Jaina*, *Samkhya*, *Yoga*) insisted on the separation of two spheres or antagonistic principles, the transcendent, immaterial life-monoad, on the one hand, and the matter of which even time and space are only aspects, on the other.]

I certainly believe that the universalistic vision of the human mind first appeared in its religious form because religion, any religion, has to be universalistic in its claims – if it is to be a religion. Christianity or Islam, for example, always were and still are universalistic in their conception of humanity.

The scientific version of cosmic universalism considers only the natural – physical, chemical, electromagnetic, neural, nuclear, or whatever other – components of the world that surrounds us including the bodily existence of man, because they only are appropriate for scientific study through the application of empirical and formalizing methods. Consequently, at the highest level of scientific inquiry elements of the universe are treated in a theoretical, in my language non-ontological way, through the application of mathematical formulae. It corresponds, thus, to a strictly formal universalism.

Turning now to the auto centric or instrumental form of universalism, it is normally linked either to the drive to domination, the Nietzschean 'will to power,' serving only persons' or groups' own interests, or as a typically modern phenomenon, to a cultural self-justification of our society built on individualism and the concomitant destruction of human communities. The best example of such an instrumental universalism in our era is a totalitarian ideology. It claims universal validity for its dogmas based on pronouncements of its charismatic initiators, thus imitating the characteristic evolution of great world religions, sometimes even taking on a pseudo-scientific garb like ultra-nationalism or Marxism-Leninism. The worst distortion of scientific universalism is when – and this is a basic characteristic of our times – science's claims concerning specific domains of the world and possessing a limited validity, is extended to the whole ontological field. As a result, it is recognized as governing the nonphysical, or mental and spiritual manifestations of the human universe, too. In both cases, universalism can turn out to be a devastating force in society with its reckless drive for power, or creating a risk society and, thereby, destroying science's own invaluable accomplishments for the human species.

² RADHAKRISHNAN, S.S. and MOORE, Ch.A. (eds.), *A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957, p. 27.

[I would like to share with you here a souvenir from Afghanistan to show how science became an 'idol' or a 'magic thing' instead of being one of the most important aspects of human cultural endeavors. In April 1978, after the change of not only of government but of the regime, in the full sense of this word, when the nationalist ('narodnik') wing of the Communist party took power, it was enough to say that, for example, 'scientifically speaking' it is correct or not correct to act in a way or in another; the reference to science immediately shortcut the debate, and the proposition was accepted. And this despite the fact that most top government officials studied at one of the universities of the Socialist block, – my counterpart, for instance, spent years at the famous Charles University of Prague (one of the oldest in Europe).]

Particularism, in opposition to universalism, stands to designate any particular instances of reality, any instances or entities which possess their own identity, their own quality or characteristics, in one word, their own 'individuality' or self-sameness. A human person is a particular instance as against all men; a tribe or an ethnic community is a particular entity in comparison to humankind; and a specific culture's self-sameness is its particularity in opposition to other cultures, or to the so-called 'world culture.' In view of the reigning universalistic worldviews, particularism is always referred to with a connotation which aims to devalue it in favor of the universalistic whole. By universalistic whole is meant a wholeness in which all particulars, or all particularities, are collapsed into the whole which alone has an identity, proper characteristics, and self-sameness. However, one can also be a holist recognizing the existence of plural entities, or of particular instances within the whole, that is, one can be a holist acknowledging fundamental differences within the holistic framework.

Particularisms, thus, are worldviews which represent the identity, quality, characteristics, or 'individuality' of certain determinate instances of reality and which defend the existence and the interests of these instances against efforts to erase them. Under the pretext of representing particularisms, certain social and cultural phenomena, for example tribalism and nationalism (as if they would cover the same reality), are condemned by the dominant ideologies of the day. The same is the case with many cultural features or social attitudes which do not fit into what the universalist mainstream considers appropriate, and are, therefore, declared particularisms, and as such rejected.

The Origins of Universalism

Universalism dates back to ancient times in its religious or cosmic forms. Not only in monotheistic religions, but even in the polytheistic ones, the universalistic view embraced the whole living world, although in the latter it did not exclude the empirical fact that other people believe in different gods. A genuine scientific universalism, genuine because cosmic in its conception, characterized all naturalist thinkers since the great Greek philosophers of the Milesian school, Thales and Anaximenes. The most extraordinary example of cosmic universalism was the philosophy of Parmenides for whom "everything was one." The evolution of the philosophical/scientific view in Antiquity thus took the direction of an all-embracing holism, from a "partially unified *physis* to a single but complex *kosmos*," in the words of Louis Dupré, professor at Yale University, who in his book *Passage to Modernity*³ described this cosmic universalism:

"*Kosmos* includes, next to the *physis* of organic being, the *ethos* of personal conduct and social structures, the *nomos* of normative custom and law, and the *logos*, the rational foundation that normatively rules all aspects of the cosmic development ... Clearly, its meaning of ordered totality exceeded that of the physical universe we now call *cosmos*."

³ DUPRE, Louis. 1993. *Passage to Modernity: An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, p. 17.

Another source of the various forms of modern universalism – beside the religious one inherited from medieval Christianity and the scientific one accompanied by breathtaking technological developments – was the gradually evolving *individualism* which took on a definitely universal character since the Enlightenment. This statement does not aim at all to discredit modern individualism: the individual person was recognized, since immemorial times, as the bearer of human destiny, and human communities (kinship and ethnic groups, nations and religious groups) were built on the multitude of individuals. The lives of individuals and communities are inextricably interwoven. This holistic conception of the relationship between individual and community was destroyed by modernity, and the individual was granted an absolute preeminence over the collectivity or any other social group.

Adam Seligman expresses in a striking formula this universalizing role of individualism when he says that in the modern age "the universal is collapsed into the particular."⁴ That individualism is one of the sources of universalism means that universalism is derived from the individual, or, in other words, that the particular is invested with the characteristics of the universal. The individual, the subject, as a self-contained entity related to other individual subjects by a 'metaphysical equality,' became universal. Accordingly, the individual lost its personality. Its essence being the common denominator of every individual, it was transformed into an empty concept. Expressed differently, the individual became abstracted from the living human being and stands for nothing more than theoretically formulated universal preferences or interests.

[To give you an example of this, I refer here to recent developments in the field of public ethics. Since Kant a specific sort of moral universalism accompanied the development of Western society in which the individual's preferences and interests represent the ultimate standard, through establishing a unique guiding principle of moral conduct. This guiding principle is that what an individual considers as good for himself, or serving his interests, should be 'universalizable,' – a norm is only ethical if it is applicable by all and to all. In addition, an important shift took place from rules imposing duties on everyone and granting benefits to everyone, towards an ethic of rights which puts the emphasis exclusively on the entitlements for every member of society.]

The universalization of the empty concept of the modern individual had profound consequences from the point of view of social structuring. Today's societies in the West are composed of autonomous individuals in the sense that they are like atoms independent from each other, as there are no other links relating them to each other than the citizenship in a state. In this way, such atomistic individuals face alone, separately, the powerful state. Individuals, only constrained by the laws of the State and by regulations of other public institutions are, as citizens, to such an extent dependent of the omnipotent State, that the doctrine of human rights, the rights of individuals against all powers that be, gains more and more importance every day. Here is the profound sociological reason why rights and justice are so much more preeminent in our times than duties and obligations towards the collectivity.

In conclusion, we can say that to the atomization of society corresponds the idea of universalism encompassing the whole of humanity. Not that the image of this worldwide *Gesellschaft*, shimmering on the horizon as presented by public discourse and the media, would be a concrete reality (except in a biological sense), but it corresponds to the lingering desire of autonomous individuals for a community, be it an ungraspable one. The planetary human community existed since time immemorial; it is nothing new in it. What is new, however, is that modern universalism is intended to replace the loss of social cohesion with an alleged universality of everything the modern worldview puts forward. It is the distortion of a genuine, originally cosmic universalism; it tries to introduce an integrative force into a fragmented, truly de-centered or de-constructed society.

⁴ SELIGMAN, Adam, *Towards a Reinterpretation of Modernity in an Age of Postmodernity*. In: TURNER, Bryan S. *Theories of Modernity and Postmodernity*. Newbury Park, Cal.: SAGE Publications, 1990, p. 124.

Universalism is, in my view, an outmoded perspective in a world in which a plurality of great civilizations co-exist and communicate in the same space. It is, therefore, not adequate as a framework to settle problems which emerge on the world scene because actions of the international community cannot be derived from irrelevant foundations. It is thus inevitable to return to the principle of *contextuality*, implying a considerable degree of relativism. Contextualism in my understanding means that each question, each problem to be considered, has to be placed in its proper context, that is, in its cultural framework and in the social and economic circumstances prevailing in the civilizational world in which it emerged. The problem of contextuality conceived in this way allows me to now turn to the examination of the bipolar concepts of globalization and localism.

2. GLOBALIZATION VERSUS LOCALISM

Globalization, in my perspective, *is a cultural phenomenon*. The term does not describe our world as a 'global village,' corresponding to the idea launched by Marshall McLuhan some forty years ago, because it does not only refer to the worldwide extension of communication facilities. As defined by Roland Robertson,⁵ professor at the University of Pittsburgh, globalization means that a 'compression' of phenomena took place on the world scene and, therefore, the world became 'a single place.' Formulated in a dialectical perspective by Anthony Giddens,⁶ director of the London School of Economics, the global world of modernity means 'space and time distancing' compensated, in turn, by the irresistible spread of concepts, views, customs and lifestyles to the remotest regions of the world.

Globalization is a process and it is, as such, simultaneously, a horizontal and a vertical phenomenon in space, and a diachronic (sequential) and synchronic (simultaneous) phenomenon in time. In this sense, the 'global circumstance' of modernity is a framework allowing for the existence of 'plural' worlds. This signifies diversity, fragmentation and sharp discontinuities. As a process, globality is a relational network of phenomena, an interdependence of everything with everything. As Robertson put it, globalization stands for "the interpenetration of the universalization of particularism and the particularization of universalism." Robertson's formula constitutes the best characterization of the globalizing process because it clearly indicates that the concept of globalization admits universalistic trends (such as the worldwide spread of Western consumerism) as well as particularistic self-affirmations and ways of life (like the revival and global valorization of national consciousness or other collective cultural identities). The general process of globalization as the interpenetration of universalistic and particularistic orientations makes, consequently, necessary that all entities involved 'identify' themselves in relation to the global-human circumstance." This constitutes the dualistic face of contemporary reality: the simultaneous expectation and concrete experience of universalism and particularism.

In contrast to globalization, universalism intends to grasp the world as a whole in the sense that it affirms presumably universally held beliefs, values, identities and characteristics as well as presumably universally applicable institutional structures. In contrast to universalism, globalization recognizes the importance of contextuality and, through this recognition; it embraces its bipolar opposite, localism. Localism and contextualism are, in my eyes, identical terms, but I used here localism as it underlines more clearly the contrast with globalism. Localism, by its inner logic, gives priority to particularism as much as does contextualism; the latter, however, favors

⁵ Roland Robertson is the main theoretician of globalization. His most important work on the global phenomenon is :*Globalization : Social Theory and Global Structure*. Newbury Park, Cal.: SAGE Publications, 1992.

⁶ For those interested in Giddens's ideas on modernity, I recommend reading three of his studies: 1/ *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1984; 2/ *The Consequences of Modernity*. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1990, and 3/ *Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1991.

in an evident manner what in a given situation is really particular. Contextualism, therefore, eliminates abstract, formalistic approaches or pre-conceived principles for the sake of the contingent particularity of things and the contingent particularity of events. Thus, globalization, in accordance with Robertson's above quoted definition, absorbs certain aspects of localism and frequently reflects contextual realities, whereas particular situations incorporate a certain number of global traits or instrumentalize for their own purposes such global traits. In fundamentalist worldviews like the Islamic or the American Evangelical, for example, globalization is present in the form of discourse, in the formal valuations employed, and in the use of particular arguments.

In consequence, globally recognized categories of thought and action enter into particular and local contexts. From the political point of view, a good example of how particular contexts may be globalized, and how globalizing tendencies become contextualized in international politics is the recent arrangement concluded between Hungary and Romania in order to solve the problem of the substantial Hungarian minority in Transylvania. These small European States try to obtain global support from the so-called international community in order to be admitted into NATO and the European Union (expected to guarantee their security and to give them generous economic assistance), therefore both countries felt obliged to show their willingness to make concessions to each other by signing a treaty recognizing the inviolability of their frontiers and the inalienable rights of the minorities. In contrast, the local situation is strained as the opposition of a considerable part of public opinion and mentalities born out of a century-old conflict cannot evidently be alleviated by the fiat of foreign powers and of the international community.

To give you another example, now from the microeconomic domain, I take the case of Honda, which is one of the financially most successful enterprises of the automotive industrial sector in Japan, because its policies reflect a real understanding of global/local realities, and a consecutive adaptation of the company's policies to this dialectical reality. For this purpose, I will quote from a study of Andrew Mair, a British business economist who studied in detail Honda's concept of strategic localization which aims at consistency and coherence among different dimensions of the company's orientation:

"The concept of strategic localization, by contrast, suggest that localization must not only seek consistency with the local environment, whether market, industrial infrastructure, or culture/society, but do so in a way that is also consistent with the company's strategy and operations in other regions of the world ... this means developing patterns of consistency and coherence across clustered dimensions of activity. It also means developing patterns of consistency and coherence across space and across time. Moreover, the Honda case reveals that strategic localization is not simply a case of 'fitting in' to existing local environments. Indeed, these latter may have to be inventively molded if company operations and strategy in one region are not to become inconsistent with those in other regions."⁷

It is, then, possible to state that in our late modern age two contradictory movements exist together, of which each possesses its own dialectics. On the one hand, the ever-widening globalizing trend characterized by space-time distancing; on the other hand, the growing importance of the 'place,' the focus of the local setting of multiple interactions, which necessitates the co-presence of human beings (Giddens's *presence-availability*), the situation of being-together and the possibility of coming-together. This late modern trend signals an imperceptible change in contemporary attitudes; it is perceived that the world is not-so-global a village as imagined, and the concrete place and the concrete temporal dimension of existence are regaining their overwhelming reality. The 'place' is not only the contextual locus of action, but is also linked to the lived experience of generations of human beings and to the recollection of past events in human memory. It is, therefore, the context in which space, experience and temporality fuse together to constitute the lifeworld (with the expression of the hermeneutic philosophy).

⁷ MAIR, Andrew, *Strategic Localization. The Myth of the Postnational Enterprise*. In: COX, Kevin R., *Spaces of Globalization. Reasserting the Power of the Local*. London/New York, The Guilford Press, 1997, pp. 64-88. Mair also wrote a book about Honda: *Honda's Global Local Corporation*. London, Macmillan, 1994.

The reappraisal of the concepts of universalism and globalization is all the more necessary today that universalism is no longer relevant, and the globalization process is not such as it appears to be. One of the main problems concerning globalization is that it does not possess an institutional support which could be its bearer such as the inter-state system was, and still is, for the universalistic worldview. There are two tentatives to peg globalization to an institutional framework. The first is the *world-system theory*, focused around the center-periphery divide, based on economic determinism and the homogenizing effects of the worldwide spread of a 'commoditized culture.' If Immanuel Wallerstein,⁸ the founder of world-system theories, was, in his earlier writings, not inclined to include the concept of a world culture in his world-system, it was for the good reason that he recognized that cultures are particularistic entities, though he pretended that their justification had to be with reference to universal criteria. Later he changed his views in the sense that economic flows characterizing the capitalism of our age unavoidably breaks down national distinctions and cultural particularisms, resulting in an internationalization of habits, customs and cultural practices.

The second tentative concerning the institutional structure of globalization was put forward by Stuart Hall⁹ and Roland Robertson. Hall conceived globalization as a cultural process in the form of a decentralized or, better, de-centered global culture, – as a variant of the economically-determined world-system approach. Mass culture is a homogenizing form of cultural representation which, due to its own nature, never reaches completeness. For Hall, therefore, this consumerist mass culture reflects the American conception of the world; world capitalism operates through a multipolar cultural world. However, others theorists, like Robertson, postulate a proper dynamics characterizing global culture, an evolution independent from the globalizing tendencies of late modern capitalism. Accordingly, it is supposed that the cultural pluralism of our age is deeply penetrated by the awareness that the world is becoming a 'single place,' that there is an interpenetration of culture and economy. Thus, in Robertson's eyes, the relation between culture and economy stands as a striking example of the dialectical relationship of universalism and particularism in the sense of the definition of globalization quoted before. Robertson's world is "a series of culturally equal, relativized entities or ways of life," and the world culture of the future is the institutional bearer of the globalization process.

I believe that these views still do not explain sufficiently the contemporary globalizing trend, as they do not indicate: i) the medium through which the interpenetration of culture with other different spheres of society, and ii) the institutionalization of the cultural process take place. In my view, this interpenetration of the global and the local is the result of a combination of several factors:

– *First*, the technological developments of the last 50 years, especially of communication and information technologies. We could not speak of globalizing certain cultural features if the first generation of technological developments in communication had not taken place, such as railways, air transport, wireless transmissions and emissions; nor could it be furthered without the second generation of such developments we call information revolution, consisting of computerized networks, block trading of securities, satellite transmissions, etc. This unique and overwhelming role of technology does, of course, not exclude the interplay of universalistic and particularistic elements.

⁸ WALLERSTEIN, Emmanuel. *Culture as the Ideological Battleground of the Modern World-System*. In: FEATHERSTONE, Mike (ed.) *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity*. /Theory, Culture and Society Special Issue/ Newbury Park, Cal.: SAGE Publications, 1990, pp. 31-55. – See further from Wallerstein: *Geopolitics and Geoculture. Essays on the Changing World-System*. Cambridge/Paris, Cambridge University Press/La maison des sciences de l'homme, 1991.

⁹ HALL, Stuart. *The Local and the Global. Globalization and Ethnicity*. In: KING, Anthony D. (ed.), *Culture, Globalization and the World-System: Contemporary Conditions for the Representation of Identity*. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1997, pp. 19-39.

– *Second*, technology, though it shows an autonomous dynamics, is still a servant of those who manipulate it in their own interest. I mean by that that technology is a vehicle of hegemonic power politics, of power holders whoever they may be. In consequence, globalization's main institutional framework is, as Nietzsche would have said, the will to hegemonic power. Old-fashioned hegemonic politics applied pressures in a straightforward way to all those who happened to be in its orbit of influence. Hegemonic politics in the global age, precisely because technological progress led to transparency in all public spaces, not only has to take into account cultural, social, political and other differences, but has to exercise its influence on each of the entities concerned. Stuart Hall's formula expresses this in a concise way: "The global is the self-presentation of the dominant particular" as the global stands for nothing else than the manner in which "the dominant particular localizes and naturalizes itself." Hegemonic intent underlying globalization does not aim at the destruction and disappearance of different particularities, but endeavors, in the course of a cultural process, to integrate multiple identities and particularities into the hegemonic identity and particularity, though in conditions dominated by the unforeseen, unintended and contingent features of the environment.

– *Third*, for technology to be able to assume the role it is expected to play in the globalization process, and for technology-based hegemonic politics to be able to successfully penetrate and bend the innumerable particularities in the world without eliminating them, a vehicle is needed ensuring that the message has the correct content and the required coherence in the course of its dissemination by the media. This vehicle is the ideology of globalization. Ideology thus is an essential factor in globalization processes, perhaps the most important of the three components in the institutionalization of these processes. Formulated in a dialectical way, ideology creates and sustains globalization, and globalization processes are themselves the source of the ideology of globality. There is, however, an additional dialectical complexity here: ideology as expression and servant of hegemonic power interests becomes, in turn, hegemonic in and itself, too. Globalization, therefore, serves the promotion of twofold hegemonic interests: of those striving for political and economic power and of those striving for the 'end of history' in the form of the conquest of the planet by one particular civilization.

The globalization process is, then, the engine of the self-affirmation and ideological hegemony of the Western civilization, and it appears successful in the dissemination of Western civilizational values and ways of life, although frequently with a devastating effect. Examples of such globalizing phenomena are: extended urbanization from the structural, the formation of nation-states from the political, the establishment of Western-type judicial processes from the legal-procedural point of views. Finally, the 'consumerization' of large masses due to the invasion of products such as modern clothing or electrical appliances, is the engine of the modification of indigenous customs and ways of life.

The impression given by the world conquest of our civilization¹⁰ is, however, deceiving because globalization is a phenomenon solely at the surface of the life of peoples belonging to other civilizations. This basic fact did not change since the Second World War, and theories of economic and political duality in the non-Western world did not lose their validity. They express the non-congruence between fundamental cultural givens and imported concepts, values and modes of action. The non-congruence between the old and the new is also proven by the self-defense of non-Western cultures against the onslaught of modernity, either in the form of mushrooming religious fundamentalisms reacting against a secular and rationalist foreign culture, or in the form of the rebirth of ethnic solidarity, both aiming to protect people's collective identity.

¹⁰ See on the conquest of Western civilization: LAUE, Theodore H. von, *The World Revolution of Westernization. The Twentieth Century in Global Perspective*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987.

3. PLURALISM AND THE BELIEF IN 'ONE WORLD'

Our discussion of this pair of concepts will be short because their opposition was already implied in the analysis of universalism versus particularism and globalization versus localism. I mention them separately to emphasize the importance of pluralism characterizing our age.

Pluralism is a self-explanatory term, but is used in multiple ways. In my usage, it means civilizational pluralism which also stands for cultural pluralism. The distinction is important because it distinguishes this usage from the concept of multiculturalism which means the co-existence of different cultures in one State, and is linked to the defense of minority rights and the freedom of expression. *Civilizational pluralism stands for the co-existence of several different civilizations on the world scene.* It is evident that civilizational pluralism is the opposite of universalism, of which the contemporary belief in the 'one world' is a particular, time-bound manifestation.

Civilizational pluralism is also a major force in dissipating the universalist belief in the one and only rationality, valid for all peoples and for all times. The Western concept of an overwhelming rationality originated

i) In the development of scientific progress (for which it meant a strict application of methodological requirements), and

ii) In the conviction of the Enlightenment thinkers that human reason is a quasi-biological quality of all human beings; therefore it has to be the same in each of us without being conditioned by the culture in which we live. From my point of view, there is no such universal rationality independent from concrete features of human existence, but there is a 'meaningful rationality' which corresponds to given, local contexts, or to particular cultural worlds.

In consequence, pluralism is inevitably linked to relativism, but a relativism concerning civilizational differences, not a relativism within such civilizational orbits. The unexpected development of communication and information technologies which opened up the world, on the one hand, and the decolonization movement which made possible the entry of non-Western civilizations onto the world scene as independent actors, on the other hand, were the factors which made impossible to believe in the 'one world' thesis, but to accept the reality of the plurality of co-existing civilizations. The universalism of Western modernity was born in an age when little was known of other cultures and civilizations. Cultures of indigenous populations, colonized or surviving in remote territories untouched by the impact of modern ways of life, were not considered on equal footing with our own culture, especially in the glamorous days when infinite hopes were inspired by the progress of science and technology. After the Crusades in the Middle Ages, the Western world came face to face with non-Western civilizations only in the aftermath of the Second World War and in the wake of the accelerating process of decolonization. At the beginning of the globalizing era, the West met the 'otherness' of the East. It was obliged to acknowledge that other civilizations have also the right to their own identity and that each is entitled to live in accordance with its own cosmic vision, its own cultural framework and traditions which evolved during centuries. This new plurality of a composite world, this relativism consequent to civilizational diversity inaugurated Western civilization's ideological-hegemonic tendency, in the formulation of Mike Featherstone,¹¹ "as the guardian of universal values on behalf of a world formed in its own self-image." The drive to conquer the world through the ideological message promoting the planetary hegemony of Western civilization, summed up in the 'end of history' prophecies, is mainly sustained by the media and the electronic instruments of dissemination of information – the institutional framework of the globalization process.

¹¹ FEATHERSTONE, Mike. *Global and Local Cultures*. In: BIRD, J. et al. (eds.). *Mapping the Futures: Local Cultures, Global Change*. London, Routledge, 1993, pp. 169-187.

The interface of civilizations in our time does not mean that a confrontation is inevitable as some authors would like us to believe. A mutual awareness of the other's existence; a profound sensitivity towards what people living in the orbit of other civilizations are thinking, feeling, believing and valuing; and, above all, an attempt to interpret and evaluate the beliefs and acts of others on their own, not our terms, would make it possible to reach a peaceful co-existence between these great traditions and systems of beliefs and morals. Such an effort would not inevitably require relativizing our own cultural tradition, but it certainly presupposes that all sides show readiness to learn from the others, and to integrate in their own contextual, local world elements from other civilizations whenever the latter appear to be necessary for the realization of particular human projects. I used to call such an approach the 'relativistic reading of realism' on which to base a plural world.

It is in this sense that one can speak of the necessity to adapt Western scientific views, methods and technologies to a given cultural framework, even implying certain changes in the ways of life of the populations if these adaptations and changes are compatible with their inherited values and traditions. The same goes for the integration in specific cultural contexts of such fundamental Western beliefs as the one in human rights. Such rights cannot be imposed by the West but have to be properly rooted in particular, culturally conditioned mentalities. In the same vein, the West may learn much from other civilizations, in particular by re-introducing an ontological/cosmic framework in its cultural perspective, or by re-appropriating the fundamentals of genuine human solidarity.

Having finished the conceptual analysis, I thought to discuss with you two problems to illustrate the intertwined realities of universalism and globalization. Our first case study will be what I call, together with some other scholars, *the myth of financial market integration* and the other the *uncertain future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization* (NATO).

Case Study One: THE MYTH OF FINANCIAL MARKET INTEGRATION

The myth of the worldwide integration of financial markets is taken by most of our contemporaries as an undisputed reality, precursor of an integration of all economies of the world. This myth is based solely on the accomplishments of technological development, specifically of the communication and information technologies which sustain this sector's activity. The myth corresponds to the Giddensian notion, mentioned before, of 'space and time distanciation'. The collapse of the Bretton Woods agreements which gave priority to the gradual liberalization of trade but encouraged protection of financial markets was an important factor in creating this myth. In addition, the abolition of capital controls by the United States at the end of the sixties gave the impetus to global financial liberalization.

The truly impressive development of technologies which made possible what one calls the integration of financial markets consists of two elements:

- i) The instantaneous availability of information on transactions and events in one market to all others at distant location on the world map; and,
- ii) The instantaneous reaction of traders – selling or buying – at all those distant locations in response to the transactions and events in the first market.

These instantaneous links creating a virtual reality suggest a growing interdependence and effective linkages between national financial markets, and represent the empirical foundations of the belief in worldwide financial integration. They, however, do not constitute an integration in the true sense of the word as the recent events in South East Asia, Russia, and Brazil evidenced it, but simply offer a hitherto unimaginable facility for the dissemination of information without delay – and nothing more.

I qualified this belief in the financial integration of markets virtual reality because the easiness of information and communication does not correspond to any criteria of integration. Integration implies a definite and continuous creation of a whole from separate and distinct elements or parts of a specific domain, a definite convergence in national economic policies as well as of individual actions of worldwide operators. However, recent turbulences on world financial markets have proven that, although the technical means remained at everybody's disposal, the effects of the South East Asian or Russian crises were not the same for all national economies. The presumably efficient, private and corporatist self-regulatory governance structures of the markets could not avoid the occurrence of such unintended consequences.

With flows of enormous amounts of capital continuing to be uncontrolled and unpredictable, there is another factor also showing that there can be no question, at least for the moment, of financial market integration. This factor is the continuous intervention of States, and even actors of the inter-state system like the International Monetary Fund, in regulating financial market transactions implying that domestic control and orientation of international financial markets (including controls exerted by domestic private institutions and firms as well) cannot be discounted. In fact, one of the reasons that financial institutions and individuals operating on the international level try to set up some sort of a frame for independent movements of capital flows and financial transactions was precisely to avoid domestic controls and the preponderance of domestic actors. Complementing this global trend is that banks and securities firms undertook a diversification of their domestic operations and even intensified their activities on home markets.

[I mention here *pro memoria* what are the main features of the liberalization of financial markets: market de-segmentation, end of protectionism, abolition of controls on the movements of capital, and, unavoidably, the onset of a more unpredictable international monetary system anchored in flexible exchange rates.]

As in many countries the Keynesian macroeconomic demand management policies are, at least partially, in vigor, governments need to shelter their economies and their domestic financial order from the vagaries of international financial markets. Until today the view is, for example, unchanged that economic stability and growth require stable and relatively fixed exchange rates. The trend toward a worldwide liberalization of financial transactions made extraordinarily complex, if not impossible, the formulation of adequate and efficient public policies because worldwide transactions would require global government and globally enforced regulations if consumers and individual economies are expected to be protected and stability is to be maintained. But no such government exists nor is any such structure on the immediate horizon and convergence of economic policies can only be approached through inter-governmental coordination. At the World Economic Forum in January 1999, Henry Kissinger, therefore, spoke of the 'incompatibility' of the world's political and economic governance. National governments meet regularly and try to develop a consensus on policy problems and to devise possible solutions through coordinated action. In this respect it is frequently stated that the State itself became internationalized. This is true to the extent that in the era of globalization the State has changed its function : from its Bretton Woods role of shielding the domestic financial order from external disturbances, a policy considered necessary for the maintenance of the Welfare State as well, the State was transformed to become an active player in the financial market and, thus, instead of staying out of the hassle in order to remain an impartial arbiter, it became involved in the free for all competition by promoting the interests of firms located on its territory or belonging to its nationals.

Problems of public policy in respect of the worldwide integration of financial markets also implicate the democratic institutional build-up in most States. Existing political and social institutions must be mobilized if a polity is to respond to compelling challenges and the significantly increased volatility in foreign financial markets, through modifying the policies the State pursued hitherto. But these institutions have only a limited repertoire of potential solutions or responses available, a repertoire not easily modified or replaced, and the pattern of decisions will longtime remain the same.

This description of the present state of international financial markets, expressed in the formula of the myth of worldwide financial integration, clearly evidences the dialectical traits of universalism and globalization, thus showing that our bipolar concepts offer a convenient analytical frame for the examination of contemporary problems. There is no doubt in my mind that the underlying desire of the 'one world,' a beginning of the realization of the secular universalist dream, leads to a clash with particular circumstances reigning in the nation-states which compose the inter-state system. At the same time, the analysis of worldwide financial transactions also offers a good example of the essence of globalization what we described as the 'universalization of particulars and the particularization of universals." What is the extension of financial techniques and operations to the whole world if not the universalization of particular economic conditions, attitudes and activities which were born in the most developed economy of an age dominated by liberal ideologies, that is, the United States? And what is the transformation of public policies pursued by nation-states, involving them in the planetary financial competition through adapting their policies to the challenges represented by worldwide financial transactions, if not a particularization of a phenomenon perceived as a universal trend?

The drive for the financial integration of the world's economies, if there is a conscious action in this sense pursued by some operators in the field of finance or by economic policy makers of big powers, will be brought to an arrest, and probably reduced to some acceptable proportions, by the local and the particular regaining preponderance in the exchange relationships between peoples. It is evident that this drive is contrary to the most powerful tendency of our age at the end of the twentieth century: the affirmation and achievement of pluralism. We live in a plural world and in a pluralistic society in each country. I do not think that this basic fact can be changed, or will be changed, by new developments in information and communication technologies which, on the other hand, definitely serve all aspects of a pluralistic human existence. The most astonishing phenomenon therefore is that those who intend to promote the myth of worldwide financial integration confess, at the same time, their belief in a pluralistic world. Is this myth then an ideological tenet only, but not a determining factor for the economic future of our world?

Case Study Two: THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

The future of NATO is uncertain. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was created by democratic States, committed to liberal, market-oriented economic policies and to individual and collective freedom, in order to defend these ideals in the face of the menacing power and ideology of Communist totalitarianism. In consequence, NATO was a regional defense alliance with a clearly conceived and declared objective. Accordingly, the necessary command structures were established, a strategic vision spelled out in numerous documents, and plans for military mobilization were prepared. Although there were many frictions between members of the alliance in its history, – the best known being the decades long absence of France from the alliance, – NATO has proven to be an undeniable success and one of the most important institutions on the world scene – until the disappearance of the enemy against which it was created: the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and the international Communist movement.

It is perfectly justified to ask now: what is the function of NATO in the present and what will it be in the future? Should it remain a regional defense alliance? Against whom? Or should it be maintained as a military organization of which the services are, let's say, 'contracted out' to anyone who needs them? But in this case what will become of the ideals which formerly constituted its ideological basis? What should be NATO's relation to the United Nations, to the West European Union (WEU) and to the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)? What purpose will be served by the admission of new members?¹² Events since the collapse of the Soviet Union

¹² There were numerous books published recently on the future of NATO. For example: WIJK, Rob de, *NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium: The Battle for Consensus*. London/Washington, Brassey's, 1997, and KUPCHAN, Charles A. (ed.), *Atlantic Security: Contending Visions*. New York/Washington, A Council on Foreign Relations Book, 1998.

and of the Warsaw Pact indicate that NATO can increasingly be conceived as an organization for security co-operation, directed towards the protection of mutual interests. Mutual interests are defined in terms of internal and external security, that is, peaceful and stable relationships both inside and outside the treaty area. Crises and wars, of course, can produce direct threats leading to floods of refugees, – an example is what happened with the Kurds and the Albanians, – which may have great social and economic consequences for the member States. It can also obstruct international trade flows, posing a threat to the importation of vital raw materials and the exportation of end products. Finally, if weapons of mass destruction are used in a conflict they will cause enormous human and ecological devastation and, because of increased interdependence, these negative consequences will not be limited to one or two member States. This does not imply, however, that each country's interests will be equally threatened. It means, in turn, that the nature and magnitude of participation of member States in security operations may differ.

[In the usual terminology, collective defense means the obligatory participation of each Member State of a military alliance whenever one of the member States is attacked or menaced. Collective security is a looser definition which stands for any measure – political or economic like an embargo – leading to the elimination of security risks, but does not cover the obligation of each State participating in the collective security organization such as the UN, to take part in the defense of a member whose security is jeopardized.]

The problems of NATO's transformation can be summarized as follows: As a result of the demise of the Soviet Union, the emphasis for NATO came to rest on other security risks such as a spillover of local conflicts, or the threat of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons developed by various countries. These mostly concerned relatively small-scale, regional security risks outside the NATO area, which in most cases might produce an indirect security risk for a limited number of NATO countries. This brought the issue of out-of-area operations (not covered by Article 5 of the Treaty), taking the form of conflict prevention, peacekeeping or peace enforcement, to the forefront of the debate.¹³ The problem of out-of-area operations raised the question: which international body has the necessary authority to order such operations? In consequence, a distinction was made by 'mandate-issuing' (UN and OSCE) and 'executive organizations' (NATO and WEU) in conformity with the view that NATO would put at the disposal of others its military command structures and forces, in accordance with the principle of 'separable but not separate capabilities.' This issue raised one of the most serious problems which plagued all efforts made to adapt NATO to the circumstances of a new situation, because the Alliance does not have a political-military doctrine for out-of-area operations since the end of the Cold War. This meant that there was no firm foundation for the formulation of political aims for such operations, also called 'provoked' and 'non-provoked' aggressions, to which the necessary military means could be geared. To this lack of political consensus was added the obscurity surrounding the term 'Alliance support' in case of a request by a 'mandate-issuing' organization, and the division of responsibilities between NATO and such organizations. Posing the problem of 'mandate-issuing' organizations was a response linked to a concept formulated already before, namely the one of 'interlocking institutions,' whereby organizations like the OSCE, NATO, and the WEU would have a clearly defined function, and would complement and reinforce each other.

Since the 1992 Helsinki conference, the OSCE was, in fact, transformed into a regional organization in the sense of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and thus authorized to be involved in conflict prevention and peacekeeping. The WEU as well, since the 1992 Petersberg meeting, declared itself ready to deploy military units of member States for humanitarian, rescue and peacekeeping tasks, and for combat tasks related to crisis management, including peacemaking. However, only the UN could give a mandate for peace enforcing (being the roof organization in international relations), whereas the OSCE could only provide a mandate to NATO for peacekeeping, supposing that in the context of peacekeeping there was consensus regarding such basic assumptions as 'consent of the parties involved' and 'impartial conduct.'

¹³ On peace enforcement by arms, see Boutros Boutros-Ghali's "An Agenda for Peace."

Some particular problems also emerged in respect of NATO and the overwhelming influence of the United States in it, because European States insisted along all negotiations about the acceptance of a 'European Defense and Security Identity.' The Franco-German 'European Corps' was an expression of such an identity in the sense of the Alliance Strategic Concept which referred to 'integrated and multinational European structure' of defense. Beside this problem, there was opposition on the European side to peace enforcement operations and, therefore, the term 'peace support' was accepted to cover practically all military interventions outside the treaty area. The concept of collective defense was maintained, but in line with the expression used in the Alliance Strategic Concept, the meaning of the so-called 'management of crisis' was extended. Crisis management became an umbrella under which were ranged as much direct threats to the Alliance as crises outside the treaty area where intervention could only take place on the basis of a mandate from the OSCE or the UN, with guidelines expressed in terms of military capabilities. Finally, a 'combined joint task force' (CJTF) concept was proposed by the United States, which meant a joint venture of several member States in multinational, multiservice operations for out-of-area interventions, under the existing commandment of NATO forces. The acceptance of this concept by France was linked to a simultaneous decision to improve the politico-military co-ordination of operations.

All these debates underline the importance, in the context of decisions concerning NATO's future, of the relationship between the European Defense and Security Identity and transatlantic solidarity. On the basis of the clarified nature of this relationship a politico-military doctrine could be worked out to guide operational activities. If clarity cannot be reached over such fundamental problems there is a great risk that NATO would cease to exist as a credible, effective organization. However, on all these points there are no answers but only an anxious silence as the revision of strategies would turn upside down the present organizational structures and patterns of decision-making. Sometimes changes were accepted under the pressure of external circumstances as, for example, in the case of 'conflict prevention.' Earlier this concept was still presented in the framework of collective defense, but it was transformed by NATO's involvement in the crisis in former Yugoslavia into one of acting outside the treaty area. Combined joint task forces (CJFT) are formed for 'contingency operations,' and the latter include both Article 5 and non-Article 5 interventions. This proves that the transformation process is driven by imperatives of practical circumstances and not by grandiose visions of NATO's future.

The 1991 Alliance Strategic Concept no longer serves its political purpose, namely expressing what the Alliance stands for, what are its shared objectives. The political strategy was primarily based upon the risk of a large-scale attack on treaty territory, whereas the emphasis now lies on limited security risks that might lead to regional collective defense and out-of-area operations. Consequently, in this Strategic Concept conflict prevention and crisis management were still seen in the context of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, adhering to the classical interpretation of collective defense. However, both cases may involve regional conflicts which could possibly escalate. Therefore, in today's world the distinction between Article 5 and non-Article 5 interventions is militarily irrelevant, but it is politically and judicially relevant because it has a bearing on the degree of obligation of member States to assist each other. One analyst therefore rightly pointed out, using a striking formula that "NATO's dilemma is that the greatest political commitment exists for the least probable threat and the least commitment for the most probable task which will face the Alliance."

In this perspective, the future of the Alliance, according to many experts, should be seen as a *co-operative security* organization which would

- i) Anticipate potential conflicts and prevent them breaking out, or
- ii) Actively pursue the suppression of conflicts once they have broken out by means of joint international action adhering to common norms and standards of conduct.

The concept of co-operative security corresponds to collective security, as described above, in the framework of which member States offer assistance only on a case-by-case basis. This security concept does not assume that all crises can be controlled and that wars can be avoided. It is rather intended to induce members of the inter-state system to undertake anticipatory actions. But in this case would NATO not be a simple duplication of the United Nations?

The case of NATO is thus similar to the case of the UN and other international institutions – nobody dares to touch the existing legal and institutional framework because it appears certain that a consensus on its revision could not be achieved. The fear that the existing balance of power in the Alliance would be undermined and fixed positions rendered insecure, blocks all reasonable re-structuring exercise. Political controversies stand in the way of the structural adaptation of the organization. In fact, five years after the beginning of the transformation process of NATO, the organization of its headquarters and the design of the integrated military structure are not essentially different from what they had been during the Cold War, so there are doubts about how effective NATO would be in carrying out its new tasks. In addition, it is also uncertain what the nature and extent of contribution to regional collective defense would be from countries not directly threatened, as their decisions will be taken on the basis of national political considerations. Intervention for conflict prevention and crisis management outside the treaty area will be even more difficult to carry out when the interests of individual member countries will exclusively be taken into consideration in view of their participation in them. This poses a great threat to an Alliance which is based on mutual solidarity. And one can justifiably ask, what is an alliance without mutual solidarity? The reform of NATO or the transformation of the Alliance into an effectively functioning defense and security system of Western States finally raises the most important question: what reasons justify the continued existence of the Alliance, or what are the compelling reasons for its members to continue cooperating with each other. And, especially, what can a defense or security alliance do if its democratic member States show a growing reluctance to accept casualties when their vital national interests are not at stake?

Thus, it is clear that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which started as a regional defense alliance with a strategy centered on an eventual confrontation with the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact partners, became completely ensnared in a contradictory position into which it was induced by the universalist ideology dominating in international circles, on the one hand, and in the whirls of the globalizing dialectics of our world, on the other hand.

In consequence, as a result of the collapse of Soviet power NATO lost its *raison d'être*, therefore it has to re-formulate its political and military strategy, or it has to disappear. However, as a military structure, unique in our world, NATO is an invaluable tool at the disposal of Western countries for their own collective security and self-defense, if the political objectives and necessary means for the realization of such a project could be agreed upon by its members. To carry out this program is rendered extremely difficult for a number of reasons:

– *First*, the universalistic dream pushes NATO members to enlarge the circle of membership, or to peg future NATO actions to decisions taken by organizations, like the Security Council of the United Nations, to give them a justification on a universalistic basis. This is, of course, an incomprehensible behavior if not considered in the perspective of the reigning universalistic ideology because, since the beginning of history, actions undertaken by military alliances did never need the approval of States which were not members of the alliance. We still live in the so-called Westphalian system of nation-states established in the middle of the seventeenth century. For this reason, in case of an alliance comprising sovereign States it may be considered as an inexplicable attitude to resort to the approval of a group of other States, whose interests are not necessarily converging with those of alliance members when these latter take action in their own national interests. NATO leaders, perhaps, do not want to take responsibility and be burdened by the ensuing accountability for the actions taken by their collective security organization in the interests of its members, only under the umbrella of an international consensus obtained from States with no interest whatsoever in the particular conflictual situation.

It is, of course, true that Art. 43, Chapter VIII, of the UN Charter (Regional Arrangements) specifically states in its par. 1, that

"The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against an enemy State" [the enemy state being defined in par. 2 as "any State which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter".

This provision of the Charter thus forbids any peace enforcement action by any regional organization without the authorization of the Security Council – making it impossible for NATO to assume a role in out-of-treaty areas. NATO is not authorized to act in such areas following a decision of its own Council, only when empowered by the Security Council of the UN. In view of this stipulation of the Charter, one can even justifiably ask whether it was worth founding NATO in 1949, because operations of such a defense alliance against Warsaw Pact forces would certainly have implied out-of-treaty area operations, and the same Soviet Union sat with its veto power in the Security Council against whom and against whose allies NATO was expected to defend the democratic West. I think that this is again a glaring example of those fundamental contradictions embodied in the UN Charter, due to the creation of the United Nations Organization in the euphoria following allied victory in World War II.

In the perspective defined by the Charter's provisions, the only remaining solution would be to make out of NATO a 'mercenary organization' executing tasks assigned to it by entities entitled to approve such mandates. However, in this case, it would be much better and straightforward to transform NATO into a 'standing army' of the UN. One consequence in either case is certain: that NATO would lose its efficiency and its usefulness because one cannot expect that States representing different civilizational worlds, and even countries belonging to the same civilization, would agree on conflictual political issues and, in particular, on enforcement solutions regarding local and civil conflicts. This is evident from the record of the UN during the last decade when all peacekeeping and peace-restoring operations of the world organization went sour.

Thus the choice is either to keep NATO as a regional defense organization, or to consider it as an international military service agency as implied by the recent practice to act on the authorization of the United Nations Security Council or the organs of the OSCE like, for example, in Bosnia or Kosovo. In all these cases, members of the Security Council who do not know anything about the conflictual history of the Balkans gave their approval to NATO's action. This is a wrong way to solve political conflicts, and leads only to inaction and inefficiency. I believe that the same principle of regional competence should be applied to conflicts on any continent (see the Indian-Pakistani conflict, for example), and members of NATO should not be implicated in whatever manner in conflicts out of the treaty area. This, of course, would mean the end of the so-called era of collective security which, in reality, never existed.

– *Second*, the predicament of the NATO alliance also reflects the dialectical interplay of political forces in the global age. The universalist inclinations of its leaders who encounter on the world scene, almost exclusively, localized conflicts in the form of civil wars, ethnic confrontations, efforts of specific countries to achieve regional hegemonies, etc., oblige them to have recourse only to diplomacy even when hundreds or thousands of people die under their eyes (remember Srebrenica?) The attitude of these leaders is therefore a crystal clear example of the particularization of past events vested with universal character like the Cold War. The conviction that there is 'one world' ruins, in consequence, the possibility of maintaining a regional defense alliance with newly defined objectives, corresponding to the present interests of its members in completely changed circumstances. It favors submitting the Alliance to some nebulous, universal ideals according to which world security is an affair of all of the world's States. The irony of the situation is that NATO, as a regional alliance, would fit perfectly in a particularized, though global world and, in turn, its actions could have global implications but still serving only the promotion of its own particular interests.

– *Third*, and I think that the real dilemma of transforming NATO lies here; the principal problem is whether NATO should become an instrument for whatever hegemonic intentions. Hegemonic intentions, in this respect, can be envisaged in a twofold manner: either NATO as the instrument of Western hegemony aiming at the domination of the inter-state community, or NATO as the hegemonic instrument of one superpower, the United States of America, which, since the collapse of the Soviet empire, became the world's policeman. In this role, NATO and the participation of its members in actions to maintain order in the world would serve the interests of the hegemonic power. NATO thus would be a duplication of the United Nations where, let's be sincere about it, such a drive toward world hegemony is already taking place since the Gulf War.

The conflict between the hegemonic policies of the US, and the affirmation, by at least some European members of NATO, of a specific European identity and of the continent's specific security interests, is evident in all negotiations, as much as the conflict between US interests and the policies of other States is evident in the United Nations since the Gulf War.

[I have to mention here an interesting detail concerning debates in the Security Council at that time: the representative state of the East European region in this gremium was Romania. The Romanian representative supported, without hesitation and without any considerations of his own, the US position on all aspects of authorizing a joint military intervention to safeguard collective security and punish a member State which attacked another member State. I think that US policies at the time were entirely justified, but what impressed me was the readiness of the Romanian delegation to support any position taken by Washington – like they would have supported any position of Moscow ten years before. Just the master changed, but the mentality remained the same.]

It must, of course, be admitted that the lack of common defense and foreign policies of the European Union and, in general, of a resolute stand of European States concerning events pertaining to European security which take place on European soil, explains and justifies the Americans' hegemonic tendencies. But, in fact, and this is a deadly danger for Western security and defense including the problem of NATO's transformation, Americans and Europeans share democratic regimes and it is an unavoidable consequence of societies living in abundance and self-aggrandizing, to enter into conflicts for their own collective security only when no sacrifice in human lives is expected. I do not think that in contemporary America, Britain or Germany, any security and defense policy could obtain popular support if it would involve human casualties. But one cannot secure one's security, and one cannot maintain world order as one conceives it, without taking risks of destruction and of loss of human lives.

SECOND SESSION

The United Nations Organization and the International System

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Today, I shall present to you the organization and activities of the United Nations in the framework of the international system. After a short systemic analysis of international relations as an introduction, I shall proceed with a historical sketch of the idea and evolution of international cooperation. In the main part of this session I shall, then, describe in detail the organizational structure of the United Nations specifying the activities of each institution. Finally, I shall deal with the almost insoluble problems of the reform of the Organization.

1. A SYSTEMIC ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

I am not much in favor of systems theories and systemic analyses in general, but I think that a systemic analysis of the United Nations Organization¹ reveals useful aspects of the institution and, in addition, permits a little insight into the methodology of systemic analysis.

Systemic analysis always proceeds with taking into account the properties of the system and of its environment as well as looking into the possibility and intensity of communication and mutual impact between them. From the point of view of systems theories, the United Nations occupies an intermediary place between the international system and the nation state (or inter-statal) system. The difference between these two systems can be described as follows:

The *first*, the international system, encompasses all interaction taking place within the system and its environment; therefore, it is expected to give the most comprehensive picture of international relations.

The *second*, the inter-statal system, allows for

- i) Significant differentiation among the actors of the international system, and
- ii) Making valid generalizations for purposes of comparison.

In accordance with the input/output formula of systemic analysis, the UN is affected by inputs from other systems, adapting itself to developments which occur at higher as well as lower levels. The outputs of the UN, in turn, can be conceived as inputs by both the international and inter-statal systems. The description of the UN and the evaluation of its activities is, then, performed by examining the impact of its outputs on the behavior of the international and the inter-statal systems, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, by the volume and importance of the flow of communication between them processed by the UN's own channels.

The picture drawn by systems analysis is extremely complex. Two sub-systems in each of the systems indicated above, constituting the environment of the UN, are distinguished: the intra-national system is separated from the inter-state system, and the international organization system is distinguished from the international system as such. The intra-national system is divided into three major subsystems – the political, economic and socio-cultural –, which are at the same time subsystems of inter-statal relationships, international organization and international systems as well. The distinction between the intra-national and inter-statal systems permits to evidence two important features of the structure of international relations:

¹ ELMANDJRA, Mahdi. *The United Nations System: An Analysis*. London, Faber and Faber, 1973.

a) Though decisions at the international level are formally made by nation states which constitute the majority of the membership of the international system, the identification of the components of the intra-national system is important because communication between the international system and its sub-systems flows only partially through the governmental structures of nation states.

b) The creation of the United Nations as a decentralized system of autonomous agencies made possible to increase and to intensify interactions with the intra-national sub-systems of its member states. This is an especially crucial point brought out by systemic analysis as the effectiveness of the UN system depends, in particular in the fields of economic and social cooperation, on its ability to communicate with the intra-national level, to assess its needs, to adjust to its demands and to have a significant impact on its evolution.²

The best definition of the *international system* was given by Stanley Hoffman:

"[The] international system is a pattern of relations between the basic units of world politics, which is characterized by the scope of objectives pursued by those units and of the tasks performed among them, as well as by the means used in order to achieve those goals and perform those tasks. This pattern is largely determined by the structure of the world, the nature of the forces which operate across or within the major units, and the capabilities, pattern of power, and political culture of those units."³

The sub-systems of the international system can be defined in the following way:

- The political sub-system stands for the decision-making process,
- The economic sub-system determines the tactical and short-term goals, and
- The socio-cultural sub-system performs the function of setting the values, norms and long-term objectives – finalities – of the system.

The most important feature of the interaction between these sub-systems is the considerable time lag between the change generated by the socio-cultural sub-system and the translation of this change into decisions and action by the political sub-system, while the economic sub-system can act either as a brake (as in most cases) or as an accelerator. The international system encompasses all communications which take place between its sub-systems and their units and which have a bearing on the behavior of these entities at the international level. It is not surprising that the bulk of the information flow within the international system occurs at the bilateral level and only a small proportion passes through the international organization system and even a smaller part through the United Nations Organization.

The *inter-statal system*, composed of nation-states, is the formally structured and institutionalized higher level of the intra-national system. In effect, the States represent the operational membership of the inter-statal system as their role is preponderant in setting the objectives in the decision-making process and in the allocation of resources to the international organization system. The inter-statal system also carries out the task of limiting the informal communication flow between its own sub-systems and those of the international system.

² One specialized agency, the International Labor Office (ILO), reflects in its very structure intra-national economic and social divisions, as it includes in national delegations representatives of employers, labor and governmental authorities.

³ HOFFMAN, Stanley. "International Systems and International Law." In: KNORR, Klaus, and VERBA, Sidney (eds.), *The International System*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961, p. 267.

The *international organization system* can be broken down into two subsystems:

- i) The inter-governmental, and
- ii) The non-governmental (the NGOs),

whereas *the inter-governmental organization system* is composed, in turn, of three subsystems:

- i) The United Nations system,
- ii) The regional and sub-regional systems, and
- iii) The system of military pacts, especially NATO (and formerly the Warsaw Pact), and other military alliances.

The importance of the UN is due to the comprehensive scope and universal character of its objectives and the quasi-universality of its membership, but if one compares the UN and other intergovernmental organizations from the point of view of mobilization of human and material resources, the latter appear to be more superior.

The United Nations system increasingly interacts with regional and sub-regional intergovernmental systems, and their formal recognition by the UN system is evidenced in matters which pertain to the election of members of the governing organs. The institutions which constitute the United Nations system all have some form of regional or sub-regional structures which often coincide with the geographical coverage of the regional organizations. Recourse to a regional entity by a State involved in a dispute, in conformity with the 'subsidiary principle' popularized in the context of the European Union, was foreseen since the beginning. Art. 33 of the Charter states that in the event of any dispute, parties must first "seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, judicial settlements, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice." This is reaffirmed in Art. 52, par. 2, which states that members of the UN "shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council." However, nowhere in the Charter or other basic documents do we find a definition of a regional organization or 'arrangements,' – an omission which showed its usefulness in, for example, the cooperation with NATO to solve the Bosnian crisis⁴.

The *international non-governmental organization system* is composed of about one thousand-five hundred NGOs, without counting the considerable numbers of transnational corporations. This system can be divided into three sub-groups:

⁴ In accordance with one classification, there are four types of regional organizations : 1/ Multipurpose organizations such as the Organization of American States or the Organization of African Unity; alliance systems like NATO; functional organizations like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and finally, the United Nations Regional Commissions. MILLER, L.H. "Regional Organizations and Subordinate Systems." In: CANTORI, Louis J. and SPIEGEL, Stephen L. (eds.) *The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach*. Prentice-Hall, 1970, pp. 357-378.

- i) The international,
- ii) The regional, and
- iii) The multinational enterprise sub-systems.

NGOs are important components of the international system, not only as pressure groups in respect of the nation-state system, but as valuable contributors to economic and social development efforts or promoters of the defense of human rights. This is recognized in Art. 71 of the Charter which foresees to grant to some of them a special consultative status with the Economic and Social Council. Most of the founding agreements of the specialized agencies have a clause which either refers specifically to cooperation with NGOs or to cooperation with international organizations, in general without distinguishing between intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. The multinational enterprise sub-system is the only one which has no formalized relations to non-governmental or intergovernmental organizations, and which is only governed by national legislations.

The *United Nations system* constitutes the intermediary level between the global international system and the inter-statal system and, consequently, interacts with the three sub-systems of both. Its importance is indicated by the fact that the only concrete and structured institutional framework of the international system is the one which is provided by the international organization system and, above all, by the United Nations. There are two ways to look at international organizations and, particularly, at the United Nations. The first approach prefers to consider them as instruments of foreign policy of the member States, while the second approach regards them as primary institutions of a new world order in formation. In the first instance, the United Nations can be seen as a mere regulator of some of the sub-systems of the international system within the classic context of power politics. In the second perspective, it is viewed as a vehicle for the gradual integration of international society and as an 'actor' in the international system. In other words, the UN is, for the protagonists of the first view, the agent in charge of the maintenance and reproduction of the basic patterns of the international system and, for the protagonists of the second view, it is the agent leading to the transformation of the international system into a world community. If some authors mention the 'marginality' of the UN within the international system it is because in all areas of its activities it represents only a fractional amount of the overall interactions that take place at international level. One should not forget, however, that the output of any system in systemic analysis as well as in the real world is never corresponds to the intentions of any single actor or group of actors.

The designation of the United Nations system covers the process and patterns of interaction within and between two basic sets of structures endowed with different attributes. The elements of the first set are the member States and the specialized agencies⁵; the second set is composed of a network of international institutions and programs. The reference to the UN system thus applies to the transactions which take place between these structures and organized units. There are three types of such units: the member States, the secretariat and the individual organizations which belong to the system. These individual organizations are themselves clusters of systems and parts of systems which are integrated and controlled, as much as it can be done, by the politically motivated, central administrative system.

⁵ The expression 'specialized agency' is defined by Art. 57. para. 1, of the Charter which states that "the various specialized agencies [are] established by intergovernmental agreement having wide international responsibilities as defined in their basic instruments."

2. THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION

In our analysis of the intergovernmental system we shall concentrate on the United Nations Organization, the main topic of this seminar in its interrelation with co-existing world civilizations. We shall not dwell on the problems related to regional governmental organizations such as, for example, the European Union, the Organization of African Unity (and the many other sub-regional African institutions), or the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Governmental, regional organizations as much as military pacts, forming together with the United Nations the intergovernmental system, fall outside the subject of this seminar.

a) *A Historical Overview*

Though many have written in Antiquity and in the Middle Ages about the *oikuméné*, a designation of the then-known world, the only form of organizing international relations were empires, federations or alliances between city-states, and tribal confederacies. The problem as such appeared only in the age of nation-states (and the concomitant disappearance of empires). It became an acute question since the outbreak of more and more devastating wars on the European continent and, especially, since the two World Wars in the twentieth century.

The first projects for an international organization surfaced in the second half of the eighteenth century in the writings of philosophers. The first of them was written by the French Abbé Charles-Irénée de Saint-Pierre (1658-1743) under the title: *Projet de paix perpétuelle*. Another project was formulated in the works of Immanuel Kant, the great German philosopher of transcendental thinking, in his *Eternal Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*.⁶

However, the development of international organizations and system of treaties really did not take off until the second half of the nineteenth century. The first such entities were technical in nature and had very specific and limited regulatory functions. They had become indispensable for greatly needed cooperation between member States in areas where they could not cope by themselves with modern developments. The first such international institution was the International Telegraph Union established in 1865 (known today as the International Telecommunication Union), followed by the Postal Bureau (presently the Universal Postal Union) in 1874, by the Union for the Protection of Patents in 1883, and the Berne Convention on Copyright in 1886. By 1939 the number of intergovernmental organizations was 87 and attained the level of 214 in 1964. The first global organization emerged after the World War I with the creation of the League of Nations whose Covenant entered into force on January 1920.

The term United Nations was adopted in a solemn declaration signed by all States, participating in the fight against the Axis Powers, in Washington on 11th of January 1942. In this declaration the parties not only promised to undertake all efforts toward the enemy's defeat and agreed not to sign a separate peace or armistice, but also approved the principles laid down by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill in the Atlantic Charter in 1942. These principles became the fundamental aims assigned to the UN. The two major propositions of the Atlantic Charter, which did not contemplate the establishment of an organization or association of States to replace the defunct League of Nations, concerned

– The necessity of creating a collective security system after the war capable of discouraging aggression, and

⁶ KANT, Immanuel. *Perpetual Peace A Philosophical Sketch*. In: *Political Writings*. Ed. with an Introd. and Notes by H. Riess. Trans. by H.B. Nisbet. 2. enl. ed. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp. 93-130.

- The establishment of strong cooperation between States in economic and social matters.

The creation of a new international body, similar to the League of Nations, came to the fore at the October 1943 Moscow conference in the Declaration of the Four Nations (the US, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and China), and was elaborated in October 1944 when the same four governments met in Dumbarton Oaks, near Washington, D.C., to lay down the foundations of the future world organization. The Dumbarton Oaks 'proposals' already contained all the essential aspects of the United Nations today. They envisaged that the purposes of the organization will be:

- i) To maintain international peace and security;
- ii) To develop friendly relations between nations, and
- iii) To promote cooperation in economic and social matters.

The structure of the new body was to be based on the model of the Covenant of the League of Nations, completely overhauling, however, the functions and powers of the organs to be established, especially those of the Security Council (comprising 11 members, of which 5, the Great Powers, had a permanent seat). The voting system was also modified, after the experiences made between the two wars, and it was proposed that the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council decide by majority rather than by unanimity. It is interesting to note that the modalities of voting by the Security Council were not agreed upon in Dumbarton Oaks. The formula embodied in Art. 27 of the UN Charter, which gave the five permanent members veto power or the possibility to block the adoption of any decision by the Council that was not of a merely procedural nature, was approved by Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin at the Yalta conference in February 1945 (hence the designation: the 'Yalta formula'). It was also in Yalta that the three powers participating in the meeting decided to hold a United Nations Conference in San Francisco which had the task to draw up the UN Charter along the lines of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

Fifty States took part in the San Francisco Conference between 25th of April and 26th of June 1945 at which, however, the Great Powers played a dominant role. The participants knew that any change in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals would be rejected by these powers; therefore they were adopted, although the majority of two-third was in principle empowered to make the required changes. Nevertheless, some important provisions were added by the participating States concerning, for example, the colonies (non-self-governing territories) or the right of self-defense. The fact, however, remained that the efficiency of the new Organization will rest largely on the will and agreement of the Great Powers and depends on their unfettered free choice. Some say, as a consequence, that the Charter, though unanimously approved, was born as a constitution granted – like in the times of empires and kingdoms. The States which ratified the Charter until the end of 1945 were considered the original members of the Organization. The League of Nations, which formally survived until World War II, was dissolved in April 1946. Parallel resolutions of the Assemblies of the two organizations provided for the transfer of a whole series of functions of non-political nature from the League to the UN; for example, from the *ad hoc* commissions of the League set up for the promotion of economic and social cooperation to the Economic and Social Council of the UN. This notwithstanding, it is still debatable whether the UN succeeded to the League in the legal sense of the term.

The objectives of the United Nations were defined in very general terms for two reasons: the uncertainties about the future, about the realities of international cooperation in the coming decades, and the already visible differences in the participants' political culture. Everybody was in agreement concerning one thing, namely, that the organization will not intervene in matters "which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State" (Art. 2, par. 7 of the Charter). Thinking of the claims put forward today by protagonists of humanitarian interventions in some

countries of Africa or Asia, we can measure the changes in mentalities which accompanied fifty years of history of the organization. The very broad objectives can be summarized as follows:

- i) Maintenance of international peace and security;
- ii) Development of friendly relations among nations;
- iii) Respect of the principle of equal rights of States and the self-determination of peoples;
- iv) International cooperation regarding economic, social, cultural and humanitarian issues; and,
- v) Promotion of the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

Any keen observer of the history of the UN realizes, however, that the emphasis was shifted from one of the above enumerated objectives to the others during the decades since the creation of the Organization. Maintenance of international peace and security dominated the first two decades as a result of the Cold War, and returned to the fore, in the nineties, because of the growing number of localized conflicts with a potential of jeopardizing the interests of many UN members. Charter provisions concerning a sort of 'code of conduct' for members in inter-statal relations belong under this heading. They include, first of all, Art. 2, par. 3 and 4 (under which the members "shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means" and "shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force"), or Art. 51 which recognizes the right of every member State to act in self-defense against an armed attack until the intervention of the Security Council. It is important to emphasize that this 'code of conduct' is not based on the usual requirements in international law regarding reciprocal rights and duties of States, but is applicable only in the framework of an institution empowered by its members to initiate actions to maintain collective security and peace.

The same two decades saw the unfolding of the decolonization movement (Objective iii) which, after having achieved the abolition of most colonial situations until the mid-seventies, gave way to the preeminence of objective iv), cooperation regarding economic, social, cultural and humanitarian issues. This activity concentrated on international efforts around the elaboration of developmental policies and channeling technical assistance to countries in Asia, Africa, and South America. These efforts aimed at reducing inequalities at international level and, in consequence, to assure to all people equal human dignity and a better life. Finally, activities under point (v) above – human rights and fundamental freedoms – occupied the foreground in the last decade of the present century because, and this is an important qualification, maintenance of collective security and peace in the world became less problematic after the collapse of the Soviet block.

The Charter of the United Nations is an international treaty. In certain respect it is also considered as a constitution, especially because some of its provisions foresee the possibility of the Organization taking measures with regard to non-member States, something considered to be in contradiction with the principle that treaties have no effect on third parties. A very particular interpretation of the Charter, as constitution, contends that unwritten rules created by the practice of the organs and by the conduct of the member States can be superposed on the Charter's provisions. This type of interpretation serves, however, specific purposes, for example, of people who promote the idea of a 'world state' and insist on the similarity of the organs and their function in the UN and in an individual State. In this sense, an extensive interpretation of the Charter is acceptable in accordance with the doctrine of 'implied powers' developed by the Supreme Court of the United States which affirms that every organ of the federal state has not only those 'expressly attributed' but also the implied powers deducted from the Constitution. The Supreme Court's intention in elaborating this doctrine was clearly to extend the powers of the federal government to the detriment of the federated states. The International Court of Justice went even further in following the example of the US Supreme Court, and against the traditional principle that international treaties should be interpreted restrictively,

inferring that certain powers of the organs stem directly and exclusively from the extremely vague objectives of the Organization. All these debates about the Charter and its interpretation reflect the critical phase in which the Westphalian system of sovereign states finds itself today.

If the Charter is nothing else but a treaty, it has to be governed by the rules which govern all other international treaties. This means that the United Nations does not represent a world community, being constituted on a voluntary basis, even if today almost all States are its members. If those unwritten rules, derived from the practice of UN organs and member States, are followed in derogation of Charter provisions, this constitutes an acceptable development because customary law was acknowledged since time immemorial as a source of international law. Thus, the Charter can be overruled by practices, observed over a period of time, which became customs in the world community, although the number of such cases is limited.

b) *The Structure of the United Nations*

The common features characterizing the United Nations Organization and the specialized agencies can be summarized as follows:

- i) A constitutional base whereby each organization is the product of an intergovernmental instrument ratified by its members who thereby accept a number of commitments and a set of common rules;
- ii) A specific membership which determines policy and controls performance;
- iii) Equal rights for all the members in the plenary body and a proportional and equal representation in the executive body (does not apply to the IMF, IBRD, IFC, and IDA);
- iv) A regular program in the field of competence of the organization as defined by its constitutional mandate, financed by a regular, assessed budget appropriated by the plenary body and paid by governments as a legal obligation devolving from their status of member States (does not apply to those mentioned under (iii), as well as UNDP and most specialized agencies);
- v) An international secretariat, recognized as a major organ, with an elected executive head fully responsible for the selection and appointment of the staff and operating under the authority and control of the plenary and executive bodies as collective entities; and,
- vi) Mutually accepted and common relationship arrangements concluded with other institutions in the UN system, and formal agreements concluded between the United Nations Organization and each specialized agency with the aim of ensuring coordination to attain global ends.

Article 7 of the Charter establishes as principal organs of the United Nations the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat. They were complemented by a set of specialized agencies in the form of autonomous international organizations with attributes clearly defined in the Charter as well as in their respective founding documents.

The *General Assembly* in which all States are represented and have equal weight in the voting, can be concerned, in principle, with any matter that is within the scope of the Charter, but its powers are very limited. The Assembly

- Considers and makes recommendations on the principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and arms regulations as well as the peaceful settlement of disputes, regardless of their origin, which might impair friendly relations among nations;
- Initiates the preparation and elaboration of treaties to promote cooperation among members which, however, require ratification by each State before entering into force;

– To promote international political cooperation, the development and codification of international law, the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, and international collaboration in economic, social, cultural, educational and health sectors of the society.

Concerning matters affecting the powers and functions of any organ of the UN, the General Assembly as the supreme authority of the organization

- Receives and considers reports from the Security Council and other UN organs;
- Approves the UN budget and apportions contributions among members; and,
- Elects the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the members of the Economic and Social Council and those members of the Trusteeship Council that are elected. It also elects, jointly with the Security Council, the judges of the International Court of Justice, and, on the recommendation of the Security Council, appoints the Secretary General.

The Assembly carries out its work through six established⁷ as well as some supplementary *ad hoc* committees, international conferences organized at its initiative, and the Secretariat. The resolutions of the General Assembly are not more than recommendations, that is, have no legally-binding force for governments of member States.

The *Security Council* (15 members of which 5 are permanent enjoying the right of veto power) is the most powerful organ of the organization. It only is entitled to decide measures to be taken against States responsible for aggression or for threats to peace. Under the Charter, the functions and powers of the Council are:

At the substantial level

- i) To maintain international peace and security in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations;
- ii) To investigate any dispute or situation that might lead to international conflict;
- iii) To recommend modalities of solving such disputes or terms of a settlement;
- iv) To formulate plans for establishing a system to regulate production and use of armaments;
- v) To determine the existence of a threat to peace or act of aggression and to recommend what action should be taken;

⁷ First Committee – Disarmament and International Security
Second Committee – Economic and Financial Problems
Third Committee – Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Questions
Fourth Committee – Special Political Questions and Decolonization
Fifth Committee – Administrative and Budgetary Matters, and
Sixth Committee – Legal Matters.

vi) To call on members to apply economic sanctions and other measures not involving the use of force to prevent or stop aggression;

vii) To call for military action against an aggressor;

On the organizational level

viii) To recommend the admission of new members;

ix) To exercise the trusteeship function of the UN in so-called strategic areas;

x) To recommend to the General Assembly the appointment of the Secretary General and, with the Assembly, to elect the judges of the International Court of Justice.

In consequence, the Security Council decides about constituting peacekeeping forces to reduce tensions in troubled areas, keep opposing forces apart and create conditions of calm in which peaceful settlements may be reached. Under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council may decide on enforcement measures, economic sanctions (such as trade embargos) or collective military action.

At this point I should like to clarify the meaning and sequence of concepts in respect of international peace and collective security. First, peacemaking stands for the use of diplomatic efforts to obtain the cessation of hostilities in a conflict and a negotiated and peaceful settlement of a given dispute. It is in this area that belongs what is generally called 'preventive diplomacy,' a most important action but for which, in truth, the UN is not prepared. Peacekeeping operations, while not specifically envisaged by the Charter, were pioneered by the UN in 1948 with the establishment of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East. Peacekeeping operations are authorized to be deployed by the Security Council with the consent of the host government and of all parties involved. Such operations may consist of observer missions, peacekeeping forces, or a combination of both, preventive deployment, or protection of humanitarian assistance during a conflict. They may include military and police personnel, together with civilian staff. Military observer missions are made up of unarmed officers to monitor an agreement or a ceasefire. The soldiers of the peacekeeping forces have weapons, but in most situations can use them only in self-defense. Finally, the Security Council can take, as indicated before, enforcement measures – embargos and sanctions, or military action – to maintain or restore international peace and security.

One of the major problems regarding peacekeeping, or military enforcement of the Security Council's decisions, concerns rapid deployment of peacekeeping forces. After an operation has been decided, its credibility and effectiveness are affected by the promptness with which it is carried out. Rapid deployment of troops can prevent enormous suffering and can spare a country from a bitter legacy making political reconciliation impossible for years. In order to enhance such a rapid deployment capability of the UN, a 'Standby Arrangements System' was put in place to facilitate the timely planning and deployment of an operation. As of mid-1998, some 70 member states had identified troops and equipment that are potentially available for service in peacekeeping operations, subject to approval on a case-by-case basis.

In the UN terminology, these actions related to international peace and collective security are complemented by so-called peace-building operations. In the aftermath of a conflict, the UN system is sometimes called upon to carry out peace-building – action to support structures that will strengthen and consolidate peace. Such areas of activity

include military security, civil law and order, human rights, election monitoring, local administration, health, education and reconstruction. Peace-building also includes, at a later stage, development cooperation and technical assistance in order to ensure lasting peace.

[Before continuing the review of the UN's organizational structure, let me refer here – in respect to the principal task of the United Nations, collective security and the maintenance of peace, – to the overwhelming difficulties the Organization faces in carrying out its duties. I want to mention the disarmament of Iraq and the problems concerning it which were recently evoked in public. The Organization does not dispose of the means necessary to carry out a continuous inspection of Iraq's, or for that matter any other country's disarmament, especially the destruction of chemical, bacteriological or nuclear weapons. There is no other way to implement the resolutions of the Security Council than to request those members who possess the very sophisticated technological equipment required as well as the specialists who can handle such an equipment, to assist the UN in undertaking this task. It goes without saying that these members always have to be the great powers which only have in their possession the necessary technologies, especially the only superpower of our world, the United States of America. It is evident that no great power would help the Organization without asking to benefit of the findings its own specialized services. This is so because we do not live in 'one world' but in an international system of nation-states and national interests must have, from the point of view of any State, priority over any commitment to a world organization. Hence the risks of any operation such as the one carried out in Iraq, despite the indignation of idealistic people who believe that States participating in international actions will forget their own interests. This is an excellent example of the fundamental contradictions contained in the Charter of the United Nations which undermine all security and peace-related activities of the Organization.]

The *Economic and Social Council* (ECOSOC), composed of 54 members elected for 3 years, coordinates all worldwide socio-economic activities, ensures the follow up action to global conferences, and exercises oversight of operational activities for development. The Council

- i) Serves as the central forum of discussion of international economic and social issues, and for formulating policy recommendations addressed to member states and the UN system;
- ii) Initiates studies and reports and makes recommendations on economic, social, cultural, educational, health and related matters;
- iii) Endeavors to promote respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms;
- iv) Calls international conferences and submits draft conventions to the General Assembly;
- v) Coordinates the activities of the specialized agencies, through consultations with and recommendations to them, and through recommendations to the General Assembly and member States; and,
- vi) Consults with non-governmental organizations concerned on matters with which the Council deals.

ECOSOC built up huge subsidiary machinery in order to be able to cope with its tasks:

- Nine functional commissions (for example, statistical, population and development, human rights, etc.);
- Five regional commissions: Economic Commission for Africa (Addis Ababa); Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (Bangkok); Economic Commission for Europe (Geneva); Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (Santiago), and, Economic and Social Commission for West Asia (Beirut);

- Four standing committees on Program and Coordination; Human Settlements; Non-Governmental Organizations, and Negotiations with Intergovernmental Agencies;
- A number of expert bodies on subjects such as natural resources, development planning, or economic, social and cultural rights. It also consults and cooperates with the executive committees and boards of various UN entities and agencies (UNICEF, UNDP, UNHCR, etc.)

The *Trusteeship Council* (with a fluctuating membership according to the number of states administering trust territories) was originally created by the Charter to supervise the administration of Trusteeship Territories placed under the Trusteeship system, and to promote the advancement of the 11 original Trust Territories and their progress towards self-government or independence. To date, all Trust Territories have attained self-government or independence, either as separate States or joining neighboring independent countries. The Trusteeship Council, by amending its rules of procedure, will now meet as and where occasion may require.

The *International Court of Justice* (The Hague, Netherlands), consisting of 15 judges elected in a way that the principal legal systems of the world be represented in the Court, is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations (Art. 92), – this is the only case in the UN structure in which civilizational differences are acknowledged. Its activities are governed by the Charter and by the Statute annexed to it. It settles disputes between States, as an arbitration organ, and functions as traditionally did international tribunals of the past, with its jurisdiction resting on agreement between the parties. In accordance with its Statutes, the Court decides disputes by applying:

- i) International conventions establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting States;
- ii) International custom, as evidence of a general practice, thus accepted as law;
- iii) The general principles of law recognized by nations; and,
- iv) Judicial decisions and the teachings of the most qualified scholars of various nations.

The Court is authorized to give advisory opinions on any legal question to the General Assembly, the Security Council and other organs of the organization, opinions which, however, are neither obligatory nor binding (no obligation to request them or to conform to them).

The Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and the Trusteeship Council are organs made up of States. The individuals who with their vote concur in making collective decisions are representatives of their states and as such express the will of their state. On the other hand, the Secretary General, head of the administrative services of the UN, is invested with the charges of his function as an individual. The International Court of Justice is also made up of individuals elected for their professional qualities although representing, as a rule, different regions of the world, without conforming to the will of any State and with the obligation not to receive, instructions from a State.

The *Secretariat* is composed of 12 departments and offices, including the office of the Secretary General, with headquarters in New York, but it also has important offices in Geneva, Vienna and Nairobi. The Secretary General is the chief administrative officer of the UN who directs a staff of around 8'000 members. As international civil servants, the Secretary General and the staff answer to the UN alone for their activities, and take an oath not to seek or receive instructions from any government or outside authority. The Secretariat carries out a series of varied duties from administering peacekeeping operations to mediating international disputes, from surveying economic

and social trends in the world and preparing studies on human rights and sustainable development. The Secretary General being the depository of all multilateral treaties since World War II, these as well as bilateral treaties (of which depositories include governments or other international entities) are registered and published. The Secretariat informs the worldwide network of media of issues with which the UN is preoccupied, organize conferences and meetings, monitors the extent to which decisions of UN bodies are carried out, and has permanent services to facilitate the accomplishment of all these tasks (interpretation, translation, reproduction of documents, etc.)

The Charter empowers the Secretary General to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which appears to threaten international peace and security. It also requires him to perform 'such other functions' with which he is entrusted by the Security Council, the General Assembly or any other main UN organs. While clearly limiting the powers of the Secretary General, these broad guidelines do grant him considerable scope for action in such fields as, for example, the so-called 'preventive diplomacy.' Nevertheless, specialized agencies and, especially such organizations as the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank, decide and act independently, and consult the Secretary General only in respect of problems which concern the entire organization of the UN.

The United Nations programs, funds and other entities, enjoying a large degree of autonomy are, among others, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), or the World Food Program (WFP). As new problems emerged gradually altering the original configuration of the system, the establishment of new structural entities like new 'subsidiary organs' (Art. 22 of the Charter) became necessary, – permanent conferences like UNCTAD, and occasional conferences in the form of world gatherings (women, social problems), etc.

There are 13 specialized agencies (ILO, – established already in 1919, – FAO, UNESCO, etc.) which have policy formulating, legislative, regulatory, and development cooperation functions. A special category is constituted, because of their almost total independence of the UN, by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank group composed of: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) granting regular loans and financing of investment and technical assistance; International Development Association (IDA) making available financing on highly concessional terms for the poorest countries; International Finance Corporation (IFC), the largest multilateral source of equity and loan financing for private sector projects in developing countries; and the Multilateral Investment Guarantees Agency (MIGA) established to encourage the flow of foreign private capital to developing countries.

The budget of the United Nations (excluding specialized agencies and programs) is approved by the General Assembly for a two-year period. The regular budget, together with the cost of peacekeeping, approved for the years 1998-1999 amounts to 2'532 billion US dollars. It covers the costs of UN activities in areas such as political affairs, international justice and law, international cooperation for development, human rights and humanitarian affairs, and public information. The main source of funds for the regular budget is the contribution of member States that are assessed on a scale approved by the General Assembly. In principle the fundamental criterion on which the scale of assessment is based is the ability of countries to pay. This is determined by considering their relative shares of the world total of gross national product, adjusted to take into account other relevant considerations like the countries' per capita income. The main contributors are: the USA (25%), Japan (15.6%), Germany (9%), France (6.4%), the United Kingdom (5.3%), Italy (5.2%), and the Russian Federation (4.3%). Together these States account for more than two-third of the regular UN budget. The overall financial situation of the Organization has been precarious for several years because of the continuing failure of many member States to pay, in full and on time, their assessed contributions to the regular and peacekeeping budgets. The Organization could continue its work, however, thanks to voluntary contributions, and by borrowing from the peacekeeping budget.

Fundamental transformations in the international system took place in the last 50 years, such as

- The substantial increase of the members of the inter-statal system as membership reached now 185 States;
- The effects of Cold War and, after its end, the effects of the virtual hegemony of one superpower;
- Gradual substitution of the East-West bipolarity by North-South bipolarity;
- Globalization of international trade patterns and of the network of financial transfers;
- Greater concern with the operational aspects of economic and social development in the form of technical assistance programs, almost entirely financed through voluntary contributions because of the desire of major contributors to restrain the growth of the regular assessed budgets, and, finally,
- The enormous problems of the so-called 'transitional' economies, transiting from a socialist build up towards market orientation.

In view of all these changes, the United Nations is obliged to take reform initiatives to adapt the organization to the novel circumstances. To this question I now turn.

iii) *Reforming the United Nations*

In the Organization of the United Nations there is no organ that has special power to interpret the Charter with binding effects for other organs and for member States. The view that such a power belongs to the General Assembly has no foundation whatsoever neither in the preparatory works of the San Francisco Conference, nor in the Charter. Art. 15, par. 2, requires that all organs submit a report to the General Assembly, but this provision does not give the power to the latter to review individual measures taken by other organs (though there were examples of such a review), and thus does not justify an extensive interpretation of the powers of the General Assembly. The reality is that each organ interprets the Charter on its own at the time it adopts specific measures,⁸ but it is evident that such interpretations, even those of the Security Council, cannot be considered binding on member states. The San Francisco Conference expressly warned that

"It is to be understood, of course, that if an interpretation made by any organ of the Organization or by a committee of jurists is not generally acceptable, it will be without binding force. In such circumstances, or in cases where it is desired to establish an authoritative interpretation as a precedent for the future, it may be necessary to embody the interpretation in an amendment to the Charter. This may always be accomplished by recourse to the procedure provided for amendment."

⁸ Committee IV of the San Francisco conference unanimously expressed the view that there would be no need to codify the principle who has the authority to interpret the Charter because "in the course of the operations from day to day of the various organs of the Organization, it is inevitable that each organ will interpret such parts of the Charter as are applicable to its particular functions." In case of different interpretations either the International Court of Justice or an *ad hoc* committee of jurists will decide the matter. In: *United Nations Conference on International Organization* (U.N.C.I.O.), London-New York, 1945, Vol. 13, pp. 631 and 633.

It is Art. 108 which provides a specific procedure for the adoption of amendments to the Charter. In order for an amendment to enter into force, it must be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly and then ratified by two-thirds of the members of the United Nations, including all permanent members of the Security Council, holding veto power. The review procedure (Art. 109) is almost entirely the same. Both were included in the constituent agreements of other international organizations.

These procedures are basically deviating from the classical practice embodied in international law that a change in a treaty may be made only with the consent of all contracting parties. It is, therefore, justified to say that they draw their normative force not from general international law but from the Charter itself, superseding the principle of consent. It is noteworthy in this respect that the Charter, the 'rigidity' of which has been frequently criticized, sustains the principle incorporated in Art. 25 (concerning the Security Council) and in Art. 2, par. 5, (with regard to all organs) that a member State is obligated to cooperate with the Organization when it adopts measures or takes actions "in accordance with the present Charter." However, the force of these provisions is weakened as they also point out that a State may withdraw from the Organization "if its rights and obligations as such were changed by Charter amendment in which it has not concurred and which it finds itself unable to accept" – although the Charter does not foresee the possibility of withdrawals as did the Covenant of the League of Nations (Art. 1, par. 3, and Art. 26, par. 2). The least one can say is that the dispositions of the United Nations Charter are less than clear, and this is the reason why in times of reform a great confusion reigns in the debates on how to remedy the shortcomings of a document formulated half a century ago.

The General Assembly created a special Committee already in 1974 (Res. No. 3349-XXIX of 17 December 1974) to study the problem of unavoidable changes in the Organization's objectives, organizational setup and activities. But all the work led only to the approval of grandiose declarations and other documents, but not to fundamental changes.

However, some reforms were undertaken in the UN initiated by the Secretary General during the last two years. They concerned mainly an effort to streamline the organization and improve coordination of the extremely varied activities. This happened sometimes through creating new bodies or new high level posts (Executive Committee on Economic and Social Affairs, or United Nations Development Group, and the Deputy Secretary General), sometimes through merging certain offices, consolidating certain programs and eliminating a few of such posts. A limited reduction of the personnel was achieved not only by attrition, but also by cancellation of contracts of temporary staff. Some important changes, in fact the most important, are still under consideration by the General Assembly : the expansion of the Security Council, the reorganization of the Economic and Social Council, changes in the proportion of the assessment of dues paid by member States, as well as ways to improve the overall coordination between the United Nations and its specialized agencies. These administrative and organizational reforms, in my personal opinion, did not achieve any of the expected results. It appears that there could be no solution to the problems without a revision of the Charter, but no Member State is willing to risk such a move because it is believed that no consensus could be found among members on any point concerning its modification.

This is all the more critical that an adaptation of the Organization to changed circumstances is an urgent task. The major changes which would require an adaptation and reformulation of statutory provisions can be summed up as

- The number of the member States of the UN almost tripled during the last 50 years;
- The epoch-making advances in communication and information technologies, including their contribution to the spread of worldwide terrorism;
- The growing importance of tendencies towards fragmentation, including the domination of some ideologies sustained by particular identities and leading to localized conflicts, civil strife and civil war;

- The far-reaching and hardly foreseeable phenomenon of decolonization involving fundamental changes on the world scene which I call the interface of civilizations;
- The end of the conflict between capitalism and socialism, depicted by some as the 'end of history,' or the final triumph of the market economy and of democracy; and, finally,
- The developing conflict between industrialized and non-industrialized countries or between North and South.

[I would like to highlight here the harassing problem of minorities, related to the human rights issue as well as linked to particular identities, localized conflicts and civil wars. The prevalent conception in our age and in the UN about minorities sees them in individualistic terms and does not recognize their collective or group rights, though Art. 27 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights considers minorities as benefiting of collective human rights. They are defined, by the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities as "any group of persons resident within a sovereign State which constitutes less than half the population of the national society and whose members share common characteristics of an ethnic, religious or linguistic nature that distinguishes them from the rest of the population." However, minorities are not recognized as legal subjects in international law.⁹ In consequence, the view dominates that minority rights should be addressed within the boundaries of the nation-state. Identification of minorities with territory should be avoided in order to prevent the splitting up of existing States. Solutions for the protection of minorities should therefore be sought on the national level, and the cause and claims of members of minorities should, on the international level, be addressed in the context of human rights protection.]

It is, nevertheless, unlikely that radical changes in the objectives and in the structure of the UN will be made, especially as the permanent members of the Security Council are not ready to give up their favored status. It is my conviction that in this respect the decisive element is constituted by the civilizational otherness of countries which belong to different, co-existing civilizations. It is, therefore, necessary to recognize that

- i) When the United Nations was created the great majority of the original member States belonged to the Western civilization (communism and socialism being Western phenomena), and
- ii) It is impossible to continue to impose our moral, legal, political and economic concepts, believed to be prevalent in the whole world, as principles of an inter-statal organization which claims to be universal, embracing all countries of the world.

3. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND OTHER NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Various categories of non-state actors form the international non-governmental system. They consist of non-governmental organization (NGOs) and other non-state actors like regional entities and multinational firms. We shall briefly deal with them here.

Non-governmental organizations include several types of entities which can be broadly classified into political, humanitarian, and economic non-state actors. The first category comprises those which have or are seeking governmental, public or sovereign powers like indigenous peoples, minorities, liberation movements, etc. The second category, humanitarian non-state actors, is composed of entities that do not seek such governmental powers but whose objectives are dominated by humanitarian values and respect for the conditions of life on earth.

⁹ The term 'legal status' refers in international law to the question of whether international law imposes rights and obligations on a particular actor at the international scene. International law imposes rights and duties on States which are seen as the primary subjects of international law. Also individuals are, by now, recognized to some extent as such. In respect of non-governmental, non-state actors the qualification depends on what category they belong to.

Finally, the third category consists of transnational corporations which are motivated to increase their markets and profits through globalizing their activities, and of international federations of trade unions, employers, etc.

Liberation movements These movements played an important role in the decolonization process, and received the support of the UN which also called upon member States to provide moral and material assistance to the peoples of colonial territories and their national liberation movements. In other non-colonial situations, the UN became involved in conflict resolution at the intra-state level where the government was opposed by revolutionary movements. These movements and groups often constitute actors commanding considerable power.

International non-governmental organizations. Important United Nations programs and activities and, for that matter, any other significant initiatives at worldwide level, can only function effectively if supported by public opinion. The UN Charter explicitly acknowledges the importance of NGOs for their expertise and competence, and the contributions they can make in economic, social, relief and human rights matters. As a sign of this recognition of the role of NGOs, especially at the grass root level, the Charter empowered the Economic and Social Council to grant consultative status to selected NGOs. At present, more than 1'500 NGOs have obtained such a status or are placed on the roster. NGOs were classified in 1993 by an open-ended working group of ECOSOC in

- Grass root organizations, focusing on self-help and community work;
- Operational and intermediary organizations, which support the grass root organizations by counseling, funding, and capacity building; and
- Advocacy NGOs and networks focused on constituency-building, policy research and advocacy around specific issues (gender problems, human rights, environment, minorities, etc.).

Transnational corporations (TNCs). The extensive movement in favor of market-oriented economies, free financial flows and free inter-state trade was made possible by TNCs as mobilizers of capital, generators of technology and international operators with considerable impact on what one usually calls global governance – but without any global framework of rules to regulate their competition. They, as well as other non-state actors, exert strong influence on the activities of international governmental organizations, and they affect operations of such specialized agencies as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank (IBRD), or the regional development banks.

4. THE REPLACEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL BY TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS

As a result of the evolution of the last four decades, especially of technological advances in the fields of communication, transportation, and thanks to some outstanding achievements in the inter-statal system, international relations were transformed into transnational relations. *Transnational relations are those which encompass the planetary level as a result of unintended effects of the actors or as a result of voluntarily taken decisions, outside the activities of the national-state and the inter-statal system. Falling beyond the scope of States' activity they escape, entirely or partially, controls or actions of the national or international political sphere.* Hence transnationalism.

Transnational relations consist of several large, transnational flows or currents containing ideas, institutional forms, or even human persons, beyond actions of non-state actors on the international scene. Among these flows, I would like to mention some to indicate the nature of these new phenomena:

i) Civilizational influence or the worldwide exportation of the Western model of modernity : This is one of the most important flows of a transnational character, because beside the role the inter-statal system plays within it, its bearers are cultural institutions, universities, technology exchanges, enterprises, etc. Western educational institutions are a decisive element in the creation of this flow, because they trained most of the leaders and managers in non-Western areas. On the transnational scene reign, as much as in domestic cultural spaces, fashion and imitation in respect of expressions of identities or cultural stereotypes (remember the American TV programs such as 'Lifestyles of the rich and famous,' etc.). Transnational influences on the world scene include the privilege granted to certain forms of institutions, the prioritization of the certain types of moral values and legal constructions, and the acceptance of similar diplomatic practices. Of course, choices by individuals and economic agents are always selective in accordance with local circumstances, but they inevitably lead to the revival of shared cultures and communal identities. The greatest harm caused by this kind of transnational influence is that it leads to servile adaptation or radical opposition, killing between the two any inclination towards innovation and creativity which could achieve a fusion of the traditional and the new.

ii) Social structuring: The accelerated separation of the State from civil society or of public from private space, became as well a transnational phenomenon to such an extent that the State's control of non-state actors (enterprises, churches, etc.) and of individuals, decisively weakened, simultaneously with the weakening of the citizen's allegiance to the State.

iii) Globalization of economic activities: The separation of political and economic spaces in every society and the structuring of economies through the self regulation of the market are the main features of the globalizing trend. It is evident that in the economic sphere not the rationality of the Westphalian system but the proper rationality of economic operations is the guiding force, through the activities of multinational corporations and the more and more independent functioning of the markets like, for example, the financial markets. Accordingly, this transnational trend represents the real core of globalization as it denationalizes choices in economic policy, investment decisions, management styles and even models of consumption.

iv) Dissemination of violence: Unfortunately, transnational trends also include the worldwide dissemination of violence in the form of terrorist organizations which, if they receive the necessary financing from donors whose political objectives they are expected to serve, dispose of the most up-to-date technologies for their armament, organization, communication, etc. This unintended but real consequence of technological modernity deprives the State from one of its overwhelmingly important function, that is, to be the unique enforcement agency, at least on its own territory, authorized to have recourse to physical force. Countering terrorism and terrorist acts are well beyond the scope of the possibilities of international organizations, especially because international terrorism is frequently State-sponsored terrorism which makes the case of an intervention of international organizations definitely impossible.

v) Patterns of individual mobility: Individuals have regained a mobility not experienced since the advent of the era of nation-states four centuries ago, whether as migrants, tourists, students abroad, or consumers of cultural programs imported from foreign countries. The transnational flux of individuals is characterized by an aggregation of individual wills in combination with actions of collective, non-state actors.

vi) Demographic migratory flows: All the above enumerated types of transnational currents contribute to the creation of huge migratory flows reaching a planetary dimension. As causes of these migratory flows we can refer to terrible historical events, dramatic natural and economic calamities, the division of the world's population into haves and have-nots, aggregated individual decisions responding to tragedies, and life chance differences, but – in my opinion – its main origin is the complete demographic imbalance which resulted, since the nineteenth century, from the advances of science and its medical, nutritional or agricultural applications. Many biologists recognized already that scientific progress in all fields destroyed the ecological balance between man and his natural world which governed population growth since humans appeared on the earth's surface. Recent enormous migratory

movements, usually taking the South/North direction (in contradiction to the last century when their direction was East/West), evidently and forcibly de-structure both the societies of origin of the migrants and the societies receiving them. The conception of citizen-societies in receiving countries serves to facilitate the reinsertion of migrants into the established social structure, and the respective countries' identity and character is transformed in accordance with the model of multicultural societies.

[I would like to explain here what I mean by citizen-societies although we shall deal with this concept more in detail tomorrow. The transformation of national-societies into citizen-societies is a major phenomenon in modernity. It means that instead of belonging to a national community that determines the basis of membership of a social collectivity, *it is the fact of being the citizen of a given State which is the decisive characteristic of this membership*. This transformation reflects the permanent interface between atom like individuals and the all-powerful State, a completely inequitable relationship. Citizenship can thus be only defined in relation to a State because it is the State which grants the quality to be a citizen and defines duties and obligations, rights and entitlements of those in its citizenry. This is the same for someone who was born in a State or for someone who was naturalized into by a State he has chosen as a home. The citizen is, at the same time, defined as a consumer, a bundle of preferences, desires, and tastes. This economic designation of a consumer is as much abstract and lacking of any personal trait as the definition of a citizen.]

The progressive gliding of national societies towards multicultural societies has extremely important long-term effects not only on social structuring or cultural traditions, but even on the State as supreme form of political organization of a particular society. For the mobilization of its citizenry the State cannot count anymore on national symbols, myths, or evocation of historical memories, etc. Its only means to achieve popular mobilization remain the emphasis on welfare entitlements and the eventual redistribution of national wealth. Finally, transnational demographic movements even transform the circumstances in which the international system was born. In comparison to cultural collectivities encompassing smaller or greater regions, the nation-state loses its importance and, with it, the inter-statal system and international organizations such as the United Nations.

The transnational trend among societies and individuals clearly leads towards a 'multicentered' world community characterized by autonomy and decentralization, and the demise of the territoriality principle. De-territorialization is an important element in the strategies of the bearers of transnational drive. All this boils down to a doubling of the States and the inter-statal system. Transnational flows do not eliminate the States' power and do not achieve the destruction of the international system, but create a world functioning independently of them, and beyond the scope of their actions. These flows indicate a relation of interaction rather than opposition. One of the most curious effects of transnational flows is sometimes the reinforcement of the politics pursued by some States, or by some ideological movements. For the first, the best example is that transnational cultural trends – let's call their effect the 'mythologization of everything American' – definitely contribute to the hegemonic tendencies in the policies and attitudes of the United States;¹⁰ for the second, a recent example is non-state actors' cooperation with the majority of members of the UN to create an international criminal court with a view to realize international justice based on the doctrine of human rights. Both examples show that transnational flows, even when leading to autonomy of action, can as well create a situation of dependency from a State or an inter-statal organism.

¹⁰ The American hegemony – to be understood as not only political but economic and, especially cultural hegemony – is a result not mainly of the action of the US authorities but, first of all, of the unintended coincidence of actions of American private and civil as well as official institutions participating in the transnational current in the world. This is designated by such expressions as a 'societal imperialism' or 'American supremacy.' These are real phenomena to which the same people criticizing America contribute to a large extent through their admiration of American films, technology, or whatever other product of American origin.

THIRD SESSION

The State and the Inter-Statal System in Late Modernity

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I propose to discuss with you today the critical and dramatic problems the modern State and the inter-statal system face at the end of the twentieth century. These problems characterize many aspects of the situation in which the United Nations finds itself today, and are also part of the crisis engendered by the interface of the international organization with different co-existing civilizations. By late modernity I mean the end of the century and the beginning of the next millennium for two reasons: first, I do not think that we are already in a postmodern age but we still live in modern, though degenerated, conditions; postmodernism is anyway not a firmly established and precise description of a historical epoch. Second, the expression 'late modernity' suggests that we live at the end of the modern age, at the end of a remarkable evolution of three hundred years, but we do not know where we go, we do not have the faintest idea what will follow upon our times – which are distinguished from all other civilizations by, precisely, their modernity.

In this context, the interplay of the trends and ideologies of universalism, globalization and pluralism will constitute important guidelines in our analysis, as they will help us to explain the interaction of various factors in the evolution of the world in late modernity.

We are going to review three themes in this seminar session : *first*, the crisis of the territoriality of the modern State, a topic hardly noticed until now in political and economic discourse but which manifests itself in multiple guises in the real world; *second*, the crisis of the nation-state which appeared on the horizon a decade or more ago, but which still nobody knows how to handle and, therefore, it is ignored or denied; and, *third*, the growing inefficiency and irrelevance of most intergovernmental institutions, especially of the United Nations Organization, in a world situation in which its member States are in crisis; in which its objectives and its ways of resolving emerging problems appear to be obsolete, and in which the relationships between the member States is constantly undergoing modifications. This latter statement refers to the fundamental changes the world lived through in the last half century: decolonization, the Cold War between two superpowers during which the world was divided into three camps, and the present era which began with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The latter event led to the hegemonic efforts of the only remaining superpower, a hegemonic drive facilitated by the incapability of the statesmen and the governing strata of the other would-be great powers like the European Union or Japan.

1. THE MODERN STATE AS TERRITORIAL INSTITUTION¹

Territories represent the foundation of a State's existence. They stand for a spatial and, simultaneously, also a temporal, long-lasting determination of the State's identity. Whereas today all States are legally equal within the international system, in geographical terms there are great differences which find reflection in the way individual States may be perceived and accepted as participants in the system. Territories can be considered as absolute locations from the point of view of a population's existence – an inside perspective of the State – and relative locations from the point of view of linkages to the outside world – a perspective oriented towards the external environment – which, of course, can change due to a variety of factors on the international scene.

[I have to clarify here that in discussing the principle of territoriality I refer only to the political institution of the State, but do not mean to imply that my discussion concerns as well territorialization as a factor of economic development. In economics, territorialization may be defined not only as the localization of an economic activity, but as the dependence of such an activity on resources that are territorially specific. These resources may range, among others, from asset specificities available solely from a certain place or, more importantly, assets that are available only in the context of

¹ The most comprehensive exposure of the territorial problem of modern states was written by Professor Bertrand Badie of the Institut d'Etudes Politiques of Paris, under the title: *La fin des territoires: Essai sur le désordre international et sur l'utilité sociale du respect*. Paris, Fayard, 1995. – A very good collection of essays on the subject is: MLINAR, Zdravko (ed.). *Globalization and Territorial Identities*. Aldershot, U.K.: Avebury, 1992.

certain relationships between companies and the market, relationships that necessarily involve geographical proximity (the assets referred to are: labor, technology, information facilities, relation-specific skills, etc.). Geographically proximate relations constitute valuable asset specificities if they are necessary to the generation of spillover effects – positive externalities – in an economic system. So territorialization is often tied to specific interdependencies in economic life. In consequence, an activity can be considered fully territorialized when its economic viability is rooted in assets that are not available in many other locations and that cannot easily or rapidly be created or imitated in places that lack them.^{2]]}

The empirical reality of territory – a natural occurrence – was involved in every type of political organization since the beginning of history, in the sense of the State being a physical, legal, and territorially-based governmental entity. The territory was a bounded space containing in a particular area on the earth's surface – people, resources and other natural endowments, and linkages through reasonably efficient communication and transportation systems. The State thus acted as promoter and creator for other socio-economic systems falling into this bounded area. It is, however, most important to take into consideration that territories, constituting the life space of particular States, were always conceptualized or formulated in cultural terms, by human decisions and actions. In other words, territory itself simply being an empirical reality, human beliefs, decisions and actions gave to territory a meaning. Meanings gained from territory – but which really are human attributions of the territory – reflect a cultural relationship with this territory. These so-called 'geographies of the mind' form a significant part of the territorial component of national and ethnic identities. This also explains why the concept of a State's territory is not value-free; it holds different kinds of meanings, depending upon the context of the human group involved (remember of the problem of Kosovo today which, because of the great battle fought with the Turks on its territory in 1378, is considered by the Serbs as a sacred, historical land). However, the principle of territoriality supposes, as Bertrand Badie wrote:

"The abandonment of the community's social logic. In the statal order, territory became the functional framework for political redefinition because it implied that individuals' identities and allegiances were entirely to be oriented towards a centre which pretended to monopolize authority. In this perspective, the territorial logic is contrary to the construction of the social in a community; affirming the value of belonging to a tribe, to a clan, or to an extended family renders uncertain, ambiguous, and contestable the principle of territorial identification. Such identification is, on the contrary, efficient when all mediation between individual and state disappears, when the state's territory becomes the geographical concretization of the idea of public space."³

Besides reflecting the meanings people attributed to them, territories also constitute long-term processes in a historical perspective: dimensions of States, their shape, their bounds, their 'contents' and longevity are not givens but result from these long-term processes. Therefore, in practical terms, a territory when delimited by a system of government that has effective control over it, generally provides both security and opportunity for those who live within its bounds. The interplay between these two contrasting, fundamental dimensions of territory – security and opportunity – are vital in understanding contemporary problems of certain States and of the inter-statal system. To mention here just one example: the dominant clustering of people and urban-based activities in one zone creates a severe spatial imbalance on a State's territory, for it means that every region which lies outside this zone (usually the capital city and the adjacent metropolitan area) is considered a periphery with corresponding detrimental economic and political consequences.

² On problems of territorialization of economic activities, see: STORPER, Michael. "Territories, Flows, and Hierarchies in the Global Economy." In: COX, Kevin R., (ed.) *Spaces of Globalization: Reasserting the Power of the Local*. London, The Guilford Press, 1997, pp. 19-44.

³ BADIE, Bertrand. *L'Etat importé: Essai sur l'occidentalisation de l'ordre politique*. Paris: Fayard, 1992, p. 83 (translated from the French original by the author).

In addition, the idea of territory is related to two other, powerful concepts, namely 'place' and 'territoriality.' Place refers to the 'locale' in which people live. Attachments to place are strongly related to meanings that are both inscribed into and gained from place. Territoriality refers to the attempt by individuals or groups to affect, influence, and control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a particular geographic area.

In the modern world, state bounds are seen generally to be firm, clear lines. The territory is constitutive of the State as a political community. In contrast, space takes on different meanings in different political settings. However, territories were conceived in a completely different way in past ages and in different circumstances:

1/ In the *city states*, the territory expressed a particular relation between members of the community living on it and between the community and its land. It led to a spatial fragmentation into small territorial units expressing an exclusive particularity and resisting to such territorial constructions as the empires. The territory was not a constitutive element of the political system, but subordinated to it; instead of being the principle representing continuity of public life and political rule, it was constructed as an instrument of separation and distinction.

[Examples of city-states are Athens or Sparta in Antiquity, Florence and other urban centers in Renaissance Italy; the relation of territory and community are particularly evident in the writings of Niccolò Machiavelli.]

2/ In the *empires*, the territory plays an entirely different role. According to the distinction between State and empire made by the German historian, Otto Hintze, the first is based on a territory, whereas the second is a cultural creation. In this perspective, an imperial construction of the political community is not compatible with territoriality as it needs extension, radiance, and diffusion. An empire is founded on a cultural identity which is projected as having a universal scope. Therefore, the idea of a boundary is the negation of the imperial project which does not aim at creating a national or territorial community; in the empire practically without boundaries communal and territorial delimitations were fluid and governance was local. There were multiple competencies and overlapping jurisdictions. The imperial project is always uniquely linked to the everlastingness of itself. This was the time what a Canadian historian, William McNeill, called 'civilized polyethnicity.'⁴

Any particularism which does not jeopardize this cultural perspective is politically unimportant; its separate identity, which is not claiming a separate territory, is recognized, tolerated and integrated in the sacral perspective of the imperial whole. For this reason, problems of minorities did not exist within the great, inclusive empires. Material and political interests, economic, military and diplomatic strategies contributed to make of imperial territories an ever-changing ensemble in which particular human communities, notwithstanding their resistance to the empire's integrative tendencies, were acknowledged as parts of a universal entity. Each branch of an imperial government had its own radiance in the territories over which it exercised the emperor's power, thus the universalist drive was maintained in reasonable limits. The territory lost its constitutive force as it became an ensemble of multiple territorialities, and could not serve anymore the delimitation of local sovereignties.

[Again, it is easy to find examples of empires in history – the Holy Roman Empire, the empire of the Turks based on the memories of the Khalifate, or the African empires of Ghana, Mali and of the Songhai – which correspond to the description given above.]

3/ *Suzerainty relationships* represent a political organization which is based on personal allegiance and, consequently, is dissociated of the principle of territoriality. Personal allegiance is derived from the obligation of fidelity, a moral and at the same time juridical obligation towards the feudal lord. Thus, the feudal system is based on

⁴ McNEILL, William H. *Polyethnicity and National Unity in World History*. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1986.

legal links between persons instead of being founded on the territorial concept. The lord, as such, disposes of a territory, over which he has social, economic and political jurisdiction, but as a vassal he is inserted into a chain of dependence, the feudal system, and as a result the territory under his jurisdiction cannot be anymore under his exclusive domination. The suzerainty system eliminates all political power monopolies, except for the highest lord, the emperor (who, however, depends, in turn, from the benevolence of God). Under a different angle, suzerainty was defined not only by zones of transition between component parts but also by formal hierarchical relations between suzerain and non-suzerain members of the system. Indeed, since zones of transition were a significant feature of suzerain-state systems, the imposition of the modern Western territorial principle (including delimited boundaries) represented a radical change in inter-state relations.⁵ In fact, the location on an interaction continuum from totally open to totally closed boundaries and frontiers explains certain aspects of the nature of relationships between neighboring states.

European feudalism in the early Middle Ages or the suzerain-state systems in Indian empires, like the one of Ashoka at the beginning of our millennium, come to mind when dealing with the subject of political orders based on suzerainty. The Hungarian historian and thinker, Jenő Szűcs, was right in saying that

"Unity in plurality meant that 'freedoms' became the internal organizing principle of the structures and led to something which drew the line so sharply between the medieval West and many other civilizations; the birth of 'society' as an autonomous entity. The boundaries between the hierarchically divided groups were always drawn by some higher authority, but since authority was not identical with sovereignty there were everywhere ascending legal maxims and 'customs' imposed upwards from below."⁶

It has to be noted here that what Bertrand Badie calls 'spatial culture' is unique to Christian political communities – neither Islam and Judaism, nor Hinduism or Buddhism possess such a spatially-conditioned view of the world. This Christian attachment to the principle of territoriality was born out, on the one hand, of the central position occupied by the Church and of the principle of representation which enabled Christian universalism to have an unlimited radiance, and, on the other hand, of the dissociation between the temporal and the spiritual. This dissociation made possible for the Church to support the spatially defined State power which was subjected to the supreme authority of the pope. The sixteenth century Reformation affected inversely this conceptualization of the territorial State, and contributed to the destruction of the universalist pretensions of the Church. As independent Protestant churches were established, they adhered to the geographies of the nation-states on the territory of which they functioned, bestowing on these spatial constructions not only a political but a sacred character as well.

In comparison, in the Muslim world the political institution of the collectivity did not create for itself a specific space but shared a common space with society. The lack of urban organization was compensated by the strong social cohesion through family ties, neighborhood and other group solidarities (solidarities which, in contrast to the evolution in Christendom, did not stimulate the development of associative links). The community framework of Muslims under the rule of a prince replaced, as a consequence, the order of a single territoriality with the order of plural territorialities – in a somewhat similar way as in many empires of the past. The political legitimization of power was derived from religious principles, but not in the same way as in the Christian world because the spiritual and the temporal were not dissociated. The Khalifa was recognized and obeyed as long as he respected the revelation and the commandments of the Prophet.

⁵ See on the problem of territoriality in general, PRESCOTT, J.R.V. *Political Frontiers and Boundaries*. London, 1987, and as a case study: JOO-JOCK, Lim, *Territorial Power Domains, Southeast Asia and China*. Singapore, 1984.

⁶ SZÜCS, Jenő. "Three Historical Regions of Europe. An Outline." In: KEANE, John (ed.). *Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives*. London, Verso, 1988, pp. 306-307.

4/ The *nation-state system* founded on territorial regroupings and on disappearing or destroyed community structures, definitely replaced the medieval political order at the time when the Westphalian Treaty was concluded between the European powers in Münster and Osnabrück, Westphalia. The individuation process of the nation-state was thus a process of territorialization, a process of spatial determination of political units. It limited the State's power and authority to a determined territory, but, in the name of national sovereignty, it made it absolute within these boundaries. The accomplishments of Westphalia, which gave its name to the political order in which we still live, represent some of the most important features of the evolution of our modernity:

i) Reinforcing the evolution initiated by the Reformation, the treaty went even beyond it and spelled out the bases of a secular State. The dissociation of temporal and spiritual spheres became complete.

ii) Statal territories were not subordinated to any other spaces, and authority was derived from the control of a certain territory instead of the quasi-mythical powers of the emperor. Territoriality and secularism were linked because territory lent moral and legal justification to the territorially-based state.

iii) In later periods, national sovereignty, derived also from the principle of territoriality, was added as the juridical foundation of the State; this development was complemented in the twentieth century by the principle of self-determination, again linked to the possession by the group of his 'homeland' – a territory.

iv) The territory became the foremost constitutive element of the political order; it incarnated the State as a jurisdictional space and as the basis of national sovereignty it structured the whole society, eliminating all different communal solidarities.

v) As a consequence, the links between territory and cultures were severed for the benefit of one dominant culture. The tolerance of separate, co-existent particular identities was abandoned in order to promote the domination of one particular identity. If the principle of territoriality meant the dissociation of the temporal and spiritual, it also meant the emancipation of territories from their submission to culturally-defined perspectives.

vi) Defining the State as a vast public space open to all, the territorially-based political order created out of members of different human groups – ethnic, religious, linguistic, etc. communities – a population fused into the one, unique category of citizenship vowing allegiance exclusively to the territorial State.

vii) The principle of territoriality led to modern warfare as the Westphalian system did not leave any other means at the States' disposal as the armed conflict to settle their disputes. Boundaries protect and, at the same time, create the enemy; they offer security and, simultaneously, create insecurity. For this reason, the territorial principle is the true source of the presently prevailing inter-state system.

viii) The modern State spatialized for functional purposes the political order during the last four centuries. State boundaries were established in accordance with conventions and treaties, rarely in agreement with historically determined frontiers. As this system became accepted by, or was imposed by force, on all peoples of the planet, it pretended to establish a universal world order which, however, did not represent anything else but the conquest of one, particular political conceptualization: the territorially-based State. The modern state system, therefore, was frequently opposed by frustrated or quasi-subjected people who hoped to keep their identities, their shared community values and traditions, and their ancestral social structures.

Since its inception, the ideal of the modern State contains a fundamental contradiction. On the one hand, social relations are individualized and, as this phenomenon is described by some sociologists, the society is constituted by 'atomized' individuals who are entirely independent from each other; on the other hand, total allegiance towards the

State is required from people living on a particular territory as citizens of the State in question, excluding any other territorial or cultural allegiance. This meant, not only in decolonized countries but in the West as well, that the preeminence given to the principle of territoriality led to reinventing identities, cultural ties, or even imaginary geographies. Such an evolution produced a world in which official territories rarely coincide with lively social spaces, with a spatialization grown out of interaction between human beings. *Universalization was attained through territorialization, all cultures were particularized. The final result was the elimination of congruence between human worlds composed of men and not of citizens, and the institutionalized political order had to be sustained by freshly elaborated, homogenized identities and artificially produced socio-cultural ties.*

Since time immemorial there was an opposition between homeland and territory. In pre-modern societies social links were constituted by kinship systems; thus, tribes and clans were the ones which principally structured the political order. And they were fundamentally rooted in the homeland closely related to their identities and mythical origins which differentiated them from all other surrounding peoples. In the course of history, when kinship ties and social relations were broadened and became more and more complex, tribes and clans logically lost their importance in structuring the public life of their members. At this point, then, appeared how important territory was in comparison to homeland, as territory stood for a bounded space in which a population could live under the protection of authorities that ruled them. The relationship between men and the land was broken, and the construal of states on a territorial basis ignored all communal or cultural identities and belongings together, but envisaged conquest and war as constituting the essential aspects of relationships between territorial units.⁷

The revival of communal and cultural identities is closely linked to the birth of a plural and fragmented society out of spatial deinstitutionalization and the disappearance of citizen mobilization. This reversal at the turn of the millennium presupposes a newly invented political order which would ensure the congruence of socio-cultural and political realities. Mobility in the form of transnational flux supersedes the territorial framework like in the case of migratory movements, the activities of transnational corporations, or communication-information technologies.

Even in the economic domain there is a sensible modification of regulatory rules in that they tend to assign priority to the place or 'locale' instead of the territory, and to substitute coordination to demarcation. One could perhaps say that, again, the city is preferred to the territorial state because spatial controls do not correspond anymore to economic realities. Mobility surpasses the land as source of richness. However, even if the interplay of actors on the world economic scene tries to get around the principle of territoriality, the State still is an important player in the economic game, reaffirming the requirements of territoriality. Nevertheless, it also admits some selective de-territorialization in certain domains and agrees to sacrifice some of its prerogatives for a competitive advantage. Good examples of selective de-territorialization are international trade and the worldwide coordination of financial markets.

⁷ Today the modern State is in a crisis as a result of its internal contradictions and paradoxes. In the words of Bertrand Badie: "[The] most evident contradiction resulted in a brutal reversal of the principle of territoriality. Put into practice in the chaos at the end of the feudal age with the purpose to supersede reigning particularisms, differences and singularities in order to ensure their co-existence instead of transforming them into getthos, the invention of territoriality was intended to promote universalism. An eminently political move, it superimposed the category of citizenship to all social particularisms of a more limited scope. Failing, however, to realize this project of universalization incorrectly conceived and hardly controlled, and sometimes caricatural or imposed by force, the nation-state model entered a severe crisis which cut short the processes of making it perennial in the West or introducing it elsewhere in the world. It would be illogical to suppose that this model territorial institution could be recovered for purposes contrary to its original destiny, that is, to serve as a foundation for the consolidation of the explosion of identities for which it is responsible, and to build new nation-states on the ruins of the old ones." BADIE (1995), p. 102 (translated from the French original by the author).

The most disruptive effects of de-territorialization on the States' control and surveillance capabilities appears clearly in the transgression of these rules by individuals who move across frontiers without respecting any institutional limitations. These individual comportments showing a strong disrespect of territorial demarcations are, however, volatile and instable, motivated not by collective fears of State power but by more or less free choice, though frequently driven by the pursuit of richness, or the simple desire for change, or by the uncertainties of a risk society.

The domination of the territorial principle in the political sphere is still prevalent, though shaken, and social forces try to find all kind of ways to bypass institutional controls which are yet in vigor, all the more that national boundaries do evidently not represent the limits within which security and opportunity are available. It is not exaggerated to say that we live in a world of territorial decomposition and unknown risks which are subjectively assessed by each person or each group. The main element of decomposition is de-territorialization or the growing loss of territorial references which means that individuals and groups pass beyond boundaries and geographical delimitations, and replace old allegiances and old life-styles with new ones. In fact, territorial levels are multiplied in accordance with social contexts and political stakes, always with a view to allegiances and risks, the extension of violence and social conflicts, and a fundamental alienation in a world without meaning. Does our future lie then in a post-territorial world of globalization?

2. THE NATION AND THE MODERN STATE⁸

Analyzing the questions related to nationalism and the nation-state, I would like first to make an essential distinction between nationalism, the movement which leads to the creation of nation-states, and national consciousness or national identity, which represents a collective cultural phenomenon. In opposition to class identifications emerging from the sphere of production and exchange, cultural identities derive from man's spiritual needs as well as his profound urge to communicate with other men. Cultural identities are based on an ensemble of manifestations giving a coherent meaning to the cosmic and social worlds surrounding us – values, symbols, myths and traditions, often codified in custom and ritual. Shared cultural features tend, thus, to join together all those who are members of a community, and national identity involves some sense of a political community. A political community in turn implies some common institutions and a single code of rights and duties for all members of the community. It also suggests a definite social space, that is, a well demarcated and bounded territory, with which the members identify and to which they feel they belong. A national identity is always multidimensional; it can never be reduced to a single element. In every national identity two sets of dimensions are present in varying degrees and different forms, the civic and territorial, on the one hand, the ethnic and genealogical, on the other hand. The appeal to national identity has become the main legitimation for social order and solidarity today, and the unique source of legitimacy for the supreme and independent jurisdiction of the State over its territory and population, as it derives from the people who constitute the national community. It provides, at the same time, a powerful means of defining and locating individual selves in the world through participation in a collective personality and its distinctive culture.

In the *Western model* national identity refers to a predominantly spatial or territorial reality, decomposed into four major elements:

⁸ SMITH, Anthony D. *National Identity*. Reno, University of Nevada Press, 1991. also by the same author: *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*. Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995.

i) A historic land where terrain and people are linked through mutual and beneficial interaction over several generations;

ii) The existence of *patria*, a community of laws and institutions expressing a single political will. This ideal entails some common regulating institutions based on shared political sentiments and purposes; a common code of laws over and above any other laws, and the corresponding enforcement agencies;

iii) The legal and political community implies a feeling of equality with reciprocal rights and obligations among the members of the community, and the correlative exclusion of outsiders from those rights and duties. This means that all members of the nation are legally equal and that the rich and powerful are, therefore, equally bound by the laws of the *patria*; and,

iv) Membership of the community living on the homeland, and the concomitant equality of all members, are founded on shared values and traditions, a civic ideology consisting of a set of common understandings and aspirations, sentiments and ideas, binding the population together.

In the course of historical development, national societies were transformed into citizen-societies because of the dominant influence of the territorial concept of the State, and the legalistic definition of belonging to a State's population. Instead of belonging to a national community that determines the basis of membership of a social collectivity, it is the fact of being a citizen of a given State which is the decisive characteristic of this membership. The transformation reflects the permanent interface between atom like individuals and the all-powerful State. Until national societies existed membership was acquired through belonging to the national community constitutive of the State, or to an accepted minority living in the territory of the State, though this belonging became more and more fictionalized. The new situation opposing individuals to State power was formalized in the status of citizenship. The appearance of citizen-societies reveals two important contradictions:

– *First*, it legitimized the definite separation of the State from civil society, a development which, in turn, may sound the death knell of the State;

– *Second*, it is based on the requirement of becoming citizen of a State when the destiny of the nation-state, or of any existing state-formation for that matter, is more and more questioned. In this perspective, the advent of citizen-societies contributes to the crisis of the State and points towards an evolution, more and more evident, in the direction of more or less extensive and inclusive regionalisms in which citizenship loses its importance.

There were two main reasons for the transformation of national societies into citizen-societies. It was the result, in the first place, of an extensive intermingling of populations between nation-states belonging to the Western cultural orbit (the disappearance of pure nation-states), and the growing consciousness of ethnic, cultural, religious, or other minorities in their differences with the ruling nation. In the second place, worldwide migration, due mainly i) to economic reasons, and also ii) to the devastation of wars conducted with technically sophisticated, modern weaponry widely distributed by Western technology, created such extensive movements between different civilizational areas that the notion of national societies gradually became obsolete. This migratory movement of which the direction today is almost exclusively South-North (in distinction from the nineteenth century, when it was East-West), was obviously facilitated by the rapid development of transportation and communication in late modernity. At present, we live in the age of huge migratory movements of populations which forewarn the gravest challenge for the already beleaguered nation-states of the West in the coming century.

To be a citizen does not mean to have a personality, to be an individual human being with his own good or bad characteristics; it is an abstract, idealized concept. Citizenship can be defined only in relation to a State (a State one can change as many times during a lifetime as regulations permit) because it is the State which grants the quality to be a citizen and defines duties and obligations, rights and benefits for those being part of its citizenry. This is the

same for someone who was born in the State, or for someone who was naturalized as a citizen in the State he has chosen as home. In fact, the acquisition of citizenship by birth is a residue of the national society bounded by the limits of a nation-state. The entry in a citizen-society is the legal admission by the State, following the desire of the newcomer; it is the State which admits the new citizen into the bonds constituted by the duties, rights, and entitlements granted by that State to its citizens. The deep contradictions at the heart of the contemporary State can thus be summarized as follows: on the one hand, there is a universalist conception of citizenship with its uniform rights and duties, though survived an inevitably particularist conception of the 'people,' that is, a community of which each citizen is a member, on the other hand.

The contemporary nation therefore represents an uneasy but necessary symbiosis of ethnic and civil elements. In relation to the State, the individual is a citizen with civic rights and duties, and receives the benefits of modernity through the medium of an impersonal and believed to be impartial bureaucracy. Hence the nationalism of today's nation-state is bureaucratic as well as civic, for the State is institutionalized and represented through its bureaucratic organs in its relation with its citizens. However, in relation with the ethnic community or 'the people,' individuals are members with ties and affinities based on history and vernacular culture, and are for this reason granted the rights of citizenship and the benefits of modernity by the State, which represents, personifies and protects the national community.

Intermingling of populations of various cultural origins can be considered as a principal vehicle of globalization. It is in the perspective of cultural globalization that some speak of world culture as if mixing some customs and values would already signify the birth of a new cultural conglomerate. World culture protagonists mean, however, nothing else but the extension of Western culture, especially its American version, to the whole globe. In this sense, cultural globalization is cultural imperialism. An empirical proof of this thesis is offered by the Caribbean region in which American political influence was simply replaced by American cultural influence, justified by the fact that the livelihood of most of the island States depends on the continuous inflow of millions of American tourists each year. Globalization for the Caribbean means, then, that it gradually became culturally, economically and politically the backyard of the United States.

The *non-Western, ethnic-cultural model* of national identity which refers to the nation's biological and cultural foundations, reveals three major features:

- i) The nation is, first and foremost, a community of common descent and destiny;
- ii) The community is governed, in contrast to the legal conception of the Western model, by vernacular culture, customs and traditions; and,
- iii) Shared cultural values and traditions expressing beliefs, myths, and experiences of a common history play in this type of identity a primordial role. Ethnic groups are recognized by cultural differences like religion, customs, language or social institutions. Such collectivities are characterized by their historical evolution in a twofold way: not only are historical memories essential to their continuance, but each such ethnic group is the product of specific historical forces and is therefore subject to historical change and dissolution.

Collective cultural identity does not denote a uniformity of elements over generations but a sense of continuity of successive generations of a given cultural group of population, shared memories of earlier events and periods in the history of that group, and notions entertained by each generation about the collective destiny of that group. Consequently, changes in cultural identities refer to the degree to which dramatic developments in the past disturbed and transformed the basic patterning of the cultural elements indicated above. Ethnically based identities exhibit both constancy and flux, and share with political identities a sort of concentric nature.

[The concept of concentric identities can be well illustrated by the explanation of his country's interests given by the late Egyptian president, Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser said that for him the first concentric circle of shared identity and solidarity embraced the Egyptian people; the second, the community of all Arab peoples, and the third, the shared destiny with the peoples of the African continent.]

In sum, we can define the nation, with Professor Anthony Smith, as "*a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.*"⁹

Nationalism, on the contrary, is an ideological movement aiming to attain and maintain autonomy, unity and identity of a population deemed to constitute an actual or potential nation; that is, nationalism pursues an ideal which, in its essential character, is neither necessary nor universal. It derives its force from historical embeddedness, and its success depends on specific cultural and historic contexts. Nationalism aims at the creation of nation-states, in most cases on ancestral lands, to give a political expression to national identities and communities. Such States are formed around strong and cohesive core ethnic groups; these States slowly develop their administrative, judicial, fiscal and military apparatuses, and proceed to annex adjacent territories and their culturally different populations. Here is the origin of the harassing problem of national minorities, especially in cases where these minorities lived for centuries on the same land as the core ethnic group. The criterion of greatness is mainly territorial and, as a result of the conquest by force of territories inhabited by culturally different groups, most nation-states are polyethnic States. Today, less than ten per cent of all States, members of the United Nations, are true nation-states.

It is a historical reality that ethnic groups in the outlying regions of a nation-state, or those representing middle and lower social strata in the population, were incorporated into the culture and social structures of the dominant ethnic group through the agency of the bureaucratic State. Absolutist monarchs sought to standardize and homogenize ethnic populations of territories under their rule, and aimed at obtaining from them ever-increasing revenues and military resources to maximize their effectiveness in the competition between dynastic States. The methods of bureaucratic incorporation included familiar measures of state-making such as : creation of a single code of law and system of courts throughout the territory; creation of a single system of taxation and fiscal policy; construction of a unified transport and communication system; streamlining of the administrative apparatus and centralization of control in the hands of the ruler; formation of professional cadres of skilled personnel for key bureaucratic institutions, and, finally, establishment of effective military institutions and development of military technology under central control. At a later stage, measures of welfare benefit, labor protection, insurance, health and general education came to be included in the process, usually accompanied by an extension of the franchise to middle and lower strata of the society, and recently to women.

The creation of such a secular type of nation was accomplished through political 'socialization' in the form of the mass education system, the military service which also assumed an important role in popular education, and through all channels serving the dissemination of civic culture, – symbolism and public ceremonials included. This whole process required a so-called 'dual legitimation': in terms of received religion, culture and tradition versus legitimation by appeal to reason and to scientific techniques and considerations, integrating, simultaneously, the past (tradition), the present (reason), and the future (perfectibility). Modern nations, without losing their ethnic distinctiveness, are then characterized by:

⁹ SMITH (1991), p. 14.

- i) A fairly compact territory, preferably with defensible, natural frontiers;
- ii) A unified legal code of common rights and duties with establishment of citizenship rights when independence was conquered;
- iii) A unified economy with a single division of labor and mobility of persons and goods throughout the national territory; and,
- iv) A single civic culture, and public, mass education and media system.

The State which is built up of public institutions differentiated from and autonomous in their relations to the institutions of civil society, exercises coercion and control within its territory and imposes contributions on the population. The nation signifies a cultural and social bond, uniting in a single political community all those sharing a historic culture and homeland. National identity, then, comprises both a cultural and a political aspect. To forge a national identity is always a political action with political consequences like redrawing the geopolitical map or alters the composition and character of political regimes and States. Because nationalism must obtain the active participation of citizens on a territorial and civic basis, it addresses not a community but individuals resident on the territory of the nation and future citizens-to-be. This description summarizes the essence of citizenship in territorial nations, but does not assert that national identity and State sovereignty are congruent.

The territorial-civic model of the nation is a fundamental assumption of the inter-state order and its juridical definition of the State, and, consequently, it is presupposed by the United Nations Organization. However, another important aspect of the nationalist drive in modernity was the right of the people to self-determination, a principle proclaimed by President Wilson after World War I. As historians recorded it, his Secretary of State was opposed to the proclamation of this principle on the basis that it will create enormous upheavals and convulsions in the inter-statal system. This, of course, did happen. The basic thesis of nationalist movements refers ever since to this right of peoples all over the world; it made to explode the territorial-civic model of the nation incorporated into the polyethnic modern State, a State claiming to be a nation. Frequently, contemporary nationalist movements do not want to secede from the State in which the ethnic minority they represent lives, but fight to obtain cultural, social and economic autonomy in the existing territorial framework. Autonomy became a key to dignity in the modern world, but it requires authenticity; freedom depends on identity, and destiny on shared memories. Such autonomy would mean to acquire a proper national identity within a territorial State identity; to redistribute the power within the polyethnic State in order to eliminate the systematic exclusion of certain ethnic categories and the denial of their collective culture and rights. Autonomy-oriented nationalisms therefore sharply contrast with territorial nationalisms of the past.

It became more and more evident in the course of the last decades that national interest, as difficult as it can be to determine it, cannot be identified with the possession of a national territory when nation-states are fully engaged in transnational exchanges, integrative moves and the (however limited) globalization process, though ethnicity and nation remain essential building-blocks, even in the global age, of any new international order. Nationalism has been accorded a global legitimacy, at least in the right to self-determination written into the UN Charter, but is simultaneously excoriated, and manifestations of other peoples' nationalisms are routinely denounced.

3. TURBULENCE IN THE INTER-STATAL SYSTEM

Turbulence and crisis characterize in our days not only the modern State, but the contemporary inter-statal system as well. Briefly, the phenomenon causing this turbulence and crisis is the incompatibility between the territorial-civic model of the nation on which nation-states as well as the international system are based, and the ethnic model of culturally-conditioned communities which, in the course of history, made up the empires. By the early

twentieth century the sovereign, bureaucratic State, founded on the territorial-civic model of the nation, became the recognized norm of political organization in most parts of the world, under the globalizing impact of the Western civilization. Its main vehicle is the international system, the United Nations included. Inter-regional integration does not modify this situation because inter-regional entities only recognize as collective actors the nation-states, – democratic States that are legitimated by a clear expression of the national will and which possess national identity as their basic reference.

i) *The First Source of Conflict: the Dual Model of the Nation*

The mechanisms of international incorporation, that is, incorporation into the inter-statal system is carried out through the United Nations and other inter-governmental organizations, by means of international fora and conferences, multilateral agreements and the like. The national aspirations of each nation are legitimated and thereby tamed. They become part of the global framework of assumptions constituting the international institutional order. Nationalism is considered to be domesticated, and a benign national identity or patriotism with its replicated symbolism of flags, anthems and ceremonial parades is a rule.

In these terms, *members of the inter-statal system must show that they are sharply differentiated from other States, on the one hand, but undifferentiated from each other at the domestic level, on the other hand.* This corresponds to the requirements that States have to be internally homogenized to the largest extent, and geopolitical demarcations are considered to be the fundamental indicators of differences between States. However, while geopolitical requirements can reinforce ethnically relatively homogenous States, they are just as likely to undermine the cohesion of ethnically plural States. The very demands for solidarity, commitment and homogeneity that the inter-state system imposes on its members often just provoke an ethnic resistance that has to be suppressed for the sake of the system's stability. In other words, once a conflict between centralizing, territorial nation-states and ethnic communities erupts, the geopolitics of the modern state-system only makes entirely intractable the claims of two or more nationalisms in perpetual, if sometimes latent, conflict.

The crisis of legitimacy and cohesion of the modern State must, therefore, be explained by the fact that most of the contemporary members of the inter-statal system are plurinational States, possessing large ethnic, cultural, religious, or linguistic minorities. These minorities are of two kinds : i) resident, territorially compact minorities, also called 'historic' minorities because of their long existence in the States concerned (for example, the Hungarian minorities in Romania, or the African-American minority in the United States), or ii) scattered immigrant minorities, sometimes from former colonial overseas possessions, sometimes recently arrived, especially in the wealthy areas of the Western world (for example, the immigration from Asia Minor and Africa into European countries in recent years). The latter usually live and work in a climate of marginalization, though part of the European population tries to ensure (despite the clearly adverse economic effects of such an immigration) their admission and integration under the slogans of humanitarian solidarity and the elimination of 'exclusion.' The former are more or less viewed today as legitimate, if less favored, co-residents of the national state, but experienced in earlier periods neglect and discrimination. Both kinds of minorities increasingly represent a fracturing of the homogeneity and purity of a national identity that was pictured as an organic whole in the past for practical purposes.

Not only ethnic but civic nationalisms as well require the eradication of minority cultures and communities *qua* communities on the common assumption, shared by liberals and socialists alike, of equality through uniformity. It is believed that 'higher cultures' (the scientific culture of modernity) and 'great nations' (the leading Western nations) are necessarily of greater value than 'low' cultures (non-Western cultures) and small nations (including, for example, the recently liberated nations of Eastern Europe). The civic equality of co-nationals destroys all associations and bodies that stand between the citizen and the State, and the ideology of civic nationalism (closely linked with modern

science and technology) relegates the customary and the vernacular to the margins of society, to the family and folklore. In doing so, it also de-legitimizes and devalues the ethnic cultures of resident minorities and immigrants alike, and does so consciously and deliberately.

The ethnic and cultural revival of hitherto dormant and submerged minority ethnic groups, this new wave of cultural and political pluralism, produces a mass mobilization aiming at the creation of new nation-states¹⁰ because, as of now, the nation-state remains the only internationally recognized structure in the political sphere. The result of this evolution has been, quoting Anthony Smith, to redefine and strengthen

"The concept and shape of the national state through a global process of cultural and political pluralism ... a world of incommensurable but equal national states ... The older political pluralism of a Europe of sovereign states and their colonial dependencies has been transformed, reinforced and multiplied by the nationalist principle of cultural pluralism, of each historic culture-community with its peculiar traditions, myths and memories obtaining its own historic territory, and, preferably, its own State. In the process, the earlier ideal of ethno-national homogeneity and purity, which even then was often breached, has been increasingly abandoned in favor of a 'dominant *ethnie*' model of civic nationalism, one that entails a more conscious attempt to embrace the civic ideal and simultaneously insists on the national State being underpinned by the culture and traditions of its dominant or core *ethnie*, to which most members feel they belong."¹¹

At the end of the century the paradox of the nation-state is that its concept, based on the symbiosis of the civic and ethnic models, became obsolete in the undeniably changed circumstances, but it remains a political necessity because nationalism alone can ground the inter-statal order in the principles of popular sovereignty and ensure the social cohesion of member States. Only nationalism can secure the assent of the governed to the territorially determined units through a sense of collective identification. As long as any international (not to say, global) order is based on a balance of competing States, so long the principle of nationality will only provide, in Western civilizational terms, the acceptable legitimation and focus of popular mobilization.

ii) *The Second Source of Conflict: The Divisive Impact of the Territorial Principle*

As much as the modern State is unimaginable without the nation, as much the territorial boundaries demarcate, in the eyes of our contemporaries, its spatial designation or its geographical location which defines the contours of its sovereignty. Territories are untouchable because they guarantee the stability of the inter-state system.

Nevertheless, there are signs which permit us to foresee a gradual erosion of the importance of territories from the point of view of states. A very recent example is the banana dispute between the United States and the European Union: the conflict arose because both parties are committed to defend the interests of economic operators on the international scene which are not located within the frontiers of the parties involved. The US protects the interests of American companies who exploit banana plantations in Mesoamerica (especially in Guatemala), and the European Union affirms the right to keep the market share of exporters from ex-colonial territories of its members, though they constitute now independent States, which have with the Union special trading arrangements. Another good example showing the erosion of the importance of the territorial principle is the role diasporas play in the development of several countries, first and foremost China and India, whose cases indicate a sort of de-territorialization of their human potential due, though, to historic reasons and not to political will.

¹⁰ Since 1991 at least 18 new national states have been recognized as 'successor states' of the Soviet Union.

¹¹ SMITH (1995), pp. 105-106.

Thus, there is no doubt that the existence of a world market (even if it is only encompassing some specific sectors) is one of the main engine of the de-territorialization trend as it is also the undeniable proof evoked by the protagonists of globalization. In effect, liberated from institutional and political constraints and the obstacles represented by boundaries, the market aims to create a global society based on the principles of *polyarchy* (with the expression popularized by Robert Dahl in his analysis of democratic institutions), that is, on the unfettered competition between economic operators of different countries. But as the birth of a worldwide market promotes de-territorialization and eliminates boundary-conditioned control systems, leading to the gradual disappearance of nation-states, it constitutes, at the same time, an irresolvable paradox: the world market cannot function without a worldwide 'governance' and without its participants confessing a belief in the emancipatory effects of market mechanisms and the necessity to adopt the same attitude in business practices. In consequence, the world market presupposes the existence of some world government, and of a world culture of shared principles and values. It is possible to say that parallel to the loss of the territorial dimension; the international order becomes more and more fragile, witnessing a chronic instability and unforeseeable changes.

This is the reason why operators on the world market give all the support they can to inter-governmental cooperation and to the United Nations Organization in the hope that the relativization of territorial sovereignties will be replaced in this manner by an autonomous, transnational system of norms and rules. However, these hopes remained unfulfilled because the United Nations is until today the most resolute defender of the existence of territorial States. Occasionally, however, under the cover of Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council suspended the respect of territorial sovereignty of a State in order to legitimate a military intervention against an aggressor or to safeguard the democratic order within a country. It is safe to state, I think, that one of the main sources of the UN's ineffectiveness is precisely the respect of the territorial principle forced on it by its membership because States behave individualistically in respect of any problem which concerns their territorial sovereignty.

The thesis that the process of political disintegration is the other side of the coin of the process of international economic integration appears to me, however, doubtful. It suggests a sort of economic determinism and, besides, it does not correspond to reality: political and economic integration are only possible if endeavored simultaneously. In this sense, globalization and regionalism are certainly complementary processes, producing results not always corresponding to the expectations of the actors or operators. We can easily find examples of this in both the economic and political spheres. Marketing techniques of transnational corporations show a tendency to adapt their products, publicity and sales drives to regional and, even ethnic and cultural, particularities though their operations are based on global considerations. Regionalisms – cultural, political or economic – all have recourse to selected tenets of globalizing discourses. For instance, Islamic and all other types of fundamentalisms frequently refer as well to some basic principles of modernity; and entrepreneurs in small, regional markets try to practice methods applicable in more developed, globalizing economies. A typical case of mistaken application of methods believed to be globally valid is, in my opinion, the drive of UN technical assistance programs to implant everywhere in the developing world (in African countries or in Papuasia-New Guinea, for example) stock exchanges which are expected to contribute to the development of those countries' national economies. For me, this is a nonsense because those economies are not enough mature to benefit of the functioning of a stock exchange.

[Let me give you an example of the entirely different economic and cultural conditions in which globally valid considerations cannot work: in Afghanistan, where I worked between 1975 and 1979, the Governor of the Central Bank avowed to me that his institution does not generally know where is at least the third, or sometimes the half, of the national currency in circulation. It does not enter into normal circuits, – banking system, private or public expenditure, etc., – through which the volume of monetary instruments can be checked. Everybody agreed that most of the missing currency i) must be hidden by the population at home as people do not trust or are not yet accustomed to the use of institutional channels for saving; and ii) that huge sums are committed to operations of illegal trade across the border with Pakistan, consisting of contraband of precious stones, arms, or wood.]

A number of other factors than the globalization of the market and liberal economic policies contribute as well to the disruption of the inter-state system as it exists since the Treaty of Westphalia:

- Technologies of mass communication – radio, television, videos, personal computers and Internet – which encourage smaller social and political groups and ethnic communities to create and sustain their own dense, social and cultural networks, in opposition both to national States and to a wider continental or global culture. There is a constantly growing movement of cultural eclecticism and ambivalence (characterized as postmodernism), a patchwork of localized particulars married to a standardized and streamlined technology, and linked to large-scale popularization of scientific achievements. Images, identities, cultural perspectives, all express the plurality and particularism of histories, and are proofs of their remoteness from any vision of a cosmopolitan global order.

- It also appears, from the economic point of view, that our post-industrial age requires large service industries, highly skilled labor and sophisticated information technology, thereby encouraging trends which contradict the thesis of dominant ideologies that 'big is beautiful,' promoting flexible specialization, diversification and interdependent, collective networks. Contrarily to the belief inspired by economic determinism, even if the scale, budget, technology personnel and scope of operations of enterprises and other economic entities have been vastly augmented in the last few decades, it does not follow that the nature, scale and operations of political units, much less of cultural ensembles, must undergo commensurate changes.

- The problems concerning the interdependence of globalization and simultaneous fragmentation, and of the imperative need of sustainable development, lead us to the following section.

iii) *The Indisputably Global Reality: The Environmental Crisis*

The impact of the environmental crisis is the best indicator of the inefficiency of the international system to handle one of humanity's gravest problems of the present and of the future. What does the environmental crisis mean? It consists in the complete planetary disequilibrium between human populations living on the surface of the earth and Gaia's resources that these populations consume. The ecological devastation following the more and more intensive technological exploitation of the earth is demonstrated by data showing the demographic explosion and the excessive resource consumption in our century:

"Since 1900, the world's population multiplied by more than three times. Its economy has grown twenty fold. The consumption of fossil fuels has grown by a factor of 30, and industrial production by a factor of 50. Most of that growth, about four-fifth of it, occurred since 1950."¹²

Expressed in the customary language of economics, the global ecosystemic imbalance can be obtained by multiplying the number of people with per capita resource consumption. The human ecosystem, part of the global ecological framework, expropriates all material inputs from the available resource reservoir of the natural environment, and returns to it, in the form of waste, all the used resources and all the residues of transformed energies. In this way, one can get a clear image of the throughput, the two-way commerce between man's economic activities and the natural world, which represents the extent of the ecosystemic imbalance man created.

¹² MacNEILL, Jim – WINSEMIUS, Pieter – YAKUSHIJI, Taizo. *Beyond Interdependence: The Meshing of the World Economy and the Earth's Ecology*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 3.

There is an environmental crisis because the human ecosystem is open. It can expand infinitely from the point of view of science and technology through extracting material and energy resources from the environment and returning them to it as waste. In contrast, nature is changing but not growing; it is a closed ecosystem in which matter circulates but does not increase or decrease in quantity. Only energy flows move through it (this in accordance with the first law of thermodynamics). The difference between the functioning of the closed, cosmic ecosystem and the open, human ecosystem, leads: i) to the depletion of the environment's resources beyond the natural world's regenerative capacity, and ii) to the pollution, through waste, of the same natural world beyond its absorptive capacity.

The difference between what is and what ought to be, from the environmental point of view, is best illustrated by the fact that our neo-classical doctrines consider the economic sphere in human activities in the opposite way: they consider that the economic sphere is the global framework of which nature is a subordinate part. It is the economy which is a closed system without constraints on its growth, because energy, and goods and services exchanged, circulate without entering or exiting the system. The natural environment being only part of the global economic framework, other parts of the latter can easily substitute for what it supplies, precisely because circulating flows are channeled in accordance with the guiding forces of the global system. This conception of nature is expressed in a more general, voluntarist way by saying that nature is a social construct or that nature was created by man. Such unbelievable arrogance of our species inevitably led to the crisis which is throwing a dark shadow on all human existence.

After this brief discussion of the fundamental contradiction in man's relation to his natural environment, it must be evident that the concept of sustainable development involves a series of problems which were spelled out not only in various international gatherings, but in a huge literature as well. The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, 1992), also called the Earth Summit, established a comprehensive plan of global action in all areas of sustainable development. The final document approved by the participants, the Rio Declaration, put forth the basic requirements to reverse environmental deterioration. The most important were as follows:

- A proper balance must be achieved between the efforts of halting environmental degradation and aiming at an eventual re-establishment of the ecological equilibrium disturbed by human activities, and the right of all humans for a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature;
- The politics of each State and of the inter-statal community should follow the path of sustainable economic advance in view of the recent, accelerated deterioration of the environment, without, however, jeopardizing the eradication of poverty and reducing disparities in worldwide standards of living;
- The acknowledgement by developed countries of the responsibility they bear in the pursuit of sustainable development due to the burden that their life-styles, technologies of exploitation, and economic activities place on the global environment; the commitment as well of developing countries to respect the requirements of ecologically sustainable economic policies;
- The resolute striving to improve the natural environment of man; scientific uncertainty should not delay measures to prevent environmental degradation where there are threats of serious and irreversible damage.

The Earth Summit + 5, so-called because it was convened by the General Assembly in 1997, 5 years after the Earth Summit, had to review the implementation of the above resolutions. The impulse for the convocation of Earth Summit + 5 was given by a pessimistic report of the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) early

1997 which warned that "the global environment has continued to deteriorate and environmental problems remain deeply embedded in the socio-economic fabric of nations in all regions." It was proposed to member States to:

- Consider legally binding targets to reduce emission of greenhouse gases leading to climatic change;
- Continue their dialogue on protecting forests towards a legally binding convention;
- Move more forcefully towards sustainable patterns of production, distribution, and use of energy;
- Intensify efforts to reverse the decline in development assistance; and, finally,
- Focus on poverty eradication as a prerequisite for sustainable development.

A program of work was adopted at this meeting for the period 1998-2002. Member States accepted to submit annual progress reports concerning the realization of Agenda 21, and the progress accomplished is monitored by the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), created by the Rio Conference and functioning since 1993.

3. THE TREND TOWARDS REGIONALISM

The crisis of the inter-statal system evidences the importance of certain trends towards the creation of regional entities which may result in a de-multiplication of political spaces and a relativization of the idea of national territories. In this respect, we have to distinguish two concepts of regionalism:

– *The first is regionalism without frontiers, or a regionalism constituted by entities not demarcated territorially but made up of a network of regions, – expressing, in my opinion, the authentic ideal of what I call regionalism proper. It also corresponds to the most complete form of democracy – decentralized institutionalization. Such a regionalism eliminates territorial identities replacing them with cultural definitions and characteristics as the determining feature of identities of the self and of a specific community;*

– *The second, regionalization, is the constitution of a regional entity from above, through the will of sovereign governments which, in view of the real or imagined benefits of regional integration, decide to renounce of some aspects of their sovereign power in specific spheres of activity. The regionalization of an area engenders rarely the formation of new identities, and if it does it will necessitate a long process in time, but it surely destroys the former primary allegiance of the people to their territorially defined State.*

For both regionalism and regionalization, the European Union is a good example. The nascent regional cooperation following the principle 'Europe of the regions' illustrates an authentic regionalism as a completely new articulation of spatial configuration, in which the all-important principle of subsidiary is not only respected but actively promoted; in contrast, the European Union in its present form represents a regionalism of multiple territorial demarcations, and stands as an instance of regionalization.

Regionalism is generally envisaged today only in its form of regionalization which facilitates the liberalization of markets and of the flows of foreign direct investment within a specific region. This regionalization refers to the development of intra-regional trade and investment, each inducing a process of deeper integration of economic policies and of the industrial and service sectors. Transregionalism, as the first form of regionalism may be designated, would unite people whose identification will not be based on territory but on cultural belonging. In such regional frameworks, it will be possible to "manage identities and ensure the compatibility of these identities with

other identities" in a constant readjustment between the "logic of homogenization and the logic of differentiation."¹³ There will necessarily be coordination between regions in order to undertake a limited number of common actions, for instance, the protection of the environment. Regionalism will also enable the democratic process to reach its natural end-state with the largest possible extent of decentralization of society's politico-institutional structure. In the framework of such regionalism, territorial entities will be transformed into regions the cooperation of which will be carried out and promoted mostly by actors belonging to civil society and not to statal institutions, – first of all economic organizations such as chambers of commerce and industry, professional associations and small- and medium-scale enterprises. The multiform activities in specific domains will be carried out by equal partners without established and constraining hierarchies as in the nation-state framework. Contrarily to what is believed today, the future will not confirm the hegemony of the global over the local, but the hegemony of the local over the global – the preeminence of the local in a global, not statal, framework. As John Dewey, the great American social philosopher and father of pragmatism expressed it: "The local is the ultimate universal, and as near an absolute as exists."¹⁴

The globalization processes will most likely result in a de-territorialization of the existing political units as globalization cannot make sense except as a movement of simultaneous diversification. The gradual dying out of the territorial determination of States as part of the globalizing trend, and the necessary transformation of nation-states into regional ensembles of which it is difficult at the present to visualize the process of constitution and their institutional structures, represents the universalization of particulars and the particularization of universals. The principle of territoriality will thus be replaced by the right of self-determination for populations and communities which are ethnically and culturally constituted, without reference to state boundaries. De-territorialization, however, will not mean de-spatialization of political organization because politically autonomous human communities will always be tied to their spatial characteristics elaborated in historical time. De-territorialization, then, will be replaced by re-localization, enhancing the importance of place in a spatial framework. Such a fundamental change justifies describing our epoch as the age of disappearance of territories and the end of the era of territorially defined nation-states all the more that other civilizations construe the idea of a territory as a public space in a totally different way from ours. In this perspective, globalization stands for the interplay of centrifugal forces, whereas regionalization stands for the interplay of centripetal forces, and the two lead to the critical situation of today in which these contradictory tendencies undermine the Westphalian structure of the modern world, jeopardize the international system and the existence of international organizations. Our times thus represent, as a transitory phase, an inter-statal system in disorder or, rather, in the words of Hedley Bull, an international society in the state of anarchy.¹⁵

¹³ GUEHENNO, Jean-Marie. *The End of the Nation-State*. Transl. by V. Eliot. Minneapolis, University of Minneapolis Press, 1995, p. 64.

¹⁴ DEWEY, John. *The Public and Its Problems*. New York, Henry Holt, 1994, p. 215.

¹⁵ BULL, Hedley. *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. /1977/. 2. ed. New York, Columbia University Press, 1995.

FOURTH SESSION

Co-existing Civilizations and the International System

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1. DISJUNCTION OF THE WESTERN AND OTHER CULTURAL WORLDS

We have already seen the definition of the concepts of culture and civilization during the first session of this seminar. In sum, culture is, in the words of Clifford Geertz,¹ "an ordered system of meanings and symbols, in terms of which social interaction takes place," whereas the social system is "the pattern of social interaction itself." If culture is a complex whole shared by a human community, then two essential characteristics of it must be made evident. First, that a culture is an organized whole, not a mere ensemble of isolated elements because its variables are interdependent. Second, those culture patterns, explicit or implicit, are acquired and transmitted through symbols which contain and reflect the distinct way of life of the human community, bearer of a particular culture. The overall framework of a cultural community or of a specific human society's way of life constitutes the civilization centered on this cultural core.

The multiplicity of worlds of culture signifies, for most people, not cultural pluralism but a strong relativism of traditions, values, principles, ethos, behavior, and worldviews.² If everything is relative, there can be no truth of overall validity and no reality which appears to be the same to everyone. For this reason, philosophers, scientists, and the common man, who instinctively believes in objective reality and universally accepted truths, either ignore cultural differences or deny the possibility of communication between different cultures. Others regard cultural differences as successive stages on the road of progress towards the highest cultural level ever reached, or the highest humanity ever possible, our present Western civilization.

I shall briefly review here three interpretations of cultural differences before we deal with relations between culture, civilization, and international politics. Nelson Goodman,³ an emeritus professor of Harvard University, admits that versions of interpretive schemes as well as actual worlds are many and that reality is contextual. Possible worlds may result from divergent systems of description based on specific frames of reference, or on shifting emphasis in respect of the same objects or acts. In consequence, truth or untruth becomes irrelevant, and claiming the truth derives its validity not from its rightness or wrongness with reference to a phenomenon of the world, but from the verbal or nonverbal act of communication. For Donald Davidson,⁴ who lately taught at Stanford, belief and meaning are interdependent, and cultural differences explain that no common ground for the comparison of differing 'conceptual schemes' – frameworks of thinking or worldviews – exists. For such a purpose, one should have a meta-world, lying outside all possible worlds, the Archimedean neutral standpoint which would enable us to understand attitudes and interpret cultural differences. If there are different 'conceptual schemes' but no shared beliefs, values, principles, moral attitudes, etc., which underlay these worldviews, then no dialogue between different human worlds is possible. However, if there is no uninterpreted reality, one can still appeal, thinks Davidson, to the "unmediated touch with the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true or false."

The concept of 'styles of reasoning,' advanced by Ian Hacking,⁵ Canadian philosopher of science, constitutes perhaps the best approach to understanding other cultures and civilizations. Hacking relates the difference between cultural worlds to the fact that a style of reasoning may determine the very nature of the knowledge it produces. Different styles of reasoning cannot be sorted out by independent criticism, because

¹ GEERTZ, Clifford. *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*. New York, Basic Books, 1973, p. 144.

² Speaking of relativism, I do not intend to relativize religious truths because I always keep in mind that the domains of faith and reason are not the same; as Saint Thomas said: "Credo, quia absurdum est." The problems of civilizational differences belong not to the domain of faith but to the enterprise of understanding other humans.

³ GOODMAN, Nelson. *Ways of Worldmaking*. Indianapolis, Hackett, 1985.

⁴ DAVIDSON, Donald. *Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, pp. 183-198.

⁵ HACKING, Ian. "Styles of Scientific Reasoning." In: RAJCHMANN, John, and WEST, Cornel (eds.). *Post-Analytic Philosophy*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1985, pp. 145-165.

"the very sense of what can be established by that style depends upon the style itself." Different styles may determine possible truths which can be objectively true in the framework of a given style of reasoning. That means that styles of reasoning open up new possibilities for reflection, or offer new types of possibilities. As styles arise from historical events, their possible being true is a consequence of historical and cultural developments. A style is not a way of thinking that confronts reality, but is part of reality itself. However, Hacking recognizes that there are not only biological universals about all things human, but that there is also a 'common core' in the thinking of human beings characterized by a loose fit. This 'loose fit' makes it possible to share in different styles of reasoning, to participate in more than one style; if this would not be the case, then a complete dissociation of the cultural worlds would exclude understanding.⁶

[As examples of the 'common core' one usually mentions the universal phenomenon of love between mothers and children, the love between a man and a woman, etc. But I would like to call here your attention to another proof of the existence of a 'common core.' This proof consists in the fact that human beings have recourse in all parts of the world to the same type of solutions to everyday problems, to the same ways of artistic expression of their understanding of the world, etc. In anthropology, this is the dilemma between 'diffusion' and autonomous, creative activity of human beings on different continents.]

The extraordinary scientific achievements which took place in the Western cultural world, led to the belief in the idea of progress, evolutionary or cultural, with two results. First, that humanity is progressing in every aspect of life from lower to higher stages, grades, or levels of capacity, competency, activity or achievement. Second, that man is the highest, complete, and final product of natural evolution, and Western civilization represents the highest, complete and final stage of the cultural evolution and progress of mankind. The key word, therefore, to characterize the present state of the Western civilization in relation to other cultures is *disjunction*. This term has a double meaning: *first*, the disjunction of Western modernity from its own past occurring over the last four centuries in the Western culture itself; *second*, a consecutive disjunction from other great contemporary cultures. The best clarification of the term disjunction, in the first sense, was given by Anthony Giddens, for whom the essential trait of modernity consists in "placing a *caesura* upon the traditional world which it seems irretrievably corrode and destroy. The modern world is born out of discontinuity with what went before rather than continuity with it."⁷ The second meaning of disjunction, that between our civilization and other civilizational worlds, we only encountered now, in our age, and one can foresee that it corrodes, even if it does not destroy, the international system in general, and the Organization of the United Nations in particular.

The concept of disjunction between distinct civilizational worlds is in itself a negation of what ideologues of various stripes believe to be the solution of civilizational differences. I mean the existence of a global culture. It is a chimera. Global culture is without time, forever pursuing an elusive present, an artificial and standardized universal culture that has no historical background, no sense of time and sequence. Such a culture is stripped of any sense of development beyond the present; it is fluid, ubiquitous, formless and historically shallow because without memory. In contrast, the cultures we still live in are built around shared memories, traditions, myths and symbols of successive generations of cultural and political groups of a population. Unlike the demythologized and ambivalent cosmopolitan, global culture, our cultures are told, retold and re-enacted by successive generations of each community. A timeless global culture answers to no life needs and conjures no memories. If memory is central to identity, we can discern no global identity in the making, no aspirations for one, or any collective amnesia to replace existing cultural memories with a cosmopolitan orientation.

⁶ Hacking refers to Paracelsus, the well-known physician of the 16th century, to illustrate what he means by the impossibility of understanding another style of reasoning. Paracelsus's style of reasoning built, for example, on parallelisms of sicknesses and metals, is totally alien to us; our reasoning and that of Paracelsus are, therefore, alien to each other, incommensurable. This is for him a clearcut case of dissociation. It is, however, true that similar reasoning can still be found not only in the Chinese or Indian, Ayurvedic medicines, but in the Western homeopathic medicine, too.

⁷ GIDDENS, Anthony. *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984, p. 239.

2. THE STANDARD OF CIVILIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The above mentioned disjunction is clearly indicated by the concept of a standard of civilization in international relations, and particularly reflected in international law since the nineteenth century. The standard of civilization meant, in general, an expression of the assumptions, tacit or explicit, used to distinguish those who belong to a given culture or society from those who do not.⁸ In consequence, standards of civilization apply to individual states or individual societies, as well as to systems of states. Those who fulfill the requirements of a particular society's standard of civilization are brought inside its circle of 'civilized' members, while those who do not do so are left outside as 'not civilized' or 'uncivilized.' The concept of 'civilization,' in this sense, is incorporated in international law, which defines the identity and delimits the boundaries of civilized international relations, of the civilized international society.

[To mention some practical examples: the foreign powers crushing the Chinese Boxer rebellion in 1900 were designated as 'civilized powers' (including Japan as a 'civilized' though non-European and non-Christian power); The Hague conferences in 1899 and 1907 codifying the laws of war, called the rules established those of 'civilized warfare,' etc.]

The concept of a standard of civilization denoted, in fact, the degree of adaptation to changing circumstances, to the requirements of a global transformation. Accordingly, the standard of civilization is not only of historical significance, but is also an important thread in the social, legal and institutional fabric of the contemporary inter-statal system. For example, vestiges of the standard of civilization approach to international relations still appear in Art. 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice in the qualifying phrase, 'recognized by civilized nations' and in Art. 73 of the UN Charter regarding the trusteeship system.

Originally, the standards of civilization included the following requirements:

i) Guarantees of basic rights, i.e., life, dignity, and property; freedom of travel, commerce, and religion, especially for foreign nationals (though the huge waves of migration taking place in the last half century inevitably discredited the practices of all States in respect of guaranteeing basic rights for everyone);

ii) A political build up and a bureaucratic structure with some efficiency in running the State machinery, and with some capacity to organize for self-defense (in fact the UN renounced of this condition when admitting numerous countries unable to satisfy this condition);

iii) Adherence to the principles of generally accepted provisions of international law, including the laws of war; the maintenance of domestic civil courts, codes, and published laws which guarantee legality and the access to justice for all within its jurisdiction, foreigners and native citizens alike, in accordance with the maxim of civilization in a society of States, *ubi societas ibi jus est*, 'where there is a society there is law' (China's ignorant firing on the white flag, for example, was taken as proof of its uncivilized condition at the beginning of the century);

[To give an illustration of differences in legal thinking, Chinese jurisprudence sometimes held collective rights and duties ahead of individual ones, for example when the Chinese held a ship's entire crew responsible until a single offender could be determined among them, a practice which did not square well with the Western sense of civilized justice].

iv) Fulfillment of international obligations derived from the functioning of the inter-statal system by maintaining adequate and permanent avenues for diplomatic interchange and communications. Adherence to public international bodies, and participation at international conferences also provided evidence that a State had taken a responsible role in international relations in accordance with this standard of civilization, most countries

⁸ GONG, Gerrit W. *The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984.

from the developing world, even the poorest ones, maintain diplomatic representations in many countries and participate, if possible, in all international conferences, even if the costs are paid by the former colonial power; in comparison rich countries like Switzerland, have diplomatic representations to cover entire regions, for reasons of economy); and, finally,

v) Comportment and action in conformity with the accepted norms and practices of the 'civilized' international society, e.g., polygamy or slavery were considered uncivilized and, therefore, unacceptable. This requirement clearly presupposes that members of the same society of civilized States would sufficiently share, by definition, belief in fundamental, unspoken assumptions about the world; in customary, historically proven institutions, and in everyday life-styles, so as to feel part of a common society and civilization. (From this point of view there is the greatest discrepancy between moral requirements and practical attitudes: Islam acknowledges polygamy under its own strict conditions, and covered forms of slavery remain practiced in many African countries).

From the perspective of European States, what had in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries been described as the 'law of Christian nations' or the 'public law of Europe' had by the turn of the twentieth century been slightly altered and largely redefined as the 'law of 'civilized' nations.' The standard of civilization, representing as a norm the liberal European civilization, became an integral feature of international law. From the perspective of what became the non-European periphery, it was against a foreign standard of civilization that the countries were measured. Many of them had long maintained their own standards of civilization, based on and defined by their own cultural traditions and practices. To threaten these traditional standards of civilization of non-Western countries was to undermine their traditional cultural, social and political foundations. For example, by indirectly attacking the Confucian underpinnings of China's political regime and thereby diminishing China's regional prestige, the European standard of civilization decisively imperiled the traditional East Asian regional order. Though non-European States considered the European military challenge to be significant, they actually recognized that confrontation with the European standard of civilization constituted the more fundamental threat to their existence. Each non-Western country faced the same quandary. Conflicting demands required that it preserve traditional culture (as defined by historic standards of civilization), and at the same time 'civilize' its domestic and international practices (according to the prevailing international practice). The same dilemma continues to be, until today, the destiny for most of them.

Insights into the extent to which the standard of civilization was forcibly imposed, reluctantly accepted, or eagerly embraced are essential to understand the underlying structural strength and weaknesses of today's international order. Such insights can also provide the historical context about the possible emergence of a global society and a global culture. They can facilitate as well to comprehend the shifting nature of power in a multicultural political system, and the role and impact of international organizations, whether transnational corporations or intergovernmental organizations such as the UN and its specialized agencies. Whereas the old standards of civilization emerged as a dominant norm in the nineteenth century, it is not clear how they can be transformed and adapted to the mentality prevailing in our epoch; what, if any, norms can characterize so-called contemporary standards of civilization. Efforts are being made to enshrine human rights, non-discrimination, national self-determination, democratic government, or equitable redistribution of economic wealth – within whatever legality United Nations resolutions proffer. But can they be successful?

3. THE IMPACT OF CIVILIZATIONAL DIFFERENCES ON THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

We have seen already that there must be congruence, coherence, between a culture's fundamental tenets and the practices of the society. Consequently, culture as meaning-structure or as a structure of understanding the world, conditions all types of political actions, especially at the international level.

[It is necessary to indicate here that the concept of civilizational differences in international relations and the concept of multiculturalism in one, single country are, in the present context, independent of each other. When I speak about cultural worlds or civilizational differences, I mean only the first concept.]

a) *Civilizations and the International Order*

Following the theories of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, a society, bearer of a particular culture, possesses its own system of significations based on a densely interwoven and autonomous ensemble of interactions between its members. If the nation is considered the primary community possessing such a system of significations or meaning structures, it has to be acknowledged as well that these significations and interactions are frequently linked to cultural phenomena beyond national frontiers.

Cultural and civilizational features may legitimate political action, and depending on the relations between the transcendent and the sacred, on the one hand, and the immanent or the profane, on the other, may influence in one way or another the respective roles of authority and power in everyday social life. In the same vein, these cultural and civilizational features may make or not acceptable a framework of economic activities as well as different social practices in a society. To illustrate the importance of cultural and civilizational foundations, I refer here to the different views of political action between cultures based on monotheistic religions, Buddhism, and Confucianism. In both Christianity, Judaism and Islam political authority and action, anchored in the sacred, are more compelling and have a greater influence on man's destiny than in any other religion. Buddhism does not attribute any value to politics in this earthly life because all immanent happenings and actions are illusory; Confucianism, on the contrary, anchors society and all social events solely in the here and now, therefore political life is all-important because of the quasi-divine power of the emperor which, however, is only tenuously linked to any transcendental reality.

But there are even variances between civilizations based on monotheism. An institutional differentiation between worldly and divine powers developed, since its inception, in occidental Christendom. This institutional differentiation corresponded to the double responsibilities of the prince: toward God from Whom he has his authority, and toward his people in the interest of which he has to manage all affairs pertinent to earthly life. In Islam, God does not delegate in any way His authority, and the public space in which political action takes place, cannot but be the space in which the divine law reigns, which is the only legitimate expression of authority. As a consequence, in the Muslim vision of human existence a dedifferentiation takes place between the sacred and mundane worlds. Power is assimilated to the law, and no hierarchically legitimated power structure can be envisaged because there is no space for mediation. Legitimate is only the domain of the divine law, earthly affairs are engendered by the necessities of human life. Human reason can in no case have legitimating power, its role is simply instrumental in managing everyday existence (in accordance with the teachings of the *shafiite* school, whereas the *hanbalite* school even refused to recognize such a practical appreciation of reason). If hierarchical power and authority are dissociated, authority and knowledge are closely linked because authority and political action are only legitimate as consequences of the knowledge of the divine law. In the Christian culture of the West, on the contrary, the constitution of a hierarchical institution of power was possible because of the delegation of God's power, to the popes in ecclesiastical matters, to the princes in worldly affairs. The comparison of the Christian and Islamic conceptualization of authority and power is interesting because it reveals that between two religions in which political action is anchored in the sacred and can be a means of salvation, the institutionalization of politics is carried out in an opposite fashion, by merging or by differentiating the two different perspectives of our existence.

Another striking difference between the Christian and Islamic civilizations, related to the domains of political action and international relations, is the types of contract recognized in one or the other. In the Muslim world, there are three different types of contract:

- First, the *mithaq*. The *mithaq* is the original covenant between God and men, and is the founding act of the community of believers, the *'umma*;
- Second, the *bay'a*. The *bay'a* is the pact of allegiance between the Prophet and the people of Medina;

– Third, the *sahifa*. The *sahifa* is the charter of Medina which served as the constitutional model for Muslim States. In contrast to the Western idea of social contract, the Medina charter is not between individual persons but a covenant constituting the community. It does not establish sovereign links but links of fidelity; it has nothing to do with possession, proprietorship, or, in general, with a relationship between men and things. It marks, therefore, a fundamental difference with Western conceptions of the contract between the State and civil society in which the latter transfers to the former the sovereignty of society's members as individuals. It is evident of what precedes that the Islamic ideal of the community and worldview exclude:

- i) The territorial principle as the basis of political institutionalization,
- ii) Any kind of temporal authority, and
- iii) The model of power structured hierarchically and bureaucratically.

Even from the juridical point of view, the differences between political regimes in Christian and Muslim countries are considerable: the Muslim legal schools did nothing else but to explore various ways of understanding the law revealed by the Prophet. Legitimacy is conformity with the *shari'a*, and necessity dictates compromises required by the good functioning of the community's life. This monistic perspective excludes the application of the democratic principle of plurality because it counteracts the aspiration towards unity; bureaucracy has no place in the unique public space governed by the divine law, and a national community cannot be expression of sovereign existence – sovereignty belongs only to God – but simply an expression of separate identities of populations belonging to the *ummah* of all believers.

b) CIVILIZATIONAL DIFFERENCES 1:

The Imposition of the Territorially-Based, Sovereign National State

The constitution of territorial states presupposes two fundamental principles: first, the primacy of the individual as against communal linkages in order to oblige subjects of the State to accept territorial instead of communal allegiance; and, second, the absence of any other, competitive structuring of public space. In consequence, such territorialization of the political organization in regions dominated by non-Western civilizations led to an elimination of the formerly prevalent complex but fluid patterns of social interaction as well as to the elimination of the freedom of movement of persons and goods in barely demarcated areas. Territorialization also meant that boundaries which were fluctuating in pre-modern times became now fixed; they profoundly disturbed the everyday life of populations which were frequently divided between several, newly-born sovereign States. The imposition of the Western model of the State also meant that all these recently created entities had to try to invent and to impose new identities which were completely foreign to traditional, culturally inspired, collective images of the communities concerned. As a consequence, such a violation of collective identities, elaborated since time immemorial, contributed to the fragmentation of populations on lines of ethnic, communal, or religious affiliations – leading to all those local conflicts which represent one of the greatest dangers for the inter-statal system today.

The spatial organization of pre-colonial times was either in the form of great empires consisting of lands and communities loosely hanging together, or a loosely interrelated ensemble of tribes, chieftaincies, or other forms of small- and medium-sized political units, in which the only legitimacy derived from the status of the monarchs, emperors, or chiefs. There was no obvious or accepted alternative. Plurality was recognized as a principle of structuration of the social space. This spatial segmentation was a source of equilibrating social forces, precisely because these multiple, alternative spaces made impossible territorialization, the uniformization of identities and the concentration of allegiances. In one word, the creation of territorial States in non-Western civilizations defied reality and aroused latent or open oppositions to the new, secular regimes, imposed through the intermediary of the inter-statal system, in particular the United Nations.

Another detrimental aspect of the implantation of Western political institutions replacing the traditional spatial organization was the illusory ideal of the creation of nation-states. This ideal corresponded to the universalistic character of the formation of nation-states which were all seen as individuations of the same principle. As there were no nations in non-Western civilization, they had to be artificially created through political mobilization, propaganda and the mirage of modernization. When I speak of artificial creation, I mean that in most countries outside the Western world, there was not one single ethnic group, not one single belief-system or cultural community which could form the basis of a nation-state. In consequence, even when circumstances compelled the leaders of the so-called emerging nations to seek their powerbase in one of the ethnic communities that made up the colonial State, they still aspired to rule over the whole of the territory once the colonial power was ejected, and to create a new territorial, national and civic political identity above or in place of the various smaller, ethnic communities. Nations had to be forged without those immediate antecedents which were in place in most European countries.

[Sociologists demonstrated already that in post-colonial situations there was an 'elected affinity' between the adopted model of a civic, territorial nation and the status needs and interests of the professionals (all educated in the West) as well as, though to a lesser extent, the commercial bourgeoisie. For these elites it was of particular importance to benefit of: i) the equality of rights and duties embodied in a common citizenship; ii) the lack of barriers to geographical and social mobility inherent in residential territorialism; iii) the possibility of active participation in public affairs; and, iv) The emphasis upon a standardized, public, civic education with considerable secular and rationalist content. These features of the civic, territorial model of the nation-state were clearly conducive to the realization of the interests and status demands of aspiring professionals and newly born bourgeois classes.]

Thus, the elites endeavored to create nation-states *ex nihilo* using borrowed ideologies:

– Democratic (though meaning only a formal participation of the population in public affairs), populist, socialist, or modernizing – to build up a sort of 'civil religion.' The latter was expected to provide the functional equivalent of missing symbols, myths, memories shared by people who lived together since centuries. To invent an alternative source of political legitimation, it was not enough to create a new political identity, but to elevate that type of identity into the underlying principle of a new political order, one that derives its legitimation from the doctrine of sovereign people. But the fusion of modern, Western ideologies and of a vernacular mobilization of people, attempted by the elites, produced a rather different model of national identity among these populations. In most cases, for example, popular participation was achieved without civic and political rights; populist organizations (mass parties) were created instead of democratic parties, and the creation of the nation-state prevailed over the protection of minorities and individuals from state interference.

[It is appropriate here to refer to a recent analysis of Indian politics the conclusion of which can be applied to most post-colonial States in the non-Western world. According to Atul Kohli,⁹ the process by which power is won at the highest level in the largest democracy of the world has, increasingly, little bearing on how this power is used. The personal popularity of any leader cannot easily be translated into the ability to solve problems. What is missing is parties and programs, the basis of representative democracy. Without such parties and programs, only leaders with great personal appeal of one sort or another are capable of winning majorities in contemporary India. And such majorities provide only a modicum of coherence in what is otherwise an extremely heterogeneous polity. Winning an election does not mean that the winner stands for anything specific, and general mandates quickly dissipate. It is impossible to be something to everyone, especially when important national decisions need to be made. Thus, attempts to implement specific programs quickly give rise to opposition. Kohli emphasizes in his conclusions that four major factors have influenced the nature of political transformation in India: i) the deinstitutionalizing role of national and regional leaders; ii) the impact of weak political parties; iii) the undisciplined political mobilization of various caste, ethnic, religious and other types of communities; and iv) the increasing conflicts between the haves and have-nots in the civil society.]

⁹ KOHLI, Atul. *Democracy and Discontent: India's Growing Crisis of Governability*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Charismatic and populist leaders are seldom effective at building institutions or at promoting economic development. Unless leaders are exceptionally committed to the public good, the logic of their political position militates against stimulating the development of new institutions. Such institutions can develop only if rules are put above personal discretion and if authority is systematically delegated to second, third, and even lower strata in the political hierarchy. Such a policy often means putting limits on personal power. Populist leaders also find it difficult to promote economic efficiency. Nationalistic and redistributive schemes often are central to a populist discourse, because such rhetoric helps to legitimize fragile democratic rule. This does not mean that redistribution is effective. Rather, it means that leaders often are reluctant to make difficult economic decisions. Moreover, there is a recurring tendency to use the State's resources not to promote economic development but to buy political support. Democracy in a Third World context has a tendency to evolve toward a populist regime, and populism as a ruling strategy has not been notably effective either for building institutions or for promoting economic development.

It is only natural that in such circumstances ethnic or religious separatist movements became powerful expressions of resistance to the artificially created new States. These movements sprung in a double sense from colonialism:

- *First*, because it was the colonial State that brought many separate and distinct ethnic and cultural communities under a single political jurisdiction, increasing both the chances and scale of conflicts over centrally distributed resources (remember the case of Katanga in the sixties!);
- *Second*, because it was during the process of decolonization, years of decline and upheavals, that ethnic separatisms emerged to challenge the civic order of the future pluralistic, post-colonial State, its territorial national identity and its fragile legitimacy.

A good case study of the fundamental incongruence between the Western political model and non-Western conceptualizations of the public sphere is the opposition between Islamic universalism and nationalism in Muslim States. It presents an especially interesting case in the light of the glaring contradiction between the fundamental universalism of one of the great monotheistic religions of the world, and ethnically, culturally, or politically motivated particularisms. The concept of Islamic universalism is based on the *'ummah*, which, in the Qu'ranic perspective, does not represent a supra-national unity, but the only entity, the only nation which can exist on the earth. The *'ummah* cannot be defined spatially by boundaries, but only by identification with the faith in the only God, wherever the faithful may live or die. In contrast, nationalism is based on Ibn Khaldun's famous concept of *'asabiyya* – group feeling founded on blood ties – thus recognizing practical political realities in social life.

The oscillation between the universalism of Islam and Arab, Iranian, or Indian nationalism is clearly demonstrated in the writings and efforts of the Muslim reform generation. *Al-Afghani*, the great thinker of Ottoman times, for example, presented Islam as a dynamic and creative force. He recommended to abandon the attitude of blind submission to past authorities, but stressed that Islam was not only a religion, but a civilization as well. He preached the necessity to reassert Islamic identity and to reinforce Islamic solidarity in confronting the impact of Western culture and, consequently, to actively promote Islamic solutions to contemporary problems. As the Ottoman Empire ruled over most of the Middle East in his time, the question of nationalism did not arise concretely (except among the Young Turks). It is, however, evident from his emphasis on Islamic solidarity that he considered it as a commitment above all others.

The Islamic universalist trend was much stronger among reformers of the Indian sub-continent like *Mawlana Mawdudi* who declared that nationalism is alien to Islam and ill-suited as the basis of an Islamic State. His opposition to nationalism was based, first, on its underlying character of popular sovereignty in contradiction to divine sovereignty as taught by the Prophet and, second, its secular nature which, contrary to the Islamic doctrine, separates religion and the State. In the same vein, *Muhammad Iqbal*, the great poet and reformer of Pakistan, stated that the religious ideal of Islam is organically related to the social order which is dependent on it; consequently, any nationalist doctrine which would challenge Islamic solidarity and the unity of religion and everyday life was unacceptable to him.

The unequivocal position of the Muslim Brotherhood movement (Egyptian in its origin) in favor of Islamic universalism against liberal and Arab nationalism did not hinder it to recognize, first between representatives of radical Islamism, the need for social and economic development. The main theoretician of the Muslim Brotherhood, *Sayyid Qutb*,¹⁰ who paid with his life for the ideas he fought for during the rule of Gamal Abdel Nasser, affirmed that the whole world being God's creation, the sacred law, *Shari'a*, and natural law or the law of creation, *shari'a kawniyya*, cannot but be two aspects of the same reality. Existence is becoming, process, and movement. Man understands the world through intuition and representation, expressing himself through action. The fundamental linkage of sacred and natural laws in human life ought to be achieved through what Leonard Binder calls 'ontological integration,' an all-embracing coordination of human motivation and behavior with those of other creatures, including other human beings. Man's alienation from the natural and human environment cannot be overcome, according to Qutb, but through the Islamic faith. From this radical standpoint, Qutb's second important thesis is derived. He rejects all sorts of idealisms, essentialisms, and intellectualisms, and requires from Muslims a total commitment to existential praxis, as a life devoted to God. Experience is not phenomenological or discursive but direct and based on God's creation. Islamic faith and Islamic praxis are one. Qutb made Islamic commitment anti-determinist, contextual and situational, in the sense that Muslim's consciousness and intentional action are fully integrated into prevailing conditions and circumstances of the community's life.

In opposition to these theoreticians of the doctrine of State and nation in Islam, several other thinkers, mainly from Egypt, fought under the banner of nationalism. It is true; however, that most of them represented a small, Westernized group of intellectuals. An exception was *Rashid Rida*, disciple of the reformer *Muhammad 'Abduh* and editor of *Al-Manar*, who accepted patriotism and nationalism if they do not overshadow the Islamic transnational identity and unity and Muslims' solidarity with all other Muslims. In a moving confession, Rida declared:

"I am an Arab Muslim and a Muslim Arab, of the family of Quraysh and the lineage of 'Ali, of the seed of Muhammad the Arab Prophet, whose line goes back to Isma'il the son of Abraham, and whose community of true belief is that of his ancestor Abraham; its base is the sincere affirmation of the unity of God and the turning of the face in surrender to God alone ... My Islam is the same in date as my being Arab ... I say, I am an Arab Muslim, and I am a brother in religion to thousands upon thousands of Muslims, Arabs and non-Arabs, and brother in race to thousands upon thousands of Arabs, Muslims, and non-Muslims."¹¹

Rida's text expresses the fundamental dilemma of all Arabs between Islam and nationalism. For the Arabs, in contrast to Muslims of other nations, Islam represented their history, their community and unity, their moral law, and the regulative principle of their society and culture. As Albert Hourani said, Islam, in a sense, created them. How, then, to reconcile secularism and modernization with their universalist particularism, with the fact of having between them non-Muslim Arabs who could not be treated in an Arab state as *djimmis*, or non-believers?

As much as Rida, *Mustafa Kamil* also links religion and nation, and denies that there could be conflict between Islam and Egyptian nationalism, on the condition that Islamic principles, but not the Islamic law – *shari'a* – are recognized as the basis of the national State. Contrary to Rida, he superimposed sovereignty of the people on the sovereignty of God. Mustafa Kamil signals an important turning point in Arab nationalism: Islam was accepted as faith, as a system of moral principles, but not as law, as a legal system founding the State (thereby solving the problem of non-Muslim Arabs). *Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz*, from Iraq, also insisted that there is no contradiction between Islamic universalism and Arab nationalism. The apparent contradiction is due to the misconception of Islam as a religion like Christianity, though, in reality, it is an all-encompassing ideal and movement. Al-Bazzaz made Islam a national religion which expressed inherent aspects in the nature of Arab people.

¹⁰ On Sayyid Qutb see ESPOSITO, John L. *Islam and Politics*. 3. ed. Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1991, pp. 135-140, and BINDER, Leonard. *Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1988, pp. 196-203.

¹¹ *Al-Manar*, Vol. XX, 1917-1918, p. 33.

*Sati al-Husri*¹² followed in the path of Ernest Renan, the French thinker of the 19. century. He considered that belonging to a nation is an act of will on behalf of people who identify with their ethnic and cultural group. He also emphasized that language, expressing shared history and culture, constitutes the cohesion and integrative force of nations, and interpreted this as the basis of Arab nationalism: "The idea of Arab unity is a natural idea," he said, "a natural consequence of the existence of the Arab nation itself." He combined nationalism, loyalty to one's land, and loyalty to the State in the concept of patriotism, and thought that national religions reinforce people's cohesion, but universal religions are in conflict with the ideology of nationalism. He was convinced that being an Arab is prior to being a Muslim, and especially distinguished the moral aspect of Islamic solidarity from the idea of pan-Islamic political unity. Sati al-Husri concluded that the universal brotherhood of Muslims and Arab nationalism are not mutually exclusive but may coexist together. Contrarily, *Lufti al-Sayyid*¹³ was an outspoken nationalist who insisted that reality in the Muslim world makes pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism irrelevant. Each nation must seek to preserve its very identity and existence to gain independence.

The conflict between Islamic universalism and national particularism in Muslim countries is due to the fact, as Ira Lapidus emphasized, that "Islam was never the sole or total organizing principle of pre-modern Islamic societies."¹⁴ The integration of society and State was never entirely realized, though one could say with Leonard Binder, that "the concept of the *ummah* served as a referent for the identity resolutions of individual Muslims throughout Muslim history."¹⁵ Therefore there never was a clear-cut separation of religion and social life in Muslim countries, even in the last two centuries, when secularization advanced in most areas of life. The breakdown of ethnic and tribal loyalties and traditions, as well as the disillusion with secularism and with the achievements of modernity in economic and social life, largely contributed to the formation of a national identity and nationalist movements, especially as Islamic symbolism of individual and collective identity was merged into national feeling. For this very reason, we witness a complete reversal today, as Islamic teachings became the galvanizing force for total political commitment in opposition against nation-states and against their policy failures in most domains of public life.

Conclusion 1: The Existence of Quasi-States in the Inter-Statal System

We have seen that as long as nation-states exist, there will be an inter-statal system which guarantees the collective legitimation of the existence of sovereign entities through the mutually accepted principle of sovereign equality. States' actions have to be justified by the inter-statal system's collective legitimation. The old Westphalian system therefore had to be adapted States emerging through the exercise of their right to self-determination were admitted to the system as members, because the right of self-determination was collectively considered legitimate. The principle of State succession involved, simultaneously, the requirement that the emerging States had to be constituted in the form of nation-states in order to become members of the inter-statal system (even if there was no nation, only populations eager to conquer their independence). As a consequence, the territorial jurisdiction triumphed over culture, religion, ethnicity, or any other non-juridical definition of statehood in international relations.

The decolonization movement thus led to an enormous increase in the number of sovereign entities on the world scene. The new States emerging from decolonization represented, however, a specific case of the usual accreditation of nonmembers by the inter-statal system because they were vested with the attributes of external sovereignty without benefiting from the necessary domestic empowerment and authority. The transfer of

¹² ESPOSITO, *op. cit.* pp. 73-74.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

¹⁴ LAPIDUS, Ira. *A History of Islamic Societies*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 880.

¹⁵ BINDER, Leonard. *The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East*. New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1964, p. 131.

authority from colonial power to indigenous government was assured through a new, constructivist mode of international recognition. The States emerging from the colonial era became sovereign members of the system, although they did not completely possess the institutional features usually attached heretofore to this quality. Robert Jackson¹⁶ gives the best appreciation of the status of the so-called quasi-states:

"This is entirely new; the result is a rather different sovereignty regime with an insurance policy for marginal States. In short, quasi-states are creatures and their elites are beneficiaries of non-competitive international norms ... Never have disparities between outward forms and the inward substance of sovereign States been any greater than they are today ... quasi-states are creatures of changes in the rules of membership and modes of operation of international society which were deliberately made to replace the institutions of European overseas colonialism."

Empirical factors thus became secondary as against a virtual reality based on moral requirements. The new States emerging from colonization by virtue of the application of the self-determination principle received the benefit of the so-called negative sovereignty, but could not be made to have enabling capabilities which constitute the elements of positively exercised sovereignty. Inter-statal aid policies and developmental assistance were therefore designed to create the conditions in which the new States could also acquire the attributes of positive sovereignty.

In consequence, the basic normative changes in the inter-state system following World War II and the decolonization movement were the consequent application of self-determination considered as a moral imperative, and entitlements to material and technical assistance. In addition, the self-determination principle itself was given an extensive interpretation in the perspective of the Western nation-state categorization, because independence granted by the former colonial powers and legitimated by the inter-statal system also included the inviolability of ex-colonial territories. Thus, the artificially created political demarcation lines separating colonies, which reflected contingent historical occurrences ('where the armies of two colonial powers met'), were also legitimated and guaranteed by the other States in the system. The new conceptualization of sovereignty came to full circle with the recent developments concerning individual human beings becoming subjects of a world society benefiting from legal entitlements in the form of human rights, consecrated and promoted by the inter-state system.

c) CIVILIZATIONAL DIFFERENCES 2: *Modernization as Economic and Social Development*

Problems related to the second instance of civilizational differences constitute primary examples of the globalizing trend in our contemporary world. Globalization in general, and economic globalization in the form of modernization in particular, means that our approaches, concepts, methods, and institutions which evolved since the Enlightenment in a specific historical, cultural, and social context, should be disembedded and transplanted, without further ado, into the totally different contexts of other civilizations. As Tenbruck¹⁷ pointed out:

"Wherever the vision of an inner-worldly fulfillment of the history of mankind has become triumphant, there the existence of nations and national cultures disturbed the dream of secular ecumenicity. The vacuity (and limitations) of this vision become apparent in the almost total absence of any serious reflections concerning the fate of these historical givens in the developmental process. The question where development as a cultural process is leading to does not form part of this thinking ... The more we push on with uniform and collective development the more it will have to acquire the tacit traits of a global cultural struggle."

¹⁶ JACKSON, Robert H. *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 24-26.

¹⁷ TENBRUCK, Friedrich H. "The Dream of a Secular Ecumene: The Meaning and Limits of Policies of Development." In: FEATHERSTONE, Mike (ed.). *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity*. /Theory, Culture and Society Special Issue/ Newbury Park, Cal. and London, SAGE Publications, 1990, pp. 193-206; quotation on pp. 202-203.

Such thinking and processes reflect not only the voluntary ignorance of incommensurable civilizational contexts, but negate as well one of the greatest achievements of modernity, the acceptance of pluralism (apparently, applicable only within the Western cultural orbit).

Blueprints elaborated out of context were applied without any attention to new and totally different circumstances. Existing structures, habits and ways of life were destroyed in order to implant structures, habits and ways of life borrowed from Western theory and practice. This resulted in a perfect incongruence between developmental thinking, methods and operations, and cultural givens, that is, inherited traditional perceptions, customs and basic beliefs and values. Though much time was lost, it is not too late to correct past mistakes. An overall effort should be made by all those involved to rethink and reformulate developmental programs, taking into account the respective civilizational contexts and other local constraints, as well as the environmental consequences of any action undertaken.

The main error in the twentieth century development process therefore was, first and foremost, the belief in the universal validity and applicability of the liberal market economy or Socialist economic principles developed in the context of Western society and Western culture. This universalist belief implies, by definition, another inadmissible error: the exclusion of the possibility of emerging new phenomena and of emergent new problem solutions derived from diverging cultural foundations prevalent in other civilizations. The universalist belief meant that no effort was made to explore such factors as:

i) Whether other features of human life closely correlated with the development of material civilization, as produced in the West, were really desired by the people living in non-Western cultures?

ii) Whether liberal market economy or Socialist principles of economic growth, believed to be universally applicable, should be adapted in various regions of the world taking into account the Popperian 'situational logic,' that is, could they be adapted to the evolutionary context of those regions, to the historical, environmental, and cultural realities of their peoples?

iii) If the application of Western economic principles is the only way to obtain similar benefits of material civilization as those enjoyed in the richer countries of the West, is it not conceivable or even necessary to proceed, before anything else, with the examination whether these principles may be simply and directly transplanted from one cultural world to another?

[I would like to give you a concrete example here. I found that in several countries in Africa, national investment plans were prepared on the basis of the Incremental Capital/Output Ratio (ICOR), a practice which appeared to me unfortunate and ridiculous. What could this ratio mean in, let's say, the Senegalese context?¹⁸]

The greater responsibility for neglecting these questions rests more with thinkers and leaders of non-Western countries than with those who became the apostles of modernization in the West. No foreigner can undertake the selection of ideas, concepts, and processes adaptable to a given cultural framework, that is, to adjust and harmonize these ideas, concepts, and purposes with the traditions, values, and worldview of a specific cultural world. Only those born and socialized into these traditions, values, and worldviews are capable of carrying out such an endeavor. This, of course, does not mean that natives of a country could not incorporate in their economic design what Kuznets called "the transnational stock of useful knowledge,"¹⁹ and that foreign advisers could not be helpful in the transfer of this knowledge.

¹⁸ See on this problem, for example, STREETEN, Paul. "A Critique of the 'Capital/Output Ratio' and Its Application in Development Planning." In: STREETEN, Paul. *The Frontiers of Development Studies*. New York, John Wiley, 1972, pp. 71-116, and BAUER, Peter, T. *Dissent on Development: Studies and Debates in Development Economics*. London, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1971, pp. 251-252.

¹⁹ KUZNETS, Simon. *Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure, and Spread*. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1966, p. 287.

The relevance of the cultural foundation and ethical legitimation for economic activities is now more and more widely accepted. It is admitted that "given cultural traditions have a coherent and distinctive character that can have important social and economic consequences."²⁰ The great economist Friedrich Hayek particularly emphasized the role of tradition and culture in economic and social life. In his view, tradition is a process of selection, over successive generations, from among irrational or apparently unjustified beliefs which, once crystallized, shape custom and morality in a community. Hayek affirms that traditions are "adaptations to the unknown in all communities' life and in all segments of man's activities."²¹ The clearest expression of the recognition that cultural foundations of economics cannot be ignored was given by Frank Cancian:

"Economic man always operates within a cultural framework that is logically prior to his existence as economic man, and the cultural framework defines the values in terms of which he economizes. This is a platitude to anthropologists and economists alike. It is a simple restatement of the idea that the 'given' institutional framework of the economic system may vary. However, it can be transformed in the conclusion that there are no economic men; i.e., there are no men whose economic activities are free of culture."²²

How profoundly unjust is the ignorance of pluralistic divergences has been demonstrated by the difficulties encountered in the so-called transitional economies, that is, the economies of formerly Communist countries. They were devastated by decades of not only inadequate economic policies, but an entirely incompetent governance and management. The past made for them impossible to carry out the necessary adaptation to conditions of capitalist entrepreneurship and the world market because of people's mentality which suffered incurable damages from the long ideological *Gleichschaltung* at the hands of Marxist-Leninist regimes.

The lack of success of most developmental efforts and the rising cultural resistance against Western economic and civilizational influence in many countries of the Third World and in some of the successor states of the former Soviet empire, represent the most telling examples of the unnecessarily erroneous methods of economic, social and cultural globalization. There is no proportion between the official and private financial aid and investment flows and the amount of technical assistance and cooperation channeled into developing countries and emerging markets, on the one hand, and the results obtained by which the efficiency of assistance can be measured, on the other hand. This disparity comes precisely from the inapplicability of many, though not all, economic principles, theories, methods, and institutions which are embedded in the specific context of the Western culture. A good example of such theories and principles is the West's insistence that developing economies aim at the famous equilibriums in various fields of the economic sphere posited by economic experts (though it is doubtful that such equilibriums ever existed in our economies). It must, however, be evident to any unbiased observer that in Asian, African and South American countries only a disproportionate development could lead to the desired results. I call this model disproportionate in the sense that it privileges certain sectors in a given phase of development, at the expense of others. I do not mean that I am in favor of the only disproportionality practiced in developing countries, namely, the absolute prioritization of industrial development versus agricultural production (agriculture financing the creation of industries by undue transfers imposed by the State), of which the disastrous effects are well known.

It is also easy to show that the insistence on privileging private entrepreneurship, with reference to its importance in the West's economies, is completely mistaken in developing countries and in transitional economies alike because, in the first case, there are very few private businessmen whereas, in the second case, the inherited mentality from the Communist era makes it difficult for most people to enter a business of their own.

²⁰ INGLEHART, Ronald. *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990, p. 61.

²¹ HAYEK, Friedrich A. *The Fatal Conceit : The Errors of Socialism*. /The Collected Works of F.A. Hayek. Vol. 1. Ed. by W.W. Bartley III./ Chicago, University Press of Chicago, 1988, p. 76.

²² Quoted by: POGGIE, John, J. and LYNCH, Robert N. (eds.). *Rethinking Modernization: Anthropological Perspectives*. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1974.

In addition, the lack of an appropriate legal framework offers, in both cases, an excellent opportunity for the domination of the private economy by incompetent former civil servants or people belonging to the world of criminals. It is striking that those who become private entrepreneurs are mostly members of the former State enterprise bureaucracies, possessing the necessary material means but rarely manifesting the appropriate talents and savvy required for entrepreneurship.

The right to economic and social development granted by the inter-statal system to countries emerging from the colonial status was conceived in accordance with the idea of an international distributive justice, as part of the universal moral community's ideal. In reality, it transposed the ideal of the egalitarian democratic State to the world scene. Sovereignty thus became a right not only to political independence but also to foreign aid and development assistance, as colonization was considered to be the cause of the former colonies' underdevelopment. This inter-statal entitlement was also extended to an equitable share of global resources and opportunities, such as the exploitation of ocean beds or results of technological progress. The above situation thus amounted to a voluntary limitation of reciprocity by industrialized States and an extension of preferential treatment to specific categories of developing countries, making true what a specialist of international law Roling²³ wrote shortly after World War II: "The world community is bound to become a welfare community, just as the nation-state became a welfare state."

Aid and assistance policies led to the creation of what some call 'neo-patrimonialism,' or the birth of the rentier State²⁴ in a double sense. First, as newly independent countries do not have the financial resources (fiscal revenues are insignificant proportionately to their developmental needs), they cannot avoid obtaining a greater or lesser part of their revenues, even for current expenditures, from external sources received in the form of aid or loans – whence their ever-growing indebtedness. This, of course, has an extremely detrimental effect on social development because all aid and assistance is channeled through the State – the only entity recognized by the inter-statal system – and, in this way, civil society is entirely subjected to State power, that is, to those who are invested with it at any moment of time. Second, such a dependence on the external world, and an effective, if partial, incorporation in the movement of economic globalization, create a dual economy, or an economy at two distinct levels: one which is integrated into the world market and ensures corresponding benefits to foreign and local economic operators and to the power holders; another which remains outside the so-called logic of the market, the greatest part of agriculture (even if not only serving subsistence purposes), the greatest part of the service sector (that part of it which continues in the traditional way), and the informal economy which makes possible for a large part of the urban population to survive at the subsistence level.

Conclusion 2: Modernization, Economic Development and the Inter-Statal System

Modernization and economic development became, over the course of the last thirty years, a major preoccupation on the international scene. Approaches to resolve problems in this domain were, unfortunately, confused and muddled because they became entirely politicized. Various pressure groups used development to promote their political and economic agendas, not least the governments of many countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. These countries struggled for survival as the infusion of capital and technical assistance remained unsuccessful, and inefficiency, imprudent policies and sheer incompetence created explosive social situations.

As the transformation of the inter-statal system was made in a voluntarist and constructivist mode, the 'removal of international legal disabilities' was completed by the egalitarian requirement of the right of emerging States to economic and social development. This evolution produced several unfortunate results:

²³ ROLING, B.V.A. *International Law in an Expanded World*. Amsterdam, 1960, p. 83.

²⁴ BEBLAWI, H. and LUCIANI, G. (eds.). *The Rentier State*. London, Croom Helm, 1987.

– Deferred compensation for damages and sufferance endured in colonial times creates a sentiment of dependence for governments and people receiving economic and financial aid. There is an attitude and mentality of being condemned to assistance, perhaps for a long time to come;

[I overheard myself once in Bamako (Mali) that one of my secretaries said when a photocopying machine did not work, "it does not matter the *toubab* (the white man) will buy another one." This is what many call the 'mentality of the assisted.']

– The so-called doctrine of collective self-reliance (the accent should be placed on self-reliance) remained but a slogan without any concrete effect, except political cooperation efforts at international gatherings. However, the psychological impact of present aid policies and technical assistance is one of the reasons that no innovative action has been undertaken to discover new means for promoting economic growth and social development in a manner sensitive to environmental and cultural differences.

– Another distorting effect of the new status of non-Western States in the international community is that all modernizing countries are considered to have uniform characteristics, ignoring their wonderful human and environmental diversity. They are treated as a uniform, homogeneous mass, instead of emphasizing their differences due to their differential resource endowments and their varying human capabilities and possibilities. In fact, their complete Otherness in comparison to Western universalist typification is ignored. An approach taking into account human and civilizational diversity will, of course, have to deny the equality of man as economic performer precisely because the differing environmental and cultural endowments mentioned above.

Policies in non-Western countries concurrently aim at the construction of a modern economy and a voluntarist restructuring of the society. At the same time, these policies try, under the influence of the West, to promote equality and equity, imitating the welfare States of the industrialized world without having the means to implement it. In this way, incoming capital and assistance is wasted without creating a sustainable base for continued development-cum-welfare policies. The effort of imitation eliminates all incentive for inventiveness and innovation which could take the form either of completely new and adequate economic and social policies or, at least, the adaptation to the cultural environment of the concepts and methods borrowed from abroad. In addition as trade cannot supply the engine of growth (as was the case for Europe), developing countries have to look for other potential resources. For example,

i) Emphasizing the growth of agricultural production without draining away all surpluses and profits, in order to cover the needs of the State budget overburdened by the cost of unnecessarily large administrative machinery; or

ii) Promoting industrialization based on domestic raw materials and traditional skills which can only slowly lead into a more intense phase of industrialization.

Finally, the manner in which political sovereignty was transferred from metropolitan countries to their former dependencies created, in most non-Western States, a situation in which the current governmental bureaucracy is exclusively in charge of all economic and social developmental policies. The result was the complete 'politicization' of these societies in the sense that no effort was made to give opportunities to social forces to attain a well-established organizational existence and operational efficacy. It is natural that governments prefer, as a corollary to their policies at home, to imprint an orientation on the international system and organizations which consist in proceeding with authoritative rather than market allocation of the world's resources, with authoritative rather than free changes in patterns of economic activities and in flows of trade, finances and invisibles. This orientation also represents a serious drawback to modernization efforts. Authoritative solutions only postpone the moment of real choices and decisions. Such tendencies are, however, understandable in most countries in the non-Western world. The fluctuations and shocks on the world market have resulted in severe economic dislocations, relative deprivation, corruption, and disappointment of rising expectations in these regions. Such symptoms clearly show the underlying disparities in power relations.

One can conclude that the development process was forgotten, in reality, by the bureaucracies carrying it out: the governmental bureaucracy at home which looks after its own interest and the special interests it is linked to; the international bureaucracy that imposes doctrines without taking into account each country's specificity; and the bilateral, donor bureaucracies which act under the pressure of domestic public opinion, if not in the interests of their own governments and enterprises. Few really care if the countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America finally reach a true economic sovereignty.

FINAL CONCLUSIONS OF THE SEMINAR

Since at least the seventeenth century, the international system was identified with the inter-statal system because no international order could be imagined, it was believed, in which not the States were the only actors. I tried to demonstrate in the course of our Seminar that this is not the case anymore as in the contemporary international system there are nation-states, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations and other non-state actors, as well as all kinds of transnational trends and currents. However, it appears in the historical perspective that one cannot speak of an absolute rupture with the past as the nation-state was never the only actor on the world scene. It was the restriction of the image of 'world scene' to the European and North American space which created the illusion that the international system consists exclusively of nation-states. I also indicated that the birth of the international order followed and not preceded the birth of modern nation-states. It was institutionalized because the States needed it in their universalist drive to encompass in an international system the whole planetary space, but could not eliminate the formation of parallel or complementary sub-systems to the inter-statal system. Our age is, then, the age of much weakened nation-states which may, nobody knows if and when, disappear as the worldwide dominating political institution of human societies.

The co-existence of dynamic civilizations on the earth's surface, the never-ending search for specific identities, the interpenetration of universalistic and particularistic tendencies in the globalizing world is, perhaps, the sign of a 'cultural explosion' or a 'revenge of societies'¹ which prepares the future. To such a view corresponds the nascent multicentered political sphere at worldwide level, a fragmentation instead of unification of States, societies, and cultures. It is this fragmentation which explains the outburst of identifications with culturally constituted communities tends to destroy, simultaneously, all political entities, and express a yearning for integration into a whole, – communal, societal, cultural, or religious.

The international order, in consequence, instead of serving as a matrix of universalization and globalization, produces various types of particularisms in hitherto unknown number. It constitutes the space of fragmentation, – the many critical problems of the United Nations Organization are clearly evidencing this fact, – and on its horizon appear, at the same time, some signals, however weak, however fragile, which give some indications of future trends. Depoliticized, communal and cultural allegiances do not exclude, far from that, allegiances commensurate with transnational aspirations, with potentialities of different political mobilization, not in statal frameworks, not perhaps in a United Nations Organization, but in forms of cooperation the world did not invent until now.

In the perspective traced during these four seminars, it is difficult to guess how the co-existence of world civilizations will shape the world of to-morrow. Whether there will be a confrontation in Samuel Huntington's sense² or, through an understanding of each other and the adoption of a mutually tolerant attitude, they will perhaps find a way to learn from each other and to respect each other – nobody could tell it today. I would like, therefore, finish this seminar on the United Nations Organization and Civilizational Differences with the words of a forgotten historian, Franz Borkenau:

¹ The latter expression was used by Jean-François Bayart in an article published in *Politique africaine*, September 1983, pp. 95-127.

² HUNTINGTON, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York, Simon & Schuster, 1996.

"The mechanism of cultural renewal, the decisive connecting link in the chain of human history, can be unhesitatingly called history's most universal law, admitting of not one exception. *A chaos precedes every cultural cosmos*. Chaos is not downfall, not ruin. It is the necessary connecting link between the end of one creating process and the beginning of another."³

If chaos precedes every cultural cosmos, every cultural reordering, we can quietly say that we are at the beginning of a cultural renewal – in Borkenau's sense. With all its difficulties, with all its disorders at the international scene, our age possibly represents the beginning of a new, creative, though extremely painful, process.

³ BORKENAU, Franz. *End and Beginning: On the Generations of Cultures and the Origins of the West*. Ed. with an Introd. by R. Lowenthal. New York, Columbia University Press, 1981, p. 457.

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DIALOGUE OF CIVILIZATIONS*
The Other Face of the Globalizing Process

Lecture given to the

HUNGARIAN REFORMED MINISTERS' ASSOCIATION
(Eastern Classis of the United States)

by

Victor Segesvary

20 May 2000

* One of a series of lectures I gave on the same subject in the United States since the turn of the century. I spoke at the present occasion in English as the President of the classis at that time was of Hungarian descent and served in the Calvin Synod, but did not understand well our language; thus, my speaking in English was a matter of courtesy.

INTRODUCTION

How I got to study inter-civilizational relations? Simply because I lived in several civilizational worlds during my career with the United Nations Organization and through my life experiences I got involved in the problem inter-civilizational relations, or civilizations and multiculturalism and, finally the dialogue between contemporary civilizations.

The preliminary conditions of a sincere and hermeneutic approach to inter-civilizational relations presuppose:

- 1) Total openness toward Others, toward different cultural worlds, thus
- 2) Abandoning the worldview based on the preeminence of the Western civilization, and
- 3) Self-reflective criticism of our modernity in the sense of one of my books going from a great Illusion to a desperate delusion.

CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

Culture in the sense of Cicero's *cultura mentis* consists of religion, worldview (ethos), scientific and artistic creation, patterns or styles of reasoning, ethical principles of behavior and action. Culture therefore is an autonomous, spiritual and intellectual creation of (i) individuals and (ii) their communities, born out of a long historical process.

Civilization represents a way of life inspired by, or based on a given culture – technology, living conditions, social practices, political systems and institutions, economic organization and methods of production as well as all other material aspects of life.

Cultures and civilizations are, though human creations, part of nature, of the cosmos. They are always situated in space and in time. The outcome of the process of the creation of a culture or civilization is unforeseeable because of the multiplicity of interactions such as

- i) Environmental influences
- ii) Inherited traditions transmitting cultural creation from generation to generation; and
- iii) Effects of unknown actions of other humans as such; in fact, a creation always implies some ignorance and reveals the limited nature of different cultural worlds.

Civilizations are designated on the basis of shared elements such as ethnic qualifier (Chinese, Indian); religious characterization (Islamic), or geographic connotation (African). Western civilization represents a special case because it extends to several continents, to diverse ethnic or religious groups, and because its unity and distinctness are indicated by the qualifier 'modern,' scientific, secularized, materialistic.

Concerning the interface of coexisting civilizations in our contemporary world, we have to distinguish the basic bipolar concepts describing this phenomenon. On bipolar concepts I understand that each of the concepts reviewed has to be considered together with its opposite because only taking into account the relationship between the two, throws sufficient light on their nature. The concepts to be discussed are:

1. Universalism versus particularism,
2. Globalization versus localism, and
3. Pluralism versus a unified vision of the world.
4. Disjunction of cultural worlds and the necessity of dialogue

Finally, as a conclusion to this lecture I shall consider the implications of civilizational dialogues for Christianity.

1. UNIVERSALISM VERSUS PARTICULARISM

Universalism is a worldview based on the belief that humankind is a unified, compact ensemble; that all men are the same and, therefore, represent the same beliefs, values, and desires. Human differences are superficial because, and here enters the scientific component of the universalistic worldview, a human being is part of the universe and as the life of anything else human existence is also governed by universal laws. Thus, human beings are equipped with the same mind and, consequently, they reason according to the same rules, logical, ethical, or whatever. Rationalism and universalism, belief in progress and universalism are inextricably interwoven. And rationalism and human progress are based on the scientific outlook.

Universalism appears in our thinking in two forms: pure or genuine, and auto centric or instrumental universalisms. In my categorization genuine or pure universalisms are, first, the ontological-biological as well as the cosmic. The latter, in turn, has to be divided into two groups, religious and scientific universalisms. Auto centric or instrumental universalism constitutes a distortion of the genuine forms of universalism responding to specific cultural features of a given age, or to definite social, political or economic interests.

Ontological-biological universalism is based on the concept of Being – with a great B – which appears in multiple and innumerable forms. In the universe Being refers to what exists, and expresses the fact that everything what exists hangs together in an inextricable relationship. For this reason, the ontological can also be designated as biological universalism, embracing all 'biotas' – living organisms – of the world. The latter, though, is more restricted because it does not include, as philosophical ontology does, all nonliving entities as well as mental and spiritual aspects of the human world.

Whereas the ontological or biological universalisms emphasize, in whatever form, what exists on our *Gaia*, – on our Earth – cosmic universalism refers to the interconnectedness of everything what exists in the world, – and it is a holistic perception of our environment. Religious universalism is a logically unavoidable conclusion of the faith in an omnipotent God – as in the monotheistic religions; or, it can be deduced from a metaphysical idea of the universe and man's status in it – as in Buddhism or some forms of Hinduism.

[For Buddha, the universe is an eternal process in which worlds and individuals rise and disappear in an endless succession and in infinite numbers. Present, immanent reality is the only reality, but this reality is one of Becoming, it can be neither Being nor non-Being. There is no permanent empirical self, and one thing is dependent on the other (doctrine of dependent origination). In the momentary flux-in-process which is life, there is no central purpose, no transcendent or immanent goal, but regularities, uniformities, and tendencies. In the religious core of Hinduism, on the other hand, the transcendental non-dualism of the Vedic tradition is constituted by the symbolism of the eternal yet immanent Brahman, whose reality represents the eternal Being. The Hymn of the creation (verse 4), of the oldest Vedic texts *Rg Veda*, speaks of "the bond of being and nonbeing"¹. The more materialistic philosophies (such as *Jaina*, *Samkhya*, *Yoga*) insisted on the separation of two spheres or antagonistic principles, the transcendent, immaterial life-monad, on the one hand, and the matter of which even time and space are only aspects, on the other.]

¹ RADHAKRISHNAN, S.S. and MOORE, Ch.A. (eds.), *A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy*. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1957, p. 27.

I believe that the universalistic vision of the human mind first appeared in its religious form because religion, any religion, has to be universalistic in its claims if it is to be a religion. Christianity or Islam, for example, always were and still are universalistic in their conception of humanity.

The scientific version of cosmic universalism considers only the natural – physical, chemical, electromagnetic, neural, or whatever other – components of the world that surrounds us, including the bodily existence of man, because they only are appropriate for scientific study through the application of empirical and formalizing methods. Consequently, at the highest level of scientific inquiry elements of the universe are treated in a theoretical, in my language non-ontological way through the application of mathematical formulae. It corresponds, thus, to a strictly formal universalism.

Turning now to the auto centric or instrumental form of universalism, it is normally linked either to the drive to domination, the Nietzschean 'will to power,' serving only persons' or groups' own interests, or, as a typically modern phenomenon, serving the cultural self-justification of our society built on individualism and the concomitant destruction of human communities. The best example of such an instrumental universalism in our era is a totalitarian ideology. It claims universal validity for its dogmas based on pronouncements of its charismatic initiators, thus imitating the characteristic evolution of great world religions, sometimes even taking on a pseudo-scientific garb like ultra-nationalism or Marxism-Leninism. The worst distortion of scientific universalism is when – and this is a basic characteristic of our times – science's claims concerning specific domains of the world and possessing a limited validity, is extended to the whole ontological field. As a result, it is recognized as governing the nonphysical, or mental and spiritual manifestations of the human universe, too. In both cases, universalism can turn out to be a devastating force in society with its reckless drive for power, or creating a risk society and, thereby, destroying science's own invaluable accomplishments for the human species.

Particularism in opposition to universalism stands to designate any particular instances of reality, any instances or entities which possess their own identity, their own quality or characteristics, in one word, their own 'individuality' or self-sameness. A human person is a particular instance as against all men; a tribe or an ethnic community is a particular entity in comparison to humankind; and, a specific culture's self-sameness is its particularity in opposition to other cultures, or to the so-called 'world culture.' In view of the reigning universalistic worldviews, particularism is always referred to with a connotation which aims to devalue it in favor of the universalistic whole. By universalistic whole is meant a wholeness in which all particulars, or all particularities, are collapsed into the whole which alone has an identity, proper characteristics, and self-sameness. However, one can also be a holist recognizing the existence of plural entities, of particular instances within the whole that is, one can be a holist acknowledging fundamental differences within the holistic framework.

Particularisms, thus, are worldviews which represent the identity, quality, characteristics, or 'individuality' of certain determinate instances of reality and which defend the existence and the interests of these instances against efforts to erase them. Under the pretext of representing particularisms certain social and cultural phenomena, for example nationalism, are condemned by the dominant ideologies of the day. The same is the case with many cultural features or social attitudes which do not fit into what the universalist mainstream considers appropriate, and are, therefore, declared particularisms, and as such rejected.

A specific form of modern universalism is the gradually evolving *individualism* which took on a definitely universal character since the Enlightenment. This statement does not aim at all to discredit modern individualism; the individual person was recognized, since immemorial times, as the bearer of human destiny, and human communities (kinship and ethnic groups, nations, or religious groups) were built on the multitude of individuals. The lives of individuals and communities are inextricably interwoven. This holistic conception of the relationship between individual and community was destroyed by modernity, and the individual was granted an absolute preeminence over a collectivity or any other social group.

Adam Seligman expresses in a striking formula this universalizing role of individualism when he says that in the modern age "the universal is collapsed into the particular."² That individualism is one of the sources of universalism means that universalism is derived from the individual, or, in other words, that the particular is invested with the characteristics of the universal. The individual, the subject, as a self-contained entity related to other individual subjects by a 'metaphysical equality,' became universal. Accordingly, the individual lost its personality. Its essence being the common denominator of every individual, it was transformed into an empty concept. The individual became abstracted from the living human being and stands for nothing more than theoretically formulated universal preferences or interests.

The empty concept of the modern individual had profound consequences from the point of view of social structuring. Today's societies in the West are composed of autonomous individuals in the sense that they are like atoms independent from each other as there are no other links relating them to each other than the citizenship in a State. Such atomistic individuals face alone and separately the powerful State. Individuals, only constrained by the laws of the State and by regulations of other public institutions are, as citizens, to such an extent dependent of the omnipotent State, that the doctrine of human rights, the rights of individuals against all powers that be, gains more and more importance every day. This is why rights and justice are so much more preeminent in today's world than duties and obligations towards the collectivity.

In conclusion, we can say that to the atomization of society corresponds the idea of universalism encompassing the whole of humanity. Not that the image of this worldwide *Gesellschaft*, shimmering on the horizon as presented by public discourse and the media, would be a concrete reality (except in a biological sense), but it corresponds to the lingering desire of autonomous individuals for a community, be it an ungraspable one. The planetary human community existed since time immemorial; it is nothing new in it. What is new, however, is that modern universalism is intended to replace the loss of social cohesion with an alleged universality of everything the modern worldview puts forward. It is the distortion of a genuine, originally cosmic universalism; it tries to introduce an integrative force into a fragmented, truly de-centered or de-constructed society.

Universalism is, in my view, an outmoded perspective in a world in which a plurality of great civilizations co-exist and communicate in the same space. It is, therefore, not adequate as a framework to settle problems which emerge on the world scene because actions of the international community cannot be derived from irrelevant foundations. It is thus inevitable to return to the principle of *contextuality*, implying a considerable degree of relativism. Contextualism in my understanding means that each question, each problem to be considered, has to be placed in its proper context, that is, in its cultural framework and in the social and economic circumstances prevailing in the civilizational world in which it emerged. The problem of contextuality conceived in this way allows me to now turn to the examination of the bipolar concepts of globalization and localism.

2. GLOBALIZATION VERSUS LOCALISM

Globalization, in my perspective, *is a cultural phenomenon*. The term does not describe our world as a 'global village,' corresponding to the idea launched by Marshall McLuhan some forty years ago, because it does not only refer to the worldwide extension of communication facilities. As defined by Roland Robertson,³ professor at the University of Pittsburgh, globalization means that a 'compression' of phenomena took place on

² SELIGMAN, Adam. "Towards a Reinterpretation of Modernity in an Age of Postmodernity." In: TURNER, Bryan S. *Theories of Modernity and Postmodernity*. Newbury Park, Cal., SAGE Publications, 1990, p. 124.

³ Roland Robertson is the main theoretician of globalization. His most important work on the global phenomenon is: *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Structure*. Newbury Park, Cal., SAGE Publications, 1992.

the world scene and, therefore, the world became 'a single place.' Formulated in a dialectical perspective by Anthony Giddens,⁴ director of the London School of Economics, the global world of modernity means 'space and time distanciation' compensated, in turn, by the irresistible spread of concepts, views, customs and lifestyles to the remotest regions of the world.

Globalization is a process and it is, as such, simultaneously, a horizontal and a vertical phenomenon in space, and a diachronic (sequential) and synchronic (simultaneous) phenomenon in time. In this sense, the 'global circumstance' of modernity is a framework allowing for the existence of 'plural' worlds. This signifies diversity, fragmentation and sharp discontinuities. As a process, globality is a relational network of phenomena, an interdependence of everything with everything. As Robertson put it, globalization stands for "the interpenetration of the universalization of particularism and the particularization of universalism." Robertson's formula constitutes the best characterization of the globalizing process because it clearly indicates that the concept of globalization admits universalistic trends (such as the worldwide spread of Western consumerism) as well as particularistic self-affirmations and ways of life (like the revival and global valorization of national consciousness or other collective cultural identities). The general process of globalization, as the interpenetration of universalistic and particularistic orientations, makes, consequently, necessary that all entities involved 'identify' themselves in relation to the global-human circumstance.' This constitutes the dualistic face of contemporary reality – the simultaneous expectation and concrete experience of universalism and particularism.

In contrast to globalization, universalism intends to grasp the world as a whole in the sense that it affirms presumably universally held beliefs, values, identities and characteristics as well as presumably universally applicable institutional structures. In contrast to universalism, globalization recognizes the importance of contextuality, and through this recognition it embraces its bipolar opposite – localism. *Localism* and *contextualism* are, in my eyes, identical terms, but I used here localism as it underlines more clearly the contrast with globalism. Localism, by its inner logic, gives priority to particularism as much as does contextualism; the latter, however, evidently favors what in a given situation is really particular. Contextualism, therefore, eliminates abstract, formalistic approaches or pre-conceived principles for the sake of the contingent particularity of things and the contingent particularity of events. Thus, globalization, in accordance with Robertson's above quoted definition, absorbs certain aspects of localism and frequently reflects contextual realities, whereas particular situations incorporate a certain number of global traits or instrumentalize for their own purposes such global traits. In fundamentalist worldviews like the Islamic or the American Evangelical, for example, globalization is present in the form of discourse, in the formal valuations employed, and in the use of particular arguments.

In consequence, globally recognized categories of thought and action enter into particular and local contexts. From the political point of view, a good example of how particular contexts may be globalized, and how globalizing tendencies become contextualized in international politics is the recent arrangement concluded between Hungary and Romania in order to solve the problem of the substantial Hungarian minority in Transylvania. These small European states try to obtain global support from the so-called international community in order to be admitted into NATO and the European Union (expected to guarantee their security and to give them generous economic assistance), therefore both countries felt obliged to show their willingness to make concessions to each other by signing a treaty recognizing the inviolability of their frontiers and the inalienable rights of the minorities. In contrast, the local situation is strained as the opposition of a considerable part of public opinion and mentalities born out of a centuries old conflict cannot evidently be alleviated by the fiat of foreign powers and of the international community.

It is, then, possible to state that in our late modern age two contradictory movements exist simultaneously, of which each possesses its own dialectics. On the one hand, the ever-widening globalizing trend characterized

⁴ For those interested in Giddens's ideas on modernity, I recommend reading three of his studies:
1/ *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. Berkeley, Cal., University of California Press, 1984;
2/ *The Consequences of Modernity*. Stanford, Cal., Stanford University Press, 1990, and 3/ *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Stanford, Cal., Stanford University Press, 1991.

by space-time distanciation; on the other hand, the growing importance of the 'place,' the focus of the local setting of multiple interactions, which necessitates the co-presence of human beings (Giddens's *presence-availability*), the situation of being-together and the possibility of coming-together. This late modern trend signals an imperceptible change in contemporary attitudes; it is perceived that the world is not-so-global a village as imagined, and the concrete place and the concrete temporal dimension of existence are regaining their overwhelming reality. The place is not only the contextual locus of action, but is also linked to the lived experience of generations of human beings and to the recollection of past events in human memory. It is, therefore, the context in which space, experience and temporality fuse together to constitute the lifeworld (with the expression of the hermeneutic philosophy).

The interpenetration of the global and the local is, thus, a result of the combination of several factors:

- *First*, the technological developments of the last 50 years, especially of communication and information technologies. We could not speak of globalizing certain cultural features if the first generation of technological developments in communication had not taken place, such as railways, air transport, wireless transmissions and emissions; nor could it be furthered without the second generation of such developments we call information revolution, consisting of computerized networks, block trading of securities, satellite transmissions, etc. This unique and overwhelming role of technology does, of course, not exclude the interplay of universalistic and particularistic elements.

- *Second*, technology, though it shows an autonomous dynamics, is still a servant of those who manipulate it in their own interest. I mean by that that technology is a vehicle of hegemonic power politics, of power holders whoever they may be. In consequence, globalization's main institutional framework is, as Nietzsche would have said, the will to hegemonic power. Old-fashioned hegemonic politics applied pressures in a straightforward way to all those who happened to be in its orbit of influence. Hegemonic politics in the global age, precisely because technological progress led to transparency in all public spaces, not only has to take into account cultural, social, political and other differences, but has to exercise its influence on each of the entities concerned. Stuart Hall's formula expresses this in a concise way: "The global is the self-presentation of the dominant particular" as the global stands for nothing else than the manner in which "the dominant particular localizes and naturalizes itself." Hegemonic intent underlying globalization does not aim at the destruction and disappearance of different particularities, but endeavors, in the course of a cultural process, to integrate multiple identities and particularities into the hegemonic identity and particularity, though in conditions dominated by the unforeseen, unintended and contingent features of the environment.

- *Third*, for technology to be able to assume the role it is expected to play in the globalization process, and for technology-based hegemonic politics to be able to successfully penetrate and bend the innumerable particularities in the world without eliminating them, a vehicle is needed ensuring that the message has the correct content and the required coherence in the course of its dissemination by the media. This vehicle is the *ideology of globalization*. Ideology thus is an essential factor in globalization processes, perhaps the most important of the three components in the institutionalization of these processes. Formulated in a dialectical way, ideology creates and sustains globalization, and globalization processes are themselves the source of the ideology of globality. There is, however, an additional dialectical complexity here: ideology as expression and servant of hegemonic power interests becomes, in turn, hegemonic in and itself, too. Globalization, therefore, serves the promotion of twofold hegemonic interests: of those striving for political and economic power and of those striving for the 'end of history' in the form of the conquest of the planet by one particular civilization.

The globalization process is, therefore, the engine of the self-affirmation and ideological hegemony of the Western civilization, and it appears successful in the dissemination of Western civilizational values and ways of life, – although frequently with a devastating effect. Examples of such globalizing phenomena are: extended urbanization from the structural, the formation of nation-states from the political, the establishment of Western-type judicial processes from the legal-procedural point of views. Finally, the 'consumerization' of large masses due to the invasion of products such as modern clothing or electrical appliances, is the engine of the modification of indigenous customs and ways of life.

The impression given by the world conquest of our civilization⁵ is, however, deceiving because globalization is a phenomenon solely at the surface of the life of peoples belonging to other civilizations. This basic fact did not change since the World War II, and theories of economic and political duality in the non-Western world did not lose their validity. They express the non-congruence between fundamental cultural givens and imported concepts, values and modes of action. The non-congruence between the old and the new, is also proven by the self-defense of non-Western cultures against the onslaught of modernity, either in the form of mushrooming religious fundamentalisms reacting against a secular and rationalist foreign culture, or in the form of the rebirth of ethnic solidarity, both aiming to protect people's collective identity.

3. PLURALISM VERSUS A UNIFIED VISION OF THE WORLD

Our discussion of this pair of concepts will be short because their opposition was already implied in the analysis of universalism versus particularism and globalization versus localism. I mention this third pair of concepts separately in order to emphasize the importance of pluralism characterizing our age.

Pluralism is a self-explanatory term, but is used in multiple ways. In my usage, it means civilizational pluralism which also stands for cultural pluralism. The distinction is important because it distinguishes this usage from the concept of multiculturalism which means the co-existence of different cultures in one State, and is linked to the defense of minority rights and the freedom of expression. *Civilizational pluralism stands for the co-existence of several different civilizations on the world scene.* It is evident that civilizational pluralism is the opposite of universalism, of which the contemporary belief in the 'one world' is a particular, time-bound manifestation.

Pluralism, thus, is inevitably linked to relativism, but a relativism concerning civilizational differences, not a relativism within such civilizational orbits. The unexpected development of communication and information technologies which opened up the world, on the one hand, and the decolonization movement which made possible the entry of non-Western civilizations onto the world scene as independent actors, on the other hand, were the factors which made impossible to believe in the 'one world' thesis, but to accept the reality of the plurality of co-existing civilizations. The universalism of Western modernity was born in an age when little was known of other cultures and civilizations. Cultures of indigenous populations, colonized or surviving in remote territories untouched by the impact of modern ways of life, were not considered on equal footing with our own culture, especially in the glamorous days when infinite hopes were inspired by the progress of science and technology. After the Crusades in the Middle Ages, the Western world came face to face with non-Western civilizations only in the aftermath of the World War II and in the wake of the accelerating process of decolonization. At the beginning of the globalizing era, the West met the 'otherness' of the East. It was obliged to acknowledge that other civilizations have also the right to their own identity and that each is entitled to live in accordance with its own cosmic vision, its own cultural framework and traditions which evolved during centuries. This new plurality of a composite world, this relativism consequent to civilizational diversity inaugurated Western civilization's ideological-hegemonic tendency, in the formulation of Mike Featherstone,⁶ "as the guardian of universal values on behalf of a world formed in its own self-image." The drive to conquer the world through the ideological message promoting the planetary hegemony of Western civilization, summed up in the 'end of history' prophecy, is mainly sustained by the media and the electronic instruments of dissemination of information – the institutional framework of the globalization process.

⁵ See on the conquest of Western civilization: LAUE, Theodore H. von. *The World Revolution of Westernization: The Twentieth Century in Global Perspective*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987.

⁶ FEATHERSTONE, Mike. "Global and Local Cultures." In: BIRD, J. et al. (eds.), *Mapping the Futures: Local Cultures, Global Change*. London, Routledge, 1993, pp. 169-187.

The interface of civilizations in our time does not mean that a confrontation is inevitable as some authors would have us to believe. A mutual awareness of the other's existence; a profound sensitivity towards what people living in the orbit of other civilizations are thinking, feeling, believing and valuing; and, above all, an attempt to interpret and evaluate the beliefs and acts of others on their own, not our terms, would make it possible to reach a peaceful co-existence between these great traditions and systems of beliefs and morals. Such an effort would not inevitably require relativizing our own cultural tradition, but it certainly presupposes that all sides show readiness to learn from the others, and to integrate in their own contextual, local world elements from other civilizations whenever the latter appear to be necessary for the realization of particular human projects. I used to call such an approach the 'relativistic reading of realism' on which to base a plural world.

It is in this sense that one can speak of the necessity to adapt Western scientific views, methods and technologies to a given cultural framework, even implying certain changes in the ways of life of populations if these adaptations and changes are compatible with their inherited values and traditions. The same goes for the integration in specific cultural contexts of such fundamental Western beliefs as the one in human rights. Such rights cannot be imposed by the West but have to be properly rooted in particular, culturally conditioned mentalities. In the same vein, the West may learn much from other civilizations, in particular by re-introducing an ontological/cosmic framework in its cultural perspective, or by re-appropriating the fundamentals of genuine human solidarity.

4. DISJUNCTION OF CULTURAL WORLDS AND THE NECESSITY OF DIALOGUE

In sum, culture is, in the words of Clifford Geertz,⁷ "an ordered system of meanings and symbols, in terms of which social interaction takes place," whereas the social system is "the pattern of social interaction itself." If culture is a complex whole shared by a human community, then two essential characteristics of it must be made evident. First, that a culture is an organized whole, not a mere ensemble of isolated elements because its variables are interdependent. Second, that culture patterns, explicit or implicit, is acquired and transmitted through symbols which contain and reflect the distinct way of life of the human community, bearer of a particular culture. The overall framework of a cultural community or of a specific human society's way of life constitutes the civilization centered on this cultural core.

The multiplicity of worlds of culture signifies, for most people, not cultural pluralism but a strong relativism of traditions, values, principles, ethos, behavior, and worldviews. Speaking of relativism, I do not think of religious truths because I always keep in mind that the domains of faith and reason are not the same; as Saint Thomas said: 'Credo, quia absurdum est.' The problem of civilizational differences belongs not to the domain of faith but to the enterprise of understanding other humans. If everything in the human world is relative, there can be no truth of overall validity and no reality which appears the same to everyone. For this reason, philosophers, scientists, and the common man who instinctively believes in objective reality and universally accepted truths, either ignore cultural differences or deny the possibility of communication between different cultures. Others regard cultural differences as successive stages on the road of progress towards the highest cultural level ever reached, or the highest humanity ever possible, our present Western civilization.

The concept of 'styles of reasoning,' advanced by Ian Hacking,⁸ Canadian philosopher of science, constitutes perhaps the best approach to understanding other cultures and civilizations. Hacking relates the difference between cultural worlds to the fact that a style of reasoning may determine the very nature of the knowledge it produces. Different styles of reasoning cannot be sorted out by an independent criticism, because "the very sense of what can be established by that style depends upon the style itself." Different styles may determine possible truths which can be objectively true in the framework of a given style of reasoning.

⁷ GEERTZ, Clifford. *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*. New York, Basic Books, 1973, p. 144.

⁸ HACKING, Ian. "Styles of Scientific Reasoning." In: RAJCHMANN, John, and WEST, Cornel (eds.). *Post-Analytic Philosophy*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1985, pp. 145-165.

That means that styles of reasoning open up new possibilities for reflection, or offer new types of possibilities. As styles arise from historical events, their possible being true is a consequence of historical and cultural developments. A style is not a way of thinking that confronts reality, but is part of reality itself. However, Hacking recognizes that there are not only biological universals about all things human, but that there is also a 'common core' in the thinking of human beings characterized by a loose fit. This 'loose fit' makes it possible to share in different styles of reasoning, to participate in more than one style; if this would not be the case, then a complete dissociation of the cultural worlds would exclude understanding.

Examples of the 'common core' are the universal phenomenon of love between mother and children, the love between a man and a woman, etc. But I would like to call here your attention to another proof of the existence of a 'common core.' This proof consists in the fact that human beings have recourse in all parts of the world to the same type of solutions to everyday problems, to similar ways of artistic expression of their understanding of the world, etc. In anthropology, this is the dilemma between 'diffusion' and autonomous, creative activity of human beings on different continents.

The extraordinary scientific achievements which took place in the Western cultural world led to the belief in the idea of progress, evolutionary or cultural, with two results. First, that humanity is progressing in every aspect of life from lower to higher stages, grades, or levels of capacity, competency, activity or achievement. Second, that man is the highest, complete, and final product of natural evolution, and Western civilization represents the highest, complete and final stage of the cultural evolution and the progress of mankind. The key word, therefore, to characterize the present state of the Western civilization in relation to other cultures is *disjunction*. This term has a double meaning : first, the disjunction of Western modernity from its own past occurring over the last four centuries in Western culture itself; second, a consecutive disjunction from other great contemporary cultures. The best clarification of the term disjunction, in the first sense, was given by Anthony Giddens, for whom the essential trait of modernity consists in "placing a *caesura* upon the traditional world which it seems irretrievably corrode and destroy. The modern world is born out of discontinuity with what went before rather than continuity with it."⁹ The second meaning of disjunction, that with other civilizational worlds, we are only starting to understand now, in our age, and one can foresee that it corrodes, even if it does not destroy, the international system in general, and the Organization of the United Nations in particular.

The concept of disjunction between distinct civilizational worlds is in itself a negation of what ideologues of various stripes believe to be the solution of civilizational differences. I mean the existence of a global culture. It is a chimera. Global culture is without time forever pursuing an elusive present, an artificial and standardized universal culture that has no historical background, no sense of time and sequence. Such a culture is stripped of any sense of development beyond the present, it is fluid, ubiquitous, formless and historically shallow because without memory. In contrast, the cultures we still live in are built around shared memories, traditions, myths and symbols of successive generations of cultural and political groups of a population. Unlike the demythologized and ambivalent cosmopolitan, global culture, our cultures are told, retold and re-enacted by successive generations of each community. A timeless global culture answers to no life needs and conjures no memories. If memory is central to identity, we can discern no global identity in the making, no aspirations for one, or any collective amnesia to replace existing cultural memories with a cosmopolitan orientation.

a) *Civilizational Differences: Religion and the Sacred*

A society, bearer of a particular culture, possesses its own system of significations based on a densely interwoven and autonomous ensemble of interactions between its members. If the nation is considered the primary community possessing such a system of significations or meaning structures, it is also true that these significations and interactions are frequently linked to cultural phenomena beyond national frontiers.

⁹ GIDDENS, Anthony. *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984, p. 239.

Cultural and civilizational features may legitimate political action, and depending on the relations between the transcendent and the sacred, on the one hand, and the immanent or the profane, on the other, may influence in one way or another the respective roles of authority and power in everyday social life. In the same vein, these cultural and civilizational features may make acceptable or not a framework of economic activities as well as different social practices in a society. To illustrate the importance of cultural and civilizational foundations, I refer here to the different views of political action between cultures based on monotheistic religions, Buddhism, and Confucianism. In both Christianity, Judaism and Islam political authority and action, anchored in the sacred, are more compelling and have a greater influence on man's destiny than in any other religion. Buddhism does not attribute any value to politics in this earthly life because all immanent happenings and actions are illusory; Confucianism, on the contrary, anchors society and all social events solely in the here and now, therefore political life is all-important because of the quasi-divine power of the emperor which, however, is only tenuously linked to any transcendental reality.

But there are important variances even between monotheistically based civilizations. An institutional differentiation between worldly and divine powers developed, since its inception, in occidental Christendom. This institutional differentiation corresponded to the double responsibilities of the prince: toward God from Whom he has his authority, and toward his people in the interest of which he has to manage all affairs pertinent to earthly life. In Islam, God does not delegate in any way His authority, and the public space in which political action takes place, cannot but be the space in which the divine law reigns, which is the only legitimate expression of authority. As a consequence, in the Muslim vision of human existence a de-differentiation takes place between the sacred and mundane worlds. Power is assimilated to the law, and no hierarchically legitimated power structure can be envisaged because there is no space for mediation. Legitimate is only the domain of the divine law, earthly affairs are engendered by the necessities of human life. Human reason can in no case have legitimating power, its role is simply instrumental in managing everyday existence (in accordance with the teachings of the *shafiite* school, whereas the *hanbalite* school even refused to recognize such a practical appreciation of reason). If hierarchical power and authority are dissociated, authority and knowledge are closely linked because authority and political action are only legitimate as consequences of the knowledge of the divine law. In the Christian culture of the West, on the contrary, the constitution of a hierarchical institution of power was possible because of the delegation of God's power to the popes in ecclesiastical matters, to the princes in worldly affairs. The comparison of the Christian and Islamic conceptualization of authority and power is interesting because it reveals that between two religions in which political action is anchored in the sacred and can be a means of salvation, the institutionalization of politics is carried out in an opposite fashion, merging or differentiating the two different perspectives of our existence.

It is evident of what precedes that the Islamic ideal of the community and worldview exclude:

- i) The territorial principle as the basis of political institutionalization;
- ii) Any kind of temporal authority, and
- iii) The model of power structured hierarchically and bureaucratically.

Even from the juridical point of view, the differences between political regimes in Christian and Muslim countries are considerable: the Muslim legal schools did nothing else but to explore various ways of understanding the law revealed by the Prophet. Legitimacy is conformity with the *shari'a*, and necessity dictates compromises required by the good functioning of the community's life. This monistic perspective excludes the application of the democratic principle of plurality because it counteracts the aspiration towards unity and bureaucracy has no place in the unique public space governed by the divine law. Therefore, a national community cannot be expression of sovereign existence – sovereignty belongs only to God – but simply an expression of separate identities of populations belonging to the *'ummah* of all believers.

b) *Civilizational Differences: The Imposition of Territorially-based, Sovereign Nation-states*

The constitution of territorial states presupposes two fundamental principles: first, the primacy of the individual as against communal linkages in order to oblige subjects of the State to accept territorial instead of communal allegiance; and, second, the absence of any other, competitive structuring of public space. In consequence, such territorialization of the political organization in regions dominated by non-Western civilizations led to an elimination of the formerly prevalent complex but fluid patterns of social interaction, and of the freedom of movement of persons and goods in barely demarcated areas. Territorialization also meant that boundaries which were fluctuating in pre-modern times became now fixed; consequently, they profoundly disturbed the everyday life of populations which were frequently divided between several, newly-born sovereign States. The imposition of the Western model of the State also meant that all these recently created entities had to try to invent and to impose new identities which were completely foreign to traditional, culturally inspired, collective images of the communities concerned. As a consequence, such a violation of collective identities, elaborated since time immemorial, contributed to the fragmentation of populations on lines of ethnic, communal, or religious affiliations – leading to all those local conflicts which represent one of the greatest dangers for the inter-statal system today.

The spatial organization of pre-colonial times was either in the form of great empires consisting of lands and communities loosely hanging together; or a loosely interrelated ensemble of tribes, chieftaincies, or other forms of small- and medium-sized political units, in which the only legitimacy derived from the status of the monarchs, emperors, or chiefs. There was no obvious or accepted alternative. *Plurality was recognized as a principle of structuration of the social space.* This spatial segmentation was a source of equilibrating social forces, precisely because these multiple, alternative spaces made impossible territorialization, the uniformisation of identities and the concentration of allegiances. In one word, the creation of territorial States in non-Western civilizations defied reality and aroused latent or open oppositions to the new, secular regimes, imposed through the intermediary of the inter-statal system, in particular the United Nations.

Another detrimental aspect of the implantation of Western political institutions replacing the traditional spatial organization was the illusory ideal of the creation of nation-states. This ideal corresponded to the universalistic character of the formation of nation-states which were all seen as individuations of the same principle. As there were no nations in non-Western civilization, they had to be artificially created through political mobilization, propaganda and the mirage of modernization. When I speak of artificial creation I mean that in most countries outside the Western world there was not one single ethnic group, not one single belief-system or cultural community which could form the basis of a nation-state. In consequence, even when circumstances compelled the leaders of the so-called emerging nations to seek their powerbase in one of the ethnic communities that made up the colonial State, they still aspired to rule over the whole of the territory once the colonial power was ejected, and to create a new territorial, national and civic political identity above or in place of the various smaller, ethnic communities. Nations had to be forged without those immediate antecedents which were in place in most European countries.

There was an 'elected affinity' between the adopted model of a civic, territorial nation and the status needs and interests of the professionals (all educated in the West) as well as, though to a lesser extent, the commercial bourgeoisie. For these elites it was of particular importance to benefit of

- i) The equality of rights and duties embodied in a common citizenship;
- ii) The lack of barriers to geographical and social mobility inherent in residential territorialism;
- iii) The possibility of active participation in public affairs; and,
- iv) The emphasis upon a standardized, public, civic education with considerable secular and rationalist content.

These features of the civic, territorial model of the nation-state were, therefore, clearly conducive to the realization of the interests and status demands of aspiring professionals and newly born bourgeois classes.

Thus, the elites endeavored to create nation-states *ex nihilo* using borrowed ideologies: democratic (though meaning only a formal participation of the population in public affairs), populist, socialist, or modernizing – to build up a sort of 'civil religion.' The latter was expected to provide the functional equivalent of missing symbols, myths, memories shared by people who lived together since centuries. To invent an alternative source of political legitimation, it was not enough to create a new political identity, but to make that type of identity the underlying principle of a new political order, one that derives its legitimation from the doctrine of sovereign people. But the fusion of modern, Western ideologies and of a vernacular mobilization of people, attempted by the elites, produced a rather different model of national identity among these populations. In most cases, for example, popular participation was achieved without civic and political rights; populist organizations (mass parties) were created instead of democratic parties, and the creation of the nation-state prevailed over the protection of minorities and individuals from state interference.

Charismatic and populist leaders are seldom effective at building institutions or at promoting economic development. Unless leaders are exceptionally committed to the public good, the logic of their political position militates against stimulating the development of new institutions. Such institutions can develop only if rules are put above personal discretion and if authority is systematically delegated to second, third, and even lower strata in the political hierarchy. Such a policy often means putting limits on personal power. Populist leaders also find it difficult to promote economic efficiency. Nationalistic and redistributive schemes often are central to a populist discourse, because such rhetoric helps to legitimize fragile democratic rule. This does not mean that redistribution is effective. Rather, it means that leaders often are reluctant to make difficult economic decisions. Moreover, there is a recurring tendency to use the state's resources not to promote economic development but to buy political support. Democracy in Third World context has a tendency to evolve toward a populist regime, and populism has not been notably effective either for building institutions or for promoting economic development.

It is only natural that in such circumstances ethnic or religious separatist movements became powerful expressions of resistance to the artificially created new states. These movements sprung in a double sense from colonialism:

- *First*, because it was the colonial State that brought many separate and distinct ethnic and cultural communities under a single political jurisdiction, increasing both the chances and scale of conflicts over centrally distributed resources (remember the case of Katanga in the sixties!);
- *Second*, because it was during the process of decolonization, years of decline and upheavals, that ethnic separatisms emerged to challenge the civic order of the future pluralistic, post-colonial State, its territorial national identity and its fragile legitimacy.

As long as nation-states exist, there will be an inter-statal system which guarantees the collective legitimation of the existence of sovereign entities through the mutually accepted principle of sovereign equality. States' actions have to be justified by the inter-statal system's collective legitimation. The old Westphalian system therefore had to be adapted. States emerging through the exercise of their right to self-determination were admitted to the system as members because the right of self-determination was collectively considered legitimate. The principle of State succession involved, simultaneously, the requirement that the emerging States had to be constituted in the form of nation-states in order to become members of the inter-statal system (even if there was no nation, only populations, eager to conquer their independence). As a consequence, the territorial jurisdiction triumphed over culture, religion, ethnicity, or any other non-juridical definition of statehood in international relations.

The decolonization movement thus led to an enormous increase in the number of sovereign entities on the world scene. The new States emerging from decolonization represented, however, a specific case of the usual accreditation by the inter-statal system because they were vested with the attributes of external sovereignty without benefiting from the necessary domestic empowerment and authority. The transfer of authority from colonial power to indigenous government was assured through a new, constructivist mode by international recognition. The States emerging from the colonial era became sovereign members of the system, although they did not completely possess the institutional features usually attached heretofore to this quality.

Empirical factors thus became secondary as against a virtual reality based on moral requirements. The new States emerging from colonization by virtue of the application of the self-determination principle received the benefit of the so-called negative sovereignty, but could not be made to have enabling capabilities which constitute the elements of positively exercised sovereignty. Inter-statal aid policies and developmental assistance were therefore designed to create the conditions in which the new States could also acquire the attributes of positive sovereignty.

In consequence, *the basic normative changes in the inter-state system following World War II and the decolonization movement were the consequent application of self-determination considered as a moral imperative as well as the entitlements to material and technical assistance.* In addition, the self-determination principle itself was given an extensive interpretation in the perspective of the Western nation-state categorization, because independence granted by former colonial powers and legitimated by the inter-statal system also included the inviolability of ex-colonial territories. Thus, the artificially created political demarcation lines separating colonies, which reflected contingent historical occurrences ('where the armies of two colonial powers met'), were also legitimated and guaranteed by the other States in the system. The new conceptualization of sovereignty came to full circle with the recent developments concerning individual human beings becoming subjects of a world society benefiting from legal entitlements in the form of human rights, consecrated and promoted by the inter-state system.

c) *Modernization as Economic and Social Development*

Problems related to the second instance of civilization differences constitute primary examples of the globalizing trend in our contemporary world. Globalization in general, and economic globalization in the form of modernization in particular, means that our approaches, concepts, methods, and institutions which evolved since the Enlightenment in a specific historical, cultural, and social context, should be disembboded and transplanted, without further ado, into the totally different contexts of other civilizations. Such thinking and processes reflect not only the voluntary ignorance of incommensurable civilizational contexts, but negate as well one of the greatest achievements of modernity, the acceptance of pluralism (apparently, applicable only within the Western cultural orbit).

Blueprints elaborated out of context were applied without any attention to new and totally different circumstances. Existing structures, habits and ways of life were destroyed in order to implant structures, habits and ways of life borrowed from Western theory and practice. This resulted in a perfect incongruence between developmental thinking, methods and operations, and cultural givens, that is, inherited traditional perceptions, customs and basic beliefs and values. Though much time was lost, it is not too late to correct past mistakes. An overall effort should be made by all those involved to re-think and re-formulate developmental programs, taking into account the respective civilizational contexts and other local constraints, as well as the environmental consequences of any action undertaken.

The main error in the twentieth century development process therefore was, first and foremost, the belief in the universal validity and applicability of the liberal market economy or of socialistic economic principles developed in the context of Western society and Western culture. This universalist belief implies, by definition, another inadmissible error: the exclusion of the possibility of emerging new phenomena and of emergent new problem-solutions derived from diverging cultural foundations prevalent in other civilizations. The universalist belief meant that no effort was made to explore such possibilities as

i) Whether other features of human life closely correlated with the development of material civilization as produced in the West were really desired by the people living in non-Western cultures?

ii) Whether liberal market economy or socialistic principles of economic growth, believed to be universally applicable, should be adapted in various regions of the world taking into account a 'situational logic' (Karl Popper), that is, could they be adapted to the evolutionary context of those regions, to the historical, environmental, and cultural realities of their peoples?

iii) If the application of Western economic principles is the only way to obtain similar benefits of material civilization as those enjoyed in the richer countries of the West, is it not conceivable or even necessary, to proceed before anything else with the examination whether these principles may be simply and directly transplanted from one cultural world to another?

The greater responsibility for neglecting these questions rests more with thinkers and leaders of non-Western countries than with those who became the apostles of modernization in the West. No foreigner can undertake the selection of ideas, concepts, and processes adaptable to a given cultural framework, that is, to adjust and harmonize these ideas, concepts, and purposes with the traditions, values, and worldview of a specific cultural world. Only those born and socialized into these traditions, values, and worldviews are capable of carrying out such an endeavor. This, of course, does not mean that natives of a country could not incorporate in their economic design what Kuznets called "the transnational stock of useful knowledge"¹⁰ and that foreign advisers could not be helpful in the transfer of this knowledge.

How profoundly unjust is the ignorance of pluralistic divergences has been demonstrated by the difficulties encountered in the so-called transitional economies, that is, the economies of formerly Communist countries. They were devastated by decades of not only inadequate economic policies, but an entirely incompetent governance and management. The past made for them impossible to carry out the necessary adaptation to conditions of capitalist entrepreneurship and of the world market, because of people's mentality which suffered incurable damages from the long ideological *Gleichschaltung* at the hands of Marxist-Leninist regimes.

The lack of success of most developmental efforts and the rising cultural resistance against Western economic and civilizational influence in many countries of the Third World and in some of the successor states of the former Soviet empire, represent the most telling examples of the unnecessarily erroneous methods of economic, social and cultural globalization. There is no proportion between the official and private financial aid and investment flows and the amount of technical assistance and cooperation channeled into developing countries and emerging markets, on the one hand, and the results obtained by which the efficiency of assistance can be measured, on the other hand. This disparity comes precisely from the inapplicability of many, though not all, economic principles, theories, methods, and institutions which are embedded in the specific context of the Western culture.

The so-called doctrine of collective self-reliance (the accent should be placed on self-reliance) remained but a slogan without any concrete effect, except political cooperation efforts at international gatherings. However, the psychological impact of present aid policies and technical assistance is one of the reasons that no innovative action has been undertaken to discover new means for promoting economic growth and social development in a manner sensitive to environmental and cultural differences.

Another distorting effect of the new status of non-Western States in the international community is that all modernizing countries are considered to have uniform characteristics, ignoring their wonderful human and environmental diversity. They are treated as a uniform, homogeneous mass, instead of emphasizing their differences due to their differential resource endowments and their varying human capabilities and possibilities. In fact, their complete Otherness in comparison to Western universalist typification is ignored. An approach taking into account human and civilizational diversity will, of course, have to deny the equality of man as economic performer precisely because the differing environmental and cultural endowments mentioned above.

¹⁰ KUZNETS, Simon. *Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure, and Spread*. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1966, p. 287.

Policies in non-Western countries concurrently aim at the construction of a modern economy and a voluntaristic restructuring of the society. At the same time, these policies try, under the influence of the West, to promote equality and equity, imitating the welfare states of the industrialized world without having the means to implement it. In this way, incoming capital and assistance is wasted without creating a sustainable base for continued development-cum-welfare policies. The effort of imitation eliminates all incentive for inventiveness and innovation which could take the form either of completely new and adequate economic and social policies or at least the adaptation to the cultural environment of the concepts and methods borrowed from abroad. In addition as trade cannot supply the engine of growth (as was the case for Europe), developing countries have to look for other potential resources.

Finally, the manner in which political sovereignty was transferred from metropolitan countries to their former dependencies created, in most non-Western States, a situation in which the governmental bureaucracy is exclusively in charge of all economic and social developmental policies. The result is the complete 'politicization' of these societies in the sense that no effort was made to give opportunities to the forces of civil society to attain a well-established organizational existence and operational efficacy. It is natural that governments prefer, as a corollary to their policies at home, to imprint an orientation on the international system and its organizations which consist in proceeding with authoritative rather than market allocation of the world's resources, with authoritative rather than free changes in patterns of economic activities and in flows of trade, finances and invisibles. This orientation also represents a serious drawback to modernization efforts. Authoritative solutions only postpone the moment of real choices and decisions. Such tendencies are, however, understandable in most countries in the non-Western world. The fluctuations and shocks on the world market have resulted in severe economic dislocations, relative deprivation, corruption, and disappointment of rising expectations in these regions. Such symptoms clearly show the underlying disparities in power relations.

One can conclude that the development process, in reality, was forgotten by the bureaucracies carrying it out: the governmental bureaucracy at home which looks after its own interest and the special interests it is linked to; the international bureaucracy that imposes doctrines without taking into account each country's specificity; and the bilateral, donor bureaucracies which act under the pressure of domestic public opinion, if not in the interests of their own governments. Few really care whether the countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America finally reach a true economic sovereignty.

CONCLUSION: THE IMPLICATIONS OF CIVILIZATIONAL DIALOGUES FOR CHRISTIANITY

The inevitable dialogue among civilizations in the coming century will have some major implications for our Christian Churches, though not without precedents in the history of Christian Europe. These implications can be summarized under three headings:

1. *Replacement of the Prevailing Anthropocentric with Theocentric and Cosmocentric Views*

The Enlightenment and the scientific-technological revolution of the modern age put man into the center of interest of human thinking and social life. Man became a worshipper of himself. This worldview is reflected in the reigning individualism, in all the manifestations of the consumer age and of the democratic political institutions.

However, there are tendencies which go exactly in the opposite direction – a phenomenon which is a major characteristic of the epoch of globalization – as, for example,

- The overwhelming bureaucratization of our societies which is nothing but a rule of the impersonal, or
- The de-personalization of human relationships through the channels created by the information and communication technologies, whatever should be hammered in our heads by the media and those who profit from the invasion of our minds by images and the flow of words.

This will result in individual minds becoming empty and, in consequence, in the dislocation of social forms and societal life. The only way out of such a situation will be a return to spirituality, as André Malraux said, in the 21st century, that is, to the faith in God and his omnipotence, and to a Christian conception of community based on shared beliefs, values, and moral principles.

2. *Return to the Belief in the Universal and Unlimited Grace of God*

God is omnipotent and his Grace must be universal; if He is omnipotent then no human beings can be excluded from the infinite divine love. It is important to note that the Christian belief in the universal Grace of God disappeared from the Christian consciences in the course of the last centuries, probably for two reasons:

First, because of the conquest of good part of the world by the Christian powers of Europe, missionary activities took precedence over the belief in the universal Grace. Missionary activities complemented the movement we call today colonization, and Christian missionaries became not only the messengers of the faith in our Lord but also the representative of the Western civilization trying, honestly, to disseminate simultaneously the religious and civilizational message of their confession and of their society. The belief in the universal Grace of God requires not only that missionary activity should be progressively abandoned, but also that faith and civilizational matters should be completely separated because to be a Christian does not and should not also mean to become Westernized through accepting Western worldviews and ethos. The Christian missionary spirit has to turn back to our own lands, and try to accomplish the re-conquest of souls and minds in our countries, where secularization, the Weberian disenchantment, reached such proportions that one cannot speak anymore of Christian societies and Christian lands. How can one honestly intend to convert adherents of other faiths and other cultures to the faith in our Lord when we live in a sea of materialism, consumerism, if not outright agnosticism and atheism?

Second, as the rational universalism of the Enlightenment and of the modern faith in universal man and his capabilities – science, technology – overtook the Christian West, the religious universalism of some of our Christian fathers not only disappeared from view, but became even something to be ignored, because it disturbed the perspective of the rational universalism embracing all humankind. This despite the fact that at the time of the Reformation there were already reformers, like Theodor Bibliander of Zurich, who could write that "In the name of God, our Lord, many greetings to all Christians, Jews and Muslims, to whom He gives His Grace and Peace!" Religious universalism, Christian universalism is the only real universalism because it is founded on a shared faith and way of life for members of the community of believers. It has to be added that this universalism does not exclude the belief in predestination which reflects God's decision taken in eternity as to the fate of each of us, but belief in the universal Divine Grace teaches that His love is infinite and that everyone can be between the chosen when the moment of the Last Judgment arrived.

3. *Concordia Mundi*

The belief of the generations of Humanism and the Reformation that all believers could and should be in peace and harmony because the ways to God are multiple but He is One. As Nicholas de Cues explained it, 'Una religio in rituum varietate,' *concordia mundi* represents, through the approaching process of civilizational dialogues, the meeting of all those who believe in God and His Grace, – we, Christians, as the disciples of Christ, the Savior, who died for all men, all sinners in the world – in opposition to those who are not believers, or who are believers in Baal, or in the terrible gods of consumption and material enjoyment and in the enchanting illusions offered by ideologies, fashions and the attraction of power. I certainly believe that the dialogue of civilizations will constitute the 'royal way' to the *concordia mundi*, of which our predecessors dreamed some centuries ago.

DIALOGUE OF CIVILIZATIONS
The Other Face of the Globalizing Process

Lecture given to the
HUNGARIAN CLUB OF WASHINGTON

by

Victor Segesvary

Lutherville (Baltimore), 20 May 2000

INTRODUCTION

How I got to study inter-civilizational relations? Simply because I lived in several civilizational worlds during my career with the United Nations Organization and through my life experiences I got involved in the problem inter-civilizational relations, or civilizations and multiculturalism and, finally the dialogue between contemporary civilizations.

The preliminary conditions of a sincere and hermeneutic approach to inter-civilizational relations presuppose:

- 1) Total openness toward Others, toward different cultural worlds, thus
- 2) Abandoning the worldview based on the preeminence of the Western civilization, and
- 3) Self-reflective criticism of our modernity in the sense of one of my books going from a great Illusion to a desperate Delusion.

CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

Culture in the sense of Cicero's *cultura mentis* consists of religion, worldview (ethos), scientific and artistic creation, patterns or styles of reasoning, ethical principles of behavior and action. Culture therefore is an autonomous, spiritual and intellectual creation of (i) individuals and (ii) their communities, born out of a long historical process.

Civilization represents a way of life inspired by, or based on a given culture – technology, living conditions, social practices, political systems and institutions, economic organization and methods of production as well as all other material aspects of life.

Cultures and civilizations are, though human creations, part of nature, of the cosmos. They are always situated in space and in time. The outcome of the process of the creation of a culture or civilization is unforeseeable because of the multiplicity of interactions such as

- i) Environmental influences
- ii) Inherited traditions transmitting cultural creation from generation to generation; and
- iii) Effects of unknown actions of other humans as such; in fact, a creation always implies some ignorance and reveals the limited nature of different cultural worlds.

Civilizations are designated on the basis of shared elements such as ethnic qualifier (Chinese, Indian); religious characterization (Islamic), or geographic connotation (African). Western civilization represents a special case because it extends to several continents, to diverse ethnic or religious groups, and because its unity and distinctness are indicated by the qualifier 'modern,' scientific, secularized, materialistic.

Concerning the interface of coexisting civilizations in our contemporary world, we have to distinguish the basic bipolar concepts describing this phenomenon. On bipolar concepts I understand that each of the concepts reviewed has to be considered together with its opposite because only taking into account the relationship between the two, throws sufficient light on their nature. The concepts to be discussed are

1. Universalism versus particularism,
2. Globalization versus localism, and
3. Pluralism versus a unified vision of the world.
4. Disjunction of cultural worlds and the necessity of dialogue

1. UNIVERSALISM VERSUS PARTICULARISM

Universalism is a worldview based on the belief that humankind is a unified, compact ensemble; that all men are the same and, therefore, represent the same beliefs, values, and desires. Human differences are superficial because, and here enters the scientific component of the universalistic worldview, a human being is part of the universe and as the life of anything else human existence is also governed by universal laws. Thus, human beings are equipped with the same mind and, consequently, they reason according to the same rules, logical, ethical, or whatever. Rationalism and universalism, belief in progress and universalism are inextricably interwoven. And rationalism and human progress are based on the scientific outlook.

Universalism appears in our thinking in two forms: pure or genuine, and auto centric or instrumental universalisms. In my categorization genuine or pure universalisms are, first, the ontological-biological as well as the cosmic. The latter, in turn, has to be divided into two groups, religious and scientific universalisms. Auto centric or instrumental universalism constitutes a distortion of the genuine forms of universalism responding to specific cultural features of a given age, or to definite social, political or economic interests.

Ontological-biological universalism is based on the concept of Being – with a great B – which appears in multiple and innumerable forms. In the universe Being refers to what exists, and expresses the fact that everything what exists hangs together in an inextricable relationship. For this reason, the ontological can also be designated as biological universalism, embracing all 'biotas' – living organisms – of the world. The latter, though, is more restricted because it does not include, as philosophical ontology does, all nonliving entities as well as mental and spiritual aspects of the human world.

Whereas the ontological or biological universalisms emphasize, in whatever form, what exists on our *Gaia*, – on our Earth, – cosmic universalism refers to the interconnectedness of everything what exists in the world, – and it is a holistic perception of our environment. Religious universalism is a logically unavoidable conclusion of the faith in an omnipotent God – as in the monotheistic religions; or, it can be deduced from a metaphysical idea of the universe and man's status in it – as in Buddhism or some forms of Hinduism.

I believe that the universalistic vision of the human mind first appeared in its religious form because religion, any religion, has to be universalistic in its claims if it is to be a religion. Christianity or Islam, for example, always were and still are universalistic in their conception of humanity.

The scientific version of cosmic universalism considers only the natural – physical, chemical, electromagnetic, neural, or whatever other – components of the world that surrounds us, including the bodily existence of man, because they only are appropriate for scientific study through the application of empirical and formalizing methods. Consequently, at the highest level of scientific inquiry elements of the universe are treated in a theoretical, in my language non-ontological way through the application of mathematical formulae. It corresponds, thus, to a strictly formal universalism.

Turning now to the auto centric or instrumental form of universalism, it is normally linked either to the drive to domination, the Nietzschean 'will to power,' serving only persons' or groups' own interests, or, as a typically modern phenomenon, serving the cultural self-justification of our society built on individualism and the concomitant destruction of human communities. The best example of such an instrumental universalism in our era is a totalitarian ideology. It claims universal validity for its dogmas based on pronouncements of its charismatic initiators, thus imitating the characteristic evolution of great world religions, sometimes even taking on a pseudo-scientific garb like ultra-nationalism or Marxism-Leninism. The worst distortion of scientific universalism is when – and this is a basic characteristic of our times – science's claims concerning specific domains of the world and possessing a limited validity, is extended to the whole ontological field. As a result, it is recognized as governing the nonphysical, or mental and spiritual manifestations of the human universe, too. In both cases, universalism can turn out to be a devastating force in society with its reckless drive for power, or creating a risk society and, thereby, destroying science's own invaluable accomplishments for the human species.

Particularism in opposition to universalism stands to designate any particular instances of reality, any instances or entities which possess their own identity, their own quality or characteristics, in one word, their own 'individuality' or self-sameness. A human person is a particular instance as against all men; a tribe or an ethnic community is a particular entity in comparison to humankind; and, a specific culture's self-sameness is its particularity in opposition to other cultures, or to the so-called 'world culture.' In view of the reigning universalistic worldviews, particularism is always referred to with a connotation which aims to devalue it in favor of the universalistic whole. By universalistic whole is meant a wholeness in which all particulars, or all particularities, are collapsed into the whole which alone has an identity, proper characteristics, and self-sameness. However, one can also be a holist recognizing the existence of plural entities, of particular instances within the whole that is, one can be a holist acknowledging fundamental differences within the holistic framework.

Particularisms, thus, are worldviews which represent the identity, quality, characteristics, or 'individuality' of certain determinate instances of reality and which defend the existence and the interests of these instances against efforts to erase them. Under the pretext of representing particularisms certain social and cultural phenomena, for example nationalism, are condemned by the dominant ideologies of the day. The same is the case with many cultural features or social attitudes which do not fit into what the universalist mainstream considers appropriate, and are, therefore, declared particularisms, and as such rejected.

It is thus inevitable to return to the principle of *contextuality*, implying a considerable degree of relativism. Contextualism in my understanding means that each question, each problem to be considered, has to be placed in its proper context, that is, in its cultural framework and in the social and economic circumstances prevailing in the civilizational world in which it emerged. The problem of contextuality conceived in this way allows me to now turn to the examination of the bipolar concepts of globalization and localism.

2. GLOBALIZATION VERSUS LOCALISM

Globalization, unfortunately, is mostly perceived in its superficial manifestations by the media as well as the public at large. However, it is a multi-faceted, complex phenomenon, a process, which has at least four aspects:

First, at a superficial glance the most impressive is the rapidity of transactions between financial markets or the expansion of world trade. It is sometimes believed, wrongly, that these phenomena will produce a worldwide 'market integration.' In this perspective globalization is represented as a finality, as the logical and inevitable culmination of the market at work.

Second, globalization is also characterized by such recent phenomena as various types of transnational movements which are visible to everybody as well;

Third, much fewer people recognize, nevertheless, that globalization in reality is nothing else but a hegemonic trend which intends to extend to the whole world the civilization of the West, in particular as it flourishes in America, – with its materialistic worldview, its opulent, and, simultaneously, impoverished lifestyles. In this sense, globalization is an ideology affirming that there is no alternative to it, and that in the long run it will be beneficial, at least for some people. Thus, the globalizing process is seen as the advent of a world culture and world civilization, which means that people on all other continents will have to copy the achievements and failures of our modern culture; and, finally,

Fourth, the consciousness that the inevitable 'other face' of globalization is the opening up of a planetary perspective on co-existing civilizations, just starts to throw its light on the darker side of the projected Western civilizational hegemony. This revelation makes it indispensable to initiate a dialogue among the different great civilizations of the world in order to avoid a 'clash of civilizations.'

Thus, *globalization*, in my perspective, *is a cultural phenomenon*. The term does not describe our world as a 'global village,' corresponding to the idea launched by Marshall McLuhan some forty years ago, because it does not only refer to the worldwide extension of communication facilities. As defined by Roland Robertson,¹ professor at the University of Pittsburgh, globalization means that a 'compression' of phenomena took place on the world scene and, therefore, the world became 'a single place.' Formulated in a dialectical perspective by Anthony Giddens,² director of the London School of Economics, the global world of modernity means 'space and time distanciation' compensated, in turn, by the irresistible spread of concepts, views, customs and lifestyles to the remotest regions of the world.

Globalization as a process is, simultaneously, horizontal and vertical in space, and a diachronic (sequential) and synchronic (simultaneous) phenomenon in time. In this sense, the 'global circumstance' of modernity is a framework allowing for the existence of 'plural' worlds. This signifies diversity, fragmentation and sharp discontinuities. As a process, globality is a relational network of phenomena, an interdependence of everything with everything. As Robertson put it, globalization stands for "the interpenetration of the universalization of particularism and the particularization of universalism." Robertson's formula constitutes the best characterization of the globalizing process because it clearly indicates

i) On the one hand, that the concept of globalization admits universalistic trends (such as the worldwide spread of Western consumerism), as well as

ii) On the other hand, particularistic self-affirmations and ways of life (like the revival and global valorization of national consciousness or other collective cultural identities).

In contrast to globalization, universalism intends to grasp the world as a whole in the sense that it affirms presumably universally held beliefs, values, identities and characteristics as well as presumably universally applicable institutional structures. In contrast to universalism, globalization recognizes the importance of contextuality and, through this recognition; it embraces its bipolar opposite – localism. *Localism* and *contextualism* are, in my eyes, identical terms, but I used here localism as it underlines more clearly the contrast with globalism. Localism, by its inner logic, gives priority to particularism as much as does contextualism; the latter, however, evidently favors what in a given situation is really particular. Contextualism, therefore, eliminates abstract, formalistic approaches or pre-conceived principles for the sake of the contingent particularity of things

¹ Roland Robertson is the main theoretician of globalization. His most important work on the global phenomenon is: *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Structure*. Newbury Park, Cal.; SAGE Publications, 1992.

² For those interested in Giddens's ideas on modernity, I recommend reading three of his studies: 1/ *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. Berkeley, Cal., University of California Press, 1984; 2/ *The Consequences of Modernity*. Stanford, Cal., Stanford University Press, 1990, and 3/ *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Stanford, Cal., Stanford University Press, 1991.

and the contingent particularity of events. Thus, globalization, in accordance with Robertson's above quoted definition, absorbs certain aspects of localism and frequently reflects contextual realities, whereas particular situations incorporate a certain number of global traits or instrumentalize for their own purposes such global traits. In fundamentalist worldviews like the Islamic or the American Evangelical, for example, globalization is present in the form of discourse, in the formal valuations employed, and in the use of particular arguments.

In consequence, globally recognized categories of thought and action enter into particular and local contexts. From the political point of view, a good example of how particular contexts may be globalized, and how globalizing tendencies become contextualized in international politics is the recent arrangement concluded between Hungary and Romania in order to solve the problem of the substantial Hungarian minority in Transylvania. These small European states try to obtain global support from the so-called international community in order to be admitted into NATO and the European Union (expected to guarantee their security and to give them generous economic assistance), therefore both countries felt obliged to show their willingness to make concessions to each other by signing a treaty recognizing the inviolability of their frontiers and the inalienable rights of the minorities. In contrast, the local situation is strained as the opposition of a considerable part of public opinion and mentalities born out of a centuries old conflict cannot evidently be alleviated by the fiat of foreign powers and of the international community.

It is, then, possible to state that in our late modern age two contradictory movements exist simultaneously, of which each possesses its own dialectics. On the one hand, the ever-widening globalizing trend characterized by space-time distanciation; on the other hand, the growing importance of the 'place,' the focus of the local setting of multiple interactions, which necessitates the co-presence of human beings (Giddens's *presence-availability*), the situation of being-together and the possibility of coming-together. This late modern trend signals an imperceptible change in contemporary attitudes; it is perceived that the world is not-so-global a village as imagined, and the concrete place and the concrete temporal dimension of existence are regaining their overwhelming reality. The place is not only the contextual locus of action, but is also linked to the lived experience of generations of human beings and to the recollection of past events in human memory. It is, therefore, the context in which space, experience and temporality fuse together to constitute the lifeworld.

The interpenetration of the global and the local is, thus, a result of the combination of several factors:

- *First*, the technological developments of the last 50 years, especially of communication and information technologies. We could not speak of globalizing certain cultural features if the first generation of technological developments in communication had not taken place, such as railways, air transport, wireless transmissions and emissions; nor could it be furthered without the second generation of such developments we call information revolution, consisting of computerized networks, block trading of securities, satellite transmissions, etc. This unique and overwhelming role of technology does, of course, not exclude the interplay of universalistic and particularistic elements.

- *Second*, technology, though it shows an autonomous dynamics, is still a servant of those who manipulate it in their own interest. I mean by that that technology is a vehicle of hegemonic power politics, of power holders whoever they may be. In consequence, globalization's main institutional framework is, as Nietzsche would have said, the will to hegemonic power. Old-fashioned hegemonic politics applied pressures in a straightforward way to all those who happened to be in its orbit of influence. Hegemonic politics in the global age, precisely because technological progress led to transparency in all public spaces, not only has to take into account cultural, social, political and other differences, but has to exercise its influence on each of the entities concerned. Stuart Hall's formula expresses this in a concise way: "The global is the self-presentation of the dominant particular" as the global stands for nothing else than the manner in which "the dominant particular localizes and naturalizes itself." Hegemonic intent underlying globalization does not aim at the destruction and disappearance of different particularities, but endeavors, in the course of a cultural process, to integrate multiple identities and particularities into the hegemonic identity and particularity, though in conditions dominated by the unforeseen, unintended and contingent features of the environment.

– *Third*, for technology to be able to assume the role it is expected to play in the globalization process, and for technology-based hegemonic politics to be able to successfully penetrate and bend the innumerable particularities in the world without eliminating them, a vehicle is needed ensuring that the message has the correct content and the required coherence in the course of its dissemination by the media. This vehicle is the *ideology of globalization*. Ideology thus is an essential factor in globalization processes, perhaps the most important of the three components in the institutionalization of these processes. Formulated in a dialectical way, ideology creates and sustains globalization, and globalization processes are themselves the source of the ideology of globality. There is, however, an additional dialectical complexity here: ideology as expression and servant of hegemonic power interests becomes, in turn, hegemonic in and itself, too. Globalization, therefore, serves the promotion of twofold hegemonic interests: of those striving for political and economic power and of those striving for the 'end of history' in the form of the conquest of the planet by one particular civilization.

The globalization process is, therefore, the engine of the self-affirmation and ideological hegemony of the Western civilization, and it appears successful in the dissemination of Western civilizational values and ways of life, – although frequently with a devastating effect. Examples of such globalizing phenomena are: extended urbanization from the structural, the formation of nation-states from the political, the establishment of Western-type judicial processes from the legal-procedural point of views. Finally, the 'consumerization' of large masses due to the invasion of products such as modern clothing or electrical appliances, is the engine of the modification of indigenous customs and ways of life.

3. DISJUNCTION OF CULTURAL WORLDS AND THE NECESSITY OF DIALOGUE

The impression given by the world conquest of our civilization³ is, however, deceiving because globalization is a phenomenon solely at the surface of the life of peoples belonging to other civilizations. This basic fact did not change since the World War II, and theories of economic and political duality in the non-Western world did not lose their validity. They express the non-congruence between fundamental cultural givens and imported concepts, values and modes of action. The non-congruence between the old and the new, is also proven by the self-defense of non-Western cultures against the onslaught of modernity, either in the form of mushrooming religious fundamentalisms reacting against a secular and rationalist foreign culture, or in the form of the rebirth of ethnic solidarity, both aiming to protect people's collective identity.

The interface of civilizations in our time does not mean that a confrontation is inevitable, as some authors would have us to believe. If the attitude of those belonging to different civilizations would reflect

- i) A mutual awareness of the other's existence,
- ii) A profound sensitivity towards what people living in the orbit of other civilizations are thinking, feeling, believing and valuing; and, above all,
- iii) An attempt to interpret and evaluate the beliefs and acts of others on their own, not our terms,

it would be possible to reach a peaceful co-existence between the great civilizational traditions and systems of beliefs and morals. Such an effort would not inevitably require to relativize our own cultural tradition, but it certainly presupposes that all sides show readiness to learn from the others. It would presuppose as well to integrate in one's own contextual, local world elements from other civilizations whenever the latter appear to be necessary for the realization of particular human projects.

³ See on the conquest of Western civilization: LAUE, Theodore H. von. *The World Revolution of Westernization: The Twentieth Century in Global Perspective*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987.

It is in this sense that one can speak of the necessity to adapt Western scientific views, methods and technologies to a given cultural framework, even implying certain changes in the ways of life of populations if these adaptations and changes are compatible with their inherited values and traditions. The same goes for the integration in specific cultural contexts of such fundamental Western beliefs as the one in human rights. Such rights cannot be imposed by the West but have to be properly rooted in particular, culturally conditioned mentalities. The West may learn much from other civilizations, in particular by re-introducing an ontological/cosmic framework in its cultural perspective, or by re-appropriating the fundamentals of genuine human solidarity.

The multiplicity of worlds of culture signifies, for most people, not cultural pluralism but a strong relativism of traditions, values, principles, ethos, behavior, and worldviews. Speaking of relativism, I do not think of religious truths because I always keep in mind that the domains of faith and reason are not the same; as Saint Thomas said: 'Credo, quia absurdum est.' The problem of civilizational differences belongs not to the domain of faith but to the enterprise of understanding other humans. If everything in the human world is relative, there can be no truth of overall validity and no reality which appears the same to everyone. For this reason, philosophers, scientists, and the common man who instinctively believes in objective reality and universally accepted truths, either ignore cultural differences or deny the possibility of communication between different cultures. Others regard cultural differences as successive stages on the road of progress towards the highest cultural level ever reached, or the highest humanity ever possible, our present Western civilization.

The concept of 'styles of reasoning,' advanced by Ian Hacking,⁴ Canadian philosopher of science, constitutes perhaps the best approach to understanding other cultures and civilizations. Hacking relates the difference between cultural worlds to the fact that a style of reasoning may determine the very nature of the knowledge it produces. Different styles of reasoning cannot be sorted out by an independent criticism, because "the very sense of what can be established by that style depends upon the style itself." Different styles may determine possible truths which can be objectively true in the framework of a given style of reasoning. That means that styles of reasoning open up new possibilities for reflection, or offer new types of possibilities. As styles arise from historical events, their possible being true is a consequence of historical and cultural developments. A style is not a way of thinking that confronts reality, but is part of reality itself. However, Hacking recognizes that there are not only biological universals about all things human, but that there is also a 'common core' in the thinking of human beings characterized by a loose fit. This 'loose fit' makes it possible to share in different styles of reasoning, to participate in more than one style; if this would not be the case, then a complete dissociation of the cultural worlds would exclude understanding.

The extraordinary scientific achievements which took place in the Western cultural world led to the belief in the idea of progress, evolutionary or cultural, with two results. First, that humanity is progressing in every aspect of life from lower to higher stages, grades, or levels of capacity, competency, activity or achievement. Second, that man is the highest, complete, and final product of natural evolution, and Western civilization represents the highest, complete and final stage of the cultural evolution and the progress of mankind. The key word, therefore, to characterize the present state of the Western civilization in relation to other cultures is *disjunction*. This term has a double meaning : first, the disjunction of Western modernity from its own past occurring over the last four centuries in Western culture itself; second, a consecutive disjunction from other great contemporary cultures. The best clarification of the term disjunction, in the first sense, was given by Anthony Giddens, for whom the essential trait of modernity consists in "placing a *caesura* upon the traditional world which it seems irretrievably corrode and destroy. The modern world is born out of discontinuity with what went before rather than continuity with it."⁵ The second meaning of disjunction, that with other civilizational worlds, we are only starting to understand now, in our age, and one can foresee that it corrodes, even if it does not destroy, the international system in general, and the Organization of the United Nations in particular.

⁴ HACKING, Ian. "Styles of Scientific Reasoning." In: RAJCHMANN, John, and WEST, Cornel (eds.). *Post-Analytic Philosophy*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1985, pp. 145-165.

⁵ GIDDENS, Anthony. *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984, p. 239.

The concept of disjunction between distinct civilizational worlds is in itself a negation of what ideologues of various stripes believe to be the solution of civilizational differences. I mean the existence of a global culture. It is a chimera. Global culture is without time forever pursuing an elusive present, an artificial and standardized universal culture that has no historical background, no sense of time and sequence. Such a culture is stripped of any sense of development beyond the present, it is fluid, ubiquitous, formless and historically shallow because without memory. In contrast, the cultures we still live in are built around shared memories, traditions, myths and symbols of successive generations of cultural and political groups of a population. Unlike the demythologized and ambivalent cosmopolitan, global culture, our cultures are told, retold and re-enacted by successive generations of each community. A timeless global culture answers to no life needs and conjures no memories. If memory is central to identity, we can discern no global identity in the making, no aspirations for one, or any collective amnesia to replace existing cultural memories with a cosmopolitan orientation.

4. CIVILIZATIONAL DIFFERENCES: POLITICS DETERMINED BY THE SACRED

Cultural and civilizational features may legitimate political action, and depending on the relations between the transcendent and the sacred, on the one hand, and the immanent or the profane, on the other, may influence in one way or another the respective roles of authority and power in everyday social life. In the same vein, these cultural and civilizational features may make acceptable or not a framework of economic activities as well as different social practices in a society. To illustrate the importance of cultural and civilizational foundations, I refer here to the different views of political action between cultures based on monotheistic religions, Buddhism, and Confucianism. In both Christianity, Judaism and Islam political authority and action, anchored in the sacred, are more compelling and have a greater influence on man's destiny than in any other religion. Buddhism does not attribute any value to politics in this earthly life because all immanent happenings and actions are illusory; Confucianism, on the contrary, anchors society and all social events solely in the here and now, therefore political life is all-important because of the quasi-divine power of the emperor which, however, is only tenuously linked to any transcendental reality.

But there are important variances even between civilizations based on monotheistic religion. An institutional differentiation between worldly and divine powers developed, since its inception, in occidental Christendom. This institutional differentiation corresponded to the double responsibilities of the prince: toward God from Whom he has his authority, and toward his people in the interest of which he has to manage all affairs pertinent to earthly life. In Islam, God does not delegate in any way His authority, and the public space in which political action takes place, cannot but be the space in which the divine law reigns, which is the only legitimate expression of authority. As a consequence, in the Muslim vision of human existence

- i) No temporal authority can govern human communities.
- ii) A de-differentiation takes place between the sacred and mundane worlds, and the territorial principle can not constitute the basis of political institutionalization.
- iii) Power is assimilated to the law, and no hierarchically or bureaucratically legitimated power structure can be envisaged because there is no space for mediation. Legitimation is only the domain of the divine law; earthly affairs are engendered by the necessities of human life. Human reason can in no case have legitimating power; its role is simply instrumental in managing everyday existence. If hierarchical power and authority are dissociated, authority and knowledge are closely linked because authority and political action are only legitimate as consequences of the knowledge of the divine law. In the Christian culture of the West, on the contrary, the constitution of a hierarchical institution of power was possible because of the delegation of God's power, to the popes in ecclesiastical matters, to the princes in worldly affairs. Consequently, even between two religions in which political action is anchored in the sacred and can be a means of salvation, the institutionalization of politics is carried out in an opposite fashion, merging or differentiating the two different perspectives of our existence.

The Islamic perspective excludes the application of the democratic principle of plurality because it counteracts the aspiration towards unity. A national community cannot be expression of sovereign existence – sovereignty belongs only to God – but simply an expression of separate identities of populations belonging to the *'ummah* of all believers.

5. CIVILIZATIONAL DIFFERENCES:

THE IMPOSITION OF THE INSTITUTION OF TERRITORIALLY-BASED, SOVEREIGN NATION-STATES

The constitution of territorial states presupposes two fundamental principles: first, the primacy of the individual as against communal linkages in order to oblige subjects of the State to accept territorial instead of communal allegiance; and, second, the absence of any other, competitive structuring of public space. In consequence, such territorialization of the political organization in regions dominated by non-Western civilizations led to an elimination of the formerly prevalent complex but fluid patterns of social interaction, and of the freedom of movement of persons and goods in barely demarcated areas. Territorialization also meant that boundaries which were fluctuating in pre-modern times became now fixed; consequently, they profoundly disturbed the everyday life of populations which were frequently divided between several, newly-born sovereign States. The imposition of the Western model of the State also meant that all these recently created entities had to try to invent and to impose new identities which were completely foreign to traditional, culturally inspired, collective images of the communities concerned. As a consequence, such a violation of collective identities, elaborated since time immemorial, contributed to the fragmentation of populations on lines of ethnic, communal, or religious affiliations – leading to all those local conflicts which represent one of the greatest dangers for the inter-statal system today.

The spatial organization of pre-colonial times took two forms:

- i) Either the form of great empires consisting of lands and communities loosely hanging together, or
- ii) A loosely interrelated ensemble of tribes, chieftaincies, or other forms of small- and medium-sized political units, in which the only legitimacy derived from the status of the monarchs, emperors, or chiefs.

There was no obvious or accepted alternative. *Plurality was recognized as a principle of structuration of the social space.* This spatial segmentation was a source of equilibrating social forces, precisely because these multiple, alternative spaces made impossible territorialization, the uniformisation of identities and the concentration of allegiances. In one word, the creation of territorial States in non-Western civilizations defied reality and aroused latent or open oppositions to the new, secular regimes, imposed through the intermediary of the inter-statal system, in particular the United Nations.

Another detrimental aspect of the implantation of Western political institutions replacing the traditional spatial organization was the illusory ideal of the creation of nation-states. This ideal corresponded to the universalistic character of the formation of nation-states which were all seen as individuations of the same principle. As there were no nations in non-Western civilization, they had to be artificially created through political mobilization, propaganda and the mirage of modernization. When I speak of artificial creation I mean that in most countries outside the Western world there was not one single ethnic group, not one single belief-system or cultural community which could form the basis of a nation-state. In consequence, even when circumstances compelled the leaders of the so-called emerging nations to seek their powerbase in one of the ethnic communities that made up the colonial State, they still aspired to rule over the whole of the territory once the colonial power was ejected, and to create a new territorial, national and civic political identity above or in place of the various smaller, ethnic communities. Nations had to be forged without those immediate antecedents which were in place in most European countries.

The best way out of such situations is always recourse to charismatic and populist leaders, though these are seldom effective at building institutions or at promoting economic development. Democracy in Third World context manifests a tendency to evolve toward a populist regime, and populism has not been notably effective either for building institutions or for promoting economic development. It is only natural that in such circumstances ethnic or religious separatist movements became powerful expressions of resistance to the artificially created new States. These movements sprung in a double sense from colonialism:

First, because it was the colonial State that brought many separate and distinct ethnic and cultural communities under a single political jurisdiction, increasing both the chances and scale of conflicts over centrally distributed resources (remember the case of Katanga in the sixties!);

Second, because it was during the process of decolonization, years of decline and upheavals, that ethnic separatism emerged to challenge the civic order of the future pluralistic, post-colonial State, its territorial national identity and its fragile legitimacy.

The decolonization movement thus led to an enormous increase in the number of sovereign entities on the world scene. The principle of State succession involved simultaneously, the requirement that the emerging States had to be constituted in the form of nation-states in order to become members of the interstate system because the right of self-determination was collectively considered legitimate. The new States emerging from decolonization represented, however, a specific case of the accreditation of nonmembers by the United Nations because they were vested with the attributes of external sovereignty without benefiting from the necessary domestic empowerment and authority. The transfer of authority from colonial power to indigenous government was assured through a new, constructivist mode by international recognition. The new States emerging from colonization by virtue of the application of the self-determination principle, as a moral imperative, received the benefit of the so-called negative sovereignty, but could not be made to have enabling capabilities that constitute the elements of positively exercised sovereignty. Interstate aid policies and developmental assistance were therefore designed, as entitlements, to create the conditions in which the new States could also acquire the attributes of positive sovereignty. In addition, the self-determination principle itself was given an extensive interpretation in the perspective of the Western nation-state categorization, because independence granted by the former colonial powers and legitimated by the interstate system also included the inviolability of ex-colonial territories. Thus, the artificially created political demarcation lines separating colonies, which reflected accidental historical occurrences ("where the armies of two colonial powers met"), were also legitimated and guaranteed by the other states in the system.

6. CIVILIZATIONAL DIFFERENCES:

MODERNIZATION AS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Problems related to the second instance of civilization differences constitute primary examples of the globalizing trend in our contemporary world. Globalization in general, and economic globalization in the form of modernization in particular, means that our approaches, concepts, methods, and institutions which evolved since the Enlightenment in a specific historical, cultural, and social context, should be disembedded and transplanted, without further ado, into the totally different contexts of other civilizations. Such thinking and processes reflect not only the voluntary ignorance of incommensurable civilizational contexts, but negate as well one of the greatest achievements of modernity, the acceptance of pluralism (apparently, applicable only within the Western cultural orbit).

Blueprints elaborated out of context were applied without any attention to new and totally different circumstances. Existing structures, habits and ways of life were destroyed in order to implant structures, habits and ways of life borrowed from Western theory and practice. This resulted in a perfect incongruence between developmental thinking, methods and operations, and cultural givens, that is, inherited traditional perceptions,

customs and basic beliefs and values. Though much time was lost, it is not too late to correct past mistakes. An overall effort should be made by all those involved to re-think and re-formulate developmental programs, taking into account the respective civilizational contexts and other local constraints, as well as the environmental consequences of any action undertaken.

The main error in the twentieth century development process therefore was, first and foremost, the belief in the universal validity and applicability of the liberal market economy or of socialistic economic principles developed in the context of Western society and Western culture. This universalist belief implies, by definition, another inadmissible error: the exclusion of the possibility of emerging new phenomena and of emergent new problem-solutions derived from diverging cultural foundations prevalent in other civilizations. The universalist belief meant that no effort was made to explore such possibilities as

i) Whether other features of human life closely correlated with the development of material civilization as produced in the West were really desired by the people living in non-Western cultures?

ii) Whether liberal market economy or socialistic principles of economic growth, believed to be universally applicable, should be adapted in various regions of the world taking into account a 'situational logic' (Karl Popper), that is, could they be adapted to the evolutionary context of those regions, to the historical, environmental, and cultural realities of their peoples?

iii) If the application of Western economic principles is the only way to obtain similar benefits of material civilization as those enjoyed in the richer countries of the West, is it not conceivable or even necessary, to proceed before anything else with the examination whether these principles may be simply and directly transplanted from one cultural world to another?

The lack of success of most developmental efforts and the rising cultural resistance against Western economic and civilizational influence in many countries of the Third World and in some of the successor states of the former Soviet empire, represent the most telling examples of the unnecessarily erroneous methods of economic, social and cultural globalization. There is no proportion between the official and private financial aid and investment flows and the amount of technical assistance and cooperation channeled into developing countries and emerging markets, on the one hand, and the results obtained by which the efficiency of assistance can be measured, on the other hand. This disparity comes precisely from the inapplicability of many, though not all, economic principles, theories, methods, and institutions which are embedded in the specific context of the Western culture.

LE II^e FORUM INTERNATIONAL

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per la democrazia, la pace et la cooperazione internazionale

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LES PERSONNES ET COMMUNAUTES HUMAINES DANS LA TOURMENTE DE LA GLOBALISATION

Intervention à la Table Ronde du Forum

de

Victor Segesvary

Docteur ès sciences politiques, docteur en théologie

Excellences,

Mesdames et Messieurs,

Tout d'abord, je voudrais remercier le Sénateur Angelo Bernassola, Président de la Fondazione Alcide de Gasperi, de m'avoir invité à ce IIe Forum International ayant comme thème un sujet si brûlant de notre époque. En outre, je voudrais féliciter les organisateurs pour l'excellent argumentaire ou note de présentation dont je suivrai, plus ou moins, la progression dans les idées.

Vu la brève période impartie pour chaque intervention, je ne ferai qu'effleurer mes idées concernant deux aspects essentiels du sujet : premièrement, la relation entre l'individu et la personne humaine ; et, deuxièmement, la signification ou le sens de ce que nous appelons le mouvement transnational de globalisation dont l'autre face est l'inévitabilité d'un dialogue entre les grandes civilisations du monde. Je citerai quelques effets de ce visage de Janus de la globalisation sur les perspectives du développement et de la paix mondiale en tant qu'évidence de ce que j'ai esquissé dans mon intervention.

Je présenterai mes pensées sous la forme de quatre thèses avec une explication appropriées pour chacune d'elles.

Première thèse : *L'individu moderne, créé par l'évolution de la civilisation européenne au cours des trois derniers siècles, fait face à un Etat tout-puissant. Cette situation est aggravée par un individualisme excessif pour satisfaire l'amour-propre des individus.*

Explication : Il y a une certaine confusion dans notre monde entre les concepts de l'individu et de la personne humaine qu'il est nécessaire de clarifier. L'individu n'est autre que l'homme nu, solitaire, perdu dans un univers qu'il ne comprend pas, et qui est à la merci de tous les pouvoirs qui s'efforcent de régner sur lui. Il a une identité qu'il se fabrique, prétendument, lui-même, mais du point de vue de la collectivité représenté par l'Etat.

— *Sur le plan social*, l'individu n'est qu'un citoyen dont les droits et les devoirs sont définis et lui accordés par l'Etat tout-puissant ;

— *Sur le plan économique*, donc du point de vue des marchés, il ne représente qu'un ensemble de désirs, de préférences, une certaine quantité de pouvoir d'achat ;

— *Sur le plan politique*, il n'est qu'un rouage de la machine à voter pour légitimer, démocratiquement, le pouvoir des gouvernants.

A ce triple rôle de l'individu comme citoyen s'ajoute qu'à notre âge de l'Internet cet individu est en plus inondé d'informations fragmentaires et de communications désorganisés, et ne peut se soustraire, encore moins qu'auparavant, de la pression des idéologies envahissantes dont, toutefois, il a besoin car il n'est plus capable de maîtriser le flux des mots et des paroles, des discours politiques ou de la publicité. A ce propos, il faut se rappeler que la désorientation de l'individu dans le monde moderne est une chose connue depuis longtemps. Bernard Shaw avait écrit, au début du 20^{ème} siècle, que l'homme moyen est aussi crédule aujourd'hui qu'au cours du Moyen Age ; à quoi a ajouté le Professeur Neil Postman, directeur de l'Institut de la Culture et de la Communication à New York University, que les gens du Moyen Age se sont soumis à l'autorité de la religion, tandis que les gens d'aujourd'hui se soumettent à l'autorité de la science (*Technopoly : The Surrender of Culture to Technology*). A quoi j'ajouterai, moi, qu'ils se soumettent, qu'ils doivent se soumettre à l'influence des idéologies et des modes, et d'accepter les opinions 'des experts', pour pouvoir s'orienter dans un monde devenu pour eux incompréhensible.

Ainsi, cet individu solitaire dont se composent nos sociétés d'aujourd'hui fait face à l'Etat tout-puissant. Créer une telle situation était l'issue inévitable de l'évolution de l'Etat moderne lequel avait essayé de détruire ou de priver de l'influence tous les éléments de la société qui auraient pu s'interposer entre l'Etat et l'individu afin de pouvoir dominer ce dernier. L'Etat moderne naissant avait donc sciemment réduit, sur le plan social, à une quantité négligeable toutes les communautés religieuses, culturelles et autres, ayant admis seulement ceux dont il avait besoin comme partenaire, les syndicats par exemple, qui constituaient son interlocuteur justifiant ces actions dans le cadre de l'Etat Providence, ou ceux qui ne pouvaient pas le nuire comme, par exemple, les associations des *tifosi*. Tout ce problème, nous le traitons aujourd'hui sous l'étiquette de la 'société civile' — une désignation qui réunit toutes les institutions et formations sociales qui ne servent pas, directement ou indirectement, le fonctionnement de l'Etat. En outre, la disparition des entités intermédiaires entre l'Etat et l'individu avait aussi créé le besoin d'inventer le régime des droits de l'homme pour protéger ce pauvre être solitaire des abus du pouvoir, car lui, seul, ne pouvait résister à la toute puissance des régnants, quoique élus, et au despotisme bureaucratique dans nos démocraties contemporaines.

L'idéologie républicaine ne suffisait, toutefois, pas de soulever l'enthousiasme des masses d'individus pour remplir leur rôle de bons citoyens. L'Etat avait donc recouru, depuis la révolution française, à l'idéologie nationaliste afin d'obtenir la légitimation populaire. C'est au cours des dernières décennies seulement que la légitimité étatique s'est vue graduellement transformée dans le sens que l'accent était mis sur l'idéologie libérale — la démocratie, la liberté des marchés, et la prévalence d'une forme de vie basée sur un système de valeurs exclusivement matérialiste.

Deuxième thèse : *Contrairement à l'individu moderne, la personne humaine est un être ancré dans la foi et les croyances, dans le système des valeurs, dans les conventions sociales et culturelles de la communauté dont il est issu.*

Explication : Cette conception de la personne humaine se situe dans la perspective chrétienne que je représente. En ce sens, toute l'identité, toute la vie spirituelle, mentale et physique d'une personne est le résultat d'une interaction continue avec sa communauté. On peut dire qu'une personne humaine n'existe pas sans communauté, mais on peut dire aussi qu'une communauté n'existe pas sans les personnes humaines qui la composent. Les affirmations de l'individualisme excessif de l'époque moderne, prétendant que des contradictions fondamentales existent entre l'appartenance à une communauté et la liberté humaine sont totalement fausses. La communauté et ses traditions lient les membres par des attaches transcendantales au cosmos, à l'au-delà, et par la participation dans un monde humain particulier, créent un sentiment de solidarité. La vraie liberté humaine n'est possible que dans le cadre d'une vie communautaire, mais non dans une société atomisée constituée par des individus prétendument autonomes dont les intentions et décisions séparées sont supposées s'amalgamer pour devenir l'intérêt collectif.

Afin de cacher l'interface cruelle entre un individu sans défense et un pouvoir sans limite, l'idéologie moderne avait recouru à une version déformée de l'image chrétienne de l'homme (créé à l'image de Dieu), en transformant l'homme en Dieu, en le poussant à croire qu'il peut être son propre dieu. L'homme, couronnement de l'évolution biologique, c'est la création de la science et de la technologie moderne qui servent, en même temps, comme la preuve de l'excellence de l'être humain par leurs résultats véritablement éblouissants. A l'inverse, l'homme dieu, l'individu comme le dieu de la modernité, sert comme preuve pour démontrer que le véritable Dieu, le Dieu de la Trinité, de Moïse, d'Abraham, et de Muhammad est, avec les paroles toujours citées de Nietzsche, mort. Ceci explique la farouche opposition de l'idéologie de la modernité contre communauté et tradition, car dans toutes les civilisations les communautés et les traditions séculaires sont profondément ancrés dans la foi d'un Etre transcendantal, que ça soit dans le cadre des religions monothéistes ou dans le cadre des religions métaphysiques comme l'hindouisme ou le bouddhisme. Il est évident qu'au christianisme, même si le chemin du salut est individuel, un croyant fait toujours partie de l'Eglise visible sur cette terre, et de l'Eglise triomphante dans l'au-delà.

L'Etat moderne naissant avait sciemment réduit à une quantité négligeable, du point de vue des affaires publiques, toutes les communautés culturelles, religieuses et autres, ayant admis seulement celles dont il avait besoin comme partenaire ou celles qui ne pouvaient pas le nuire. Toutes ces questions, nous les traitons aujourd'hui sous l'étiquette de la 'société civile' — une désignation qui rassemble toutes les institutions et formations sociales qui ne servent pas, directement ou indirectement, le fonctionnement de l'Etat.

Le monde humain spécifique d'une communauté culturelle ou ethnique fait partie d'un ensemble plus large, d'une civilisation. Les civilisations coexistent sur notre planète depuis des temps immémoriaux ; leur dialogue éventuel, d'une part, et leur entente ou confrontation, d'autre part, conditionnera la vie des hommes au cours du 21^{ème} siècle.

Troisième thèse : ***La globalisation n'est autre que l'interpénétration de l'universel et du particulier dans tous les domaines de la vie.***

Explication : La globalisation est le résultat du développement incroyable des technologies de communication, de transport et de l'information dont un exemple est la transmission des informations en temps réel. Cette évolution technologique constitue, en effet, un phénomène irréversible, rendant possible des développements imprévus, mais qui ne détermine pas à l'avance le caractère de ces développements. L'extrême rapidité est trompeuse, car cette rapidité ne change en rien l'essentiel des opérations — qu'elles soient financières, le transfert d'un milliard de dollars d'un marché à l'autre, ou commerciale, l'utilisation des moyens offerts par l'Internet pour vendre et acheter des produits — étant donné que l'instantanéité ne modifie pas leur sens fondamental.

Il y a, par conséquent, d'innombrables définitions de la globalisation. Je vous en ai proposé une, Excellences, Mesdames et Messieurs, qui, à mon sens, reflète au mieux l'essentiel du phénomène de la globalité. La première version de cette définition a été formulée par le professeur Roland Robertson, de l'Université de Pittsburgh en 1992. Mais la formulation du concept de la globalisation, que j'ai indiquée plus haut, entraîne des conséquences importantes pour notre pensée sur ce phénomène de notre époque. Nous avons vécu, depuis deux cents ans, dans un rêve que nous a légué le Siècle des lumières, le rêve de l'universalisme fondé sur la croyance — car elle n'était qu'une croyance — que l'humanité est une entité indivisible, que tous les hommes sont semblables car tous possèdent la même raison, caractéristique principale de l'être humain. Cette croyance n'était acceptable à l'époque quand on n'a pas connu grande chose des autres mondes humains, des autres grandes civilisations, mais elle est inexcusable à notre époque — justement parce que la globalisation a éliminé la différence entre l'universel et le particulier ou local. La relation planétaire, mais non pas fusion, de ces deux catégories fondamentales peut être facilement illustrée dans les domaines de l'économie et de la politique. En ce qui concerne l'économie, les grandes entreprises multinationales n'ont-elles pas recours à des éléments d'une civilisation ou d'une culture particulières dans l'adaptation de leurs produits et de leurs techniques de marketing selon les régions du globe où elles sont actives ? Sur le plan politique, les soi-disant fondamentalismes n'utilisent-ils pas les moyens universels, donc omniprésents sur la planète, dans leurs actions pour promouvoir leur cause ? Est-ce que ces deux cas ne sont pas des exemples frappants de ce que j'ai appelé 'l'interpénétration de l'universel et du particulier' ?

Cette interprétation du phénomène de la globalisation exclut, et je dis bien exclut, le sens prêté par la plupart de nos concitoyens en Occident à ce fait dominant de notre époque. Cette incroyable vision consiste à croire que la globalisation signifie la conquête du monde par la civilisation occidentale comme prévu, il y a plus d'une décennie, par un professeur de l'Université de Yale, Theodor von Laue, sous l'étiquette 'La révolution mondiale de l'occidentalisation'. De par les exploits technologiques, cette croyance est devenue presque un article de foi, malgré l'ineffable mouvement de la décolonisation après la Seconde Guerre Mondiale. Cet événement historique aurait dû définitivement ouvrir les yeux des occidentaux sur les réalités d'autres grandes civilisations comme la chinoise confucéenne et taoïste, comme l'hindouisme des brahmanes ou des jaïnistes, comme le bouddhisme, la riche diversité des cultures africaines, et, finalement, la civilisation islamique à laquelle notre culture occidentale doit la connaissance de l'héritage culturel grec transmis par Avicenne, Averroès et les autres grands savants du Moyen Age musulman.

Quatrième thèse : ***La globalisation a donc deux visages comme Janus : elle signifie les mouvements transnationaux et planétaires, d'une part, et l'inévitabilité d'un dialogue entre différentes civilisations, d'autre part.***

Explication : Le sens de la globalisation comme l'interpénétration de l'universel et du particulier inévitablement incorpore l'idée d'un dialogue des civilisations. Le futur de la personne humaine, le développement ou le progrès matériel de ces mondes humains distincts que sont les civilisations, et la paix mondiale, dépend, en ce 21^{ème} siècle, du dialogue et de la compréhension mutuelle de ces grands ensembles qui encadrent l'existence de tous les hommes. *Ainsi, la globalisation exige et impose le pluralisme culturel*, — un concept totalement différent du multiculturalisme qui signifie la coexistence de différentes orientations culturelles dans un même pays. Toute civilisation est autonome, toute civilisation possède des fondements inaltérables et une vision de l'homme et du monde propre à son essence, c'est pour cela que seulement un dialogue fructueux et des concessions mutuelles puisse mener à une paix et à leur coexistence durable.

Pour illustrer mes propos je voudrais, en conclusion, citer trois exemples des conflits entre nos idées occidentales et les réalités prédominantes dans d'autres civilisations :

Premièrement, la formule de l'Etat-nation que nous avons imposé aux pays devenus indépendants après la décolonisation, n'est pas conforme à leur ordre social, et la distribution des populations diverses dans les frontières existantes ne correspond pas à leur appartenance ethnique ou culturelle ;

Deuxièmement, la démocratie en tant qu'institution politique ne peut pas être adaptée à certaines sociétés hiérarchisées dans sa forme pratiquée chez nous ; et

Troisièmement, le principe que le développement économique et social des pays appartenant à d'autres civilisations devrait se faire en ayant recours à des concepts, formes d'organisation, méthodes et pratiques économiques élaborés en Europe, ne tient nullement compte des conditions d'existence de ces pays. On ne peut pas transposer concepts et méthodes d'un monde culturel à d'autres sans courir le risque d'un échec ou d'une destruction totale des autres cultures et traditions.

La globalisation mènera à une grave confrontation et à la disparition de l'incroyable richesse et diversité humaines si un dialogue des civilisations n'a pas lieu au cours de ce siècle.

Excellences, Mesdames et Messieurs, je vous remercie.

THE PROBLEM OF GLOBALIZATION AND CURRENT ISSUES IN WORLD POLITICS*

Interview with Victor Segesvary

by

Luigi Zarro

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First question

Is there any possibility to establish a viable and normal economy in Afghanistan?

Answer

Afghanistan is not a very poor but, potentially, a rich country, excluding trade in drugs and arms. It is unfortunate that during the last 30 years no correct and comprehensive reporting about Afghanistan was diffused by the media and, thus, the real economic situation of the country was lost from view. I would like, first, to give some indications of the economic resources of Afghanistan, and list afterwards those factors which obstructed in the course of its recent history a gradual improvement of economic performance and of people's standard of living. Among economic resources I would mention:

1. Afghanistan has substantial *natural gas* reserves in the north, around the Mazar-i-Sharif area, where the exploration had been undertaken by Soviet companies. Since the beginning in the 1960s, however, all production was exported to the Soviet Union and paid for by a fraction of world market prices because, in accordance with the official explanation, bilateral trade was conducted in a compensatory framework, on reduced prices. In fact, pipelines were built at Termez, on the Uzbek side of Amu-Darya, and no natural gas was used in view of the development of the Afghan economy;

2. In the same area, but also in some other regions of the country, important quantities of medium-quality *cotton* were produced, mainly exported to the Soviet Union and other countries of Eastern Europe, such as Hungary. Apparently, the imported cotton was used in the Central Asian member states of the Soviet Union, and their own cotton production, of a much better quality, was used in textile factories of Russia. However, important quantities of local cotton were used by Afghan carpet producers;

3. The country also produced a certain number of *agricultural and livestock* products which were exported to Western Europe or other Asian countries like nuts, dried raisin, medicinal herbs for pharmaceutical industries;

4. An important mineral resource, in the eastern part of Afghanistan, consists of precious and semi-precious stones (Afghanistan is one of the major producers in the world of lapis lazuli, for example), but most of this production, especially precious stones such as ruby or amethyst, were smuggled through uncontrollable frontiers to foreign markets, first of all Hong-Kong, except those which were used by local craftsmen. For this reason, this mineral wealth did not contribute to the nation's economic development. The same happened with some other products like part of raw wood production, which was transported on rivers to Pakistan, in part from the same region where recent combats took place;

5. The *industrial base* is very narrow, consisting of construction, transformation of agricultural products for local use (i.e., fruit juices or animal product processing), textiles, and some simple consumer goods;

6. *Handicraft* goods represent, in normal circumstances, an excellent perspective for the country's economy;

7. *Tourism* could be an exceptional foreign exchange earner as the Afghan countryside's natural beauty, the archeological remains of bygone ages (whatever survived the Taliban rule), possibilities for certain sports, could attract many tourists. It is, however, true that the necessary infrastructure – hotels, restaurants, roads, etc. – should be first developed;

8. Finally, and this is very little known in the Western world, Afghanistan possesses an enormous mineral wealth underground, especially in the southern zone around the Hindukush (or Lower Himalaya), the mountain range cutting the country in two parts, but it is not possible to exploit this richness, even with today's technological means, because of the configuration of the terrain and the impossibility to build railway tracks in order to transport the products to the nearest ports in Pakistan.

Among the factors obstructing economic development, the most important are:

i) The *geography and climate* which, on the one hand, made impossible either the exploitation of mineral wealth and certain agricultural productions, or control of the borders to eliminate smuggling; on the other hand, the slow evolution of stable production patterns. Among the difficulties created by geography is also the inaccessibility from and to major world markets.

ii) *Great power intervention* in the country's affairs at every moment of its history. It is known that the British Empire had three wars against the independent Afghan State between the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries, but it is less known that the tradition rivalry between the West and Russia (whose push toward warm seas never ceased to be part of its international strategy), since World War II between the USA and the Soviet Union, is witnessed by many details; for example, the paved road from Kabul to Mazar-i-Sharif and the Russian frontier was built by the Soviet Union, and the road from Kabul to Kandahar was built by the United States.

iii) *Ethnic, inter-cine warfare*, coupled with religious dissension (between Sunni and Shi'a), always stimulated, of course, by foreign powers, including Iran and Pakistan, obstructed any effort aiming at the creation of a stable environment indispensable for sustained economic development. However, this last impediment to economic development is sometimes overemphasized because members of other ethnic groups than the dominant Pashto were frequently admitted to high government positions or reached excellence in trade and business. For example, when I worked in Afghanistan, the minister of commerce was an Uzbek and the most successful trader a Shi'a hazara.

[Let me tell you a little story here which illustrates many of the points made above: During my first year the Minister of Trade called me to his office to tell me that we have to do something because most wood produced in the Suleiman mountains on the frontier with Pakistan, is smuggled by the tribes to Pakistan using the rapid river ways. I responded that this is not an economic problem; the government has to send its troops to stop such a trade. The Minister's answer was: We tried it already, but the tribes are much better armed than our military. I, then, concluded that in this case the only thing to do would be to increase the price of raw wood in Afghanistan; thus, the price differential between the two countries would not be a stimulus for the tribal chiefs to smuggle out of the country its wealth.]

Second question

What impact does have the tragic events of September 11 and the ensuing American 'war on terrorism' on the perspectives of globalization?

Answer

I think that first we have to clarify what we understand under globalization which undoubtedly means transnational phenomena, on the one hand, but which, in certain respects, is not even a new process but one well-known from the past to historians. In my mind, globalization designates four different processes: a global trend in economic activities; the hegemony of a technological and military superpower and of its satellites in politics; technological development as the creator and bearer of globalization, and the now inevitable encounter between various civilizations at the cultural level – above nations and above States.

Speaking of globalization, everybody normally thinks of *the worldwide extension of Western economic methods and practices* (stock exchanges, financial markets, etc.) and the unavoidable interlinking of populations in their economic activities – trade, investments, mobility of manpower, etc. The truthfulness of the novelty of this phenomenon is contested by many economists and historians (the example always referred to is the epoch preceding World War I); though, in my opinion, it cannot be doubted that globalization of the Western model of economic activities is undeniable (for example, under the influence of the model's success stock exchanges were created, with Western assistance, in most developing countries like, among others, in Papua-New Guinea). However, this trend of economic globalization is entirely interwoven with the three other forms of globalization which assure its feasibility.

There is no doubt in my eyes that at *the political level* globalization in our age is nothing else but the hegemony of the superpower, the United States of America and its mainly European allies, usually dubbed the 'international community.' (Believe me, Mr. Zarro, for me, a convinced European in his soul and in his flesh, it is extremely sad to say this, but when I saw, after September 11, the rush of European head of states or governments to Washington to express their horror and to publicly confirm their fidelity, I had the impression that we are back in the feudal ages with the princes going to catch the favors of the emperor.) In this perspective, the drama of September 11, which showed the first time in history that America is not invulnerable, marks a watershed in American foreign policy: Either it could induce US policy makers, and Americans in general, to search for an understanding with all people living in the orbit of other civilizations, that is, comprehending the reality of cultural Otherness, or to become more hardened in their attitude of a hegemonic power which does not recognize any possible difference from its own way of life, from its own ways of thinking and seeing the world. I sincerely hoped that the first option will be chosen, but unfortunately the 'war on terror' showed that the United States turned in the other direction. Thus, the global hegemony of the superpower is reinforced ever more (unilateralism in action); any people living in multinational States or suffering foreign occupation, that is, who oppose their government or the rule of the dominating population, became by definition terrorists – Uighurs in West China, Chechens in Russia, Palestinians in Israel, or any tribal or ethnic group which opposes the suzerainty of an African State established within the frontiers left behind by the former colonial power. This turn in international politics leads to the globalization of the present American formula that anybody who is opposing a legitimate State authority (in principle democratically elected, but in practice this qualification became less and less important) is a terrorist, forgetting the age-old wisdom that majority rule signifies, if no constitutional safeguards are erected and if people's mentality is not adapted to the democratic political process, the oppression of minorities (was it not in the French Revolution that a law was voted according to which those who dare to speak another language than the French should be executed, and that, following this tradition, France never signed the Council of Europe's Charter of Minority Languages?). In consequence, September 11 heightened the dangers inherent in globalization, understood in the political sense, resulting in the extension of the hegemonic power to the whole planet.

I think that for any observer of current developments in our world there can be no doubt that the global trend is created by the very recent *information and communication technologies*. It is not true that the world became a single place, as some would have it, but it is undeniable that people living in the orbit of different civilizations, in the orbit of different 'human worlds' as I like to say, learned about each other – via the media and Internet – and communicate constantly with each other in innumerable ways through the means put at their disposal by those incredible technological advances which represent a formidable success of Western culture. The possibilities offered by new technologies are not really explored yet; and I tried to make such an inquiry in the field of political institutions in my latest book on *Information and Communication Technologies: A Vision of the Future in Politics*.

As you know well I wrote extensively on civilizations and the historic opportunity in our epoch of their encounter and dialogue. I became convinced, therefore, that *the principal meaning of globalization is the cultural one*, finding its expression in the awareness of civilizational differences evidenced by transnational movements of ideas, customs, traditions, and, above all, people. Consequently, the acknowledgement of civilizational differences and the imperative necessity of a continuous dialogue between civilizations is the other side of the coin, the inevitable complementary aspect of globalization in its true sense. True because it must be evident for everybody that the illusion of universality of the Western civilization could only be affirmed in the eighteenth century, the epoch of the Enlightenment, when people in Europe had very little idea about other human beings living in the orbit of the Chinese, Indian, Islamic or African civilizations; the notion of 'being civilized,' that is, adopting European customs and ways of life could only be coined as a result of this ignorance. The knowledge of the ways of life of other civilizations is also marked by the emphasis put on people's identity, the affirmation of one's own and the acknowledgment or rejection of the identity of others. The importance of the cultural factor can be shown by two examples. On the one hand, in the practice of transnational enterprises which adopt their publicity and promotional slogans to the cultural context in which they intend to sell their products; on the other hand, in the amalgamation of their principles and view of the world with the use of modern Western public relations methods by the Islamic radical movements.

In sum, globalization is a very complex phenomenon of which aspects and effects contradict each other. For example, technological progress made possible the worldwide Western economic influence as well as the hegemonic attitudes of the United States and its allies, but at the same time it also highlighted the importance of civilizational differences which represent the counter current and the forceful resistance of human groups to economic globalization and the hegemony of powerful States. Hence, ethnic and religious minorities, or all kinds of opposition to the globalizing forces are, simultaneously, the product and the antidote to globalization.

Third question

Can an improvement of the chances of civilizational encounters and of cooperation of people belonging to different cultures can be envisaged and hoped for today?

Answer

I do not think that any crystal gazing would be justified in this matter which is a matter of the survival of the human race, because the possession of destructive technologies is now for everybody possible. I am convinced that there will be, and there must be, an understanding between people of different civilizations not only to eliminate violence and war, indiscriminate killings and devastating attacks on civil populations, but even to resolve fundamental problems of our future existence like, for example, safeguarding of our environment – the biodiversity of our world. But this understanding can only be reached on one condition, namely, that all sides accept the existence, the particular cultural identity, the way of life of the others, without trying to impose one's own on them, – a condition which supposes not only information and knowledge about others, communication with those living on the other side of the planet, but a sincere humility sustained by all – Christian or secularized Westerners, believing or westernized Muslims, Indians, Chinese and Africans – that is, the birth of an individual and collective will to arrive at such a result. This, therefore, means to renounce any kind of 'exceptionalism,' meaning (as the expression 'American exceptionalism' is used in contemporary social science describing the American creed that everything is the best in America), the renunciation, at collective level, of any temptation of self-aggrandizement and boasting of one's own beliefs, qualities and social practices. But, as I insisted earlier, this must be a shared attitude in every civilizational dialogue by all participants; if emphasis is put on the abandonment of the universalistic pretensions of the West it is because our present domination in most fields of human activity and endeavors is the greatest obstacle to such an.

Fourth question

Are the conflicting, degenerative forces of late modernity linked to the past and repeat the history of conflict and violence of the last two centuries?

Answer

The summary paragraph at the end of my answer to your second question contains already, in fact, the answer to this one, too. The continuously resurging conflicts and, I agree with you, the somewhat degenerative trend in contemporary culture, world history and world politics, are an integral part of the phenomenon of globalization, as I tried to describe it above. Ours is a tumultuous and disconcerting age, full of contradictions and violent actions and reactions, precisely because on the surface everything became global but, in truth, in the deep waters of human life it is difficult to find fundamental changes. Nevertheless, this gives it also its stimulating character, because one has the distinct feeling that we are on the threshold of a completely new epoch; late modernity means that we live in the last days of the 500-year-old modern age, that something entirely different has to come in its footsteps. I do not mean the disappearance of everything old, traditional and customary, but the invention of new forms of action in politics and society as well as in our approach the world. Therefore, the past, in my view, will not be repeated but renewed, re-invented in the framework of a global understanding, entirely conditioned by the encounter of world civilizations and by the dialogue of different cultures. Globalization and the varying civilizational shades of distinct human worlds do not contradict but complement each other in the spiritual and material contours of humanity's future.

DIALOGUE OF CIVILIZATIONS*

The Other Face of the Globalizing Process

by

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INTRODUCTION

In the course of history, there were always transborder movements between kingdoms and empires, – movement of ideas and people, of merchandise or artifacts reflecting specific human creativity and skills. We have only to think of the spread of the alphabet from the coastal town of Ugarit in Aramaic Syria in the whole Mediterranean basin; the adoption of the zero, invented in India, by our European culture transmitted by Arabic scientists; the enormous movements of peoples across Asian steppes since time immemorial, or the Silk Road linking China to Europe along which sprung up such well-known commercial centers of Antiquity as Palmyra in the Syrian desert.

These transborder movements do not resemble the phenomenon we call today globalization. Despite transportation and communication lines and increasing knowledge of other countries, the geographical regions related to each other by such movements remained isolated. China remained the Middle Kingdom between the Heaven and the Earth, the latter being constituted of all other people not belonging to the population of the Celestial Empire, though subject, in principle, to the authority of the Emperor. And Venice, on the receiving end of the Silk Road, already represented a certain consciousness of European superiority which, however, did not impede Venetian merchants to benefit from good deals offered by transcontinental trade.

It was only since the Industrial Revolution and the great development of Western science and technology in the nineteenth century, parallel to the universal acceptance of the nation-state as the dominant political institution in the Western world, that transborder, now called transnational, movements exponentially increased. The pace of transnational contacts, overarching the farthest regions of the world, quickened especially with the truly astonishing technological development, during the last four decades of the twentieth century, in the fields of transport, electronic communication and information systems. These technological developments created the dominant phenomenon of our contemporary life we call globalization.

Transborder or transnational movements of ideas and people were always, simultaneously, trans-civilizational movements. However, in view of the superficiality of contacts in the period before the second half of the twentieth-century, these movements did rarely offer possibilities of what Benjamin Nelson called *civilizational encounters*, occasions of cultural dialogue or confrontation. It is undeniable that there were interactions between various cultures, leading to the diffusion of ideas and values from one civilization to another, without developing into a dialogue. Due to the fact that all civilizations are centered on a religious core, confrontations took place between representatives of different religions, especially between those of a monotheistic nature, among themselves or in their relation with believers of other religions.

In our age, civilizational encounters take place regularly because of the changed nature of contacts among people belonging to different civilizations, as a result of the hitherto unimaginable and unforeseen advance in various means disseminating information worldwide. For this reason some even envisage the birth of a world culture. This utopian vision is due to a misunderstanding of the nature and essence of what civilizations are, what globalization means, because they are under the influence of certain ideologies which defend the view of a universal civilization in order to promote their own, particular interests. Therefore, explaining the concept and practice of civilizational dialogue has to start with the clarification of what we mean by civilization, globalization, pluralism, and dialogue of civilizations.

1. CIVILIZATIONAL DIALOGUES AND THE GLOBALIZING TREND

What Is Civilization and What Is Civilizational Pluralism?

It is surprising that the notion of civilizations has not much currency in our days because international relations as well as the apparent coming into existence of worldwide financial markets shrouded in a veil of forgetfulness the fact that the largest comprehensive entities, determining the framework of human existence, are civilizational worlds. Of course, it is understandable that the participants in international activities, filling the

programs of television news and the pages of newspapers, tend to ignore the existence of civilizations because the recognition of the fundamental importance in human life of the latter would deprive them, they think, of their role in world affairs. Does the world of Islamic civilization the community of believers, the *'ummah*, not include several dozen of States, or is the world of modern, Western civilization not consisting of States on three continents? Or, are the people belonging to the Buddhist civilizational world not living between the borders of numerous Asian States where they enriched the heritage of the original cultural setting with their ideas and practices?

Civilizations, coexisting on our planet, are the largest ensembles created by human persons and communities around a religious or metaphysical as well as cultural core. Culture (in Cicero's sense of *cultura mentis*) encompasses religion and worldview, scientific and artistic creation, patterns of reasoning, and ethical principles of behavior and action. Civilization stands for a whole way of life, including technology, living conditions, social practices, political systems and institutions, economic organization and methods of production, as well as all other material aspects of our earthly life centered on the cultural core. They effectively are above the international system considered today as the highest level of human interaction. For this reason, it is justified to speak of civilizational worlds having spatial and temporal dimensions.

In the perspective adopted here cultures are, on the one hand, at the core of every civilization, and, on the other hand, from these cultural foundations develop social practices in every domain of human activity. In turn, the core of every culture is a theistic or metaphysical religion, a link to the cosmic reality, transcending the world of here and now. The only exception is the modern civilization of the West that overtly denies any transcendental foundation (Max Weber's 'disenchantment'), though its Christian roots are undeniable even in the present late-modern period. For this reason, the key word characterizing the present state of the Western in relation to other civilizations is (with a term borrowed from Anthony Giddens) *disjunction*. This term has a double meaning: first, a disjunction of Western modernity from its own past which occurred over the last four centuries; second, a consecutive disjunction from other great, contemporary civilizations.

The multiplicity of civilizational worlds signifies that between different civilizations only a pluralistic approach can prevail. Though the cultural core of every civilization is anchored in a transcendental faith or cosmic perspective, *the problem of civilizational pluralism does not concern the domain of faith but consists in understanding other humans in the course of civilizational encounters*. Pluralism in this sense is frequently mistakenly comprehended as relativism, that is, relativism of traditions, values, principles, ethos, behavior, and worldviews. However, pluralism is not a form of relativism, but it is the acceptance of the fact that there are different human worlds with different visions of man and the universe, with different emphasis on types of social ordering and interactions; shortly, affirming civilizational pluralism is to be realistic in contradiction to such utopians who believe in a postulated, unique world.

It is necessary to briefly point out that civilizational pluralism is completely different from the much-discussed multiculturalism. Civilizational pluralism concerns the relationship between great, coexisting civilizational ensembles on our planet, whereas multiculturalism stands for the simultaneous presence in one country or one region of people belonging to different cultural worlds, though not always to different civilizations. Therefore, multiculturalism can have varying connotations in diverging contexts. For example, multiculturalism in the United States, a so-called settler country, means a problem of simple coexistence of the culture of older or newer immigrants as assimilation into the predominant, Protestant, Anglo-Saxon culture is less and less important because the latter gradually loses of its importance. In European countries, assimilation or integration represent a much more difficult problem because of the defensive posture taken by strong autochthonous cultures, including religion, social practices, and ways of life. Finally it has to be pointed out that multiculturalism is not a new phenomenon; at the time of the European Middle Ages, Confucianism, and later Buddhism, were introduced to Japan and slowly blended with the autochthonous, Shinto culture. This encounter was very successful as Japan became one of the lands of flourishing neo-Confucianism and of various types of homegrown Buddhist tendencies.

2. GLOBALIZATION AND THE DIALOGUE OF CIVILIZATIONS

Globalization is, in my perspective, a cultural phenomenon. The term does not describe our world as a 'global village,' corresponding to the idea launched by Marshall McLuhan some forty years ago, because it does not refer only to the worldwide extension of communication facilities. In Roland Robertson's definition,¹ globalization corresponds to a 'compression' of phenomena on the world scene, expressed by Anthony Giddens as 'space and time distanciation' compensated, in turn, by the irresistible spread of concepts, views, customs and lifestyles to the remotest corners of the world. In this sense, the 'global circumstance' of modernity [Robertson] is a framework, which makes possible the existence of plural human worlds.

It is clear from the foregoing that globalization does not simply mean the instantaneous transmission of information from one point of the world to another, or the rapid circulation of merchandise through world trade channels, or the ever-quicker transportation of persons and goods between continents. Rapidity of communications and of dissemination of information, even instantaneity, does not change the character of operations, economic, technical or any other type, because it does not modify their essence linked to a specific activity. A transfer of money remains a transfer of money whether done in two seconds or in two days; the definition of export/import activities, the kind of merchandise traded, remains the same whether it takes two months to take them across the oceans, or twenty-four hours by flying them in a Boeing 747.

The essential meaning of globalization is only captured by the definition given by Roland Robertson in his landmark study in which he refers to globalization in the dialectical framework of the universal and of the particular as "*the interpenetration of the universalization of particularism and the particularization of universalism*" [*ibid.* 100; italics in original]. The globalizing process, therefore, incorporates universalistic trends (such as the worldwide spread of Western consumerism) as well as particularistic self-affirmations and ways of life (like the revival and global valorization of national consciousness or other collective identities).

In contrast to globalization, universalism grasps the world as a whole in the sense that it affirms presumably universally held beliefs, values, and social practices, as well as presumably universally applicable institutional structures. In contrast to universalism globalization recognizes the importance of context and, through this recognition, it embraces its bipolar opposite: localism. Localism, by its inner logic, gives priority to particularism as much as context. Context, as an aspect of globality, eliminates abstract, formalistic approaches or pre-conceived principles for the sake of contingency and particularity of things and events. The global trend absorbs certain aspects of localism and frequently reflects contextual realities, whereas particular situations incorporate global traits or instrumentalize, for their own purposes, such traits. In fundamentalist worldviews like the Islamic or American Evangelical, for example, globalization is present in the form of discourse, in the use of particular arguments and of suitable technological solutions such as television.

It is, then, possible to state that in our late modern age two contradictory movements exist simultaneously, of which each possesses its own dialectics. On the one hand, the ever-widening globalizing trend characterized by *space-time distanciation*; on the other hand, the growing importance of the *place*, the focus of the local setting of multiple human interactions, which necessitates the co-presence of human beings, as being-together and the possibility of coming-together. The place designates not only a specific context, but is also linked to the experience of generations of human beings and to the recollection of past events in collective human memory. It is, therefore, the context in which space, experience and time fuse together to constitute particular cultural and civilizational worlds.

The interpenetration of the global and of the particular is the result of the combination of three factors:

First, two generations of technological developments which took place in the last hundred years. The first generation consisted of the use of railways, air transport, wireless transmissions and emissions; the second consists of what we call the information revolution, computerized networks, block trading of securities, satellite transmissions, etc. This unique and overwhelming role of technology does not, of course, influence the interplay of universalistic and particular elements.

¹ ROBERTSON, Roland. *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Structure*. London, SAGE Publications, 1992.

Second, technology is a servant of those who manipulate it in their own interest. I mean by that statement that technology is a vehicle of hegemonic power politics. In consequence, globalization's main bearer is, as Nietzsche would have said, the will to hegemonic power. Old-fashioned hegemonic politics applied pressures in a straightforward way to all those who happened to be in its orbit of influence. Hegemonic politics in the global age, precisely because technological progress led to transparency in all public spaces, not only has to take into account cultural, social, political and other differences, but it has to exercise its influence on each of the entities concerned. Stuart Hall's formula expresses this in a concise way: "The global is the self-presentation of the dominant particular" as the global stands for nothing else than the manner in which "the dominant particular localises and naturalises itself."² Hegemonic intent, under conditions of unforeseen, unintended and contingent features of the global environment, does not aim at the destruction and disappearance of different particularities, but endeavors, in the course of the global cultural process, to integrate multiple identities and particularities into the hegemonic identity and particularity.

Third, for technology to be able to assume the role it is expected to play in the globalization process, and for technology-based hegemonic politics to be able to successfully penetrate and shape in its own image the innumerable particularities of the world without eliminating them, a vehicle is needed ensuring that the message has the correct content and the required coherence when disseminated by the media. This vehicle is the ideology of globalization. Formulated in a dialectical way, ideology creates and sustains globalization, and globalization processes are themselves the source of the ideology of globality.

The globalization process is, then, the engine of the self-affirmation and ideological hegemony of the Western civilization, and it appears successful in the dissemination of Western civilizational values and ways of life, – although frequently with a devastating effect. Examples of such globalizing phenomena are: Extended urbanization, the imposition of the nation-state formula on countries emerging from the colonial period, the establishment of Western-type judicial processes, or the so-called consumerization of large masses due to the invasion of modern clothing, electrical appliances, etc. which constitutes the most powerful instrument to modify indigenous customs and ways of life.

The impression given by the world conquest of our civilization³ is, however, deceiving because globalization is a phenomenon solely on the surface of the life of peoples belonging to other civilizations. This basic fact did not change since World War II, and theories of economic and political duality in the non-Western world did not lose their validity. They express the lack of congruence between fundamental civilizational givens and imported concepts, values and modes of action. This lack of congruence between old and new is also evidenced by the self-defense of non-Western cultures against the onslaught of modernity, either in the form of mushrooming fundamentalisms reacting against a secular and rationalist foreign culture, or in the form of the rebirth of ethnic solidarity, both aiming to protect people's collective identity.

The global era does not reveal itself today as the age of a 'world revolution of Westernization' because the definition of globalization includes the idea of an inevitability of civilizational encounters. Therefore, the dialogue of civilizations can be envisaged as the other face of the globalizing trend. This interface of different civilizations does not automatically signify a confrontation; it can also be a fruitful dialogue. A mutual awareness of the other's existence; a profound sensitivity toward what people living in the orbit of other civilizations are thinking, feeling, believing, and valuing; and, above all, an attempt to interpret and evaluate the beliefs and acts of others on their own, not on our terms would make it possible to reach a peaceful coexistence between these great traditions, and systems of beliefs and morals. Such an effort would not inevitably induce us to have doubts concerning our own cultural tradition, but it certainly presupposes that all sides show readiness to learn from the others, and to integrate in their own contextual, local world elements from other civilizations whenever such elements appear to be necessary for the realization of particular human projects.

² HALL, Stuart. "The Local and the Global: Globalization and Ethnicity." In KING, Anthony D. ed. *Culture, Globalization, and the World-System: Contemporary Conditions for the Representation of Identity*. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1997, p. 27.

³ LAUE, Theodore von. *The World Revolution of Westernization: The Twentieth Century in Global Perspective*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987.

3. THE NECESSITY OF CIVILIZATIONAL ANALYSIS

The foregoing makes it clear that in order to participate in civilizational encounters one has to know the other side's particular human world, enabling the parties in the dialogue to have sufficient knowledge of fundamental problems in their relations. Such a knowledge includes, at least partially, to be familiar with the principal theses of the religion representing the other civilization's core element; the meaning of the world or the explanation of life and of the cosmos, built on the religious perspective; the ethical precepts elaborated in the course of the cultural evolution characterizing that specific civilization; the prevailing symbolism, myths, rituals (and ritualization) as well as important magical traits; the role of the temporal dimension as reflected in these traditions; the relationship and interaction between individual and community which mutually presuppose each other; and, finally, the effects of modernization (which today equals Westernization) on society, political institutions, economic activities, and, in particular, on everyday life.

The concept of *styles of reasoning*, advanced by Ian Hacking, Canadian philosopher of science,⁴ illustrates most clearly civilizational differences, if we extend Hacking's considerations regarding the limited field of science to civilizational wholes. Differences between cultural worlds can be related to the fact that a style of reasoning determines the very nature of the cosmic vision, or the knowledge of the natural and human worlds it produces. An independent observer cannot sort out such styles of reasoning because "the very sense of what can be established by that style depends upon the style itself." Different styles may determine possible truths or varying understandings of the world, which can be objectively true in the framework of a given style of reasoning. That means that styles of reasoning open up new possibilities for reflection. As styles arise from historical and civilizational developments, their possibly being true is a consequence of the same developments. A style of reasoning, therefore, naturally bears the imprint of the religious/transcendental and cultural core of a civilization that defines its features. *A style is not a way of thinking that confronts reality, but is part of reality itself.*

Many examples can be given of differences between styles of reasoning. The complexity of various forms of Indian logical and philosophical thinking is well known; there is some similarity between some Indian trends of thinking and the ones that dominate modernity. In contrast, the Buddhist worldview is not properly rational in the Western perspective because it lays more emphasis on man's intuitions than his reasoning capacities as it believes in an existential path to reality. Buddhist thinking is based on the doctrine of self-generating instantaneity; reality is not a continuous process but is perceivable only in a momentary, discontinuous way. Things come into being and pass away in every instant, there is no causality in our sense. Time is, by definition, irreversible; there is no duration, the existence of things is revealed by their effects, and their before-and-after are incorporated in their instantaneous existence.

Chinese dialecticians produced millennia ago, the most curious metaphysical speculations of ancient times. In Chinese civilization itself two entirely different ways of thought coexist since centuries, Confucianism and Taoism. To show the differences between Chinese and other, especially Western, thinking one can refer to the most striking example, the different conception of the mind in Chinese culture. As Chad Hansen demonstrated⁵ concepts are determined by the nature and structure of a language, and he translates the ancient Chinese pictographic symbol for heart, to which no mental string of words and sentences correspond, with the composite expression 'heart-mind' in order to obtain the meaning intended by the Chinese. Hansen's bridging of linguistic and cultural barriers by showing the essential difference between divergent conceptions of the mental and the emotional, represent an excellent example of how and why civilizational dialogue has to be based on a thorough knowledge of different cultural worlds.

⁴ HACKING, Ian. "Styles of Scientific Reasoning." In RAJCHMANN, John and WEST, Cornel. eds. *Post-Analytic Philosophy*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1985, pp.145-165.

⁵ HANSEN, Chad. "Language in the Heart-mind." In ALLISON, Robert E. ed. *Understanding the Chinese Mind: The Philosophical Roots*. London, Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 75-124.

Another fundamental difference between civilizations or, perhaps, more precisely, between the modern Western and all other civilizations, leading to their disjuncture, is the vision concerning the place of the human world in the universe, the cosmos. In this respect, once again referring to the Chinese conception, it is striking to see that in Chinese paintings, wonderfully reflecting the natural beauty of some of the country's particular regions; men are always very, very small figures, lost in the immensity of the universe. This encompassing vision of man and the cosmos of the Chinese (which can be found in the Japanese worldview as well) indicate the essential difference of their outlook with the worldview of modernity that belittles the natural world in comparison to the human species.

A much more complex problem in respect of the relation of this world and the beyond is the Islamic worldview. Among all monotheistic religions, Islam is the only one which considers that there is a continuum between this world and the world beyond, that there is no difference between man's life and actions here and now, and his life, in Paradise or in Hell, after. The links cannot be broken. And the unity of the faith creates a unity among all those who believe in God, in accordance with the teachings of His Prophet, Muhammad. This unity is the *'ummah*. The religious ideal of Islam is organically related to the social order that is dependent on it, as expressed by Muhammad Iqbal; consequently, any nationalist doctrine, which would challenge Islamic solidarity and the unity of religion and everyday life, is unacceptable. From this source originates the tension between universalistic and particularistic tendencies in the world of Islam, between the *'ummah* and the various Muslim nations, Arab or other. Any discussion of the political order or institutions has to be seen in the perspective of a contradiction between the community of believers and the national communities based on ethnic or cultural (other than religious) differences.

Despite the overall importance of styles of reasoning and other basic differences separating cultures and civilizations, there are biological universals in all things human as well as a common core in the mental and emotional set-up of human beings, which is characterized by a 'loose fit' [Hacking]. Examples of this common core are the universal phenomena of love between mother and children, between a man and a woman; but we also have to include into it, for example, the recurrence of solutions to everyday problems in many human societies, or the different ways of artistic expressions in understanding our world and the universe. The latter indicate similarity in the artists' vision, in their comprehension of the human predicament, and in their style and approaches, wherever they live on the surface of the earth. This common core, this 'loose fit,' makes it possible to share in different types of reasoning, or to participate in more than one style, and thus to understand the others' point of view, that is, to have civilizational encounters.

4. ORGANIZATIONAL MODALITIES OF CIVILIZATIONAL DIALOGUES

Content and Form of Civilizational Dialogues

Civilizational pluralism is different from all other forms of pluralism, especially those within particular civilizational worlds. *Civilizational pluralism stands for the co-existence of several and different civilizations on the world scene; – it really is a celebration of difference.* This pluralistic world represents an ordered heterogeneity in human existence as against a uniform world culture, if the designation world refers to a perspective of human totality.

Recurrent culture patterns or social practices as well as environmentally and historically conditioned relationships certainly constitute cross-cultural regularities, either simultaneously – contemporaneity – or on a temporal continuum – history – without implying a linkage between various civilizations through diffusion or through a repeated developmental sequence. Civilizational pluralism poses, therefore, the problem of how to ensure communication and how to achieve mutual understanding between people belonging to different civilizations, against a background of civilizational disjunction.

To initiate a civilizational dialogue, it is necessary to be familiar with aspects of the civilization whose representatives are one's partners in the dialogue. Thus, such dialogues have to be thoroughly prepared through

civilizational analysis, encompassing all the features of a civilization, or specific religious principles and cultural identities, or practices which are determined in advance as objects of a dialogue between representatives of two or more civilizations. For this reason, from the point of view of *dialogical content*, a debate can be organized, either (i) with reference to every characteristics of a civilization, and in this case it may be useful to initiate the process between two of them only in order to avoid that debates become so vast as to be ungraspable by all participants; or, (ii) on specific subjects, such as the role of the sacred in everyday life, the principles of social ordering and ethical questions, political institutions like the nation-state, or obstacles to civilizational cooperation in a given field, and in this case representatives of several or all civilizations can be participants in the dialogue. One must, however, be realistically aware of the fact that civilizational differences cannot be bridged over and corresponding mentalities changed, in a short period of time. The process of the dialogue of civilizations must embrace a series of encounters and a long time span, if it is expected to produce results, even partially.

Organizational Framework

The organizational framework of civilizational dialogues represents one of the most important conditions of their success. First of all, as the interface of civilizations represents the highest level of encounters between different human worlds, it is evident that such dialogues are doomed to failure if they are conceived in international institutional frameworks. As civilizations encompass sometimes dozens of States, as our world is more and more becoming a world of (in today's parlance) transnational movements due to the globalizing trend, how could one imagine that civilizational dialogues be successfully initiated in a framework in which particular political interests, many times serving clearly hegemonic pretensions, dominate? In fact, the interstate system ignores civilizational differences precisely because acknowledgement of such differences would jeopardize the more limited interests of the member States and of those who govern them.

It was an exceptional opportunity that the Iranian President, Mohammed Khatami, raised the issue of civilizational dialogues at the United Nations General Assembly in November 1998, and it was entirely understandable that he did so there because, as of now, there is no highest forum at the world scene before which the issue could have been raised. The muted response of the members of the interstate system to the proposal is the best indicator of the reluctance with which sovereign nation-states envisage the eventuality of an era of civilizational dialogues.

Participation

Beside the openness of participants in civilizational dialogues to each other's convictions, worldviews and characteristic way of life, an essential aspect of the organization of such encounters is that it has to take place between representatives of a civilization's religion, philosophy, art and science, as well as social leaders, entrepreneurs and workers, etc., that is, between thinkers, intellectuals and practical men, and not between politicians, diplomats and bureaucrats. In one word, they have to be free people, free from serving political and particularistic interests, free from being subject to ideological pressures and mental contrivances, free from any, voluntary or involuntary, submission to whatever powers in their specific human world. They have to be representatives of their civil society. What I am aiming at with all these restrictions, is that representatives of various civilizations have to be independent in their opinions, autonomous in their relation to whatever political or economic powers trying to intervene in the dialogue, and entirely sincere in their intentions to reach common ground through discursive communication.

For this reason, it appears that the best solution is to invite participants individually but, in cases where appropriate, through institutions they belong to. Such institutions can be religious organizations, universities and other educational establishments, or cultural associations (like, for example, writers' or artists' federations) and other social entities (such as unions, women and youth organizations).

It should be emphasized, however, that the most important aspect in the selection of participants must be, first, their personal qualities, and, second, that they represent particular cultural tendencies of a civilization like modernizers, Confucians or Taoists from China, or modernizers, Brahmins, Jains as well as members of the various social classes from India, or modernizers, conservatives, Islamic reformers and fundamentalists from the Muslim world.

The only hope to avoid a confrontational stance between civilizations in the twenty-first century is to initiate, as soon as possible, civilizational dialogues. Such encounters will condition not only peace in the world but the destiny of our planet as well because of developing weapon technologies, ethnic feuds and nationalistic wars, and because of the intensification of the environmental crisis – perils which can only be avoided by a common effort of all mankind.

DIALOGUE OU CONFRONTATION DES CIVILISATIONS ?

Un problème incontournable de notre époque

Conférence donnée à l'Auditoire Jacques Freymond de l'Institut
à la demande de l'Association des Anciens Etudiants
de l'Institut de Hautes Etudes Internationales
le mardi, 2 décembre 2003, à 18.30

par

Victor Segesvary

Docteur ès sciences politiques

Docteur en théologie

Mesdames, Messieurs,

J'aimerais vous dire, tout d'abord, ce qui m'a amené à l'étude des relations entre civilisations et à mes efforts de promouvoir le dialogue entre civilisations. Il était mon destin de consacrer une grande partie de ma vie — vingt-cinq années exactement — au développement économique et social des pays africains et asiatiques comme directeur des programmes de développement de l'Organisation des Nations Unies ou comme conseiller principal des gouvernements. J'ai vécu en Algérie, en Afghanistan et au Mali, et pendant neuf ans j'ai visité régulièrement le Ghana. J'ai aussi parcouru beaucoup de régions des continents d'Asie et d'Afrique. Ma dernière mission, qui avait lieu en janvier et février 1994, m'a amené au Cambodge, où j'ai eu l'occasion de visiter les ruines impressionnantes de l'ancien empire Khmer, y compris Angkor Vat, connues dans le monde entier. Je suis reconnaissant à Dieu pour cette vie enrichissante au cours de laquelle j'ai dû confronter, jour par jour, la réalité des cultures et des civilisations différentes de la nôtre, car je n'ai pas été dans un bureau climatisé d'où je devais envoyer des rapports à mes supérieurs au siège de l'organisation, mais j'ai travaillé directement avec les ressortissants nationaux des pays concernés. C'étaient donc ces expériences qui m'ont amené à consacrer tout mon temps libre, au cours des vingt dernières années quand de New York j'ai entrepris des missions en Afrique ou en Asie, à l'étude des différentes civilisations, à la réflexion sur le phénomène de la globalisation et sur l'interaction entre l'évolution biologique et culturelle.

Il est aussi vrai que je me suis intéressé, depuis toujours, aux autres cultures que la civilisation occidentale. J'étais surpris de retrouver, il y a quelques mois, le texte d'une conférence que j'avais donné à la réunion des jeunes chrétiens-démocrates européens en 1963, qu'à cette époque déjà j'ai considéré notre ère comme celle du conflit ou de dialogue des civilisations — et ceci trente ans avant la parution du fameux article de Samuel Huntington, professeur à l'Université de Harvard, dans la revue *Foreign Affairs*. J'ai porté un grand intérêt à la civilisation islamique depuis ma jeunesse. Ceci s'est manifesté dans le fait que j'ai choisi comme sujet de ma dissertation en vue d'obtenir le grade de docteur en théologie à la Faculté Autonome de Théologie Protestante de l'Université de Genève, le débat et les circonstances entourant la publication du texte latin du Coran à Bâle en 1543, qui reflétait l'attitude des réformateurs à l'égard de l'Islam. A cette occasion, pour la première fois dans l'histoire des académies théologiques de la Suisse, le professeur de la langue et de la littérature arabe à l'Université de Genève était le directeur de ma thèse. Ce livre a été réédité, en langue française et avec un résumé en anglais, même aux Etats-Unis.

La fracture intervenue au sein de la civilisation occidentale au cours des dernières décennies

Au cours des dernières cinquante années, mais particulièrement pendant les deux dernières décennies, une fracture s'est manifestée au sein de la civilisation occidentale. Cette fracture entre les efforts tendant à l'intégration globale, d'une part, et les forces menant à une fragmentation globale, d'autre part, indique, en fin de compte, une crise planétaire, si nous comprenons cette expression en son sens original grec. Le mot grec, *krízis*, désigne une époque dans laquelle l'évolution de l'existence humaine a atteint un point critique, et cette situation nécessite une prise de décision fondamentale. Dans le sens de cette expression en chinois, une crise se réfère à un horizon plus large qui porte en son sein plusieurs possibilités inconnues, c'est-à-dire une situation critique est susceptible de révéler une future alternative par rapport à l'avenir envisagé à présent.¹ Les caractéristiques de la présente situation critique sont les suivantes :

¹ JOHNSTON, R.J. – TAYLOR, P.J. (eds.) *A World in Crisis ? Geographical Perspectives*. 2. ed. Oxford, Blackwell, 1982, pp. 4-5.

- La lente éclipse des illusions héritées du Siècle des lumières ;
- La décolonisation ;
- La globalisation et les grands mouvements migratoires transnationaux ;
- L'avènement, après l'âge des dictatures, de l'époque des hégémonies et, de par cela, la fin du rêve d'une coopération et d'une intégration internationales ; et, enfin,
- Le poids croissant, les exigences incontournables et l'affirmation de l'identité des civilisations autres que celle appelée euro-atlantique, y compris les tendances radicales et le terrorisme — la démocratisation de la violence — c'est-à-dire l'inévitabilité d'un dialogue entre civilisations différentes.

Tous ces événements historiques rendent indispensable l'analyse des concepts de la civilisation, de la culture et de la globalisation dont je parlerai maintenant.

1. CIVILISATION ET CULTURE

Les civilisations que j'appelle aussi 'mondes humains' (ne tenant compte que des civilisations contemporaines) sont, dans ma perspective, les suivantes :

- La civilisation occidentale fondée sur les traditions classique gréco-romaine et l'héritage judéo-chrétien ;
- Les civilisations islamique, bouddhiste et hindou ;
- La civilisation chinoise avec ses deux branches, confucéenne et taoïste, et
- La civilisation constituée par les diverses cultures africaines.

A cause des traits qui unissent une civilisation, on ne peut pas parler des civilisations européenne et américaine, seulement distinguer leurs caractéristiques culturelles. En ce qui concerne l'Amérique du Sud, on ne peut y voir une civilisation particulière, car ses anciennes grandes cultures étaient détruites par les puissances conquérantes, donc les pays se trouvant dans cet espace géographique peuvent être considérés comme appartenant à la civilisation occidentale.

Examinant le fondement des diverses cultures et civilisations nous devons reconnaître que, selon le témoignage de l'histoire, l'existence humaine révèle inévitablement une *perspective transcendante/cosmique* et, pour cette raison, toutes les cultures et toutes les civilisations sont formées autour d'une religion. Au lieu de la simple désignation 'religieux' j'utilise la définition 'transcendante/cosmique', car une religion monothéiste, comme le christianisme, le judaïsme ou l'Islam, ne forme pas le noyau de toutes les civilisations, mais l'impulsion intérieure, créative se rattache dans tous ces ensembles au transcendantal, au dépassement de la réalité d'ici-bas et à la nature, donc l'univers cosmique. Ainsi en ce qui concerne les différentes branches de l'hindouisme ou du bouddhisme il est préférable de parler des religions *meta*-physiques, tandis que concernant le confucianisme ou le shintoïsme nous devons les considérer comme reflétant une conception du monde qui part de la réalité immanente, mais se base sur l'évanescence mortelle de l'existence humaine, autour de laquelle s'est formée une civilisation.

Une telle définition du noyau des cultures et des civilisations indique qu'elles affirment la nature, l'univers cosmique, beaucoup plus grand, beaucoup plus puissant que le monde des êtres humains.

Ceci ressort clairement de la contemplation des peintures chinoises nées, pour la plupart, dans la magnifique région montagneuse du sud-est de la Chine, et dans lesquelles les hommes et les animaux sont toujours négligeables par rapport à la majesté de la nature les entourant. Ainsi, la conception transcendentale/cosmique du monde reflète l'aspect spatial et temporel des cultures et des civilisations ; c'est pour cela que les mythologies et les symboles y jouent un grand rôle.

Une 'culture' — *cultura mentis* selon la définition de Cicéron — est constituée par la religion, la vue sur le monde (*Weltanschauung*), les créations artistique et scientifique, la façon de penser déterminée par les conditions de vie biologique et culturelle, donc la rationalité de la culture, et, finalement, les principes éthiques qui gouvernent les attitudes et les activités de tous les jours des individus et des collectivités. Une culture est, par conséquent, autonome, indépendante des autres 'mondes humains', elle naît des efforts intellectuels communs des individus et de leurs générations successives au cours d'une longue évolution historique.

Une 'civilisation' se forme autour d'une culture donnée et contient, en plus de cette culture, les institutions et pratiques sociales, économiques et politiques (par exemple, formes étatiques ou méthodes de production), les caractéristiques du développement technologique, de même que les conditions de vie déterminées par l'environnement naturel ; en un mot, les perspectives spirituelle, intellectuelle et matérielle de l'existence humaine.

C'est dans ce sens que Robert Cox a écrit dans son article, intitulé *Pensées sur la civilisation*, paru en décembre 2000 que

« La manifestation de tous les jours d'une civilisation n'est pas dans le sentiment d'appartenance. Plutôt dans ce *bon sens* inconscient, authentique, qui s'exprime dans l'image commune que les gens forment de la réalité. Cette conception du monde contient aussi ce qu'ils considèrent correct ou incorrect dans le comportement journalier de chacun. La réflexion sobre, coutumière est, d'une part, un guide normatif dans les activités de tous les jours et, d'autre part, elle reflète l'image que les gens ont de la réalité objective ... Des mots n'ont un sens que dans leur contexte historique ... Les données géographiques constituent, entre autres, le fondement des civilisations. Divers peuples voient la réalité différemment dans la même situation géographique ... [à cause de ceci] la compréhension de la réalité diffère chez ces peuples différents ».²

Ian Hacking, philosophe des sciences d'origine canadienne, analyse, dans l'un de ses articles, les modes de raisonnement (*styles of reasoning*).³ Son point de départ est la constatation que les caractéristiques de la connaissance scientifique acquise à certaines époques ou dans certaines cultures dépendent de la mode de leur raisonnement. Ces différentes modes de raisonnement ne peuvent pas être évaluées ou jugées par des observateurs indépendants, car seulement une mode de raisonnement peut déterminer la qualité et les caractéristiques des connaissances valables. Diverses modes de raisonnement produisent des vérités possibles lesquelles, dans le cadre de ce raisonnement, sont objectivement vraies. Une mode de raisonnement est le produit d'une évolution historique et culturelle. *Ainsi, une mode de raisonnement n'est pas quelque chose qui examine, analyse et explique la réalité, mais fait partie de cette réalité.* Hacking reconnaît, néanmoins, que les données biologiques sont universelles pour toute l'humanité, et que parmi les diverses modes de raisonnement il y a quelque chose que d'aucuns appellent 'traits universels culturels', un noyau de certains traits de la réalité observés communément.

² COX, Robert W. "Thinking About Civilizations." *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 26, décembre 2000, pp. 217-234 ; la citation est sur les pages 217 et 220 Le thème de ce numéro spécial de la publication était le suivant : *How Might We Live ? Global Ethics in a New Century*.

³ HACKING, Ian. "Styles of Scientific Reasoning" In John RAJCHMANN, John et WEST, Cornel. (eds.) *Post-Analytic Philosophy*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1985, pp. 145-165.

Les civilisations et les cultures, quoique produit par les individus et leurs communautés, font partie de l'univers naturel et, pour cette raison, se situent toujours dans la perspective de l'espace et du temps. Ces créations des efforts spirituel et intellectuel de l'homme naissent à la suite d'un long développement influencé par divers facteurs extérieurs et indépendants. Ces facteurs peuvent être rangés en trois catégories : *premièrement*, l'influence de l'environnement naturel constituant le cadre de l'évolution des civilisations ; *deuxièmement*, les traditions transmises de génération en génération ; et, *troisièmement*, les effets inconnus et inattendus de l'action d'autres individus et d'autres communautés humaines qui marquent, en même temps, les limites spatiales et temporelles des divers 'mondes humains' que sont les civilisations.

Les civilisations énumérées ci-dessus peuvent être catégorisées sur la base de différentes caractéristiques : *ethnique* — comme la chinoise ; *religieuse* — comme l'islamique, ou *géographique* — comme l'africaine. La civilisation occidentale représente un cas spécial parce que c'est le qualificatif *moderne* qui exprime son identité et unité. Le moderne signifie que sa conception du monde est basée sur les sciences naturelles, sa caractéristique principale est constituée par la sécularité de sa culture, car ses racines traditionnellement religieuses sont tombées dans l'oubli. La civilisation moderne juge toutes les autres civilisations par ses propres critères culturel et politique, car elle les considère universelles. Avec les mots d'Arif Dirlik, un universitaire américain d'origine iranienne :

« La modernité se définit en se référant à l'Autre comme celle qui la précède ou qui est pré-moderne, et de par cela transforme le concept de la modernité en une affaire intérieure de la [civilisation] européenne .. ». Et Dirlik constate que « les différentes traditions culturelles créent des modernités différentes et déterminent différentes perspectives pour l'avenir »⁴.

Aujourd'hui, on peut illustrer les relations entre civilisations en examinant la paire de concepts à la fois contradictoire et complémentaire : le global et le local.

2. LES CONCEPTS DU GLOBAL ET DU LOCAL

La globalisation se caractérise, à la fois, par l'élargissement horizontal et vertical de l'espace, d'une part, ainsi que par les événements suivant une séquence, mais se déroulant, toutefois, simultanément, d'autre part. Pour cette raison le monde global de notre époque n'est autre chose que le cadre donné pour la co-existence de la pluralité des 'mondes humains'. En même temps, il est caractéristique de la contradiction interne du phénomène de la globalisation d'aujourd'hui qu'il projette même dans le passé l'actuel concept de ce que nous croyons global en éliminant ainsi les diverses et possibles dimensions historiques de la globalité.

Ainsi à l'époque de la modernité tardive, nous sommes en face de deux courants contradictoires dont chacun possède sa propre dialectique. Chaque jour nous vivons l'expérience des vagues toujours plus larges de la globalisation comportant l'élargissement des dimensions spatiale et temporelle et, simultanément, nous sentons chaque jour plus l'importance du contexte local, car ce contexte est dominé par la communauté et la culture des êtres humains concrets. Donc, la globalisation est un processus très complexe, avec des aspects contradictoires, parce qu'il manifeste en même temps l'élargissement universel de l'horizon humain et une fragmentation inévitable au lieu d'une intégration attendue. En conséquence Roland Robertson, professeur à l'Université de Pittsburg, parle de 'l'incertitude' à propos de la globalisation, tandis qu'Immanuel Wallerstein prononce 'la disparition du monde comme nous l'avons connu auparavant'.

⁴ DIRLIK, Arif. *Reconfiguring Modernity : From Modernization to Globalization* (Duke University). <http://www.sidint.org/programmes/politicsplace/politicsDirlik.PDF>, pp. 20 et 21.

Il est regrettable que dans les médias et dans l'opinion publique une image tout à fait simpliste de la globalisation domine. L'analyse du processus de globalisation nous montre pourtant qu'il revêt une quadruple perspective menant à une vision de plus en plus large de ce phénomène :

— *Dans un premier sens*, la globalisation apparaît comme la coopération des marchés financiers et la rapide augmentation d'un commerce mondial englobant tous les pays. En conséquence, beaucoup d'observateurs qualifient le processus comme 'l'intégration du marché'. En ce sens, la globalisation est un résultat logique et incontournable de l'activité du marché et représente un phénomène qui se crée et recrée continuellement lui-même. Avec les mots de John Brohman : « La conception idéologique du marché remplace la multiplicité des marchés qui ont vu le jour au cours de l'évolution historique dans les différents pays du monde »⁵.

— *Le deuxième sens* de la globalisation est un phénomène de masse, aperçu par tout le monde, qui se manifeste dans la forme des mouvements transnationaux (et non internationaux).

— Peu de nos contemporains réalise que dans *une troisième perspective* la globalisation n'est rien d'autre que l'effort hégémonique de la civilisation occidentale et de sa variante américaine pour conquérir le monde. La globalisation comme telle est, en vérité, une idéologie car elle proclame que pour les peuples appartenant à d'autres civilisations que celle euro-atlantique, il n'y a pas d'autre moyen de se moderniser que de 's'occidentaliser' — une idéologie que Theodore von Laue, anciennement professeur à l'Université de Yale, avait désignée dans son livre publié en 1988 comme 'la révolution mondiale de l'occidentalisation' (*The World Revolution of Westernization*). Les exemples d'une telle compréhension de la globalisation sont, entre autres, l'irrésistible mouvement de l'urbanisation sur le plan structurel, l'implantation des Etats-nation sur le plan politique, ou ce qu'on appelle dans le monde anglo-saxon 'consommérisme', sur le plan économique. D'ailleurs, cette vague de consommation effrénée est l'un des moteurs les plus puissants du processus de globalisation, car c'est par ce phénomène qu'on peut anéantir, le plus sûrement possible, les coutumes et les façons de vivre traditionnelles.

— Finalement, dans *la quatrième perspective*, la globalisation est la prise de conscience que le global révèle une vérité fondamentale — ce qui constitue l'autre visage de la globalisation — l'incontournable nécessité d'un dialogue entre les civilisations co-existant dans notre monde d'aujourd'hui. Dans ce sens, la globalisation équivaut à une vision planétaire qui contient tous les 'mondes humains'. Ceci signifie également que certains traits culturels ou de civilisation perdent leur attachement local ; en même temps, cette perspective nous oblige de reconnaître que le global embrasse les différentes parties du monde d'une façon inégale, car sa conquête dépend en premier lieu du contexte du moment, de la classe sociale et de la mode de vie. Ainsi, la globalisation se présente comme un processus qui mène à la formation de plusieurs centres régionaux dans le monde.

Parlant de la globalisation, il faut mettre en évidence l'importance du développement technologique et des intérêts dominants qui sont déterminants pour les relations entre le global et le local, car

— *Premièrement*, c'est le développement des technologies d'information et de communication qui a rendu possible l'interaction entre le global et le local ;

— *Deuxièmement*, malgré le développement autonome des technologies d'information et de communication, ces dernières sont toujours au service de certains intérêts politiques ou économiques déterminés. Je veux dire par cela que les technologies sont toujours à la disposition des pouvoirs politiques et des efforts hégémoniques depuis le début de l'histoire, que ces intérêts soient ceux des fondamentalistes

⁵ BROHMAN, John. "Economism and Critical Silences in Development Studies : A Theoretical Critique of Neoliberalism." *The Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 16, 1995, p. 314.

comme Osama Bin Laden ou ceux, économiques, qui tendent vers une hégémonie dans leur propre secteur d'activité comme dans le cas de Bill Gates. Nous pouvons donc dire avec Nietzsche que la force inhérente dans le processus de globalisation est la 'volonté tendant à l'hégémonie'. Au cours des siècles passés, à cause des caractéristiques propres aux anciennes technologies, le pouvoir s'est imposé crûment et écrasant toute résistance, mais les technologies d'aujourd'hui rendent possible, sinon obligatoire, en raison de l'exigence de la transparence, que les efforts hégémoniques du pouvoir tendent vers ses objectifs d'une façon indirecte en utilisant les caractéristiques culturelles, sociales, politiques ou autres se prévalant dans les différents contextes particuliers. Avec les paroles de Stuart Hall, sociologue britannique, « le global n'est autre que l'autoréalisation de la tendance particulière dominante »⁶, c'est-à-dire que le particulier dominant s'infiltré dans tous les contextes locaux et en devient partie intégrante.

— *Troisièmement*, et finalement, toute politique hégémonique profitant des technologies avancées a besoin d'un moyen institutionnel pour se faire expliquer au public et accepter par lui. C'est l'idéologie de la globalisation qui joue ce rôle et garantit que les informations transmises par les médias soient correctes et cohérentes. Ce sont naturellement les médias qui, en premier lieu, diffusent cette idéologie et maintient la foi du public dans l'avancement irrésistible du processus de la globalisation.

3. TRAITS SIMILAIRES ET DIFFERENCES FONDAMENTALES DES CIVILISATIONS

Les similarités entre civilisations découlent de deux sources différentes. La première source est *l'évolution biologique* qui constitue la base de l'existence humaine et par laquelle tous les êtres humains sont caractérisés par certains traits communs, corporels et mentaux. Ceci ne concerne pas seulement des faits proprement biologiques, mais aussi des traits psychologiques ou sentimentaux qui sont indispensables pour notre existence. Tel est l'amour des parents envers leurs enfants, car si le maintien de l'espèce humaine est le but de la lutte existentielle, on doit ranger dans cette catégorie, du point de vue biologique, l'attitude des parents vers leur progéniture. Ceci ne signifie naturellement pas que de tels sentiments ne se manifestent pas différemment dans les différentes cultures, non plus que ces sentiments puissent avoir non seulement une fonction biologique mais également une valeur spirituelle.

Certaines compétences humaines doivent aussi être considérées comme biologiquement fondées, ainsi, par exemple, la capacité d'apprendre des langues, quoiqu'il dépend de l'environnement culturel quelle langue et par quel moyen nous apprenons. Je suis aussi convaincu que le besoin instinctif de l'homme d'exprimer son identité, ses pensées, sa vue du monde, donc le besoin d'expression par la création artistique, est aussi fondé biologiquement, mais les formes d'une telle expression varient parallèlement avec la variation de l'environnement naturel et culturel. Enfin, le besoin humain d'ouvrir son existence vers le transcendantal et le cosmique est aussi un fait biologique, la preuve en est que toutes les civilisations se sont cristallisées autour d'un centre religieux. Ceci est motivé par la conscience de la mort, une compétence exclusivement humaine, reconnue également par la théorie de la biologie évolutionniste.

La seconde source des traits communs des civilisations est *l'environnement naturel et humain*. Il est universellement reconnu que l'environnement naturel est un déterminant fondamental de l'existence humaine, mais cet environnement n'engendre pas seulement des similarités entre les 'mondes des hommes', il crée également des perspectives différentes. La façon de vivre de ceux qui vivent dans les climats tempérés est nettement différente de ceux qui vivent dans les climats tropiques. Je n'oublie jamais que lorsque j'ai vécu à Bamako, capitale du Mali en Afrique occidentale, j'étais surpris en traversant le pont

⁶ HALL, Stuart. *The « Local and the Global : Globalization and Ethnicity »*. in KING, Anthony D. (ed.) *Culture, Globalization, and the World-System : Contemporary Conditions for the Representation of Identity*. 2. ed. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1992, p. 37.

sur le Niger un matin du mois de novembre que les gens allaient sur bicyclette vers leur lieu de travail avec des bonnets tricotés sur leur tête. J'ai demandé à mon chauffeur pourquoi cette habitude quand, pour moi, le temps était très chaud et humide. Il m'a répondu : « Patron, chez nous c'est l'hiver et les gens se protègent pour ne pas attraper un froid ».

On peut trouver beaucoup d'exemples d'adaptation aux différentes conditions environnementales naturelles et humaines, et dans la plupart des cas ces conditions s'amalgament avec les données culturelles régnant dans une société particulière comme, par exemple, dans la formation des agglomérations, dans la nécessité et les modes de construction des cabanes, des yourtes, des maisons ou des gratte-ciel, etc. Tournant de nouveau vers les arts, on ne peut expliquer que par l'évolution culturelle la floraison des arts différents dans la vie de certains peuples et à certaines époques — comme les créations littéraires et artistiques dans l'Athènes classique au 5^{ème} siècle avant Jésus Christ, ou les réalisations philosophiques, musicales ou littéraires dans les pays de langue allemande au tournant du 18^{ème} et 19^{ème} siècles.

En ce qui concerne les différences entre civilisations, elles sont surtout déterminées par l'évolution culturelle : Je vais maintenant illustrer ces différences par des exemples qui reflètent les problèmes les plus actuels dans les sphères sociale, politique et économique.

Tout d'abord, je parlerai de l'interpénétration très particulière de l'individualisme et de l'universalisme dans notre culture dont les conséquences sont immenses pour la vie sociale. Ma thèse est la suivante : après le Siècle des lumières, l'évolution de la société s'est fait non seulement sur la base d'un individualisme intégral, mais dans sa phase tardive, au cours la seconde moitié du 20^{ème} siècle, cet individualisme était artificiellement amalgamé avec la tendance universaliste issue, elle aussi, du Siècle des lumières. Je dois dire, avant tout, que je ne veux pas critiquer l'individualisme raisonnable car, comme c'était reconnu depuis l'aube de l'histoire, la personne humaine est porteur du destin de notre espèce et toutes les communautés humaines — familles, groupes ethniques, nations ou communautés religieuses — se composent d'individus. En fin de compte, le sort des individus et de leurs communautés chevauche entièrement. Mais justement cette vue que beaucoup appellent holistique, était disparue au cours du développement du monde moderne, car l'individu était revêtu d'une primauté absolue par rapport à sa communauté ou par rapport à n'importe quelle autre collectivité.

Adam Seligman exprime le mieux cet idéal universel de l'individualisme en écrivant qu'à la fin de l'évolution moderne « l'universel et le particulier se sont totalement confondus »⁷. L'individualisme est précisément l'une des sources de l'universalisme, parce qu'il prête un caractère universel à l'individu. Le sujet disposant d'une existence autonome, lié aux autres individus seulement par une sorte d'égalité 'métaphysique', est ainsi devenu universel. En même temps, cet individu en tant que personne, a perdu les traits caractéristiques, uniques, de sa personnalité, car l'essence de l'individu n'est plus défini que par ce qui le lie à tous les autres êtres humains. La personne en tant que telle est devenue une formule vidée de tout essence, et dans les conceptions actuelles de la pensée scientifique est déterminée comme l'ensemble des préférences et des intérêts universels.

L'acceptation de cette conception abstraite de l'individu a eu des conséquences très importantes du point de vue de structuration sociale. Aujourd'hui les sociétés occidentales se composent d'individus autonomes qui se côtoient comme des atomes solitaires et font face aussi solitairement à l'Etat tout-puissant. Du point de vue social et politique rien ne les lie aux autres qui vivent dans leur environnement que le fait qu'ils sont, tous, les citoyens d'un même Etat. D'une part, la liberté individuelle n'est limitée que par les lois de l'Etat ou les réglementations d'autres institutions publiques auxquelles les individus sont soumis ; d'autre part, les citoyens dépendent de l'Etat et lui sont livrés dans une telle mesure que, précisément pour

⁷ SELIGMAN, Adam. "Towards a Reinterpretation of Modernity in an Age of Postmodernity." In TURNER, Bryan S. (ed.) *Theories of Modernity and Postmodernity*. Newbury Park, Cal., SAGE Publications 1990, p. 124.

contrebalancer cette inégalité totale entre les hommes et leurs Etats, il s'est avéré nécessaire d'élaborer un système des droits de l'homme. Donc, l'atomisation de la société correspond à l'idéal de l'universalisme qui, dans son regard, embrasse toujours toute l'humanité. *Contrairement à ceci, dans toutes les autres civilisations se sont les communautés et non pas les individus qui composent, en premier lieu, la société.*

Dans le domaine de la politique, l'institution des Etats-nations constitués sur un territoire donné, qui était imposée par force aux peuples appartenant aux autres civilisations, représente la fracture la plus importante entre les civilisations co-existant sur la globe aujourd'hui. La création d'Etats souverains nécessite l'existence de deux conditions préalables :

- *D'abord*, la primauté de l'individu par rapport aux communautés diverses vivant sur le territoire du futur Etat, c'est-à-dire l'exigence de loyauté exclusive des individus à l'Etat et non pas à une communauté ;
- *Ensuite*, l'absence de toutes autres organisations dans la vie publique qui pourrait concurrencer l'Etat.

En conséquence, l'imposition de l'Etat territorial aux peuples se trouvant en dehors du monde occidental a aboli toutes les formes de coopération coutumières dans les sociétés civiles, formes qui assuraient le mouvement libre des personnes et des marchandises à travers les limites de domination à peine reconnaissables entre différents pays. L'application du principe de la territorialité a ainsi signifié que ces limites de domination à peine reconnaissables auparavant deviennent des frontières définitives et infranchissables compliquant, d'une façon inimaginable, la vie des populations frontalières, issues de la même ethnie dans la plupart des cas, qui devenaient citoyens de deux Etats souverains différents. Ces nouveaux Etats, que certains auteurs occidentaux qualifient de 'quasi-Etats'⁸, devaient trouver une nouvelle identité, une identité nationale, qui ne correspondait pas du tout aux identités traditionnelles des collectivités — élaborées au cours de l'évolution culturelle pendant des siècles — se trouvant sur leur territoire. La destruction de ces identités traditionnelles a créé les conditions nécessaires pour la fragmentation des populations en des petites communautés ethniques, religieuses ou autres menant, en conséquence, aux conflits locaux qui se manifestent partout et qui représentent un grand danger pour le system interétatique actuel.

Avant le colonialisme, nous connaissons deux formes d'organisation de l'espace politique dans les civilisations non-occidentales : (i) Les grands empires dans lesquels les territoires et les communautés étaient reliés entre eux par des liens tenus, et (ii) les ensembles politiques, petits et moyens — comme, par exemple, les cité-états, tribus, groupes ethniques — dans lesquels l'autorité de la personne qui se trouvait à leur tête représentait la seule source de légitimité. *Dans ces formes d'organisation politique la pluralité était le principal facteur de structuration de la société.* C'était justement la fragmentation de l'espace qui jouait le rôle équilibrant entre différentes entités politiques parce que les multiples espaces alternatives avaient empêché les efforts d'unification territoriale et l'homogénéisation des identités selon un modèle déterminé. En conséquence, l'introduction de l'institution de l'Etat territorial dans le monde non-occidental était contraire aux exigences de la réalité sociale.

L'introduction de cet institution s'était fait dans la forme d'Etats-nation, là où il n'y avait pas de nation. C'était un acte parfaitement illusoire qui correspondait à la tendance universaliste de l'Occident. Personne ne voulait parler du fait que dans les civilisations non-occidentales il n'y avait jamais des nations, qui devaient être artificiellement créées au moment de la décolonisation par la propagande, la mobilisation politique et la promesse des miracles de la modernisation. Quand je parle de la création artificielle des nouveaux ensembles politiques, j'entends par cela qu'il n'y avait pas un groupe ethnique ou une communauté religieuse ou culturelle sur lesquels on aurait pu fonder un Etat-nation. Ce fait a obligé les

⁸ Voir à ce sujet : JACKSON, Robert H. *Quasi-States : Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990.

dirigeants des nouveaux Etats qui avaient conduit la lutte pour l'indépendance, qu'ils déclarent le nouvel Etat celui de leur propre groupe ethnique considéré comme nation. En même temps, ces dirigeants ne voulaient absolument pas renoncer à aucune partie du territoire hérité de la puissance coloniale et, pour cette raison, ils ont fait tout ce qui était dans leur pouvoir — dans la plupart des cas sans succès — d'initier la formation d'une nouvelle identité territoriale et nationale afin d'unifier les groupes ethniques ou religieux en les intégrant dans la nouvelle nation. Il fallait créer des nations sans une telle évolution historique qui, en Europe, a préparé le terrain pour la fondation des Etats-nationaux. L'issue d'une telle situation ne pouvait être autre que la prise de pouvoir d'un leader charismatique et populaire au sens de Max Weber, quoique ces leaders n'étaient en général pas apte pour construire un système institutionnel politique et lancer le développement économique. Pour cette raison, la plupart des régimes démocratiques dans le monde non-occidental s'orientent vers un populisme plus ou moins radical.

Après la Seconde Guerre Mondiale le nombre d'Etats-nationaux souverains a augmenté énormément. En vertu de la thèse wilsonienne de l'autodétermination collective et les principes du droit international concernant la succession des Etats, le passage du pouvoir du métropole colonial aux autorités locales était assuré par le système interétatique. Ceci a signifié qu'en raison du principe de l'autodétermination comme impératif moral, les nouveaux Etats étaient investis par l'Organisation des Nations Unies des signes négatifs de la souveraineté — par exemple, l'interdiction de l'ingérence dans leurs affaires intérieures par d'autres Etats — mais les caractéristiques positives de la souveraineté concernant la construction de la vie intérieure de l'Etat, les Nations Unies ne pouvaient pas offrir à ses nouveaux membres. Ainsi, les autres membres de l'organisation interétatique leur avaient mis à disposition une sorte de fonds d'assistance internationale en forme de crédits, de dons et de coopération technique, pour que les nouveaux Etats puissent acquérir les caractéristiques intérieures de la souveraineté — l'organisation d'une armée et de la police, par exemple, ou la modernisation économique et sociale, tant souhaitée, de leur pays.

Finalement, les Etats anciennement colonisés, en raison de l'application extensive du principe d'autodétermination, étaient aussi bénéficiaires d'une faveur particulière car, en vertu de l'idéal de l'Etat territorial, l'intouchabilité de leurs frontières héritées des pouvoirs coloniaux étaient garanties par la communauté internationale. En conséquence, les limites artificielles séparant les nouveaux Etats, limites nées d'accidents historiques ('où deux armées coloniales se sont rencontrées' comme on le dit), avaient reçu une légitimation de cette communauté.

Comme dernier exemple des différences séparant les civilisations je parlerai du problème du développement économique et social, un domaine où j'ai beaucoup d'expériences personnelles. La question de développement est étroitement liée au processus de globalisation dont nous avons déjà parlé. La globalisation en général, et la globalisation économique en particulier, signifient que nos concepts, méthodes et institutions, qui étaient nés d'une longue évolution historique dans l'orbite de la culture européenne, peuvent être facilement transplantés dans d'autres contextes, dans le 'monde humain' d'autres civilisations. Cette approche nie sciemment non seulement l'incommensurabilité des civilisations diverses, mais signifie aussi que le principe du pluralisme, admis et prisé dans le cadre de la civilisation occidentale, est écarté en ce qui concerne les nouveaux Etats. Cela veut dire que l'exigence du pluralisme n'est valable que pour les pays et cultures appartenant à la civilisation occidentale.

L'élaboration d'un modèle général a impliqué la méconnaissance et l'ignorance voulues des différentes données et conditions prévalant dans les pays nouvellement indépendants. J'ai qualifié ce modèle dans la discussion avec mes collègues travaillant avec le Fonds Monétaire International ou avec la Banque Mondiale, leur 'Bible', car on ne peut pas discuter sur les thèses et sur l'*a priori* suppositions qui sont à la base de ce modèle. *En conséquence, les anciennes structures sociales, les coutumes et modes de vie hérités du passé, sont entièrement disparues afin de faire place aux institutions, structures, coutumes et façon de vivre, empruntées de l'Occident et faisant partie du model.* Ceci a créé une fracture psychologique et culturelle dans les peuples concernés, car les concepts, méthodes et activités que comporte le processus de modernisation, sont en contradiction avec les données locales et contextuelles. Quoiqu'on ait perdu beaucoup de temps, il n'est pas encore trop tard de renverser ce trend. Ceci imposerait une réflexion nouvelle de la part de tous ceux qui sont intéressés par le problème de la modernisation, en particulier de ceux responsables de la vie sociale, économique et politique — une réflexion menant à une réévaluation des

programmes de modernisation en fonction des données locales culturelles, en adaptant les concepts, méthodes et institutions importés aux données de la civilisation. Ceci permettrait de reformuler, tout en tenant également compte des incidences écologiques, les perspectives de développement de chaque pays de l'Asie, de l'Afrique et de l'Amérique du Sud.

La plus grande erreur de la théorie et de la pratique de la modernisation était, au 20^{ème} siècle, de croire dans l'universalité, dans l'applicabilité planétaire, des doctrines libérales de marché et des doctrines socialistes de planification centrale. Il n'y a aucune proportion entre l'ordre de l'assistance financière, étatique ou privée, les investissements et l'assistance technique, d'une part, et les résultats obtenus, d'autre part. Cette approche comportait encore une autre erreur inadmissible en excluant la possibilité de toute réalité jusqu'ici inconnue, de toute solution nouvelle aux problèmes qui pourraient se présenter dans l'orbite d'autres cultures et de civilisations. L'insuccès des efforts de développement et la résistance croissante contre l'influence écrasante de l'Occident dénotent clairement les erreurs commises par l'idéologie de la globalisation sociale, économique et politique.

4. PLURALISME DES CIVILISATIONS OU CULTURE MONDIALE ?

Aux yeux de beaucoup de nos contemporains le succès du processus de la globalisation et l'extension de la civilisation occidentale sur toute la planète paraît être irrésistible, quoique des changements ne soient perceptibles que sur la surface de l'existence des hommes vivant dans les mondes d'autres civilisations. Ainsi l'approche dualiste, selon laquelle il y a une fracture fondamentale entre la civilisation de l'Occident et toutes les autres civilisations, est aussi valable aujourd'hui qu'après la Seconde Guerre Mondiale quand, à la suite de la décolonisation, le problème des différences culturelles s'est révélé d'importance sur la scène mondiale. C'est ainsi que s'est exprimé Simon Murden, professeur à l'Académie militaire de la Grande-Bretagne, dans son livre publié l'année passée :

« [Après la fin de la guerre froide] ... les dirigeants occidentaux ne voulaient pas reconnaître l'existence de diverses civilisations, quand ils ont affirmé la prééminence du libéralisme. Pour l'Occident il était mieux de définir la civilisation de telle façon qu'elle corresponde au norme universel du bien, c'est-à-dire de telle manière que la civilisation soit identique avec le norme universel du libéralisme, quoiqu'il était important que cette définition ne soit pas la même que celle de la civilisation occidentale »⁹.

La fracture entre civilisations fournit la preuve de l'impossibilité de transférer les caractéristiques culturelles fondamentales d'une civilisation à l'autre. En ignorant, sous prétexte de la modernisation, les différences entre les données culturelles, les systèmes de valeur et les modes de vie, les puissances occidentales et les organisations internationales s'efforcent d'imposer les caractéristiques de la civilisation occidentale sur les peuples d'autres orbites culturelles. Se comportant ainsi, ils ont créé les conditions d'une résistance farouche de ces peuples qui défendent eux-mêmes, leur propre foi, leurs propres valeurs et leur façon de vivre. Cette attitude d'autodéfense culturelle se manifeste ou dans les fondamentalismes religieux qui essayent de protéger leur croyance et leur vue du monde traditionnelle contre une culture étrangère séculière, ou dans le réveil de la solidarité ethnique qui fait éclater les sociétés. Cette attitude s'efforce, dans les deux cas, de préserver l'identité collective des différents peuples.

Cette situation est un fait. Il est important, toutefois, quelles conséquences nous tirons de cette réalité. Celle, par exemple, avec Samuel Huntington que l'Occident doit se défendre contre les attaquants comme une population enfermée dans une forteresse, ou celle que nous devons chercher, sur la base d'une compréhension mutuelle, le dialogue avec les civilisations non-occidentales. Au cas d'un dialogue entre civilisations, les deux parties doivent, obligatoirement, accepter les principes suivants de comportement :

⁹ MURDEN, Simon. *Islam, the Middle East and the New Global Hegemony*. London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, p. 38.

- *Premièrement*, admettre l'existence de l'autre civilisation avec ses traits différents de ceux prévalant dans sa propre civilisation ;
- *Deuxièmement*, montrer une compréhension sincère de la mode de pensée, de la sensibilité, de la foi et des principes moraux des autres ;
- *Troisièmement*, essayer d'évaluer et de juger les perspectives existentielles et les actes de l'autre non selon nos propres principes et conceptions, mais selon les siennes.

Un tel effort ne signifie pas la renonciation à notre propre identité et mode de vie, c'est-à-dire la relativisation des principes et des valeurs de notre culture, mais nécessite inévitablement une disponibilité d'apprendre de l'autre. Tous les participants au dialogue devront être prêts à insérer dans leur propre 'monde humain', dans leur propre contexte, des éléments empruntés d'une autre civilisation si de tels éléments se prêtent mieux à la réalisation de certains objectifs humains — sans changer, évidemment, les bases culturelles de leur propre civilisation. Malheureusement, pour la plupart de nos contemporains le pluralisme culturel signifie la relativisation des principes, traditions, valeurs, modes de vie et, plus particulièrement, des convictions religieuses, et pour cette raison refusent de dialoguer avec les autres. *C'est une erreur fondamentale, car jeter un pont à travers les différences de civilisation n'est pas une question de croyance, n'est pas un problème d'ordre moral ou de la nécessité de changer sa mode de vie, mais une question de comprendre les autres hommes et d'accepter leur monde tel qu'il est.* Si la relativité des perspectives domine dans le monde des hommes, alors il n'y a pas des vérités éternelles, et la réalité apparaît différente à tout le monde. Malgré ceci, il y a partout des savants, des philosophes et l'homme de la rue qui s'attachent à l'idée de la réalité objective (ce qui est, bien entendu, correcte en ce qui concerne les sciences naturelles) en niant, de par cela, les différences culturelles. Il y a aussi des penseurs occidentaux qui considèrent les différences culturelles comme les stations successives sur la route du progrès vers des idéaux toujours plus hauts — ces derniers correspondant, naturellement, aux caractéristiques de notre propre civilisation. La différence entre civilisations est aussi la réfutation d'une thèse idéologique visant à éliminer ces différences, notamment la thèse concernant l'avènement d'une culture globale. L'idée de la culture globale n'est pas autre chose qu'un rêve cauchemardesque sans aucun fondement dans la réalité. Dans une culture globale sans perspective temporelle on vit dans l'enchantement du moment toujours fuyant ; cette culture n'est qu'une fantasmagorie, un pur produit de l'imagination auquel manque tout fondement historique.

Un dialogue des civilisations suppose que les peuples appartenant à d'autres civilisations soient susceptibles d'emprunter de l'Occident ses résultats et méthodes scientifiques, ses technologies, même si cette adoption nécessite une adaptation sociale et culturelle. De même, le régime des droits de l'homme pourrait être intégré dans la mode de vie d'autres civilisations parce que cet aspect important de l'existence humaine ne peut être transplanté, sur commande, dans d'autres contextes, mais doit être inséré dans des circonstances culturelles différentes après l'adaptation de ces dernières tout en tenant compte des caractéristiques invariables de la civilisation concernée. En même temps, l'Occident devrait également être disponible à adopter certains traits des autres civilisations comme, par exemple, le sentiment de profonde solidarité humaine qui est presque disparu de notre société, ou l'inspiration religieuse menant à une rénovation du fondement transcendantal/cosmique de notre culture qui l'a perdu en cours de route vers la modernité. Pour terminer, me référant à la religiosité de notre époque de modernité tardive, je voudrais citer Richard Falk, professeur à Princeton et l'un des protagonistes les plus connus de 'global governance', qui s'est exprimé ainsi dans l'un de ses derniers livres :

« A la possibilité d'un gouvernement global sans identité religieuse manque tout fondement social ou politique ... à défaut de cela il n'aura pas le caractère spirituel qui, du point de vue de motivation et de mobilisation des gens, représente une force beaucoup plus grande que le marché, la rationalité séculière ou n'importe quelle sorte de nationalisme »¹⁰.

¹⁰ FALK, Richard. *The Religion and Humane Global Governance*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 2001, p. 10.

Human Rights and Protection of Minorities

ON DISCRIMINATION AND ITS DIFFERENT CATEGORIES*

A brief inquiry into the juridical literature and the relevant documents reveals very quickly the lack of an appropriate treatment of the problem of discrimination in general and neither its definition nor an exhaustive list of its different categories can be found in the handbooks and in the monographs. The only aspect of discrimination which received lot of attention – especially before 1950 – was the problem of minorities. It became a subject of legal research and of international pronouncements mainly between the two World Wars when all the successor states of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire had in their respective territories, minorities of a considerable size. The nationalist trend being dominant in the area, the minority problem became more and more acute and not only the attention of the interested countries but even that of international public opinion was in growing proportion focused on it. A number of petitions have been addressed to the various instances which were obliged to acknowledge the importance of the problem and take some resolutions concerning it, especially the Council of the League of Nations.

However, after the Second World War the minority problem, although still existent, remained somewhat in the background and discrimination in general grew more and more important as it appeared in its various forms in an ever greater number of countries. The main reasons for this phenomena are to be found in the following changes which have taken place on the world scene – the birth of totalitarian regimes since 1917 whose policies are admittedly discriminatory as deriving from their respective ideologies as well as the process of decolonization or, in other words, the emancipation of the formerly dependant countries of Asia and Africa.

The existence of totalitarian regimes is, in fact, only a symptom of the tendency of contemporary evolution toward monolithic spiritual, ideological, political or social systems and attitudes. Its forms vary from the Communist system of the Socialist bloc countries through Egypt of President Gamal Abdel Nasser to the feudal-like despotism of President Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam, – but it is always linked with an ideology, i.e., it represents a coherent system of beliefs and values, a spiritual position, whether it be Marxism-Leninism, Arab socialism or the confused personalism created by the Diem clan. The degrees of domination vary also in the various totalitarian regimes: in some of them, the State controls the whole life of its component groups and individuals, like in Communist countries, in others it leaves the private life of the individual more or less untouched, – in this case the regime is sometimes called authoritarian, – but it is always bound to practice discrimination because this derives from an internal, inevitable necessity of its existence.

The process of decolonization had a triple effect:

a) The awakening of the consciousness of individuals, groups or peoples discriminated against, for example, in the still colonial territories (Portuguese Africa), or in territories under minority rule (South Africa), or re-enforcement of the consciousness of minorities suffering from discrimination in the case of the American Negroes;

* I wrote this working paper in 1963 at the request of Dr. Edward Kozera, Secretary General of the *International Commission of Jurists* in Geneva, at a time when I wrote my doctoral dissertation in political science and worked, part time, with the Commission.

b) Domination of an overwhelming nationalism in the newly independent countries, which involves discrimination of all kinds even against groups or minorities hitherto sharing the common fate of colonial discriminatory practices with the ruling nation or social strata;

c) Discrimination in the same countries mentioned above as a psychologically compensatory reaction to the discrimination suffered in the past (e.g., against whites).

Despite these new trends, authors did not pay too much attention until now to the problem of discrimination, except in their analysis of those human rights spelled out in the Universal Declaration. Even the works concerned with the latter, treat only two aspects of discrimination: the historical background of developments since the Second World War, or the international protection of human rights as expressed in the various documents of international or regional organizations and the efforts undertaken to put them into practice. However, the United Nations Organization and its specialized agencies realized the growing importance of discrimination in today's world and published a number of studies treating of the problem of discrimination in general or of its different forms. In the preparation of this Working Paper, mainly these studies, listed at the end, have been constantly used, in the framework of, and complemented by some personal considerations.

I. DEFINITION OF DISCRIMINATION

The word 'discrimination' is used here in its pejorative sense, i.e., it is used to refer not to all differentiations, but only to distinctions which have been established to the detriment of individuals belonging to a particular group, or to the detriment of a group as a whole.

The general principle of non-discrimination was proclaimed in the *Charter of the United Nations*, Article 1, paragraph 3 of which states that one of the purposes of the United Nations is to "achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion." A similar formula is used in Articles 55 and 76.

This general principle is reaffirmed and developed in the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, notably in Article 2, which reads:

"Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it is independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty."

Article 7 of the *Universal Declaration* specifies, in addition, that

"All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination."

The *European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms* expresses, in turn, in almost the same terms, the principle of non-discrimination in its Article 14:

"The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, color, language, religion, and political or other opinion national or social origin, association with a national minority, property birth or other status."

In the framework of the United Nations Organization, under the authority of the Economic and Social Council, a *Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities*, created by the Commission on Human Rights, was charged to elaborate appropriate recommendations concerning a Universal Declaration and an International Covenant on Human Rights. The Economic and Social Council, at its sixth session, requested the Secretary General (Resolution 11 (VI) B):

"To organize studies and prepare analyses designed to assist the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in determining the main types of discrimination which impede the equal enjoyment by all of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the causes of such discrimination; the result of such studies and analyses to be made available to the members of the Sub-Commission."

The outcome of the work undertaken on the order of the Secretary General following the above request was a memorandum entitled: *The Main Types and Causes of Discrimination* published in 1949 at Lake Success.

This study suggests the following definition of discrimination: "Discrimination might be defined as a detrimental distinction based on grounds which may not be attributed to the individual and which have no justified consequences in social, political or legal relations (color, race, sex, etc.), or on grounds of membership in social categories (cultural, linguistic, religious, political or other opinion, national origin, social class, property, birth or other status)." Or, in other words, discriminatory practices are those detrimental distinctions which do not take into account the particular characteristics of an individual as such, but take into account only collective qualifications deriving from his membership in a certain social, cultural or other group.

It seems, however, that this definition is not entirely correct. It indicates as subject of discrimination only the individual, without taking into consideration that a group of individuals as a whole can also be discriminated against. In this respect, one has to recall that the Sub-Committee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities – although it decided not to attempt any legal definition of the two terms 'discrimination and minority' – suggested that the final drafting of articles on the prevention of discrimination and the protection of minorities be facilitated by some considerations, and recognizes as subjects of discrimination, individuals as well as groups of individuals:

"1. Prevention of discrimination is the prevention of any action which denies to Individuals or groups of people equality of treatment which they may wish.

2. Protection of minorities is the protection of non-dominant groups which, while wishing in general for equality of treatment with the majority, wish for a measure of differential treatment in order to preserve basic characteristics which they possess and which distinguish them from the majority of the population. The protection applies equally to individuals belonging to such groups and wishing the same protection. It follows that differential treatment of such groups or individuals belonging to such groups are justified when it is exercised in the interest of their contentment and the welfare of the community as a whole. The characteristics meriting such protection are race, religion and language" (E/CN.4/52, Chapter V).

The Commission of Human Rights, at its second session, approved the text on the prevention of discrimination submitted by the Sub-Commission, but postponed consideration of the text on the protection of minorities (E/600, paragraphs 39 and 40).

Historical facts prove also that either groups or individuals can be discriminated against. The recent developments in South Viet-Nam, a topic of particular interest today, can be quoted to illustrate this affirmation. The so-called 'Buddhist crisis' started in Hue, former capital of the Annamite kingdom, by

a discrimination against Buddhists as a group. The Buddhist celebrated the 2527th anniversary of the birth of their Lord Gautama Buddha on May 8, and thousands of them assembled for prayers, sermons and processions. But Archbishop Ngo Dinh Thuc, elder brother of President Diem, planning his silver jubilee as a bishop, could not tolerate on the streets the sight of Buddhist banners. Through his influence, – the governor of Hue and of Central Viet-Nam is another of the Diem brothers – the Government forbade the flying of religious flags, and local troops tried to prevent the Buddhists unfurling their banners. An obscure officer ordered his men to shoot. Nine women and children were killed. As there is no doubt that the Roman Catholics were entirely free to use their banners in processions, it is evident that the Hue incident constituted a clear-cut case of religious discrimination against the Buddhists as a group – by denying equality of treatment to the majority religion (about 80% of the South Vietnamese population is Buddhist).

On the basis of the preceding considerations, I would like to suggest the following definition: *Discrimination is a detrimental distinction against groups of people or individuals belonging to them, on grounds which have no justified consequences in social, political or legal relations, or on grounds of being constituent or belonging to particular social categories.*

This formula keeps the formal character of the one quoted above, correcting, however, its shortcoming as to the possible subjects of discrimination.

In order to avoid misunderstandings, one qualification has to be made concerning the concept of discrimination. When reference is made to 'discriminatory measures,' and it must be born in mind that the expression cannot be applied equally to any unjust discriminatory measures ignoring certain legitimate distinctions envisaged to restore rather than to prevent equality in the enjoyment of human rights. The same practice may have several different aspects: from the point of view of the individual it may be discriminatory, whereas from the standpoint of the authorities, it is merely a matter of protection or 'compensation.' This is a difficult subject and no hard-and-fast lines can be drawn. However, it would seem clear that a measure of this kind can be legitimate only if it is temporary, i.e., is not applied for period longer than is necessary to redress the *de facto* inequality between groups due to the economic, social or cultural conditions which prevailed in the country before its adoption.

In two cases distinctions, which do not constitute discrimination, are justified. They refer to discrimination against individuals: i) differences of conduct imputable or attributable to an individual, that is to say, controlled by him (i.e., industriousness, idleness, carefulness, carelessness, decency, indecency, merit, demerit, lawfulness, delinquency); ii) differences in individual qualities not imputable to the person, but having a social value (physical or mental capacity).

II. DISCRIMINATION OR PROTECTION OF MINORITIES

The change introduced in the definition of discrimination has a very important consequence as to the difference between prevention of discrimination and protection of minorities pointed out by the study prepared at the instruction of the Secretary General of the United Nations. In fact, this memorandum declares that discrimination implies any act or conduct which denies to certain individuals equality of treatment with other individuals because they belong to particular groups in society. To prevent discrimination, therefore, some means must be found to suppress or eliminate inequality of treatment which may have harmful results, aiming at the prevention of any act or conduct which implies that an unfavorable distinction is made between individuals solely because they belong to certain categories or groups of society. Thus, the prevention of discrimination means the suppression or prevention of any conduct which denies or restricts a person's right to equality.

The protection of minorities, according to the same memorandum, requires, although similarly inspired by the principle of equality of treatment of all people, a positive action; a concrete service is rendered to the minority group, such as the establishment of schools in which education is given in the native tongue of the members of the group. The protection of minorities therefore requires positive action to safeguard the rights of the minority group.

The conclusions of the United Nations study reads then as follows:

"As the ultimate goal of the protection of the minorities differs from that of the prevention of discrimination, the two questions must be dealt with in different ways. No contradiction exists, of course, in aiming simultaneously at the prevention of discrimination and the protection of minorities. In each case it is desired to obtain and effectively to maintain equality of treatment of all peoples. The difference arises from the wishes of the people concerned. Those affected by any plan designed to protect minorities are free to choose whether they wish to share the cultural and educational life of the majority without any distinction (no discrimination being imposed), or whether they wish to maintain the culture of their national, linguistic or religious group. Thus, it may be said that the prevention of discrimination and the protection of minorities represent different aspects of the same principle of equality of treatment of all."

It seems, however, that against this conception one can oppose a threefold argument:

1. As, according to our definition, discrimination is not only practiced against individuals belonging to a certain social group, but against such a group itself, it is evident that the prevention of discrimination needs also positive measures. It would be preferable to drop entirely this distinction between negative and positive measures in the prevention of discrimination and protection of minorities as it appears artificial and, in considering a concrete governmental policy, not at all useful. Furthermore, the expression used by the United Nations publication, 'Prevention of Discrimination,' should be replaced because it is incomplete and ambivalent; to speak about 'elimination of discrimination' gives the full value to the intentions and actions hidden behind governmental policies aiming at abolishing discrimination, and would indicate the necessity of not only negative, but positive measures too.

2. The above quoted memorandum makes also another mistake in considering merely the cultural and educational claims of minorities, or, rather, in limiting the protection of their rights to these two fields. The authors of the study seem to forget that minorities can be deprived of their political rights too, etc. Thus, the field of protection of minorities needs to be enlarged in order to assure the full enjoyment of the rights listed in the Universal Declaration for the whole community.

3. The standpoint of the United Nations memorandum is understandable when it points out that, in the case of minorities, there is discrimination if the majority impedes their assimilation – suppose that the minorities wish to be assimilated. One has to wonder if it ever happened in the course of human history that a majority did not want to assimilate a minority. It can be proved that such a supposition is not at all realistic, the problem is rather how to defend the minorities against the assimilatory tendencies of the majority?

Consequently, after all these arguments, the conclusion is clear: there are no such fundamental differences between the elimination of discrimination and the protection of minorities as pointed out by the above-mentioned memorandum, the latter is nothing else but a specific case of the former. The final sentence of the passage quoted appears to be in contradiction with what precedes it, but this impression is not correct. The statement is actually justified and explained: the elimination of discrimination and the protection of minorities are "different aspects of the same principle of equality of all." [Concerning this problem see the corresponding section of the *Study of Discrimination in Education* prepared by Charles D. Ammoun and by the United Nations in August 1957, pp. 5-6].

III. THE ROOTS OF DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES

There are two kinds of discriminatory practices as the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities states:

- a) Those 'economic, social, political or historic in character', and
- b) Those 'resulting from a policy evidently intended to originate, maintain or aggravate such practices.'

The adjectives 'static' and 'active' might have been used to distinguish between these factors. They were not used, however, by the authors of different studies published by the United Nations in order to avoid new terminology and also because the use of such terms might provide certain states with an excuse for evading responsibility by alleging that the situation to be remedied, being static, was largely beyond their control.

The distinction is, however, a highly important one, for, from the point of view of principle, discriminatory practices resulting from a policy evidently intended to originate, maintain or aggravate such practices are much more to be condemned than practices which are economic, social, political, or historic in character and do not result from such a policy. The latter type of practices is today much more widespread than the first one, of which there are very few examples. It follows that many more people are affected by discriminatory practices due to the first type of discrimination, and the problem of eliminating such practices is therefore at least as urgent as that of eliminating practices resulting from deliberate policy.

It should be noted, however, that the dividing line between the two types of discrimination is far less clear than might be thought at first sight. A deliberate policy is never conducted in a vacuum; it is always a result of economic, social, or political factors, or historical circumstances. The difference between discriminatory practices of the second type and those of the first type is the deliberate intention on the part of the authorities.

IV. MAIN CLASSIFICATIONS OF DISCRIMINATION

Acts of discrimination assume three forms:

- 1) Inequality in treatment which takes the form of imposing disabilities;
- 2) Inequality in treatment which takes the form of granting privileges, and
- 3) Inequality in treatment which takes the form of imposing odious obligations.

(*Equality* is referred to in this context as only moral and juridical equality as proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; that is to say, it is equality in dignity, formal equality in rights, and equality of opportunity, but not necessarily material equality as to the extent and content of the rights of all individuals or of all social groups.)

Some other distinct may also to be made:

As far as the authors of discriminatory acts are concerned, they can be authorities, officials, and agents of the government, on the one hand, and private people, on the other.

A distinction should be made between discriminatory acts which may be contrary to, or in conflict with, the law, and those which present social aspects only. A further distinction must be made as well, in both these categories, on the basis of the content of the acts of discrimination committed.

1. *Discrimination denying rights*

Discrimination has legal relevance when it consists of acts or omissions which violate legal rights. The main types of such discriminatory conduct with legal effects are listed below. With respect to all types of discrimination by public authorities, the following distinctions have been taken into consideration:

- i) Establishment of legal rules (statutes, regulations, etc.) which imply discrimination against one or more particular social groups;
- ii) Enforcement of statutes or regulations by executive, administrative or judicial officials, or
- iii) Administrative acts or judicial decisions, taken arbitrarily by authorities or officials without any legal basis or contrary to law.

In the first case, discrimination is committed by the legislator or by an authority entitled to enact laws; in the second case, it is committed by executive, administrative or judicial officials, or judges in carrying out the law; in the third case, it is committed by administrative officials or judges, acting outside the law or contrary to the law.

2. *Discrimination by public officials*

- i) Public discrimination in the form of disabilities:
 - Unequal recognition of the human person before the law;
 - Inequality in personal security;
 - Inequality in freedom of movement and residence,
 - Inequality in the recognition and protection of the right of freedom of thought, conscience and religion,
 - Inequality in the enjoyment of the right of freedom of opinion and expression and freedom to receive and impart information;
 - Inequality in the enjoyment of the right of freedom of peaceful associations,
 - Inequality of treatment of those born out of wedlock,
 - Inequality in the enjoyment of the right to marry and to found a family,
 - Inequality in the enjoyment of the right of free choice of employment, and inequality in business and professional opportunities,
 - Inequality in the regulation and treatment of ownership,
 - Inequality in the protection of authorship,
 - Inequality of opportunity for education or the development of ability or talent,

- Inequality of opportunity for sharing the benefits of culture,
- Inequality in services rendered,
- Inequality in the enjoyment of the right to a nationality,
- Inequality in the enjoyment of the democratic right to participate in government,
- Inequality in access to public office,
- Inequality on the ground of political, jurisdictional and International status, and
- Inequality of treatment in specific cases (e.g., racial laws).

ii) Public discrimination manifested by the granting of privileges

The following privileges may be considered as acts of discrimination:

- Special opportunities for public service open only to individuals belonging to particular social groups:
- Special weight given to votes of members of particular social group,
- Special exemption from the law for particular social groups or for their members,
- Special limitations on the right of particular social groups or of their members to own property or certain kinds of property,
- Special provisions with respect to transportation facilities applying to members of particular social groups,
- Special employment, business or professional opportunities for members of particular social groups,
- Special facilities for the education of members of particular social groups, or for the development of their abilities or talents,
- Special privileges for information media operated by, or intended for the use of, particular social groups or of their members,)
- Special public and private services for members of particular social groups,
- Special legal exemptions for particular social groups or for their members (such as exemption from taxation, military services, etc.), with the exemption of lawful privileges and immunities such as those accorded to diplomats, members of legislative bodies, etc.

Privileges may be justified in particular cases, provided that they do not result in:

- a) A denial or restriction of the human rights of any individual belonging to a non-privileged social group, i.e. privileges ought not to consist of measures the effect to which is to create inequality in the exercise of human rights,
- b) Illegitimate transference of social groups into recognized legal categories, i.e. categories of people to whom privileges are granted must be established by the law and not be merely a legal recognition of existing social groups, unless the purpose is to protect minorities. For example, it would be inadmissible to grant a certain privilege to white or to colored people, or to Catholics or to Protestants, because by such action the law would recognize social differences which did not previously have any legal effect.

It might, however, be admissible to grant exemption from taxation to the promoters of a new industry, to give allowances to owners undertaking to provide sanitation in unhealthy regions, or to grant scholarships to outstanding but poor students, etc. Privileges should, nevertheless, not result in a burden on the non-privileged; for example, if too large a category of people, or if too many categories, are exempted from taxation, the burden of taxes would then fall unduly upon those liable for them.

In order to avoid misunderstandings, it is necessary to precise that under the label 'particular social group' categories, based on racial, ethnic, sex, religious, class etc. differences are meant, following the distinctions made by the Universal Declaration and other documents, not implying other distinctions like e.g., professional groups.

iii) Public discrimination imposing odious duties

The imposition of duties which are considered base or odious upon individuals, solely because they belong to particular social groups constitutes a third major category of discriminatory practices. Methods by which these obligations are imposed include the following

- Imposition of forced or compulsory labor, or slavery, upon members of particular social groups,
- Imposition of special taxes upon members of particular social groups,
- Enforcement of laws or customs compelling members of particular social groups
- To wear or otherwise display special distinguishing marks,
- To carry special identification papers;
- To obtain special passports, visas, or other forms of permission for movement either within or outside their own country or territory, in addition to those normally required of all individuals,
- To undertake tasks which are considered to be beneath the dignity of other social groups.

iv) Legitimate distinctions which do not constitute discrimination:

Many distinctions, established by law, do not constitute discrimination because they are established on just grounds and apply to alike, not merely members of certain particular social groups. Examples of these include:

- Legal incompetence due to minority, criminality, insanity, or absence from the country,
- Restriction of liberty by virtue of lawful arrest or conviction,
- Denial of political rights to foreigners,
- Lawful expropriation with fair indemnity,
- Diplomatic immunity,
- Inviolability and Immunities of members of Parliament, etc.

This list of legitimate distinctions which do not constitute discrimination is not intended to be exhaustive and can be completed in considering individual countries and their respective legislation.

3. *Discrimination by private persons*

The most serious forms of discrimination are those embodied in laws and regulations, legally establishing or permitting acts of discrimination, those practiced by authorities and public officials in enforcing the law, and arbitrary, discriminatory measures taken by such authorities and public officials. But discriminatory behavior by private persons must also be taken into account. Conduct which explicitly constitutes discrimination by private persons may be either:

i) Acts or omissions by private persons the effect of which is to deny or limit the legal rights of particular social groups and individuals belonging to them; and

ii) Other acts which do not involve any legal infraction, but actually result in discriminatory treatment in social relations. Five forms or examples of it can be quoted as illustrations:

- Denial of equal access to opportunities (opportunities for employment may be denied to individuals belonging to a particular social group, etc.),

- Refusal to admit members of particular social groups to housing areas occupied by privileged groups which results in segregation,

- Denying Individuals of the group discriminated against entry into, or use of, hotels, cafes, restaurants, theatres or other places of entertainment or recreation, or

- The use of certain means of transportation, or other services or facilities, when these establishments or institutions are operated by private individuals or companies,

- Refusal to enter into social relations with an individual, solely because he belongs to a particular social group,

- Disguised and sometimes explicit libeling of particular social groups.

As no-one can be forced to sympathize, – sentiments as well as ideas are incoercible, and even forms of external behavior cannot always be repressed by compulsion, – one must differentiate between discrimination which cannot be compulsorily restrained by the law, and discrimination which may be eradicated by legal measures.

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GROUP RIGHTS*
THE DEFINITION OF GROUP RIGHTS IN THE CONTEMPORARY LEGAL DEBATE
BASED ON SOCIO-CULTURAL ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

Individuals are not atomized entities but integrated into groups thus sharing common belief and value-systems, traditions, language, and symbolic orderings of the world. This means that groups (or communities) and their characteristics are *constitutive* of individual beings. This fact, which was frequently ignored in modernity, is the basis of the assertion that group rights are a *sui generis* category of the national and international legal regimes. However, group rights fall into two classes: quasi-group rights which are of natural (biological or accidental) origin, and group rights which correspond to the culturally and socially formed characters of groups (ethnic, national, religious, or linguistic groups) and of their members.

KEYWORDS

Ccommunity, culture, individual, self-determination, shared traditions, solidarity

INTRODUCTION

There is a lively debate in contemporary legal scholarship and in international or regional organizations about the possibility, necessity and justification of introducing group rights as a *sui generis* concept in the larger framework of human rights. The debate is not only scholarly in character as it will depend of its outcome what will be the fate of many human groups, many minority populations in various parts of the world. It was recently the disintegration of the former Soviet Union that gave the possibility of re-affirmation of their differing national and cultural identities for peoples liberated from the domination of an alien power; a liberation which not only created new minority groups but also re-actualized the centuries long conflict between small populations inextricably mingled in the course of the historical process. For different reasons, in areas which were not part of the former Soviet Union, like the Yugoslav Federation of States, the conflict took such proportions and was carried out in such a way that it came close to resemble a genocide. In Africa, like the civil wars in Somalia and Rwanda (not to speak of other cases less highlighted in the media) prove it, the lack of tangible results of economic and social development efforts and the unexpected explosion of ancestral instincts led to the same situation, once again resembling a war of genocide.

In this article, we are going to consider, first, what I call the *Standard View* which affirms that there is no necessity to speak of 'group rights' because the concept of human rights covers all areas and activities of an individual's life; second, we shall proceed with the socio-cultural analysis to elaborate the foundations of the 'group rights' concept, and, third, we shall outline guidelines of a theory of group rights, of a *Revised View*, concluding that it is urgent to introduce in national and international legal doctrine and practice the concept of 'group rights' making it to reflect contemporary human society's realities.

1. THE STANDARD VIEW

The presentation of the *Standard View* will be brief because its main tenets are well-known in academic circles and adhered to by representatives of international and regional organizations.

The *Standard View* was formulated after the Second World War following the traumatic experiences of the League of Nations era when the necessary protection of minorities was acknowledged and required but the League was incapable to monitor effective protection or, in cases when non-respect of the principles was established, to enforce their application. As a consequence, in the United Nations, after the Second World War, involvement with 'group rights' was avoided for the practical reason not to provoke the resentment of member States; not only of those having democratic regimes in unitary nation-states though inclusive considerable minority groups within their boundaries but, especially, of newly independent States emerging after decolonization and sensitive to any attempt of limiting the prerogatives of their recently acquired statehood, which could consider efforts to protect whatever groups (ethnic, religious, racial, linguistic, etc.) as an attack on their sovereignty and an interference in their internal affairs. The theoretical rationalization of this practical attitude was the doctrine that the world-wide application of (individual) human rights would ipso facto eliminate any non-recognition or non-application of the rights pertaining to a group's (or community's) existence. The paradox of such a theoretical and practical position, combining respect for the sovereignty, integrity, and inviolability of the internal jurisdiction of States coupled with the fundamental claim of the self-determination of peoples, became evident since more than a quarter of a century. This paradox was reinforced by the fact that the absolute primacy of the right to self-determination of colonial peoples was asserted without any hesitation; but even after the decolonization movement faded away because all colonies became independent, the paradox remained in respect of whatever groups claiming a right to even less than self-determination, for example cultural or linguistic autonomy, living within the territory of established States, members of the international community of sovereign States, the United Nations. It is not possible to explain this paradox with the semantic argument that the definition of the 'self' is uncertain, as it was suggested by certain authors, though even the definition of 'peoples' and its characteristics are still debated.

A well elaborated conception of human rights, including collective rights, was recently presented by Professor Jack Donnelly. Professor Donnelly considers the axiomatic belief that "human rights are the rights one has simply because one is a human being, as they usually are thought to be" as founding the *moral universality* of human rights completed by their *international normative universality* because being accepted by the whole international community.¹ Human rights are derived, on the one hand, from the dignity of the human being, though Professor Donnelly clearly distinguishes the two notions,² and, on the other hand, from social practices or human actions because human nature is as much a social project as it is given. In the first perspective human rights are inherent to being human, in the second perspective they "represent a social choice of a particular moral vision of human potentiality, which rests on a particular substantive account of the minimum requirements of a life of dignity."³ The worldwide acceptance of human rights is thus linked to our

¹ DONNELLY, Jack (1989), *Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice*. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, pp. 1-2.

² "Conceptions of human dignity, in their social and political aspects, express particular understandings of the inner (moral) nature and worth of the human person and his or her proper (political) relations with society. By contrast, human rights are the equal and inalienable rights (in the strong sense of entitlements that ground particularly powerful claims against the state) that each person has simply as a human being." *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

contemporary society in which prevailing conditions made possible their applicability; these conditions reflect differences between social structures – modern or traditional (there is no question of civilizational 'Otherness'); they are summed up as follows: "In the liberal democracies of the western world the ultimate repository of rights is the human person. The individual is held in a virtually sacralized position. There is a perpetual, and in our view obsessive, concern with the dignity of the individual, his worth, personal autonomy and property."⁴ The central commitment is to individual liberty and autonomy, expressed as the entitlement of a person to equal concern and respect because of the equal worth and dignity of every human being.

Professor Donnelly recognizes, however, that human beings can hold these entitlements as individuals or as members of a community or group. In the latter case, the example given is cultural rights; nevertheless, these rights are not rights or entitlements attached to the group but to the individual. This conception then reflects the 'sacralized' position of the individual because group rights are rejected because they can be held and exercised against the individual; in fact, human rights are genuinely claims of the individual against the State (or, by deduction, any other community or group) and that feature assures them their universal validity and applicability. In consequence, collective rights, group rights, are not human rights; in particular, no rights of the State as collectivity, – for example, so-called third-generation rights such as the right to development, – can be assimilated to individual human rights. And Professor Donnelly advances a thesis with reference to self-determination, a thesis which is frequently held against the concept of group rights, writing that the latter are nothing else but rights of individuals acting collectively.⁵ Now, nobody could deny that a differentiation can be made between human rights and collective or group rights, but it is not a logical consequence of this differentiation (except if one accepts the 'sacralization' of the individual) that rights exercised by individuals collectively as members of a particular group, could not be considered as *sui generis* rights at the same level as individual human rights. In this respect, Professor Donnelly refers, like most other scholars when the concept of group rights is discussed, to Article 27 of the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* according to which members of minority groups must be able to enjoy collectively their 'cultural rights', held in common with other members of the group.⁶

The least one can say that in Professor Donnelly's conception as well as in the entire framework of the doctrine of human rights, the relationship between an individual and his group – be it an ethnic, religious, racial group or a nation – is unintelligible because not clearly defined. It is evident that the confusion comes from the absolute predominance of the individual in everything human; the lack of clear definition of the relationship between individual and his group is engendered by the axiomatically predominant position of the former, a position which has to be adhered to and safeguarded against all attacks and rational arguments. Therefore, to the social and cultural analysis of the mutual interdependence of individual and his community now I turn.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 57. Later, Professor Donnelly continues: "Unless checked by a fairly expansive, positive conception of the persons in relation to whom it is exercised, individual liberty readily degenerates into licence and social atomization. If liberty is to foster dignity, it must be exercised within the constraints of the principle of equal concern and respect." *Ibid.*, p. 68.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 148. It is, however, a particularly restrictive interpretation of the principle of self-determination to assimilate it to rights of political participation and to liberal freedoms (freedom of speech, press, assembly, etc.). *Ibid.*

⁶ "The subject of all human rights are individuals and individuals are members of communities. They may hold human rights both as separate individuals and as individual members of a community. The very ideas of respecting and violating human rights rest on the idea of the individual as part of a larger community and social enterprise. But it is none the less true that most human rights refer *principally* to the individual considered separate from the community, and they are values primarily as claims against the community." *Ibid.*, p. 156.

2. THE SOCIO-CULTURAL FOUNDATION OF 'GROUP RIGHTS'

The individual human being and his group or community is *ontologically* interdependent. There is no space here to demonstrate the rightness of this statement; I have done it elsewhere.⁷ This ontological interdependence clearly means that the life and destiny of individual and community are inextricably intertwined. There can be no individual without a group or community; there can be no community without individuals who are not only the actors in social and cultural life but the bearers of the community's belief- and value-systems, of its traditionally transmitted symbolic order. But the community is not only the sum of the individuals who constitute it; it is more because its institutions, mental and symbolic orders and traditional values represent the accumulated experiences and cultural treasures of past generations.⁸ Individual and community creatively interact; they mutually influence each other's existence. The individual is a *sui generis* entity physically and mentally; modern biology evidenced long time ago that there are no two human beings who represent the same phenotype (result of the interaction of the genetic background and of the environment), and sociology proved as well that the so-called 'socialization' (the process during which a person 'internalizes' the group's traditions, beliefs, values and practices) never produces the same psychic and mental configuration in two persons even if they are brought up in the same milieu. The same is true of the group or community: every group or community is *sui generis* because of the particular environment in which its members live. Men and communities live in a twofold environment: the *physical* environment and the *created* environment which includes culture transmitted in tradition and language from generation to generation, as well as society in which customs, habits, behavioral repertoire, institutions or patterns of acting individually and collectively shape the individual's world. I purposely emphasized the word created to show how important is the interaction between individual and his environment, culture and society; how the individual, each individual, contributes to re-shaping his own human world including the symbolic order and belief- and value-systems received.⁹

Western modernity initiated a total departure from this fundamental, given situation. It 'sacralized' the individual, with Professor Donnelly's expression, in the course of the fight against the strongly unified social framework of the Middle Ages dominated by Christianity and, at the same time, it suppressed everything which would have seemed to restrain the individual personality's free development. In the slow but accelerating process of 'disenchantment' (Max Weber), the essential role of the group in conditioning a human being's evolution during his span of life completely disappeared and the symbolisms, beliefs, values and traditions of his community started to wane away or were so transformed that their genuine meaning entirely changed.

⁷ SEGESVARY, Victor (1995), *Inter-Civilizational Relations and the Destiny of the West. Dialogue of Conflict?* Northwest Publishing.

⁸ Karl Popper, the great contemporary philosopher, considers, for example, that the a priori principles innate in man, are derived from the common experiences and memories of the species.

⁹ There is a beautiful text from the great scientist, Erwin Schroedinger on the interrelation of the evolution of the individual and of the species: "We are evolving. In every day of our life there occurs in us something of that evolution of our species which is still in full career. In fact every individual life, indeed every day in the life of an individual, has to represent a part, however small, of this evolution, a chisel-stroke, however insignificant, on the eternally unfinished statue of our species. For the whole of its tremendous evolution consists of myriads of such insignificant chisel-strokes. And so at every step we have to change, overcome, destroy the form which we have had hitherto. The resistance of our primitive desires, which we encounter at every step, seems to me to have its physical correlate in the resistance of the existing form to the shaping chisel. For we are at once both chisel and block, overcoming and overcome – there is a real, continuous self-contest." SCHROEDINGER, Erwin (1983), *My View of the World*. Transl. from the German by C. Hastings. Woodbridge, Conn., Oxbow Press, 54.

Some classical Greek thinkers were, however, precursors of modernity. The importance of the individual was recognized and promoted in the Athenian democracy, especially by Protagoras and Democritus; the influence of their ideas is until today persistent and shaping our comprehension of the problem of individuality. It was Protagoras who proclaimed that "Man is the measure (metron) of all things: of those which are, that they are, and of those which are not, that they are not."¹⁰ Louis Dumont, on the contrary, believes¹¹ that the divide between the individual and the community, the *polis*, became visible in the Hellenistic period. With the Epicureans, Cynics, and Stoics (following Democritus's thoughts) the self-sufficient individual was born; the relativization of values in favor of such an individual led to the creation of separate 'worlds'. Christianity came into existence in this Hellenistic world and is impregnated by the concept and importance of the individual. However, the Christian idea of the individual person cannot be compared to the modern individualistic ideal as the Christian person is an 'individual-in-relation-to-God', the person in need of salvation, member of the community of the 'children of God', or of the 'triumphant Kingdom of Christ' through the sacrifice of the latter. It is correct to depict the Christian belief, with Troeltsch, as representing 'absolute individualism and absolute universalism' – in relation to God and the Savior. Therefore, Christian individualism is transcendent in the sense that it transcends the world of man and of social institutions; this is the foundation of the dualism reflected in the Christian attitude to the immanent world.

Individualism gained a new force in the time of the Renaissance (in contradiction to the Renaissance man's turning back to the values and concepts of classical Antiquity) and, especially, since the development of the scientific worldview, the Enlightenment, and the free-market economy. Philosophically, the individualism of modernity is basically linked to the position of nominalism; the links between individualism and nominalism are clearly stated by Dumont in his work referred to above.¹² Though already Hegel wrote in his *Philosophy of Right* that 'The principle of the modern world is the freedom of subjectivity', it corresponds more to reality in our modernity to describe individualism in contemporary language as 'the ontology of abstract individualism', or as 'the product of a person's choices and action.'¹³ Perhaps the best expression of modern individualism was given by a great artist, Braque, who in his definition of his existence as a 'perpetual revelation' pointed out in almost Bergsonian terms: "I have made a great discovery. I no longer believe in anything. Objects don't exist for me except insofar as a relation exists between them and myself."¹⁴ He wonderfully encapsulated the idea that modernity is a relation to the present that all historical perspective, all fundamental relation with the 'Other', is ignored because individual existence is a 'permanent creation of ourselves in our autonomy' (Foucault).

¹⁰ PLATO, *Theaethetus*, 152a 3-8. Protagoras advocated the maxim cited against such pronouncements of Parmenides that the mind can "behold what is not present equally with what is firmly present" (which, of course, is true in a sense even if one accepts empiricism as the unique source of knowledge); one of his defenses of the man-measure principle was referred to by Sextus Empiricus [*Adv. math.* 7.61]. However, the firmness of his conviction can be questioned because as a real Sophist he confessed that concerning any question one can advance two opposite arguments and prove each of them [DK 80 B 5]. Quoted in: FARRAR, Cynthia (1988), *The Origins of Democratic Thinking. The Invention of Politics in Classical Athens*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 53 and 63.

¹¹ DUMONT, Louis (1986), *Essays on Individualism. Modern Ideology in Anthropological Perspective*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, p. 27.

¹² DUMONT, *op. cit.* p. 11.

¹³ GOULD, Carol C. (1988), *Rethinking Democracy. Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economy and Society*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp.93-94.

¹⁴ GOLDING, John (1990), "Two Who Made a Revolution." *The New York Review of Books*, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 9-10.

The reign of the individual is correlated in the modern world with the gradual dissolution of particularisms, of all local communities, for the benefit of the all-powerful State. In such an 'atomized' society each individual, seemingly totally liberated from the traditions and 'cultural worlds' of their communities, faces alone the State. In fact, the individual was divested of personality and became an empty concept, as it became abstracted from the living human being and invested by theoretically formulated universal 'preferences' or 'interests'. *The split between group rights and individual human rights is a derivative of the modern development as traced above. Under the 'reign of the individual' human rights cannot but be applicable to individuals, or, rather, to the universal because abstractly defined individual.* When one speaks of human rights as rights of the (atomized) individual facing the all-powerful State, the perspective evoked explains why human rights are so necessary and also so ineffectual: there is no mediation between the individual and the only social institution it faces, the State, as all groups or communities which could have assumed such a role were eliminated or disempowered.

If the above picture would be the complete and correct description of contemporary reality, it would be superfluous to claim that group rights are needed and should be recognized again as a *sui generis* legal discipline. This would not make sense. However, people living in our contemporary society, and this was revealed during the last years, still have powerful group instincts and they are linked by powerful bonds not as individuals but as members of a community. It became evident that individuals continue to have not only an own identity but that this personal identity is based on, and completed by, their *group identity*. This identity includes what Professor Rene Dubos once called the 'biological remembrance of things past', but its essential core is a sense of belongingness¹⁵ and the fullness of self-acceptance and self-esteem: "the sense of self is viewed through the prism of symbols and mythologies of the community's heritage," as Professor Anthony Smith pointed out.¹⁶ All secondary attachments and affinities like those linking an individual to a special social group, are grafted on the primary group identity and normally play a differentiating role only within the basic group or community. The phenomenon of group identity is, of course, surprising for those who believed that the globalizing effects of modern technology and communications coupled with an atomized society will eliminate the rests of any kind of group identities which survived under the onslaught of modernity. In this perspective, surviving groups in society like ethnic groups cannot but be 'interest groups.'¹⁷ However, there are thinkers like Daniel Bell who take into account 'common structural sources which derive from common underlying trends in the different societies for the upsurge of ethnicity'; Bell mentions among these structural sources "the tendency toward more inclusive identities."¹⁸ But it was the great poet, Czeslaw Milosz, who explained the 'return' of national feelings in accordance with the Popperian 'situational logic':

"Yet it is possible that, as the world enters an era in which technology is dominant, national feelings and traditions will begin to seem, in the modern void, the only means of satisfying the human need to belong. The erosion of beliefs and values that takes place in a consumer society may contribute to an urge to lose oneself in feelings of

¹⁵ On the sense of belongingness, see in particular: VOS, George de – ROMANUCCI-ROSS, Lola (eds.) (1975), *Ethnic Identity. Cultural Continuities and Change*. Palo Alto, Cal., Mayfield Publ. Co.

¹⁶ SMITH, Anthony D. (1986), *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. Oxford, Blackwell, p. 14.

¹⁷ GLAZER, Nathan – MOYNIHAN Daniel (eds.) (1975), *Ethnicity. Theory and Experience*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, pp. 7-8.

¹⁸ BELL, Daniel (1975), "Ethnicity and Social Change." In: GLAZER, Nathan – MOYNIHAN Daniel (eds.), *op. cit.* p. 143. In respect of communal identities, Bell writes that "throughout the world today, the largest and most important category of group membership (particularly in its ability to rouse emotional feelings) is that broad set which we call 'communal' – individuals who feel some consciousness of kind which is not contractual, and which involves some common links through primordial and cultural ties. Broadly speaking, there are four such ties: race; color; language; ethnicity." *Ibid.* p. 155.

togetherness, feelings in which one's own group is opposed to 'others'. This may seem the only remedy against nonbeing."¹⁹

Group identities evidently include physical elements of which the body is the most visible and palpable; it is the only component of group (or, for that matter, personal) identity which is of biological origin, given as it is and given its unchangeability. Other physical elements are the 'place', the soil, the natural environment, with one word, the land to which a group is attached historically, even mythically. Psychologically, the fundamental characteristics of group identities are the distinction between 'we' and 'they', the Others (or, in Benjamin Akzin's words, a 'similarity-dissimilarity' pattern). A group's identity is inseparably linked to the Others' identity, or what we think the Others' identity to be,²⁰ the awareness of Others is the referent for group-consciousness, for the group's feeling of uniqueness. This, of course, is also true of an individual's identity which is conditioned by the identity of those with whom the individual shares a common environment, private and public spaces as well as a 'cultural world'. I contend that, in addition to some ascriptive elements, the most important aspect of group identity is its overwhelming cultural component; every individual and every group is culturally conditioned, and differentiation according to cultural influences ('socialization') can clearly be established even within racial groups (which definitely refutes the thesis concerning the primacy of racial differences). *Group identity, therefore, is culturally and historically based and is characterized by shared symbolisms, shared belief- and value-systems and common historical consciousness.*

The designation of such a group as *ethnic* group corresponds to the above criteria. This designation does not exclude that one or the other elements of the main characteristics generally enumerated as having integrative force for groups, – ethnicity, religion, language, – should be preponderant. In addition, there is always a historical consideration related to the 'mythic' origins of the group; however, common historical experiences shared by the whole group, Gadamer's 'effective historical consciousness', are certainly more important than the supposed mythic origin. Talcott Parsons's definition of an ethnic or national group summarizes well its basic characteristics:

"This is a group the members of which have, both with respect to their own sentiments and those of non-members, a distinctive identity which is rooted in some kind of distinctive sense of its history. It is, moreover, a diffusely defined group, sociologically quite different from collectivities with specific functions. For the members it characterizes what the individual *is* rather than what he *does* ... Common culture is probably the most important general core, but it is a culture which has some feature of temporal continuity often reaching into an indefinite past. An ethnic group is, of course, always a group consisting of members of all ages and both sexes and ethnicity is always shared by forebears at some level. It is thus a *transgenerational* type of group."²¹

It is correct to say that the complex of meanings and shared memories underlying an ethnic group's identity define the group's 'collective location' and charters its course in history – its (imputed) origins and

¹⁹ MIŁOŚZ, Czesław (1993), "Swing Shift in the Baltics." *The New York Review of Books*, Vol. XL, No. pp. 15, and 18.

²⁰ Analyzing identity of ethnic groups, Wallerstein writes that "Membership in an ethnic group is a matter of social definition, an inter-play of the self-definition of members and the definition of other groups," WALLERSTEIN, Immanuel (1960), *Ethnicity and National Integration. Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines*, Vol. I, No. 3, p. 131. But, as Donald Horowitz pointed out in a dynamic perspective of the relations between group identities, "Self-definitions and other-definitions do not necessarily adjust at the same rate, simultaneously producing a new identity. Especially if the new identity is wider than the old, other-definitions are likely to be 'ahead of' (that is, wider than) self-definitions for some time." HOROWITZ, Donald (1975), "Ethnic Identity." In: GLAZER, Nathan – MOYNIHAN Daniel (eds.), *op. cit.* p. 131.

²¹ PARSONS, Talcott (1975), "Some Theoretical Considerations on the Nature and Trends of Change of Ethnicity." In: GLAZER, Nathan – MOYNIHAN, Daniel (eds.), *op. cit.* pp. 56-57.

common ancestry, its growth, and its destiny²². Such an elaborate sense of identity imparts also to the group a clear sense of *solidarity*; therefore, in the case of an ethnic group it is better to speak of 'ethnic community' because the designation community expresses the sentiment of solidarity between the community's members.

The destiny and future of an ethnic group involves the group-concept of the *nation*. The birth of the nation and of the nation-state led to the existence of *national minorities* which, together with racial minorities, represent the most important contenders of group rights. Becoming self-conscious makes an ethnic group a nation; the perception of a common, national destiny creates the will to assure its future and endow the nation with a political structure. This step was accomplished in the Western world with the creation of *nation-states* after the waning of the Middle Ages. The state based on the ethnic-cultural nation replaced the old concept of territorially-based states in which the belonging to the state was determined by living within its physical boundaries, to whatever nationality one might have belonged. In this sense, Morgenthau was right in pointing out that nationalism is "both in logic and experience a principle of disintegration and fragmentation."²³ Not that the nation-state would not possess its clear-cut geographical boundaries, but the emphasis was shifted to its being a political community though based on national belongingness. The territorial state became an expression of the nation. In this context, the nation is a community of laws and legal institutions based on shared traditions and history, it constitutes a *sovereign nation*.

In dealing with the problematic of nationalism, it is, first, very important to make the fundamental distinction between national consciousness and nation-state; nationalism was the movement which fought for the creation of the latter. The impulse of creating an ethnic-cultural group's own state has grown out of national consciousness and was internationally legitimized after the First World War as the *right to self-determination*.²⁴ It gave way to the de-colonization movement after the World War II. Simultaneously to the unquestioned acceptance of the principle of self-determination in regard of colonial peoples and 'recognized non-self-governing' territorial situations', the integrity and legitimacy of not de-colonized, multi-ethnic states was also maintained in international relations. Thus, the nation-state was conceived as the embodiment of the democratic state, and self-determination became self-government. The merging of the nationalist and democratic ideals, – self-determination as the realization of democratic or representative government, that is, the *civic model* of the nation, – led to a further important development: the second fundamental distinction to be made in respect of nationalism and the nation-state is the one between *nationality*, the expression of national consciousness, and *citizenship*, belonging to a nation-state. If the nation is not prospectively recognizable as projected by nationalism, the 'real' nation is not only a posteriori recognizable as Hobsbawm envisages it²⁵ because it is the 'ongoing self-definition of the nation' (Arnason).

²² SMITH, Anthony D. *op. cit.* p. 24.

²³ MORGENTHAU, Hans J. (1962), *The Decline of Democratic Politics*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, p. 184.

²⁴ "Self-determination ... is the process by which a cultural nation becomes a political state, and also that by which a political state becomes a cultural nation." COBBAN, Alfred (1969), *The Nation-State and National Self-Determination*. New York, Th. Y. Crowell Co., pp. 109-110. But, as Capotorti stated, "Contemporary international law does not recognize the right of minorities to self-determination, unless a given minority has a right to be called 'people', and provided that the State to which a minority group belongs is subject to a government representing the whole people, without discrimination of race, creed or colour." CAPOTORTI, Francesco (1990), "Are Minorities Entitled to Collective International Rights?" *Israeli Yearbook of Human Rights*, Vol. 20, pp. 355-356.

²⁵ HOBBSAWM, Eric (1990), *Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, Myth, Reality*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 9.

The inevitable contradiction between ethnicity and cultural tradition, on the one hand, and the new nation-state, on the other hand, is well indicated by the useful metaphor of Benedict Anderson describing the modern state as an 'imagined community', because the original human community was gradually lost in the course of history. National self-determination²⁶ was based on this change in the concept of the nation, and it brought unavoidably with itself the imperative of unification of all people belonging to the nation as well as the need for an expansion of the nation-state through assimilation of smaller communities, regional ethnic groups, or conquered territories in Africa and Asia.

In multi-ethnic states, with the exception of those which have no common history and cultural tradition and are based on their citizens' voluntary adherence, in such multi-ethnic states where both the major ethnic group and the smaller nationalities living within the boundaries of the state possess a specific national consciousness, the latter are what we call *national minorities*. In consequence, a conflict develops between majority and minority groups living together within the state's boundaries, and thus there is also a conflict, on the one hand, between a national group – long settled in a territory to which one belongs by birth and with which one shares the group's culture and history ('territorial minority') – and citizenship which is also received by birth but which can be adhered to or rejected voluntarily by each person living on the territory of the state (without, however, excluding the occurrence of persons having a citizenship against their will). Citizenship can be granted to foreigners who request it, but belonging to a specific human group, a nation, cannot be granted. The paradox is that the democratic State permits the *plurality of opinions* of citizens, but rarely (as in such federations like the United States) admits the *plurality of nationalities*, that is, the affirmation through autonomy of a separate identity of human groups different from the majority – though they possess their genuine cultural traditions and a specific history. Therefore, the thesis that classical democratic regimes are incapable to solve the problem of minorities, the problem of the plurality of ethnic and national groups, is correct.

3. THE REVISED VIEW: GROUP RIGHTS AND THEIR CATEGORIES

Based on the preceding socio-cultural analysis of modern development and of the concepts and ideas which are underlying the current predominance of individual human rights over *sui generis* group rights, we have now to consider some essential elements of a theory of group rights. Such a theory requires, in fact, the elaboration of a framework in which rights of the state, of the individual and of the group can be harmonized – as Nathan Lerner proposed.²⁷

One can therefore envisage the legal system in a state as constituted at three levels:

- a) *The state's legislation in respect of public and private matters or the general juridical regime*: this is the overall legal framework to which all citizens are subject who live under the state's jurisdiction;
- b) *The individual human rights regime*: it is applicable to all citizens of a state and is part of national legislation and endorsed as well by the international community;

²⁶ The expression 'self-determination of nations' was first used in the *Proclamation on the Polish Question* of the 1865 London Conference of the First Socialist International. CONNOR, W. (1972), "Nation-building or Nation-destroying?" *World Politics*, Vol. 24, p. 331, note 27.

²⁷ LERNER, Nathan (1991), *Group Rights and Discrimination in International Law*. Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, p. 17.

c) *The regime of group rights*: this regime is legislated by the state based on rights 'inherent to the condition of some specific and well-defined groups' (Lerner); these rights are at present in the course of elaboration and endorsement by the international community.

The mediation between these juridically distinguished regimes is twofold: in a narrower sense it is done by the state which represents the overwhelming authority in the collectivity; in a larger sense it is ensured by the civil society which constitutes the overarching framework of the collectivity's life.

Group rights fall into two categories, although a very few characteristics are the same for both as, for example, the *right to be different*.²⁸

i) *Quasi-group rights* refer to groups of purely natural (biological or accidental) origin – sex and sexual orientation, age, or people born handicapped or handicapped by accident, for example. As Lerner well pointed out, "A person *is* a homosexual. A member of a group *belongs* to the group; although in some cases the alternative of opting-out is open to the individual."²⁹ It is more justified to consider the rights of such quasi-groups as covered by, and incorporated into, the individual human rights regime because the differentiation of these groups is not linked to social or cultural contexts. The facts which constitute the basis of such groups' distinction from others do not depend on a person's man-made, social or cultural environment.

ii) *Sui generis group rights* are derived from the constitution of a specific social and cultural human environment by groups of men, having its distinctive symbolic orderings, belief- and value-systems, and, particularly important, shared historic experience.³⁰ These groups are ethnic groups, national minorities, groups based on religious or cultural specificity (a good example to prove this point is the difference between various African cultures because their differences are not due to racial features but to different, created cultural environments), or on social status such as in the case of the caste system in India. *The origin of group rights resides in the fact that members of the group are discriminated against precisely because of their group membership and not for their specific characteristics, qualities or defects, as individuals*³¹ These groups are kept together by a sense of belonging together, a 'diffuse enduring solidarity' which inspires in individual group

²⁸ The fundamental difference between my view and the one expressed by Jay Sigler is reflected in the the following categorization of quasi-group rights and group rights. Sigler regards "as a minority any group of people who can be identified by a sizable segment of the population as objects for prejudice or discrimination or who, for reasons of deprivation, require the positive assistance of the state. A persistent nondominant position of the group in political, social and cultural matters is the common feature of the minority." SIGLER, Jay A. (1983), *Minority Rights. A Comparative Analysis*. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, p. 5. Sigler's position, on the other hand, fully justifies my distinction as presented in the text.

²⁹ LERNER, *op. cit.* p. 32.

³⁰ This definition coincides with the definition given of a 'community' in the Memorandum of the United Nations Secretary General on the *Definition and Classification of Minorities* submitted to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/85 (1949), p. 4). Communities, in accordance with this document, are "groups based upon unifying and spontaneous (as opposed to artificial and planned) factors essentially beyond the control of the members of the group" (families, ethnic groups, nations, religious groups, etc.). Therefore, such communities are different from 'societies' or 'organizations' which designate entities created by deliberate and voluntary action to promote the members' interests (clubs, commercial firms, political parties, etc.). Communities in this sense are organic entities and not simply an aggregation of individuals.

³¹ The problem of discrimination in real life was already emphasized in the thirties by the Permanent Court of International Justice, for example, in its Advisory Opinion in the *Minority Schools in Albania* case, in which the Court insisted that the minority population should be able to safeguard those of its characteristics which distinguish it from the majority. PCIJ, Ser.A/B, No. 64, 1935.

members, following Talcott Parsons, a dispositional or motivational inclination, or loyalty. For the constitution of a group's rights as *sui generis* legal provisions, the integrative force of solidarity and loyalty within the group is extremely important because it assures the group's survival, first, through the vicissitudes of successive ages and generations (temporal dimension) and, second, when the group is dispersed across distant regions and varying environments (spatial dimension). The continuity of a group's existence in history is the major argument to justify the recognition of *sui generis* group rights.

The slow evolution of international legal doctrine and practice toward the recognition of group rights as defined above is marked by the following texts:

a) *Article 27 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* declares that

"In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language."³²

This text of the Covenant goes much further than the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* as the latter recognizes only individual but not collective or group rights, whereas the Covenant acknowledges that there are rights shared by individuals as members of a community.

b) *Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension* adopted on 29th June 1990.³³ Though still retaining the perspective of the universal (individual) human rights regime ('To belong to a national minority is a matter of a person's individual choice' or 'Persons belonging to national minorities can exercise and enjoy their rights individually as well as in community with other members of their group' [Art. 32]), it spells out the necessity for participating States to respect the rights of persons belonging to national minorities and to adopt special measures, whenever required, to ensure full equality of treatment of these minorities (Art. 31). Article 32 of the Document specifies the rights of minorities the participating States have to accept: (i) free use (even before public authorities if feasible) of their own language, and dissemination of information to them as well as education of their children in this language; (ii) free practice of their religion, of the use of religious materials and of religious education in their mother tongue; (iii) establishment of organizations and associations, and, finally, (iv) unimpeded contacts with group members and with groups in other countries with which they share ethnic origins, cultural heritage or religious beliefs. The participating States were also accepting to protect and promote ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identities of national minorities; to take into account such minorities' interests in conformity with the principles of equality and non-discrimination (Art. 33); to ensure the effective participation of national minorities in public affairs (noting the possibility of appropriate local or autonomous administrations) (Art. 35).

c) The *Proposal for a European Convention for the Protection of Minorities*, prepared by the European Commission for Democracy Through Law, adopted on 8 February 1991,³⁴ is the very first document recognizing groups as subjects of international legal documents, though it also maintains that "to belong to a national minority shall be a matter of individual choice" (Art. 2, para. 3). However, it is an epoch-making formulation when the Proposal says in Chapter I that

³² HANNUM, H. (ed.) (1993), *Documents on Autonomy and Minority Rights*. Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, p. 35.

³³ HANNUM, H. (ed.) *op. cit.* pp. 60-65.

³⁴ *Council of Europe Doc. CDL (91) (7) (1991)*.

"The international protection of the rights of ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities, as well as the rights of individuals belonging to those minorities, as guaranteed by the present Convention, is a fundamental component of the international protection of Human Rights, and as such falls within the scope of international co-operation."³⁵

It is evident that the *Proposal* reflects lessons taken from European historical experience after the First and Second World Wars.

The *Proposal* specifies that adoption of particular measures in favor of minorities or individuals belonging to them, aimed at promoting equality between the majority of the population and such minorities, cannot be considered as discriminatory (Art. 4). In addition to the rights spelled out in the Copenhagen Document, it is remarkable that the *Proposal* emphasizes the right of minorities "to freely preserve, express and develop their cultural identity in all its aspects, free of any attempts at assimilation against their will" (Art. 6). It is also noteworthy that reference to assimilation policies is again made in Article 13 which requests States to refrain from pursuing or encouraging such policies or trying to "intentionally modifying the proportions of the populations in the regions inhabited by minorities." Other provisions in the *Proposal* are similar to those in the Copenhagen Document, but it goes still further in two respects: first, it imposes the obligation on the State in which the minorities live to offer 'effective remedies' in case of violation of the group rights enumerated, and, second, that the rights determined can only be limited, by law, for safeguarding conditions prevalent in a democratic society in the areas of public safety; public order, health, and morals; as well as the protection of the rights and freedoms of others (Art. 12). It is natural that an attitude of loyalty is expected from minority group members as citizens of the State, respecting the national legislation and the rights of others (majority and other minorities if any) (Art. 15).

Following up on the 1966 *Covenant* and on the essential work carried out by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and its Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities which produced the most detailed and in-depth study concerning group rights,³⁶

(d) A *Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities* was adopted by the Commission on Human Rights (Res. 1992/16, 21 February 1992), and reprinted in the report of the Sub-Commission.³⁷ Though the language of this *Declaration* remained still ambiguous, oscillating between references to minorities as groups and persons belonging to such minorities (Art. 3), its Article 1 clearly affirms that

"States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories, and shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity."

³⁵ In the definition of a minority, the *Proposal* affirms that the term stands for "a group which is smaller in number than the rest of the population of a State, whose members, who are nationals of that State, have ethnical, religious or linguistic features different from those of the rest of the population, and are guided by the will to safeguard their culture, traditions, religion or language" (Art. 2).

³⁶ CAPOTORTI, F. (1979), *Study on the Rights of Persons belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities*. Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission; reprinted in 1991. UN sales No.: E.91.XIV.2. – Capotorti defines a minority as a group "numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-democratic position, whose members, being nationals of the State, possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing of those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving that culture, traditions, religions or language." *Ibid.* p. 96.

³⁷ *Report of the Working Group on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities*. UN Doc. E/CN.4/1992/48 & Corr. 1 (1992), pp. 16-19.

No discrimination in the treatment of such minorities is acceptable; persons belonging to these groups must be able to exercise fully and effectively 'all their human rights and fundamental freedoms'. This provision is completed by a requirement that participation of minorities in decisions at national as well as regional levels should be admitted in respect of questions related to their lives or the affairs of the region or territory where they live, if such participation is not incompatible with national legislation. It is, of course, regrettable that this last restriction ('if not incompatible with national legislation') weakens considerably the impact of this Article as it constitutes an escape-clause for States who do not intend to grant such participation in public affairs to their minorities.

(e) Finally, the *European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages* was adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and opened for signature of Member States on 2 October 1992.³⁸ This Charter has only a limited scope, though it is the first international document which goes into all details of minority language usages. Regional and minority languages are determined as those "traditionally used within a given territory" by inhabitants "who form a group numerically smaller than the rest of the State's population," and territory is defined as a "geographical area in which the said language is the mode of expression of a number of people" justifying the measures foreseen in the Convention (Art. 1). In addition, a new category appears in the form of 'non-territorial languages,' which are different from the language(s) generally spoken by the population, but is used traditionally within the boundaries of the State though the people speaking them are not concentrated in specific areas. This provision clearly concerns minorities scattered all over a country's territory.

The fullest expression of group rights is the regime of *autonomy*.³⁹ In the broader sense, (1) autonomy sets the limits of the state's interference in the life of a certain segment of the population; it means, with the words of Rudolf Bernhardt, "the autonomous self-determination of an individual or an entity, the competence or power to handle one's own affairs without outside interference."⁴⁰ In a narrower sense, (2) autonomy stands for the self-determination of a minority through fully possessing its cultural and religious freedom, being able to live according to its customs and traditions, having its own institutions and organizations as well as administrative mechanisms, and being entitled to have sustained contacts with members of the same group in other countries. This type of 'territorial' autonomy normally applies to groups which occupy a contiguous territory in a specific region. However, in other cases, when, besides such a compact territorial aggregation of the majority of the group many of its members are scattered over the State's territory, the term 'personal autonomy' is used because dispersed members of the group benefit of the group rights granted to the latter as much as those living in the same territory.

Group rights will be more and more important in the future due to the trend in political organization of the society which points in the direction of increasing integration of States, whether in federalist or in non-federalist forms. In the framework of sub-regional or regional integration, nation-states will certainly have their powers and competence curtailed in favor of the meta-State institutional setup, and it is more than probable that in regional ensembles ethnic and cultural groups, today's minorities, will have more extensive rights, perhaps full autonomies, without conflicting with the powers of the integrated political and economic organization. In the

³⁸ HANNUM, H. (ed.) *op. cit.* pp. 86-101.

³⁹ I am not dealing here with such concepts as the *associated State* which was, in the past, applied in the case of some non-self-governing territories (see: DINSTEIN (ed.), *op. cit.* p. 215, note 13), or the *associated nation*, evoked in the case of two nationalities living together on the same territory since a long period of time, which appears more as a dream than a real potentiality in view of the dominant concept of the nation-state.

⁴⁰ BERNHARDT, Rudolf (1981), "Federalism and Autonomy." In: DINSTEIN (ed.), *op. cit.* p. 25.

case of Europe's minorities, the integration of the presently dominant nation-states into the European Union is the only possible solution for gaining their group rights, their autonomy or the 'associate' nation status. There is no other road toward the resolution of group conflicts between competing nationalities in other parts of the world either, but the journey will be a long one.

4. CONCLUSIONS

This study is intended to demonstrate and justify that the concept of group rights is a *suit generic* concept which, in addition to the widely accepted individual human rights doctrine, ought to be incorporated in the national and international legal regimes.

First, the reigning *Standard View* is explained which, in its essentials, considers that group rights are already covered in the conceptualization of globally applicable, individual human rights, and that; in consequence, there is no need to establish a specific legal doctrine to adequately protect the rights of human groups, of various human communities. Second, the philosophical and legal justification and validity of the conceptualization of group rights is established based on a socio-cultural analysis of the modern predicament of individuals and society. The main element brought out in the socio-cultural perspective is the culturally and historically based group identity which leads to a clear sense of solidarity, in the case of both main contenders of group rights, – racial as well as national minorities.

Finally, a *Revised View* of group rights is presented, defining such rights and their categories, and tracing the evolution of debates at international and regional levels toward the acceptance of a concept of such rights recognizing the independent identity, and protecting the existence, of various human communities.

CONFERENCE DE LECCE SUR L'IMMIGRATION

Organisée par le Sénateur Angelo Bernassola
Président de la Fondazione Alcide de Gasperi

les 5-6 mars 1999

Deux interventions du

Dr Victor Segesvary

L'évolution socio-culturelle de l'Etat moderne en Occident : Le cadre de l'immigration envahissante de l'Europe

(Première intervention faite le 5 mars 1999)

Mesdames, Messieurs,

Les territoires déterminent d'une façon fondamentale l'existence des Etats. Ils représentent, à la fois, une détermination dans l'espace et dans le temps historique. Les territoires représentent ainsi une partie de la surface terrestre délimitée par les frontières de l'Etat depuis que nous connaissons l'institution de l'organisation politique dans les diverses sociétés du monde. Les territoires, constituant l'espace vital de la population d'un Etat particulier, était également conceptualisé en des termes culturels par ces mêmes populations. Ces significations attribuées à un territoire forment donc un attachement culturellement défini (par des symbolismes, par exemple) entre une population et son territoire. Ces relations culturelles entre territoires et populations faisaient toujours partie intégrante des identités ethnique et nationale. Rappelons-nous du problème actuel du Kosovo, un territoire qui est considéré comme sacré par les Serbes jusqu'à aujourd'hui à cause de la grande bataille entre les armées serbe et ottomane en 1378.

L'Etat moderne en Occident, appelle à juste titre l'Etat-nation, ainsi que le système interétatique, a pris sa forme définitive au milieu du 17^{ème} siècle par la signature du Traité de Westphalie qui a établi les doctrines des Etats territoriaux et des souverainetés nationales. Nous vivons encore aujourd'hui dans le cadre de ce système westphalien quoique les protagonistes d'un Etat illusoire mondial ne veuillent pas l'admettre. *Le processus de l'individualisation des Etats modernes n'était donc autre que le processus de leur territorialisation, le processus de la détermination spatiale des entités politiques reconnues.* D'une part, le pouvoir et l'autorité de l'Etat ont été limités à l'espace défini par les frontières, mais par le principe de la souveraineté nationale sa domination est devenue absolue dans le cadre territorial fixé. L'évolution de l'Etat-nation moderne peut être résumée dans les trois phases suivantes.

PREMIERE PHASE

L'Etat-nation jusqu'à la Seconde Guerre mondiale

Dans cette phase l'Etat-nation était caractérisé par les traits principaux suivants :

(i) Séparation des sphères spirituelles et temporelles, l'Etat moderne est indiscutablement une institution laïque ;

(ii) L'autorité de l'Etat était fondée sur le contrôle de son territoire et non d'une source sacrée ou mythique. Territorialité et sécularisme étaient donc liées car c'était le territoire qui a assuré la légitimation morale et légale de l'Etat territorial ;

(iii) La souveraineté nationale, découlant également du principe de la territorialité, est devenue au cours de l'évolution future le second pilier de la légitimation de l'Etat. Ce développement était complété, au début du 20^{ème} siècle, par la reconnaissance générale du principe de l'autodétermination, lui aussi lié à la possession d'un territoire — la patrie d'un peuple.

(iv) Le territoire a ainsi incarné l'espace juridictionnel de l'institution politique, et en sa forme de souveraineté nationale avait structuré la société entière. L'Etat devait donc éliminer toute concurrence possible de la part des autres communautés constituées en éliminant toutes les sources prévisibles de solidarité émanant des communautés ethnique, religieuse, linguistique, ou autres.

(v) En conséquence, tous les liens entre cultures et territoires qui existaient auparavant avaient été rompus, au bénéfice d'une culture dominante. La tolérance des identités séparées mais co-existantes, comme pratiquée dans les institutions politiques pré-modernes, était abandonnée pour promouvoir une identité particulière. Si la dominance du principe de la territorialité a signifié la dissociation du temporel et du spirituel, il a aussi confirmé l'émancipation des territoires de leur subordination à une pluralité d'identités culturelles. C'est par cette prééminence d'une identité culturelle particulière que l'Etat est devenu *par excellence* national.

(vi) Cet Etat-nation a admis l'immigration, diffuse et ne représentant jamais un grand nombre depuis le Moyen Age, selon des règles strictes ; les réfugiés politiques ou autres immigrés ne pouvaient en aucun cas faire de la politique sur le territoire de l'Etat en question, et étaient traités dans tous les domaines selon les lois en vigueur, — sans bénéficier d'exception et, surtout, des soutiens matériels alloués exclusivement à eux.

DEUXIEME PHASE

La transformation des sociétés nationales en sociétés de citoyens

L'Etat moderne ayant été défini comme un vaste espace public, ouvert à tous, l'ordre politique de l'institution territoriale a fait fusionner les membres de différentes communautés culturelles vivant sur son territoire dans une unique catégorie — la citoyenneté. Les citoyens ne devaient leur loyauté, leur obéissance qu'exclusivement à leur Etat.

L'idée de l'Etat moderne, de l'Etat-nation révèle par cette évolution une contradiction fondamentale dans son identité. D'une part, les relations sociales sont totalement individualisées, comme certains sociologues ou politologues d'aujourd'hui le décrivent, la société est désormais constituée des individus 'atomisés' qui sont entièrement indépendants l'un de l'autre, mais, d'autre part, ces mêmes individus vivant sur le territoire d'un Etat doivent, comme citoyens, une loyauté sans faille à ce dernier en jetant par le bord toutes les allégeances à d'autres communautés territoriales ou culturelles. En conséquence, la prééminence de l'attachement à l'ordre politique territorial devait amener les autorités de l'Etat de chercher désespérément

à réinventer des identités nouvelles, des attachements à des symbolismes culturels artificiels ou à des géographies imaginées. Le résultat final était que toute correspondance entre le monde des hommes et le monde des citoyens devait disparaître, et les entités territoriales n'avaient rien en commun avec les espaces vitaux de la société civile.

Faire partie d'une société particulière n'est plus fondé sur le fait d'être un membre de la communauté nationale, mais se résume dans un acte de l'Etat souverain qui admet un individu en tant que citoyen en l'intégrant dans la population vivant sur son territoire. Tant qu'il y existait des sociétés civiles nationales, les membres de la communauté culturelle de la nation ou les minorités reconnues qui résidaient sur le même territoire, avaient été automatiquement admis par l'Etat. La naissance de la société de citoyens a donné lieu à des résultats inattendus et paradoxaux :

- D'abord, qu'elle a rendu légitime la séparation de l'Etat de la société civile ;
- Ensuite, qu'elle s'est produite à un moment quand la survie même de l'Etat-nation, ou de toutes les autres formes actuelles d'institutionnalisation politique, sont de plus en plus remises en question.

TROISIEME PHASE

La naissance des sociétés sans identité aucune que la dépendance des populations de l'Etat-providence

La transformation des sociétés nationales en sociétés de citoyens a mené les Etats modernes à une dernière étape de leur évolution inévitable : les sociétés structurées par l'Etat territorial contemporain devinrent des sociétés sans aucune identité culturelle, caractérisées de l'atomisation totale des individus en face du pouvoir centralisé et bureaucratique en décadence, qui distribue les mannes en forme de prestations du système de l'Etat-providence.

Je dis de l'Etat contemporain qu'il est en décadence, un fait reconnu de plus en plus, car l'évolution esquissée ci-dessus l'accable de telles charges économiques et administratives qu'il ne peut plus les satisfaire. Mais le phénomène le plus récent qui caractérise notre époque est que cet Etat moderne est dépassé par les *mouvements transnationaux* (et non internationaux) dont le plus important est le mouvement des masses d'individus qui battent en brèche toute autorité des Etats, toutes règles de jeu jusqu'à maintenant en vigueur. Il ne s'agit donc pas des réfugiés politiques dans la plupart des cas, mais des personnes qui envahissent les sociétés dites d'abondance pour bénéficier des mêmes avantages matériels que les populations autochtones. Ce qui rend ce phénomène encore plus grave, comme dans le cas des albanais et les kurdes, est que c'est la volonté des bandes criminelles qui proposent de faire entrer clandestinement les individus et les familles dans les Etats-providence et que ces bandes imposent leur appât de gains à la volonté de ces Etats qui semblent ne pas pouvoir se défendre. Car il ne faut pas se leurrer : les albanais, en particulier les albanais de Kosovo qui ont une frontière commune avec le pays de leurs frères, ou les kurdes dont la guerre de libération contre les Turcs dure depuis plus de vingt ans, ne viennent pas en Europe pour autre chose que de profiter de largesses des gouvernements et de l'humanitarisme mal placé de certaines parties des populations européennes.

Je parle de cet humanitarisme confus qui n'est pas authentique parce qu'il trouve sa source non dans une vraie passion humaine, mais dans une dépréciation volontaire des modes de vie autres que ceux prévalant dans notre civilisation. D'ailleurs cet humanitarisme est en contradiction avec ces propres principes — intégration, non à l'exclusion — car il avantage ceux qui quittent leur propre pays en laissant à leur sort désespéré ceux qui restent à la maison et essaient de créer une vie supportable et digne de l'être humain dans les contrées où ils étaient nés, dans un environnement culturel et social qui leur était légué par leur ancêtres. Cet humanitarisme signifie aussi une certaine forme de tricherie : pour prendre comme exemple un pays que je connais bien, le Ghana, il n'y a aujourd'hui aucune raison pour les Ghanéens de quitter leur pays, car le système n'est pas dictatorial et les conditions de vie, quoique non comparable à l'Occident, sont supportables. Mais les protagonistes de l'humanitarisme ignorent les réalités du Tiers-Monde et utilisent, par exemple, les images des populations noires du Soudan du Sud exposées à des souffrances insoutenables de promouvoir leurs projets, mais pour lesquelles aucun des porte-parole de l'humanitarisme n'intervient, même pas pour ceux qui meurent de faim jour par jour.

La question que l'immigration envahissante pose aujourd'hui aux politiciens et populations européennes est la suivante : Est-ce que nous voulons sauvegarder notre culture, notre patrimoine que nous avaient légués nos ancêtres de génération en génération ? Est-ce que nous voulons sauvegarder nos identités française, italienne, allemande et autres, et celle que nous pouvons appelée notre identité européenne — car il y en a une — pour la transmettre aux générations qui nous suivent ? Nous ne devons pas nous leurrer : les immigrants ne deviendront jamais des Européens, même s'ils sont intégrés matériellement dans la société. L'assimilation d'une culture n'est pas une affaire cognitive, on ne peut pas apprendre à l'école de devenir un italien, français, allemand, ou espagnol. L'exemple américain, qui fait partie de ce que j'appelle le 'mythe européen de l'Amérique', ne soutient pas l'optimisme des intégrationnistes : le sénateur démocrate de New York, Patrick Moynihan, l'a déjà constaté il y a trois décennies que le soi-disant 'melting pot' américain n'a jamais fonctionné. Les communautés des immigrées, en particulier les orientaux et hispaniques, sont restées séparées et vivent entre elles-mêmes, et les immigrés africains s'intègrent dans la communauté des Noirs américains.

Dans ma perspective donc, il ne faut pas admettre les immigrants, à l'exception de vrais réfugiés, dans l'espace européen, mais il faut leur rendre possible de vivre décemment dans leurs propres pays. Ceci sera, entre autres, le sujet de ma seconde intervention.

L'immigration, la situation économique en Europe et les perspectives de développement dans les pays d'origine des immigrés

(Seconde intervention faite le 6 mars 1999)

Mesdames, Messieurs,

Dans cette deuxième intervention, je voudrais signaler quelques points saillants des effets économiques de l'immigration massive en Europe des gens en provenance des Balkans et du Tiers-Monde.

L'immigration et les problèmes principaux des économies européennes

Je ne pense pas qu'il faille insister sur les faits qui caractérisent actuellement la situation économique en Europe, sauf pour mettre en évidence l'irrationalité et l'inconséquence des politiques poursuivies par les gouvernements européens en matière d'immigration. Je voudrais en énumérer trois :

(i) *Le chômage* : L'Europe se bat avec un chômage persistant dû à des contradictions structurelles et aux mentalités des populations que étaient, comme les Américains le disent sans ambages, gâtés par les bienfaits de l'Etat-providence. Le chômage est persistant et se situe à des niveaux très élevés dans presque tous les pays de l'Union Européenne. Est-ce qu'on peut qualifier de raisonnable d'admettre des dizaines et des centaines de milliers d'immigrés dans des pays aux dépens de leurs propres concitoyens dont le niveau de vie se dégrade lentement, et dans lesquels l'amélioration, malgré les déclarations officielles obligatoirement optimistes, n'est pas encore en vue ? Est-ce que les syndicats peuvent être pris au sérieux quand ils savent que la situation se détériorera probablement encore dans les années qui viennent, mais ils soutiennent, par l'obligation idéologique, la cause des immigrés malgré tout ?

(ii) *Les difficultés causées par la compétition globale* : Il y a incontestablement une compétition de plus en plus aigue dans le monde parmi les pays exportateurs, en premier lieu en ce qui concerne les produits industriels. Il est d'habitude, surtout dans les médias, d'attribuer la compétition croissante à la globalisation des activités économiques dans le monde quoique aucun argument sérieux ne soit avancé pour justifier ce point de vue. A mon sens, les raisons de la compétition mondiale croissante sont, d'une part, le fait que beaucoup de nouveaux pays avaient rejoints le club de producteurs exportateurs, par exemple la Chine, les autres pays asiatiques, ou certains pays du Moyen-Orient ou de l'Amérique du Sud. D'autre part, les énormes progrès technologiques accomplis chaque année. La globalisation n'est qu'un symptôme de ces deux phénomènes. La compétition globale oblige donc les industries et autres producteurs de réduire constamment leurs coûts et, par conséquent, l'emploi dans leurs usines ou exploitations. C'est pour cela que la plupart des nouveaux emplois créés (même aux Etats-Unis qui sont fiers des millions de nouveaux jobs créés au cours des dernières décennies) sont dans les secteurs de service qui paient considérablement moins que les emplois industriels, sauf dans le cas des emplois liés aux nouvelles technologies. Il est évident que les emplois mieux payés vont se réduire de plus en plus et que même les populations européennes seront obligées de se rabattre à des emplois beaucoup moins bien payés. Ainsi, les immigrés seront

condamnés d'accepter les travaux les moins rémunérateurs ou survivre à la marge de la société, tout en surchargeant encore plus le budget des Etats et des organisations charitables. Déracinés, vivant aux marges de la société autochtone qui, probablement, les rejettera une fois que les difficultés économiques s'aggraveront — est-ce que c'est une existence digne de vivre ?

(iii) *La fin de l'Etat-providence* : Avec ou sans immigrés, l'Etat-providence qui a permis aux populations européennes de bien vivre pendant quelques décennies, s'écroule devant nos yeux. En effet, il n'est pas possible de maintenir les niveaux de prestations comme auparavant, car les finances publiques ou les caisses de la sécurité sociale ne peuvent plus répondre aux besoins comme il y a vingt ans. Fini les temps que l'ancien chancelier allemand, Ludwig Erhard, le créateur de *Wirtschaftswunder*, a ainsi décrit : « On pense que l'Etat-providence est comme une vache qui est nourrie dans le ciel et qu'on peut traire jusqu'à la fin des temps ». Qu'est-ce que les immigrés vont devenir dans une situation pareille sans avoir les moindres qualifications et perdant, sûrement, les ressources que leur assure l'Etat-providence ?

Les conséquences effrayantes des développements technologiques galopants

Il me semble, et c'est une révélation des plus étonnantes, que les autorités et populations européennes ne se rendent pas compte de ce que beaucoup de penseurs, économistes et scientifiques prévoient : les effets, que je qualifie effrayants, d'inexorables développements technologiques du futur. Lester Thurow, le grande économiste de MIT, ou Robert Reich, de Harvard, l'ancien Secrétaire au Travail de la première administration Clinton, estiment, tous les deux, que dans vingt ou trente années la société américaine se divisera en deux parties : ceux qui auront des emplois nécessitant des qualifications techniques, y compris, par exemple, les analystes financiers, et qui seront très bien payés, d'une part ; et ceux dont le sort n'attribuera que des emplois administratifs, manuels, ou dans les secteur des services, qui auront la peine de survivre. Ceci signifie que la société sera coupée en deux, et le clivage augmentera d'une façon constante entre les deux groupes. On ne doit pas être un prophète de prévoir que si ces prévisions devaient s'avérer juste de graves troubles sociaux suivront, et les sociétés du futur ressembleront à des sociétés sud-américaines contemporaines où les riches et les aisés recrutent leur propre service de sécurité pour les protéger de ceux qui subsistent à peine, car il n'y a pas de sécurité sociale pour les soutenir (d'ailleurs en Floride, où il y a beaucoup de colonies de riches retraités, cette situation existe déjà aujourd'hui). Il n'y a aucune raison à croire que l'évolution économique et sociale en Europe soit différente de celle aux Etats-Unis, surtout dans une atmosphère dans laquelle les pays européen copient tout selon le modèle américain. Est-ce que dans une telle situation, si elle se réalisait selon les prédictions, la revendication d'admettre un nombre croissant d'immigrés a un sens ? Est-ce que ces gens dont la quasi-totalité n'est pas un réfugié politique ne seront plus heureux chez eux si on pouvait graduellement améliorer le niveau de vie dans leur propre pays ?

Les possibilités de développement économique dans les pays d'origine des immigrés

La seule solution valable pour les individus et les familles originaires des Balkans et du Tiers-Monde qui essaient d'entrer en Europe dans l'espoir d'une meilleure vie serait, dans mon opinion, de créer les conditions d'une vie décente dans leurs propres pays. Ceci est le problème de coopération économique et sociale ainsi

que de l'assistance technique l'accompagnant que l'Occident a initié, sur le plan bilatéral ou multilatéral, il y a plus de quarante ans.

Il faut préciser tout de suite qu'il a un paradoxe fondamental que fait ressortir l'analyse simultanée de l'aide aux Tiers-Monde et du problème de l'immigration. Où est notre fameuse rationalité occidentale quand, d'un côté, nous essayons d'aider les peuples d'augmenter, lentement, leur niveau de vie et quand, de l'autre côté, nous admettons de plus en plus de gens originaires de ces pays dont la contribution pourrait être cruciale (surtout dans le cas des intellectuels ou de ceux formés dans les programmes de coopération) à la réussite de l'entreprise du développement économique. Bien sûr, on peut répondre que pour ces gens-là il n'y avait pas de travail chez eux, c'est pour cela qu'ils viennent chez nous. Une éventualité qui peut être vraie dans de nombreux cas.

Ainsi j'arrive à la conclusion de cette intervention, en exprimant un souci qui me préoccupe depuis longtemps et qui a mûri au cours d'une longue carrière d'un quart de siècle dans le domaine de coopération et d'assistance technique. Je suis convaincu que tous nos efforts visant à contribuer au développement des pays d'Asie, d'Afrique et d'Amérique Latine (et le cas des Balkans, comme celui des pays successeurs de l'Union Soviétique, ne sont pas différents) sont en vain parce que nous essayons transplanter nos idées, méthodes, modes d'activité et de gestion dans des mondes culturellement totalement différents du nôtre. Nous changeons entièrement contexte et environnement, — les sociétés en question existent dans l'orbite d'autres civilisations, — mais nous croyons fermement, en vertu de l'idée de l'universalisme que nous a légué le Siècle des lumières que les hommes, leur façon de penser et de vivre sont partout les mêmes. La disproportionnalité entre les résultats obtenus et les moyens financiers et humains employés sont la preuve incontestable que notre approche est erronée.

Je ne veux pas dire par cela que beaucoup d'aspect de notre technologie, par exemple, ne sont pas universellement applicables, mais je veux insister sur le fait que le processus de développement que nous créons mène les sociétés des pays assistés à une véritable clivage mental, à une véritable schizophrénie, entre leur culture héritée du passé et le nouveau monde que l'Occident leur impose. C'est ici le coeur du problème de l'immigration.

Philosophy and Theology

EN QUELLE MESURE LES PROGRES DE LA CULTURE ONT-ILS UNE INCIDENCE SUR LA PENSEE THEOLOGIQUE ?*

Messieurs les Professeurs, Mesdames, Mesdemoiselles, Messieurs,

Nous vivons dans une époque qui montre les signes les plus frappants d'une confusion spirituelle, où des contradictions insolubles — qu'elles soient réelles ou apparentes — semblent séparer les groupes antagonistes. On voit déshumanisation de l'ensemble de la vie, qui se manifeste parallèlement avec le processus de sécularisation. L'équilibre du monde paraît perdu, et la vie des croyants, comme la pensée théologique n'échappent pas non plus à ce malaise. Il y a des masses qui vivent sans Dieu, sans grâce, sans espoir de la vie éternelle, ou qui croient satisfaire les exigences de la puissance transcendante dans leur conformisme bien agréable, et il y a aussi des fidèles qui se dévouent à l'adoration du Dieu vivant avec d'autant plus d'humilité que l'époque devient indifférente. Même déséquilibre dans le domaine du spirituel : la culture s'est détachée de ses sources religieuses, s'est déclarée autonome et suffisante à la rédemption de l'homme. La théologie, par contre, a proclamé toutes les activités spirituelles de l'homme, et la culture comme telle, sans valeur du point de vue de la destinée de la personne humaine. Elle a nié tout point de rencontre — selon la terminologie barthienne : *Anknüpfungspunkt* — entre la grâce et la nature corrompue. Ainsi, à l'heure actuelle, il est inévitable d'analyser à nouveau la relation entre la pensée théologique et la culture humaine, de réexaminer leur prétendue contradiction ou leur interdépendance éventuelle, et de poser la question qui fait l'objet de ma conférence. Mais, il est déjà anormal que cette question se pose, c'est déjà le signe de la confusion de notre époque.

Une des caractéristiques de la situation actuelle étant la dévalorisation ou révalorisation des idées — il est aujourd'hui de règle d'apprendre le vocabulaire d'un auteur pendant la lecture des premières pages de son oeuvre — je pense être utile de vous préciser brièvement ce que j'entends par les notions de culture et du progrès.

Il existe deux interprétations de la notion de culture : une large et une plus restreinte. La première conçoit la culture comme l'ensemble de toutes les activités humaines — efforts spirituels et leurs applications — en embrassant les domaines de la vie sociale, politique, économique, c'est-à-dire les problèmes moraux, et les questions de la philosophie, de la science, de l'art et de l'éducation. Culture est donc synonyme de civilisation. L'interprétation plus restreinte n'approuve pas cette conception. Elle considère l'autre conception équivalente à la notion de civilisation; en conséquence, elle n'inclut dans le concept de la culture que les activités spirituelles par excellence. J'ai suivi cette deuxième trace, car j'estime que la recherche scientifique, la création artistique et la réflexion philosophique se distinguent nettement de l'activité politique, économique et sociale. Dans les premières, l'homme s'efforce de franchir la ligne séparant l'immanent et le transcendant, de passer de ce monde des faits au monde de la vraie réalité, de « transcender » soi-même. Dans la politique, l'économie, les relations sociales, j'ajouterai même le domaine de l'éducation, on cherche à résoudre les problèmes causés par l'existence commune des différents êtres humains, comme les penseurs Grisebach et Buber auraient dit, les questions de la relation entre l'un et l'autre, Moi et Toi.

* Leçon publique donnée mercredi, le 25 mai 1960, dans la chaire de Monsieur Auguste Lemaître, Professeur du Dogmatique et de l'Ethique à la Faculté Autonome de Théologie Protestante de l'Université de Genève, en vue de l'obtention du doctorat en théologie.

Quant au progrès, je préférerais plutôt remplacer cette notion par le mot changement ou développement, en raison du sens habituel qu'on lui donne en Occident. Le progrès implique, en effet, un élément de perfectionnement et de finalité en prévoyant une évolution au cours de laquelle les résultats acquis deviennent de plus en plus parfaits; les réalisations futures seront certainement meilleures que les précédentes, jusqu'à ce qu'on arrive, ainsi, au point final, le sommet de l'histoire humaine, l'âge d'or. Il n'y a point de progrès dans la philosophie et dans la création artistique, seulement des changements ; les philosophes des différentes époques ne font que réinterpréter les conditions humaines dans les termes de leurs temps, et les artistes ne donnent que l'expression de leur personnalité, de leur *Erlebnis* du moment. Dans les sciences, il faut reconnaître le développement de diverses conceptions qui nous fournissent une explication de plus en plus adéquate de la structure de l'Univers, et nous présentent, graduellement, un tableau plus fidèle des faits et de l'évolution de l'histoire humaine. Toutefois, rien ne nous autorise à penser qu'un jour nous serons en possession d'une connaissance parfaite du macrocosme et du microcosme créés, — c'est l'optimisme de temps révolu, c'est une nouvelle foi moderne qui a introduit la finalité dans le développement merveilleux de la science.

Ces remarques préliminaires étant faites, permettez-moi de vous soumettre le sujet de ma conférence selon la pensée dialectique sous forme de deux thèses opposées, en esquisant pour terminer un essai de synthèse.

La première thèse se présente comme suit : le message chrétien, incarné en notre Seigneur, Jésus Christ, qui est « le même hier, aujourd'hui et éternellement » a ainsi un contenu éternel et ne varie pas avec le temps. La pensée théologique — présentation systématique de l'enseignement biblique et la tradition réformée transmettant le message — ne peut donc jamais être influencée par la culture humaine.

Dieu omnipotent, Créateur du monde, l'Alfa et l'Oméga de toute existence, maintient sa création toujours par la Providence. En la personne de Jésus Christ, son Fils, qui a pris la forme d'un serviteur et s'est sacrifié pour l'homme, pauvre pêcheur. Par sa grâce miraculeuse, il nous a sauvé de l'anéantissement définitif et par sa résurrection victorieuse nous a promis la vie éternelle, la condition que nous croyons en Lui. Jésus Christ reviendra à la fin des temps, dans l'ἔσχατον, et le jour de sa παρουσία sera le jour du Jugement dernier et alors se réalisera la création « des nouveaux Cieux et de la nouvelle Terre ».

Ce message nous parle de deux actes, dont le premier est décisif, rend possible, par lui-même, le deuxième. Dieu appelle l'homme, et ce Logos divin s'adressant à lui, crée la véritable existence humaine. L'homme doit répondre. Il a créé à l'image de Dieu et possède la liberté — liberté que le professeur zurichois Emil Brunner appelle liberté formelle — d'accepter par sa foi ou de refuser par sa résistance la main tendue vers lui. Comme le péché a définitivement corrompu sa nature, — son cœur, sa raison, sa volonté, — il n'est pas capable d'obéir à cette voix qui retentit au fond de lui-même et il essaie de s'arracher à la dimension verticale de sa vie en se consacrant aux activités et aux illusions du monde immanent, fugace. Il ne s'intéresse qu'à la dimension horizontale. Il crée des dieux, transforme des phénomènes périssables en idoles et se pose lui-même, ses capacités, sa raison, son esprit, sa volonté, en créateur et rédempteur de l'univers, il s'identifie avec Dieu.

C'est pourquoi la Croix se dresse toujours devant nous, symbole de l'amour et de la grâce du Seigneur. C'est pourquoi la pensée théologique doit rester, elle aussi, séparée de la pensée humaine et de la culture, expliquant, développant, transmettant le message éternel de la Croix.

Car c'est justement dans la culture que réside, pour l'homme, la plus grande tentation de déification. Son esprit, ses possibilités d'expliquer le monde et de se transcender lui-même, lui sont données par Dieu. Ses activités spirituelles le distinguent de toute la nature. Dieu voulait par celles-ci rendre sa vie plus riche, plus profonde. Sa raison et ses forces créatrices montrent la destinée de l'homme et le place au sommet : il est le seul capable de comprendre le Logos, il est le seul à pouvoir répondre, à pouvoir choisir. Mais, avec toutes ces distinctions, il est une créature soumise à la souveraineté de Dieu, son Créateur. Des limites sont ainsi posées à ses activités culturelles : elles ne doivent jamais être but et norme en soi. Chercher la vérité, démontrer les lois qui règlent la vie de la nature ou de la vie commune des hommes, dévoiler — selon le rythme que nous permet Dieu — des secrets jusqu'ici cachés, c'est la mission humaine. Mission qui doit être consciencieuse du fait que

nous ne saurions jamais dans cette existence terrestre les ultimes mystères du monde, que notre connaissance est fragmentaire et ne nous permettra pas d'être le maître de toute la création. Chercher de nous transcender nous-même, de nous échapper de cette existence angoissante et de toucher par l'*Erlebnis* de la création artistique les réalités de l'au-delà, de nous enrichir par ce *καταρσις* — comme les Grecs l'ont appelé — offert par une tragédie de Shakespeare ou une fugue de Bach, c'est la chance unique de l'homme parmi toutes les autres créatures. Chance qui doit être considéré comme telle ; ni celle-ci, ni nos forces créatrices et liberté, ne doivent être abusées. L'art est tout proche de la religion, il nous met d'une manière illusoire et fugitive en contact avec la réalité transcendante et essaie de prêter un sens à cette vie transitoire. Et c'est là justement que résident ces forces destructrices. L'art peut sembler remplacer la religion, qui substitue la foi au Dieu personnel, au Seigneur Jésus Christ. Il peut revendiquer des droits qui surpassent les limites de la créature, il peut susciter de fausses convictions comme étant le rédempteur qui fournit la solution finale de la vie humaine. Il peut être le moyen de l'homme dans la rédemption de soi-même. Toute cette perversion est l'oeuvre du péché qui pénètre tous les moments de la vie humaine, qui transforme la grandeur en misère, la créature heureuse en créature souffrante. Sa tentation est infiniment plus dangereuse pour des hommes qui croient se créer eux-mêmes et goûtent ainsi l'éternel, comme l'illustre d'une façon saisissante Denis de Rougemont :

« Jakob Boehme raconte qu'on demandait à Satan : Pourquoi est-tu sorti du Paradis ? — J'ai voulu me faire auteur, dit-il. Réponse géniale si nous considérons les divers sens du nom d'auteur. — L'auteur de toutes choses est leur autorité. Il s'autorise à l'infini dans sa création déployée. Il s'y raconte à lui-même sa grandeur et l'étendue célèbre l'oeuvre de ses mains. Le Diable a voulu faire aussi son propre ouvrage. Mais il ne peut oeuvrer que par nos mains. Et c'est pourquoi l'artiste et l'écrivain sont terriblement exposés : le Diable est là pour les guider. Et comment faire la part de son incitation ? Tout écrivain digne de ce nom, tout créateur en général, soupçonne au moins l'ambivalence vertigineuse des plus secrets motifs auxquels il cède en choisissant tel mot, tel rythme, ou tel accent. En vérité, la volonté de création, le besoin d'écrire, simplement coïncide en sa profondeur avec la tentation luciférienne : se faire comme Dieu, se faire auteur, s'autoriser dans un monde autonome. Il est fatal que le Diable s'en mêle et que les meilleurs se voient tentés plus que les autres d'accepter les conseils de ce génial souffleur ».

L'autonomie : elle est le rêve de toute la culture. L'homme en tant qu'homme s'efforce à l'autonomie et cette ambition est l'élément décisif dans la lutte éternelle contre Dieu. Cette autonomie ne peut se manifester que par le caractère autonome de ses aspirations spirituelles qui se réalisent dans la culture. Le philosophe, le savant, l'artiste méconnaissent la véritable intention de Dieu, qui ne veut pas les entraver, qui ne veut pas priver la culture d'une autonomie relative. Il lui a accordé dans sa création, avant que l'homme existé, cette autonomie ; tous les domaines de l'activité de l'esprit et des forces créatrices humaines ont leurs règles, leurs lois internes, leurs structures indépendantes ; les conceptions développées, les oeuvres mises à jour ne représentent une valeur du point de vue de la culture que si elles sont conformes aux lois intérieures de leurs domaines respectifs. Mais, ni la philosophie, ni la science, ni l'art ne devraient jamais exiger l'autonomie absolue, car tout est soumis à Dieu, l'autorité finale lui seul appartient. Les différents domaines de la culture doivent trouver leurs places dans le cadre général de la vie humaine, dans l'ordre de la création — sous le règne de Jésus Christ.

Ce caractère révolté de la culture, son opposition à l'ordre établi par le Créateur, ses efforts de se libérer de l'autorité de Dieu — ne permet pas une incidence entre elle et la pensée théologique. Celle-ci est *theos logos* — la Parole de Dieu — l'ensemble de notre connaissance sur Lui qui a été révélée par son Fils et transmise à des générations successives par l'Écriture Sainte. Elle n'a que cette seule source et qu'un seul devoir : proclamer le message éternel, l'Évangile, au monde des pécheurs. Comment, alors, imaginer que l'ordre temporel d'ici-bas pourrait rencontrer la pensée théologique qui est messager de l'ordre éternel ? Comment les oeuvres périssables de la culture humaine, son développement interne — précieux ou inutile — pourraient-ils influencer la réflexion qui ne se préoccupe que des « affaires » du Seigneur ? Comment ces efforts visant à une autonomie absolue et revêtant quelquefois les caractéristiques de l'Antéchrist pourraient-ils être assimilés à la foi à Dieu l'omnipotent et au dévouement humble à l'édification du royaume du Christ ?

La *seconde thèse* est la suivante : Nous — chrétiens — ne sommes pas de ce monde, mais nous vivons. La pensée théologique est l'oeuvre de l'esprit humain et se situe en toutes les époques dans un contexte historique, culturel, social défini. Le message chrétien s'adresse à des hommes réels, vivant dans leurs temps et avec leurs cultures ; il est naturel alors que la réflexion théologique doive tenir compte des évolutions récentes, des conditions culturelles actuelles et s'adapter à celles-ci. L'influence de ces dernières sur la théologie n'est pas seulement inévitable, mais indispensable.

Cette position est très nette et tout à fait justifiable. Il est clair que le porteur du message est la voix humaine transmises par des institutions comme les églises. Les hommes ne peuvent qu'utiliser des moyens insuffisants, des formules rigides — les dogmes — et des services incomplets — l'oeuvre de la charité. Tout récemment un théologien contemporain a écrit : « La forme fondamentale de l'expression dans toute culture, est le langage ... Aucun théologien ne peut se défaire dans ses paroles ou ses écrits de la forme culturelle dans laquelle apparaît sa préoccupation religieuse. Le langage est une fonction élémentaire de toutes les activités culturelles, parce que grâce à lui l'homme peut saisir la réalité, faisant émerger du chaos des objets réels qu'il peut reconnaître et dont il peut se servir ... Les activités culturelles présupposent le pouvoir significatif et créateur du langage ».

Du point de vue théologique, cette argumentation n'est pas assez convaincante, mais existe-t-il cependant des arguments valables en sa faveur ?

Selon les paroles de la Bible qui nous font le récit de la création de l'homme affirment que l'homme a été créé à l'image et à la ressemblance de Dieu (*imago Dei et similitudo*). Il a bénéficié de la *justitia originalis*, il vivait dans l'état naturel et original, sans péché, selon la volonté de Dieu, — jusqu'au moment de la chute lorsqu'il s'est dressé contre son Créateur et a perdu son état, sa qualité précédente. L'interprétation théologique de ce fait a été très différente au cours de l'histoire du christianisme. Un des Pères de l'église médiévale, Irenaeus, pensait, que l'homme a perdu par la chute, sa ressemblance avec Dieu, mais qu'il a gardé sa qualité de *imago Dei*. En partant de cette idée, l'église catholique romaine a développé son dogme qui affirme la position d'Irenaeus, en disant que l'homme a perdu le *donum supranaturale* qui n'était pas l'essentiel de sa nature, mais qu'il a gardé au contraire les *pura naturalia*, sa nature originalement créée. La Réforme a rejeté cette interprétation et, surtout dans sa forme calvinienne, a décrété que l'*imago Dei* était totalement détruite en l'homme par la chute et que dans son état de pécheur il n'a plus rien de la *justitia originalis*. La théologie des néo—réformateurs continue cette tradition et prive l'homme, d'une manière encore plus marquante de tout espoir d'avoir encore certains traits de l'image et de la ressemblance de Dieu.

Il existe, toutefois, à notre époque une autre tendance qui se distance de la position théologique de Karl Barth et de la théologie européenne et qui est en premier lieu représentée par des théologien américains. Parmi ces professeurs américains, Reinhold Niebuhr formule le plus clairement une conception qui nous intéresse tout particulièrement. Niebuhr estime que depuis le début de la pensée chrétienne une confusion a eu lieu concernant le problème du péché original. Les théologiens trouvaient difficile de réfuter les objections rationalistes sans insister sur le fait que la chute était un événement historique et concret. Ainsi, ils ont pris à la lettre l'histoire de la création, en commettant une erreur décisive. En cédant à l'inclination naturelle de l'homme et en interprétant chronologiquement un symbole qui ne se prête pas à une telle interprétation, toute la théologie chrétienne a pris l'état original de l'homme, comme une période historique — période du Paradis — et a considéré la période d'après chute de la même façon, comme une période de l'histoire humaine jusqu'à nos jours. « Depuis que la chute est devenue un événement historique au lieu d'être plutôt un aspect de chaque moment historique et la vie de l'homme, la relation entre le bien et le mal a été obscurci » — dit Niebuhr dans son livre, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*. Donc, le problème de la *justitia originalis* est un problème de tous les jours dans notre vie terrestre, l'Ego de l'homme est le locus à la fois de l'*imago Dei* et du péché. « Le péché ne détruit pas la structure par laquelle l'homme est homme, et n'élimine pas le sens d'obligation due à la nature essentielle de l'homme, qui est le reste de sa perfection », — continue Niebuhr, — « la vertu qui correspond donc à la vraie nature humaine apparaît au pécheur en forme de loi ».

En acceptant cette conception du péché et de la justice originelle, il ne peut pas être question d'un *Anknüpfungspunkt*, d'un point de rencontre entre théologie et culture. Il y a une distinction nette, mais il n'y a pas de rupture. La théologie proclame le message qui lui a été confié et le développe en ses détails dans un système cohérent en acceptant la compétence de la pensée contemporaine dans les limites du contenu éternel de lui-même. Elle reconnaît que l'homme est capable par la recherche de la vérité et par la transcendance de lui-même en ses oeuvres d'art de retrouver les traces de la main bénie de son Créateur, d'acquiescer un attachement intuitif dans le mystère de son *Erlebnis*, — sans jamais arriver à une connaissance parfaite de Dieu et de sa grâce si ce n'est dans sa révélation incarnée — Jésus Christ — et écrite — la Bible.

Il est peut-être utile d'évoquer dans ce contexte une distinction brunnerienne qui mettra mieux en lumière la pensée que j'ai exprimée. Brunner parla dans ses Gifford Lectures des vérités de Dieu — *God-truth* — et des vérités du monde — *world-truths*. Il considère cette distinction comme tout à fait relative, adaptée à nos catégories humaines. La Saint Ecriture parle de la vérité de Dieu, et ne s'occupe pas des vérités du monde. Toutefois, il y a assez de problèmes auxquels le chrétien s'échappe dans ce monde. Ce qui doit être sa prise de position n'est pas dit explicitement dans la Bible, mais découle de sa foi et de son amour vers l'autrui. Bref, la pensée théologique doit recourir à la réflexion humaine, et tenir compte des résultats de la recherche scientifique et des expressions de l'art authentique dans les limites des vérités de ce monde, — car ces derniers sont des manifestations en diverses formes des restes de l'état originel de l'homme, de la *justitia originalis*.

Il y a énormément d'exemples de l'influence de la culture sur la pensée théologique. J'en citerai seulement quelques-uns. Le changement à notre époque de l'interprétation de la doctrine de *justitia originalis* montre déjà une incidence que l'ensemble du développement de la pensée moderne a eue sur la théologie. Un autre est l'interprétation contemporaine des premiers chapitres de Genèse, de toute la création. Pour l'homme moderne il est en effet impossible d'accepter la description des événements comme elle y figure. Les sciences nous ont révélé tout le processus de la formation de notre planète, des autres astres, les secrets du commencement de la vie et de la transformation de la vie par les lois biologiques etc. Donc, les croyants et les théologiens qui s'attachent au dogme de l'inspiration verbale de la Saint Ecriture, s'engagent dans une discussion inutile et sans espoir avec l'homme moderne, et au lieu de l'amener à la source de la grâce, il le repoussent encore plus loin dans sa solitude et ont élargi l'abîme qui le sépare de la vérité de Dieu. Le message éternel pourtant n'était pas en question; notre foi dans la création de l'univers par le Dieu Créateur, dans la création *ex nihilo*, n'est pas liée à l'historique présentée dans la Genèse. Elle est une croyance spirituelle, transmise par l'intermédiaire des moyens culturels de l'époque, il faut la dégager de son enveloppe — comme nous l'a expliqué l'ancien et vénéré professeur de la théologie systématique à Budapest, feu János Victor, qui m'a ouvert les yeux sur ces aspects de la vérité chrétienne. Le courant opposé à cette tendance de « modernisation » de la pensée théologique s'annonce, indiqué par le professeur Paul Tillich, dans une de ses conférences sur le thème : « Les traits religieux de la culture ». L'un des maux de notre culture moderne est le développement de la fausse relation entre sujet et objet sur le plan épistémologique ; en effet, une fausse alternative s'est développée depuis le règne du positivisme du siècle passé : on arrive à une « objectivisation » générale du monde. Ce mouvement ne s'empare pas seulement des formes scientifiques, mais aussi de l'homme de la rue. L'objet — en n'importe quelle relation — n'est examiné que du dehors, il n'y a aucun contact immédiat entre sujet et objet. C'est ce qu'on nomme aujourd'hui la méthode scientifique. On a oublié qu'à côté de la connaissance de l'extérieur il y a aussi une connaissance de l'intérieur par la transcendance du soi, qui se met en rapport vivant avec son objet. Cette méthode est utile et fructueuse dans les sciences naturelles, mais au fur et à mesure qu'on approche de l'homme, et en analysant l'homme et ses relations, la méthode de l'« objectivisation » ne devient pas seulement dangereuse, mais tout à fait destructive. Cette thèse d'Emil Brunner s'avère de plus en plus juste ; le processus est arrivé au point où l'essentiel de la nature de l'homme, la dimension verticale de son existence, c'est-à-dire sa communauté vivante avec son Dieu Créateur et Rédempteur, est atteint. On objectivise la conception de Dieu, de la Croix, du Saint Esprit, etc. non seulement dans certains cercles de théologiens, mais aussi dans des mouvements de réveil. Ce phénomène curieux demandera d'être analysé plus en détail ; je l'ai cité ici à titre d'exemple d'incidence — malheureuse incidence — de la culture contemporaine sur la pensée théologique.

Après ces exemples, j'arrive à vous présenter la *synthèse* entre les deux thèses précédentes : la religion et les autres activités culturelles représentent des aspects différents de la vie des hommes. La rupture, le divorce total entre elles est le signe le plus éclatant de notre misère contemporaine. Totalitarismes ou sécularismes, déshumanisation ou objectivisation découlent de cette source. Il faut donc développer entre tous les aspects de la vie humaine une unité vivante, où la pensée théologique est à la base de tous les autres efforts de l'esprit et des forces créatrices de l'homme ; où dans l'interdépendance naturelle de ces différents aspects, la question, qui est le sujet de ma conférence, ne se pose pas.

La thèse et l'antithèse que je vous ai présentées ne sont, en effet, contradictoires, ne s'excluent pas mutuellement. Toutes les deux sont réactions à un état intenable de la pensée théologique ; l'une au christianisme désillusionné du libéralisme passé, l'autre à une théologie inhumaine qui, à présent, est devenu moyen de la sécularisation. Quoique les réactions de ces deux tendances sont incompréhensibles l'une à l'autre, leur synthèse s'impose, toutefois, d'une façon impérative à notre époque.

Développer entre tous les aspects de la vie humaine une unité vivante, où l'expérience religieuse est à la base des activités spirituelles de l'homme et la pensée théologique — tout en gardant son terrain indépendant — pénètre en toutes les branches de la culture : c'est la synthèse, la *théonomie*. La situation esquissée est justement la contraire : l'*hétéronomie* règne, la théologie est séparée de la culture, la culture se méfie de la théologie, et l'une et l'autre veulent s'influencer mutuellement — du dehors. La *théonomie* ne mettra pas en danger l'accent particulier que l'une ou l'autre thèse déclare. Le message éternel retentirait avec la même clarté et pureté, la Croix ne cessera pas de se dresser, se dresser au-dessus de ce monde, de nos querelles, nos thèses et antithèses, mais — dialectiquement parlant — le message se ferait entendre de l'intérieur de la culture, la pensée chrétienne se développerait organiquement dans son contexte contemporain. L'intégration de tous les aspects ne pourrait se réaliser qu'au fond de chaque personne humaine ; dans chaque âme se transformerait la relation hétéronome de la pensée théologique et de la culture dans une unité théonome. Dans cette théonomie notre question n'aurait aucuns sens, car où theos est logos, — Dieu est la norme et la loi — la culture retrouverait l'ultime sens de son existence en Lui et se contenterait avec son autonomie relative ; la pensée théologique s'intégrerait, tout naturellement, dans la vie culturelle et suivrait ces changements et son développement liés au contexte de l'époque.

Notre foi au Royaume de Dieu nous indique aussi ce chemin. Le Royaume se réalisera ici avec la *παρουσία* du notre Seigneur Jésus Christ, — mais, d'autre part, il est déjà là, il se prépare dans les cœurs et les âmes, dans la foi, dans toutes la vie humaine avec ces forces créatrices, ces réflexions angoissantes et sa poussée désespérée vers la vérité. Le Royaume de Dieu embrasse la totalité de la vie physique et humaine : il et exige une unité vivante de ces deux aspects de notre existence. Quand on pense à la culture humaine du point de vue chrétien, il ne faut pas oublier ce que Karl Barth a dit : « Le Nouveau Testament ne parle pas seulement du royaume des cieux, mais aussi des paraboles du royaume ».

INDIVIDUALISM RE-VISITED*

If one wanted to characterize the modern age with one simple statement, the best way would be to say that it is dominated, to a hitherto unknown extent in human history, by *the reign of the individual*. As much as one has to consider the merits of individualism as an unprecedented enrichment of human existence, of the life of individual persons with their particular identities, intentions, and creativeness; one has to take into account as much the equally unprecedented unfolding of immeasurable damage and destruction caused by this overwhelming domination of the ideology of individualism in human societies. This may sound as a heresy in our times, precisely because the individuals' role and value are so highly appreciated that all social institutions are subject to this all-embracing individualism as, for example, democracy is based on the aggregate of individual wills, imagined by Rousseau, or all productive activities are geared to the individuals' preferences (or 'priority orderings') – or, at least, are pretended to be so.

In our analysis of modern individualistic ideology, we shall first examine its two parallel versions, the belief in man (i) as ultimate reality, and (ii) the 'master of the universe', together with their two sources in Greek Antiquity and in the teachings of Christianity. Afterwards, we shall proceed with an appraisal of individualism in modernity, especially the phenomena of abstract individualism in liberalism and the individual in the political arena as a democratic citizen. Finally, we shall analyze the postmodern trend toward nihilism through de-centering the individual and de-constructing the world, resulting in a 'plurality of worlds' each constructed precisely around these de-centered individuals. In conclusion, we shall insist on the necessity to re-invent the concepts of real community and of a human person, which are mutually constitutive of each other in the form of a symbiosis.

1. TWO ASPECTS OF MODERN INDIVIDUALISM

a) *The Individual as Ultimate Reality*

The modern age is marked by the increasingly predominant role of the individual as ultimate reality in contradistinction to the ideal of the human person. In my understanding *individual* means the human being taken as one of the innumerable units composing the multitude of men characterizing our contemporary world (hence the expression of 'atomized' society); the individual has no particular features but is described by generics which are applicable to all members of the species, everywhere, at any time and in all circumstances. The concept of this individual is the result of a formalizing, non-ontological methodology which creates, imitating the sciences of nature, an abstract entity, a fiction which aims at reifying the human being studied as an object like any other object in the physical universe, and which also aims at establishing general laws or rules concerning anything human.

In contradistinction to the individual, I designate by a *person* a human being who is characterized by its unique and particular features, features which indicate the person's embeddedness in a concrete cultural, social and natural environment. Whereas an individual is always an abstract concept, a person is a living creature considered in his specific, empirical context. Both are independent and autonomous, but the individual is not moral in the sense that it acts exclusively in accordance with its own interests, while the person is a moral being who acts in accordance with

* Article written in the second half of the nineties; it was never published.

principles which are not only derived from the innate nature of his autonomous self but are congruent as well with the beliefs, values and traditions of his community. The individual submits himself to social rules of behavior and action to the extent that they assure his co-existence with others who obey the same self-oriented motivations as him; the person who is 'socialized' in a certain context, in a certain cultural and social milieu, behaves and acts in a way that corresponds to the norms evolved in this milieu, precisely because he internalized these norms and rules.

In re-visiting the role of the individual in our culture, we have to take into consideration not only that the modern concept of the individual does not correspond at all to the age-old concept of the person, but also that individualism became an ideology which aggressively not only overemphasized the role of the individual in society but attempted to eliminate even the idea of a person, embedded in its cultural social, and temporal context. The ideas of the person and of the individual juxtaposed, call attention to the shortcomings of modern individualism. The ideal of the person as I or Thou, "the selves we are and the selves among whom we live," in Richard Niebuhr's beautiful formulation,¹ is totally different from an objective and impersonal conceptualization of the human being which ignores personal relations and makes an object of knowledge all other individuals for each individual. Persons are determined in a rich, dialogical context encompassing all Thou-s they encounter in their environment, including past generations with whom they are linked together through traditions and inherited customs.

The view of the individual we inherited was first elaborated in Athens in the context of the intensive social life of the *polis*, especially by Protagoras and Democritus. The influence of their ideas is until today persistent and shaping our comprehension of the problem of individuality. For this reason, we shall examine in detail their views as described in a recent, excellent study by Cynthia Farrar. It was Protagoras who proclaimed that "Man is the measure (metron) of all things: of those which are, that they are, and of those which are not, that they are not."² This maxim of the Greek philosopher was much misunderstood and misinterpreted since; therefore, in dealing with the reign of the individual in modernity it is important to delimit the contemporary conception from the one pretended to have been developed by Protagoras and Democritus. As Farrar pointed out, Protagoras's maxim concerns 'the way things are,' it conceives of man as a 'sensing' and 'judging' being:

"The man-measure doctrine makes a claim about all men; but it does not claim that the measure is the species man, except in so far as a unified view could emerge from the experience of individual men. Yet simply summing together each man's private sensations will not exhaust or indeed capture the character of the world men experience. The reality to which we do have access must be conceived in terms which explain what appeared to every man and to all men. It does not follow from this that reality is flux, or that the world possesses contradictory qualities in itself. Man's interaction with the world defines the only reality we can know, and this interaction is broadly stable and locally variable" (Farrar 1988: p. 49).

¹ Richard Niebuhr wrote one of the most beautiful texts concerning the human person as opposed to the nameless individual: "Our Western morality is built on the recognition that nothing is more important, more to be served and honored, apart from God himself, than human I's and Thou's – the selves we are and the selves among whom we live. But the morality of personal worth maintains itself in our subconscious minds like an alien in a strange country where no one understands and few acknowledge his presence ... as selves they are epiphenomena in the dominant world view of our society. Poetry and religion may portray them, but poetry and faith are officially regarded as dealing with the mythical. What alone is acknowledged, accepted and actual, is the object. So far as selves can be made objects – set before the mind as projected, eternal realities – they have their place. But then they are no longer selves; they are not I's and Thou's but It's ... So we live in a depersonalized and disenchanted world in which we are taught to doubt the primary realities we experience – the self and its companion selves and in which we are taught to flee from the knowledge which lies near the beginning of wisdom – the knowledge of ourselves." NIEBUHR, Richard (1960), pp. 139-140.

² PLATO. *Theaethetus*, 152a 3-8. However, the firmness of Protagoras' conviction can be questioned because as a real Sophist he confessed that concerning any question one can advance two opposite arguments and prove each of them. See DIELS, H. (ed.) *Die Fragmente des Vorsokratiker*. 6. ed. Berlin, W. Kranz, 1951, 80 A 1, 6a; and 80 B 5.

In fact, what Protagoras believed was that human understanding of the world, and human knowledge in general, cannot but be empirical, derived from the collective experience of mankind and of particular groups of men. The individual man's experience is concretely empirical, but mankind's collective experience secures stability and regularity, it creates a generalizable standard. This comprehension of Protagoras's maxim reflects what contemporary philosophers like Karl Popper assumed that *a priori* knowledge is derived from collective experience (Popper 1987). Even if there is a shared and common basis of men's knowledge, differences exist because men and their environments are different, and men are unevenly endowed with intelligence and virtue; some are wiser than others and these wise men, through reflective judgment and taking into account others' experience as well, refine their concepts and their ways of understanding.

But for Protagoras as much as for his contemporaries man's place, his cultural and social environment, is the *polis* which represents a world of shared belief- and value-systems as well as the encompassing experiential background out of which each citizen elaborates his 'measurement' of the world. Even if the individual is prior to society in Protagoras's view, his survival depends on his living in a community, and this necessitates many compromises in order to reach harmony. Classical Greek individualism never embraced such extremes as Western individualistic ideology because it appeared undisputable for people in fifth-century Athens that man as a citizen is member of the community of the *polis* and participates in its political and social life. Life in democracy, as conceived by Pericles and his contemporaries, constituted a collective self-expression and a collective self-restraint which, through the interaction of citizens, reflexively shaped and oriented each member's opinions and judgments. In consequence, any naturally able man could achieve excellence in public life if possessing the expertise and the moral reputation required because the *polis* offered equal opportunity to all of its citizens. It is important that the Protagorean concept of relations between man and his society are not modern, on the one hand, as life in the community is constitutive of human life, but, on the other hand, these same relations are internally reflexive (with Giddens's expression), society is not an external, institutionally imposed structure on man but is derived from his interactions with others, – and in this respect, Protagoras's man can be considered as a 'modern man.'

Democritus's view of man was an expression of his atomistic concept of the world which may be called 'cosmic materialism', the reconciliation of *nomos* and *physis*.³ His individualism was more complete and more modern than the man-measure idea of Protagoras, because he considered man as a self-sufficient entity who can attain his own good by his own forces and following his own interests. All constraints on man's freedom of action – social or political – are for Democritus derived from the features of man's own situation. The cosmic framework is the most decisive feature of this situation and represents the main constraint on an individual's intentions and will; cosmic influence is responsible for order in human existence because the unhampered interaction of physical forces produces order in the *cosmos* as well as in the *polis*, the two realms being linked through cosmic regularities and laws. In Greek atomism the phenomenal world was not reduced to its components belonging to the non-phenomenal universe, the difference between the two was due to 'viewing from a different distance.' Man belongs to both worlds, to the objective, real world – the *cosmos* – and to the phenomenal but autonomous world of his species, – the *polis*; mental phenomena being not only parasitic on configurations of atoms, but is, at the same time, controlled by them through the soul. The mind is an aspect of the soul though not identical with it, and reflective thinking is a form of perception; this linkage secures the 'differentiating distance' between the phenomenal and the non-phenomenal. Through experience, human reason endeavors to understand the *cosmos* though can never really know reality (and, therefore, truth); Democritus said, according to Sextus Empiricus, that "man is what all we know" (Farrar 1988, p. 215). Human freedom and autonomy are guaranteed precisely by the ordering forces of *cosmos* which work through man himself as 'internal necessity' (with a term used by the Epicureans), not as external constraints.

³ "Nomos is, for Democritus, an expression of what man needs and, over time, creates, yet this expression is itself limited by and grounded in human nature. The atomist definition of human *physis* serves as a standard distinct from social norms (an internal constraint), but it is not a reductionist or primitive account. Just as in its general explanation of phenomena, the atomist theory of human nature succeeds in accounting at once for the variety and mutability and the regularity of human experience by providing a non-phenomenal foundation for reality." FARRAR (1988), p. 242.

Democritus's interpretation of the self was based on the governing power and function of the (atomistic) soul in man, equipped with intelligent reasoning, which controlled his action and secured his freedom. In Democritus's philosophy one can also discover an emphasis on the Giddensian 'internal referentiality,' as the Greek thinker insists that man must act justly for his own reasons and not for fear of external sanctions. He has to elaborate his own *nomos*, his own legislation, with due respect to himself in order to avoid 'unsuitable' acts, inappropriate or harmful for his community, for his own soul and for his phenomenal well-being. Through this, man will enact justice in his behavior and attitude towards other men and the world which he has to confront as it is. It is evident from the foregoing that Democritus, though taking into account the *polis* as the human society in which man lives, did not elaborate a communitarian framework for human existence as Protagoras, because for him (as for many modern theorists) social practices were nothing but reflections of man's interests, that is, he gave absolute priority to the individual as against society. The individual's reflexivity leads to the social order's correspondence with his interests and, at the same time, enables him to internalize the norms of society with which he cooperates. Nevertheless, the autonomy of the individual in Democritus's thinking has a totally different function than in the modern conception as a result of his insistence on the all-encompassing *cosmos* grounding social as well as individual human life in the physical-cum-mental universe.

Public life in the Athenian *polis* soon became disintegrated and the cultural context changed rapidly; a polarization of interests, as described by Thucydides, led to the deterioration of the social climate and to the disintegration of socially defined values. Individual, egoistic interests replaced the primacy of what is good for the *polis* itself; individuals became, reflectively, masters of their well-being and wanted to be freed from constraints imposed by the community. The fundamental conflict of order and autonomy destroyed Athenian democracy. With the Epicureans, Cynics, and Stoics following in Democritus's footsteps, the self-sufficient individual was born; the relativization of values in favor of such an individual led to the creation of separate 'worlds'.

Christianity came into existence in this Hellenistic world and is impregnated with the concept and importance of the individual. However, the Christian idea of the individual person cannot be compared to the modern ideal of the individual as the Christian person is an 'individual-in-relation-to-God,' the person in need of salvation. It is undeniable that in Christian revelation and theology the individual person is the interlocutor of God and the object of His grace; the message of salvation is addressed to each individual believer. However, it would be false to say that Christianity ignores community at the expense of the individual because the individual being object of redemption is a consequence of the fact that he is a member of the 'community of elect' or of the 'invisible Church'. The individual sinner and the community of believers are bound together in the redemptive action of God's grace. In consequence, it is correct to depict, with Troeltsch, the Christian belief as representing 'absolute individualism and absolute universalism' – in relation to God and the Savior. Therefore, Christian individualism is transcendent in the sense that it transcends the world of man and of social institutions; this is the foundation of the dualism reflected in the Christian attitude to the immanent world.

The echo of individualism was very much tempered during the Middle Ages, but gained a new force in the time of the Renaissance and, especially, since the scientific worldview developed the Enlightenment's ideas and the free-market economy acquired pre-eminence. The individualism of modernity is basically linked to the position of nominalism, as the philosophy of Karl Popper reminds us of this important coincidence. The links between individualism and nominalism were clearly summarized by Dumont:

"The truth is that our culture is permeated by nominalism, which grants real existence only to individuals and not to relations, to elements and not to sets of elements. Nominalism, in fact, is just another name of individualism, or rather one of its facets ... [However] there are ideas linked by certain relations, and without these relations the ideas will not exist. In every case the relations form a configuration, and these configurations vary from text to text, from author to author, from one milieu to another, but they do not vary as chalk does from cheese, and we can try to see what they have in common at each level of generalization" (Dumont 1986, p. 11).

In contemporary language Gould's formula 'the ontology of abstract individualism' (Gould 1988, p. 93) expresses the best of our individualistic ideology, or, couched in Marxist terms, modernity is 'a continuous process of accumulation of self.' (Friedman). Put in another way by Gould, individuality is 'the product of a person's choices and action.' Perhaps the best expression of modern individualism was given by the great artist, Braque, who in his definition of existence as a 'perpetual revelation' pointed out in almost Bergsonian terms: "I have made a great discovery. I no longer believe in anything. Objects don't exist for me except insofar as a rapport exists between them and myself."⁴ He wonderfully encapsulated the idea that modernity perceives only the present that all historical perspective, all fundamental relation with the 'Other' is ignored because individual existence is a 'permanent creation of ourselves in our autonomy' (Foucault). The searching for autonomy is of the essence of modern individualism; man is not looking to the *cosmos* or to his community for orientation but tries to discern his own particular purpose in life. In conditions of mass society, an affirmation of the individual's freedom and autonomy became a 'burning' urge to conquer originality through a cult of oneself. Culture and society became entities derivative of, and constituted by, the activities of individuals and their relations to each other as far as these relations are motivated and justified by their self-interests. The ontological primacy of the individual is maintained in all circumstances.

Individuality is frequently construed as subjectivity presupposing that "subjectivity establishes a personal, individual and unique relation to intersubjectivity (and not to the object)" but, of course, intersubjectivity must be accepted by the subject itself (Heller 1992, p. 223). Subjective individualism is entirely relativist as individuals are free to ignore, re-cast or re-affirm values, norms and beliefs, producing the well-known phenomenon of the de-centered subject and its derivative, the de-structured society. It is questionable whether such a disintegration of the social lifeworld favors individual self-creation offering unlimited space for 'the playful unfolding of individual differences' (Honneth), in an atmosphere where no collective constraints exist.

It is a correlate of individual subjectivity that the time perspective is shortened: the now, the present, is the center, the decisive moment, and it is living in the now that the individual is embracing the horizon of the past and of the future, if at all, in the Gadamerian 'fusion of horizons.' "Our ready-made individuality, our identity, is no more than an accidental cohesion in the flux of time," as D.H. Lawrence long time ago remarked it (quoted by: Ch. Taylor 1989, p. 463). As the time-concept changed with the development of modern individualism, the unique temporal moment of now, corresponding to the 'reign of the individual,' was expressed in an 'internal time-consciousness' (Husserl) gradually replacing 'objective' time or world-time. It structured the individual's existence and gave it a definite meaning. Simultaneously, and in contradistinction to the 'internalization' of time-consciousness, this modification of the perspective carried with it, in a first phase, an extension of the temporal horizon. The new vision of time corresponded to a new sense of freedom, to the liberation from traditions and from everything 'past'; history became a proof of the 'distinctness' of the modern, in all its aspects, from bygone events and values.⁵

⁴ GOLDING, John. "Two Who Made a Revolution." *The New York Review of Books*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 9, 31 May 1990, p. 10.

⁵ In Dupré's words: "An unprecedented awareness grew that what humans accomplish in the transitoriness of time definitely changes the very nature of human life. History thereby suddenly acquired an existential significance that it had not possessed before ... The historical awareness introduced by this particular distinction [between past as *magistra vitae* and past representing something irreducibly other] resulted in a comprehensive understanding of the entire past as different." DUPRE (1993), pp. 145-146.

b) MAN: THE ULTIMATE END OF EVOLUTION

Since Greek Antiquity and Christianity, man is considered in Western civilization as the ultimate end of the evolution of the natural world.⁶ In this respect, the worldview of our culture is fundamentally different from most other civilizations in which no special status is granted to the human species.

The individual being the object of salvation and of Christ's redemptive action did not mean the limitation of the works of God's grace to the human species; the Bible refers many times to the fact that the redemptive action of grace encompasses the whole universe. The individual's particular situation, that he is endowed by the Creator with consciousness, with awareness of its human predicament, and with moral responsibility; that he has the power to choose among alternatives and is therefore responsible for his acts, these are the characteristics of man's destiny which explain the fact that he is the object of salvation.

The aspect of the Biblical teaching referred to in most cases as the foundation of the West's belief in the superiority of the human species is the metaphor of man being created 'in the image of God.' This metaphor is closely linked to the already indicated relation between man's situation involving his moral responsibility and God's redemptory act to save him. That man and his species were created 'in the image of God' means that he is endowed with capacities to assume moral responsibility, to assume the burden of making good or bad choices. I do not think that the Biblical metaphor depicting man as being created 'in the image of God' could ever be justly explained as the superiority of the human species over all animate or inanimate beings in the cosmos.

Both explications justifying the West's extreme individualism, – one referring to the individual's importance in his relationship to God and to his position as the object of salvation, and the other deducting man's being the ultimate end of evolution through his being created 'in the image of God', – are simply distortions of the Christian teaching for instrumental reasons or, to put it in another way, projected from the 'sacred' into the 'mundane' plane in order to support individualistic ideology. As always in the case of transplantation of images and metaphors from one particular context into a totally different and incommensurable one, this is an inadmissible collapsing of two independent and entirely unrelated views into one, especially if one accepts the Kantian position that the world of faith and the world of immanent realities are, and should be kept, separate.

As early as in the utopian works of Campanella or More, it was admitted that man is in control of his immanent destiny through molding his environment by scientific and technical knowledge and efficiency. This trend was, of course, reinforced by the unlimited faith of Bacon in the possibilities of human, rational thinking proceeding through empirical investigations; epistemology eliminated ontological thinking. Therefore, in the second phase of development of the new temporal horizon, the historical view was replaced by the belief in an infinite progress of humanity on the path of scientific and technological successes because, "Whenever human action shapes the future, the idea of history as indefinite progress logically follows" (Dupré 1993, p. 152). History was henceforth seen

⁶ Montaigne wrote in a famous passage of his *Apologie de Raimond Sebond*: "Let man make me understand by the force of his reason, upon what foundations he has built these great advantages he thinks he has over other creatures. Who has made him believe that this admirable motion of the celestial arch, the eternal light of those luminaries that roll so high over his head, the wondrous and fearful motions of that infinite ocean, should be established and continue so many ages for his service and convenience? Can anything be imagined so ridiculous, that this miserable and wretched creature, who is not so much as master of himself, but subject to the injuries of all things, should call himself master and emperor of the world, of which he has no power to know the least part, much less to command the whole?" MONTAIGNE, Michel de. *Essays* II, Chap. xii. English transl. W. Hazlitt. *The Works of Michael de Montaigne*. 2. ed. London, 1845, p. 205.

as a one-directional movement toward future, requiring a constant re-interpretation of the past.⁷ This belief in an infinite progress of mankind, controlled by man's science and technology, became a crucial component of modern individualism because it fuelled the self-consciousness of Western man, even if he did not understand very much, especially in the twentieth century, from scientific theories and technological advances.

2. INDIVIDUALISM IN THE MODERN WORLD

Assimilating the classical and Christian conceptions of man, born in a completely different context, modern individualism thus developed a very particular concept of the human being. There were two foundations on which this doctrine of individualism was built: the epistemological and the liberal.

a) *Modern Individualism: The Epistemological Dimension*

The formation of the concept of modern individual was mainly due to the event which determined the whole modern age, namely, the epistemological turn accomplished by Descartes and the related subject-object distinction which, at the same time, laid the foundation for the intellectual, in particular scientific, developments of the last 300 years. The ontological outlook, however, survived all along in the undercurrents of Western thinking until it re-surfaced, with full force, in the phenomenological philosophy of this century and the late modern approach to human existence. The evolution of this epistemologically-conceived individualistic concept was reflected as well in the subsequent elaboration of *methodological individualism* dominating in both the natural and social sciences, and by the reign of the subject-object confrontation in all 'foundationalist' philosophies. In fact, the modern empiricist became the principal protagonist of the 'epistemological individual' as he pushed the Cartesian position to its extreme consequence making of the individual's experiences the unique source of knowledge, – excluding any intersubjective origin of the latter. The invention of the 'epistemological individual' was seen as the major act in the progressive liberation of man from various sorts of external tutelage and constraints (religion, tradition, morals, etc.), making him totally free and the sole master of his destiny.

Steven Lukes (1977, *passim*) defined as the 'core values of individualism' (i) the respect for human dignity or for human beings, (ii) autonomy (or independence in directing one's existence), (iii) privacy, and (iv) self-development. These core values of individualism are linked to the two great ideals of modernity: the first to the ideal of equality and the other three to the ideal of freedom. In a curious way, Lukes also ties these core values to other 'cognitive' doctrines, traditionally related to individualism and, specifically, to what is important for our argumentation, the 'epistemological individualism' of modernity which refers to a disembodied, 'abstract' individual endowed with theoretically presupposed interests, wants, purposes, and needs.⁸ He nevertheless forgets to mention that this abstract creature is the same individual as depicted by the utilitarians and the scientifically-inspired reductionist theories as well.

⁷ "Modernization everywhere means a powerful shift in attention from past and present to the future. What is more the temporality within which this future is conceived is of a very popular kind – it is precise, measurable, and, at least in principle, subject to human control. In short, it is time to be mastered." BERGER (1977), p. 73.

⁸ Lukes's hesitations are revealed when he recognizes that formal equality and formal freedom represent important gains in the course of modern evolution, but that they must be transcended if true equality and liberty are to be realized: "That can only be achieved on the basis of a view of un-abstracted individuals in their concrete, social specificity who, in view of being persons, all require to be treated and live in a social order which treats them as possessing dignity, as capable of exercising and increasing their autonomy, of engaging in valued activities within a private space, and developing their several potentialities." LUKES (1973), p. 153).

To show the extreme variations of views in respect of the individual, I shall briefly refer here to the point of views of Robert Nozick and Jean-Paul Sartre who represent two different extremes on the scale of contemporary individualistic approaches. Nozick's argument (1974, *passim*) is based on an empirical fact, the factual (or physical) separateness of individuals; he even goes so far as to speak of 'sovereign individuals' in a sort of moral framework (his 'entitlement' theory) or, put in another way, Nozick justifies his moral conception by the separateness of individuals. The moral side is complemented by what he calls libertarian constraints, prohibiting aggression of one human being by another. Nozick's argument of individuality based on human beings' physical separateness is certainly a *non sequitur* even from the point of view of biology (which, incidentally, recognizes the differences separating each individual but not their ontological separateness) and also from the point of view of ethics, because separateness does not stand for a separate locus of the individuality (i.e., consciousness) nor does it create separate identities.

Sartre's existentialism (Sartre 1956, *passim*) denies that there is any substantive human essence and, in addition to this fundamental subjectivism, he adheres to an extremist 'voluntaristic' position by arguing that "man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself," there is incongruence between the self and the world, and the only reality is "one's immediate sense of one's self." The individual is thus the only judge of his moral behavior, there can be no reference to external factors or a justification of one's acts by the intervention of outside forces. This absolute freedom is expressed by Sartre when he writes that "man is condemned to be free." But in Sartre's thought, like in that of many other protagonists of individualism, a basic paradox manifests itself: it seems that he was aware of the fact that human being can never separate himself from his environment and from his fellow men; therefore, he construes, theoretically, an intersubjectivity as a network of individual subjectivities, and recognizes the existence of a universal human condition meaning by that "all the limitations that *a priori* define man's fundamental situation in the universe." The Cartesian 'cogito' almost becomes a dialogue with the Other, "we are just as certain of the other as we are of ourselves." This paradox of Sartrean existentialism has clearly its origin in the need to harmonize his subjectivistic concept of individuality with his precept of 'voluntaristic' freedom and, not the least, in the necessity to justify his own 'activism.'

The birth of the modern individual, concomitant with the secularization of the medieval world since the 15th century first led to a 'privatization' of the path to salvation ending in an increasing differentiation of religion from other spheres of society; and, second, necessitated the reconstruction of the individual identity through the creation of an immanent perspective, freed of all cosmic ties, but firmly anchored in the 'voluntaristic', scientific worldview. Since Kant a new subjectivity became possible, or at least so appeared, which was vested, simultaneously, with an empirical particularity and a transcendental generality. The individual, the Cartesian subject, emerged as a self-contained entity which was able to claim to be a transcendental source of certainty within itself and to be also, as transcendental subjectivity and empirical individual, the sole link between the differentiated segments and spheres of society. In fact, this epistemological-individualistic turn in our modern culture could, of course, not remain an exclusively intellectual phenomenon. Individualism became a social fact, a determining factor in public affairs which had a decisive influence on the evolution of our society. What is rational, or is considered as rational, is not defined, since the eighteenth century, as corresponding to the necessities relevant to the existence of a group, a community, or a society, but as a determinant of the individual's intentions, desires, needs, and wants, or as an aggregate of such elements of the individual's subjectivity. The centrality, legitimacy, and institutionalization of individualism in society's life had a feedback effect as well on the individuals' behavior. Its positive effects can be exemplified by the enormously increased self-reflexivity and self-awareness of individuals as well as in their autonomy and conscious attitude expressing their own dignity; its negative effects are manifest in the elimination of most communal ties, in the vanishing of the integrative force of even such small groups as families, and in the gradual disappearance of all shared – intellectual, moral, aesthetic – values, rights, and duties inherited from the past. As a consequence, the individual lost what was its attribute in the modern dream – its empirical particularity and its transcendental generality:

"The particular and the universal stand in a uniquely unmediated relation to one another ... What becomes a universal in the individualistic ethic is thus the individual him/herself. That the particular becomes the universal is the reigning ethic of individualistic societies ... For the relation between universal and particular is now transformed into the relations between (universal) subjects – each ontologically self-contained and existing in a state of 'metaphysical' quality" (Seligman 1990, p. 123-124).

b) *Modern Individualism: The Liberal-Democratic Dimension*

The other major source of modern individualism, – reflecting, in part, the foundationalist rationalism of the Cartesian 'cogito ergo sum', – was the evolving doctrine of liberalism starting with Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and the French philosophers, but essentially formulated by the utilitarian Bentham and the Mills, father and son. Liberalism granted absolute primacy to the individual, the lonely human being, with reference to the classical age and to the intellectual powers of man making him the 'master of the universe' through his scientific and technological achievements. With liberalism individualism was really born, an individualism which invaded both the private and public spaces of society's life. As John Dunn sees it:

"Bentham and James Mill saw a liberal individual politics as a logical outcome of the broad intellectual methods authenticated by the progress of natural science. A mechanical conception of human nature, an egoistic psychology, a purely instrumental interpretation of the character of social and political relations, were all the proper outcome of the scientific attitude towards man's place in society and nature. They were the product of a rational interpretation of experience and an experientially grounded concept of reason" (Dunn 1979: p. 41).

Society being an ensemble of independent, self-conscious entities, each pursuing its own interests and gratification, other beings were considered as objects standing over against one's own self. To compensate this confrontational situation due to the infinite pluralism of interests, the liberal doctrine presupposed that the individual, every individual, is capable of self-regulation in his own and in the society's interest. Thus, the private sphere of society was the exclusive domain of the individual; problems and eventual confrontations in the public sphere were to be settled by the mechanism of the marketplace. The latter, when functioning efficiently, was expected to automatically realize the rule of equity, that is, to achieve the mutual restrictions and limitations which satisfy the requirements of justice and freedom. Should the market fail, or should the smooth unfolding of the processes of societal or political life be troubled, liberalism had no other alternative than to fall back on the State expected to legislate and enforce the necessary regulation for the elimination of such troubles or market failures.

Therefore, the fate of a pluralistic democracy, and this is the *first paradox of liberalism*, depends on the power of the State if the individuals' and the market's self-regulatory mechanisms do not properly function. As societal divisions expressed in the doctrine of pluralism gain more and more acceptance, a *second paradox of liberalism* emerges, namely, that an increasing number of diverse social groups benefit of tolerance in pluralistic democracies, whereas some individual idiosyncrasies, non-conform to accepted and legitimated group behavior, are less and less tolerated. Finally, and this is the *third paradox of liberalism*, the absolute priority given to the individual excludes the possibility of finding common solutions to the problems of society as a whole, – problems which cannot be derived from aggregates of individual conflicts of interest, and the solution of which requires, as a basis, the integrative force of worldviews shared by all individuals.

The above sketch corresponds to the ideas Marx advanced in his paper 'On the Jewish Question' proving that even he could not liberate himself from the liberal conception that the individual is alone the basic element in any community or society.⁹ He depicts 'civil society' as the realm of antagonistic and egoistic private interests, the realm of alienated individuals situated in the atomistic and utilitarian framework of the market. The general interest represents, in his eyes, an abstraction from the non-universalizable private, individual interests and can, therefore, only be represented by the State, the objectified form of the individual's 'public self'.¹⁰ That conception leads to the distinction between not only the particular and universal, the subjective and the objective, but to the juxtaposition of man as individual and man as citizen as well.

In the liberal conception of human existence the individual is, thus, predominant in respect of any collectivity; the individual stands alone against the liberal-democratic State. The modern State represents the totality of power considered as an ensemble of rules empowering and restraining the actions of individuals living on its territory. The role of the individual in political life is conceived, since Aristotle, as that of the citizen "who rules and is ruled in turn" (Aristotle *Politics*, Bk. III, Ch. 1), who lives in freedom and is concerned by the common good. The active citizen intervenes for a 'socially consequential exercise of power' (Bowles-Gintis 1986, p. 66) that is, influencing political decisions in view of transforming social reality in which he lives.¹¹ Another conception emphasizes the citizen's negative liberties and was first formulated by Bodin who regarded the citizen "as the recipient of certain benefits that the state and no other social or political, organization provides" (Walzer 1970, pp. 205-206). 'Common liberty' and 'protection of authority' are exchanged against obedience and the 'protection of the protector.' This whole theoretical construction is based on 'the liberal myth' of the State according to which, in Walzer's words, "individuals are imagined to have come together and created the instrument of their own security" (*ibid.*); this myth, however, does not indicate at all what relations bind together those contracting citizens, in what form and on which foundation they continue to cooperate, – though their democracy cannot but be a 'collective experience,' a matter of beliefs, of outlook on life, of habits of the mind, and not merely a question of the form and constitution of government. There can be no active citizen in a vacuum, in the absence of a political-cum-cultural community which secures to all citizens equal opportunity to participate in the collectivity's life, even if this activity is reduced – as a result of the increasing number of citizens and overwhelming organizational complexities – to the periodic participation in elections, to a truncated version of the ideal self-government. It is true, though, that recipient-citizenship – the present status of the citizen in liberal democracies – is practicable in States of any size, whereas participative-citizenship can be fully enjoyed only in smaller political communities. Citizenship also connotes patriotism or loyalty to one's State (which, in most cases, is a nation-state), therefore, as Walzer justly pointed out, democratic pluralism builds, beside loyalty towards the State, moral and political conflict in the political community sustaining the State's power-structures as well (*ibid.* p. 220).

⁹ "Marx's cry of protest against the inhumanity of the capitalist economy implies an individualistic ethic" – writes George Sartori. See his argument in this respect in SARTORI (1962), pp. 463-464.

¹⁰ Interestingly enough, for John Stuart Mill not even the representatives elected by individuals express the public will. In a dialectical way, he affirms that representatives are not qualified to decide about issues of public policy just because they are qualified to represent the interests, desires, and wants of their electors; on the other hand, authorities at whatever level have the capacity to decide about such issues and serve the public interest just because their outlook is different and they are unqualified to represent the interests and needs of specific individuals, or an eventual electorate. MILL, J.S. (1962), p. 113. – In the 18th century, Rousseau had the same opinion : "The moment a people provides itself with representatives, it is no longer free: it no longer exists." ROUSSEAU, Jean-Jacques. *Du contrat social*. Livre III, Ch. 15.

¹¹ Huntington and Nelson define political participation as an "activity by private citizens designed to influence government decision-making. Participation may be individual or collective, organized or spontaneous, sustained or sporadic, peaceful or violent, legal or illegal, effective or ineffective. Effective support for a substantial shift in economic and social policies is most likely to come from organized collective participation, which can assume a variety of forms." HUNTINGTON-NELSON (1976), p. 3.

The creation of strong, centralized States since the sixteenth century and the revolutionary-democratic development engendered by the French revolution in the eighteenth, resulted in the creation of nation-states in Europe. The two consecutive developments led, with Hobsbawm's words, to the

"Equation of nation=state=people, and especially sovereign people, which undoubtedly linked nation to territory, since structure and definition of states were not essentially territorial. It also implied a multiplicity of nation-states so constituted, and this was indeed a necessary consequence of popular self-determination" (Hobsbawm: 1990, p. 20).

The political evolution engendered by the French revolution led in the third part of the nineteenth century to a progressive democratization of political processes in the Western world, implying the increasing domination of electoral politics. The sovereign citizens, whose body included ever larger segments of the population, could not be relied upon to automatically follow their leaders and the governing strata in their policies and programs in which they, as citizens, were first and foremost interested; therefore, the democratic process made indispensable to use any possible devices by parties and politicians to convince the electorate. The State needed to mobilize its citizenry for the loyal implementation of economic measures and social programs, and the acceptance of administrative, bureaucratic rulings required by the State's interests for the orderly conduct of its business. These political developments produced, in consequence, a curious return of historical events to hitherto abandoned orientations. As the State of sovereign citizens was firmly established, the unifying and expansionary forces were strengthened, and the nation-state very much needed a unique identity; the 'state patriotism' which replaced national allegiance, returned again to ethnical-cultural values, most importantly to language as the criteria of belonging to the nation, in order to secure a firm basis for the State's political legitimation in people's mind and emotions.¹²

In view of the basic need of popular mobilization in the modern State, the participative or active citizenship became a feature of the democratic political system but does not guarantee that citizens are governing, only that the system eventually responds to their interests. 'Democratic' citizenship is only possible if the citizen is believed to be endowed with full autonomy; it is universally accepted that citizens are best judges of their own interests, – a basic presupposition, of course, of the contract theory. It is also generally believed that a second presupposition of participating-citizenship is the 'improvability' of the judgment of citizens, that with improved and more extensive information and, in general, a large-scale education, citizens can be better judges of their own interests (*ibid.* p. 14). These two presuppositions, finally, must be complemented by an empirical element for the participation to be effective: the *de facto* equality of opportunity not only in the sense of inclusion of all significant interests, but also with regard to the access to sources of improvability. "Democracy requires equal rights, not equal power ... This is what complex equality means in the sphere of politics: it is not power that is shared, but the opportunities and occasions of power" (Walzer 1983, pp. 309-310). Democracy means political egalitarianism, that is, "a society free of domination," completed by distributive justice aiming at economic equality (*ibid.* pp. xiii-xv).

Our principle of equality was also inherited from the Greek *polis* and from the Christian doctrine of equality of all believers before the Almighty God. Nevertheless, the modern concept is quite different from its presumed predecessors. In the *polis*, equality concerned only a limited category of its citizens, and the classification changed in the course of times; in Christianity, human equality was the equality of sinners before the justice of God, men were equal in their status not only because of their inherent character but also because of their faults and sins. In modernity, a different conception of equality was developed since the eighteenth century, based on the doctrine of natural rights, which, then, was itself modified and 'radicalized' in our century.

¹² In the words of Patterson: "The idea of civic bond makes sense only where people have some sense of community." PATTERSON (1991), p. 228.

Equality based on natural rights meant that each person, without exception, possesses by nature a quality which is generally designed as human dignity, requiring respect on behalf of all other human beings, respect for each person's inherent, fundamental humaneness. Equality in human dignity excludes all kinds of discrimination between various types of man, should it be based on distinction of race, ethnic, sexual, cultural, class, or whatever other differences, because the inherent nature of humaneness of each person, human dignity, makes such discriminations a crime against humanity itself. The belief in human dignity was the basis of the Kantian ethics as against all utilitarian considerations.

This version of equality as human dignity was transformed in our century into equality based on every human being's total sameness in the figure of the abstract individual, eliminating all differences, all specific qualities and characteristics in persons – a diversity which gave the human species its wonderful richness, colorful variety and possibility of creativeness in culture, in the arts, or in self-expression through different ways of life.¹³ The individual whose concept is based on formal and not empirical considerations does not even admit differences which the theory of the evolution of the species proved to be real; the latter teaches that all individual units of a population are unique in their physical and mental setup due to genotypic combinations, and that these different individuals are, in addition, submitted to variations as a result of phenotypic evolution. Any empirical observation can prove if one is not blinded by ideological creeds, that human beings are different from each other in capacities, dispositions, inclinations, and that these differences produce a society in which these persons, endowed with equal dignity, have different statuses, different positions, or different values from the point of view of the community.¹⁴ In consequence, the 'ontology of abstract individualism' destroyed the idea of the 'human person' with its rich cultural and personal endowments; it destroyed the perspective of existence in a temporal continuum reducing human life to an eternal 'now'; and, finally, it distorted the ideas of equality and the principles of human rights, based on the dignity of humaneness inherent in a person in order to promote ideological interests and to disempower men opposed to the omnipotent State.

In view of the above traced development of the concept of pluralistic democracy and of equality, the recipient-citizenship instead of the participant-citizenship became characteristic of the role of the individual in the contemporary State, – known as the *welfare State*. The best definition of the welfare State was given by Logue (1979, p. 69):

"As generally used, it implies the provision of economic security for the overwhelming majority of the population through a large public sector and a considerable sense of social solidarity. It is a State democratic in form, interventionist by inclination, and eager to manage the capitalist economy to achieve steady economic growth and maintain full employment."

¹³ "The concept of equality has two basic meanings," writes Sartori, "which are at the same time heterogeneous and mutually conflicting. In one sense it is a moral ideal; in the other sense it is related to the notion of likeness. The argument can be developed in the sense that we seek justice, but also in the sense that we seek identity. If on the one hand the ideal of equality stems from the principle 'To each his due', on the other it is fed by a desire for variety, diversity, and unevenness." Sartori refers to Hegel who wrote that equality "is the abstract identity of the understanding" (*Philosophy of Right*, par 49), and continues to explore the Hegelian idea: "Which means, in plain language, that the levelling and unifying connotation of equality reflects the very pattern of logical thinking, and specifically of scientific and mathematical thinking ... this notion is another instance of the 'power of reason,' of its ability to reduce the heterogeneous to the homogeneous; that is, of the way in which our capacity for abstraction masters sense perception, and thereby the appearance of diversity, by reducing it to uniformity, regularity, and recurrence." SARTORI (1962), pp. 329-331.

¹⁴ It is interesting to quote, at this point, the definition of equality by the nineteenth-century revolutionary Louis Blanc: "What is Equality? It is, for all men, the *equal* development of their *unequal* faculties, and the *equal* satisfaction of their *unequal* needs." Cited from Blanc's *Catechisme des Socialistes*, in RANDALL (1976), p. 454 (emphasis added).

The existence of the welfare State is a fact, though the extension of its powers and services can be changed in accordance with particular states of affairs, and the main problem is how its egalitarian objectives can be better achieved. The most refined approach to formulate welfare policies is Walzer's conceptualization of 'complex equality' (a relational idea as all formulations of equality) which endeavors to take into consideration the changing character over time of what he calls 'social meanings'.¹⁵ Complex equality means a relatively autonomous and differentiated approach to distributive justice in accordance with society's pluralistic configuration because "all distributions are just or unjust relative to the social meaning of the social goods at stake" (Walzer 1983, p. 9). Differentiated interpretation of differentiated social meanings signifies that there is not a single, unique standard valid for every society; it is entirely bound to the pluralistic social environment and is, therefore, diametrically opposed to totalitarianism.

The concretization of equality may also be attempted by a policy of equality of opportunity, either through the unequal distribution of 'social goods' implemented by the method of 'impersonal competition,' or through securing equal prospect of success, the equality of chances, for all individuals in the society. In today's welfare State, the possible forms of egalitarian policies as well as the two methods of assuring equality of opportunity are, in most cases, concurrently used in order to serve the needs and satisfy the aspirations of individual citizens. The type of policies pursued by governments depends mainly on the respective countries' economic situation and, less and less, on the governing parties' political orientation. The economic consequences of welfare policies, called by Claus Offe the "spiral of constantly re-induced forms of 'relative deprivation'" (Offe 1984, p. 76), or the 'revolution of rising entitlements' (Daniel Bell), overburden the State's and other public entities' budget (especially in view of the substantial increase and aging of populations), and produce growing discrepancies between satisfactions obtained and benefits expected. The abstract individual as a less and less participating citizen becomes, then, nothing else but a welfare recipient, unable and disinterested even to enhance its role in democratic processes. The interplay between governmental power and responsiveness, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the autonomy and independence of the individual citizens who bring forward their interests and claims for satisfaction by the collectivity, is extraordinarily weakened.

(c) *Modern Individualism: The Nihilistic Dimension*

Contemporary changes in the concept of individuality are, first of all, influenced by the total transformation of the time and space perspectives because the primacy of the subject is "a function of the reduction of Being to presence" and only self-consciousness is "the locus of evidence," as Vattimo well pointed out (1988, p. 43). The process of the ever-new or always-new clearly revealed the hollowness of the idea of progress. Individual biographies replace the great narratives – as Lyotard argued two decades ago; if modernity rebelled against the "normalizing functions of traditions," the postmodern experience is rebelling against "all that is normative" (Habermas 1981, p. 344), and self-reflexivity becomes the *Leitmotive*. The aesthetic gains an overwhelming importance, and a kind of nostalgia permeates life appearing more and more as a simulacrum à la Baudrillard. The end result is, unmistakably the loss of meaning and the uneasiness of ontological insecurity.

In the sense of Gould's 'ontology of abstract individualism' already referred to, the individual is deprived of all particular features characterizing him as a person and is designated by those properties alone which are considered to be universally common human properties. These 'atomized' individuals are, in order to safeguard their autonomy

¹⁵ The concept of complex equality therefore corresponds to the first aspect of equality in Rae's two-pronged definition according to which equality first is "treating different people differently in order to treat them equally," and equality in its second sense treats "people, who may or may not be different, identically in order to treat them equally." RAE (1979), p. 48.

and independent identity, only externally related to each other, in a way that others should not be able to influence their evolution but leave them unchanged in 'their essence.' On the basis of this universal, but entirely abstract, human nature of which the main components are freedom, rationality and self-interest, individuals are taken to be equal in all their basic liberties and human rights. Corresponding to the three components of their abstract nature, the fundamental rights of individuals include freedom of agency of agents who act rationally, that is, following their own choice among alternatives, and who are motivated exclusively by their own self-interest.

The postmodern sentiment that we are at 'the end of history' (in Gianni Vattimo's and not in Francis Fukuyama's sense) shows that progress became 'routine' dissolving entirely the category of the 'new', as one 'new' follows the other in rapid succession. In addition, the dissolution of history means the breakdown of its formerly conceived unity, and its interpretation is frequently distorted as far as understanding of the past is concerned. History became a narrative, a rhetorical presentation just as much as the concept of truth became a rhetorical or individualistic trope. Rhetorical because truth is reduced, in general, to common sense, or individualistic because it represents an opinion corresponding to the particular world of one person. The acceleration of time and the reduction of space to place, so typically modern, also considerably sharpened. This is shown by the ephemerality of products, fashions, technologies, ideas and ideologies, all trying to catch the attention of the decentered individual; by the shift from the classic consumption of goods to the consumption of services; or by the quasi delinking of the financial system from any real base, material and productive, enabling it to serve the consumption needs of the individual. Postmodern society is a society of images and image-creation, in Baudelaire's sense of the fleeting, superficial, and illusory; in fact, images serve individuals, entities and also political regimes to establish their identity in the market place.

Anthony Giddens describes the life history of an individual as a reflexively organized biography ('keeping a particular narrative going'), or as a spatial and temporal trajectory, expressed by a cluster of habits and practices, the lifestyle. This trajectory spans over various institutional settings of contemporary social life, and is totally transformed by the globalization of its environment. The dialectics of the local and the global corresponds to the dialectics of the self and the society. This dialectics is complemented by a self-reflexivity of individuals, meaning, principally, the loss of collective memories as well as the elaboration of 'single, monolithic value-systems' because exclusively oriented to the individual's own 'inner logic.' As a result of modern evolution, however, the self as an internally referential, reflexive project is embedded in abstract systems of institutions and impersonal social orderings, exposed to the risks inherent in the latter and subject to their fateful impact, as these abstract and impersonal systems intervene in the formation and continuity of the individual trajectory. Practical consciousness formed by cognitive apprehensions of the enviroing reality and by emotional forces linked to inherited and acquired beliefs and values, is the seat of an ever-present, but nowadays more and more resented, need of ontological security.

Ontological insecurity is closely linked to the 'existential awareness of being,' or, as Paul Tillich said, 'the awareness that non-being is part of one's own being' (Tillich 1977). Giddens's 'existential contradictions' express the feeling of ontological insecurity. Among such existentially troubling questions are (i) the ordering of time hitherto accomplished by tradition; (ii) the consciousness of finitude due to man's endowment with an ability to sense the temporal dimension, (the 'death-awareness' of Theodosius Dobzhansky); and, (iii) the relationship to the Other, to members of the human community. But perhaps the greatest of these existential problems is the growing feeling of 'personal meaninglessness' due to the elimination of moral resources sustaining the life experience of individuals which results in a sort of 'existential isolation,' moral values and legitimation are replaced by authenticity, understood in the sense of corresponding to oneself. Consequently, the need of ontological security is deeply embedded in the ontic being, and is only satisfied in a coherent and intelligible (which does not obligatorily mean cognitive) ontological-cosmic perspective.

Jürgen Habermas put his finger on the crisis of modern individuality as a crisis of morality because of the disappearance of worldviews (or any ontological-cosmic perspective) on which the individuals' and their societies' meaning-construction efforts were founded:

"The fundamental function of world-maintaining interpretive systems is the avoidance of chaos, that is, the overcoming of contingency. The legitimation of orders of authority and basic norms can be understood as a specialization of this 'meaning-giving' function ... If world-views have foundered on the separation of cognitive from socially integrative components, if world-maintaining interpretive systems today belong irretrievably to the past, then what fulfills the moral-practical task of constituting ego- and group-identity?" (Habermas 1975, p. 118).¹⁶

Later, in *The Philosophical Discourse on Modernity*, Habermas reverses his preceding position and asks whether modern subjectivity and the structure of self-consciousness embedded in it are able to 'provide foundations' for the contemporary world and its science, art, or morality? Are the criteria offered by modern individuality sufficient to guide our world, cut off from all historical perspective, and to guide the individual himself in the perplexities of a modernity always 'at variance with itself' (Habermas 1987, pp. 17-20).

Modern art expresses the breaking up of the community in favor of the all-dominating and decentered individual but the postmodern trend goes much further, in Scott Lash's apt formulation: "Modernism conceives representations as being problematic whereas postmodernism problematizes reality" (Lash 1990, p. 13). A contradiction thus appears between the immediacy of experience, the overwhelming present, or, in Hannah Arendt's words, the loss of freedom 'to establish a certain distance between ourselves and the art object,' on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the quasi-exclusive turning towards the future, the quest for the ever-renewed self, mirrored in new objects of consumption. It is, however, the close connection between the self-identification of the individual and his consumption of goods following his ever-changing preferences which in fact dissolves the contradiction between the overwhelming present and the imagined horizon of an overshadowing future. Consumption became a means for the affirmation and maintenance of individual selfhood.

The detraditionalized mode of life of the modern individual, "a historically contradictory process of socialization" (Beck 1992, 90),¹⁷ leads to an 'immediacy of individual and society,' an immediacy due to the successive crises engendered by risks; the individual becomes part of the standardization and institutionalization of the modern way of life. This represents, in contradiction to what we described before, a total reversal of the individual's situation in the world. Thus, the individual's life spans over private and public spheres; that is, it becomes institutionally dependent from, among others, educational establishments, welfare state regulations, consumption patterns, and so on. At the same time, it also becomes controllable through the processes of institutionalization. As a result, the institutionally enforced norms, on the one hand, and the socially legitimized norms, on the other, develop in increasingly different

¹⁶ Axel Honneth put it in a similar way: "Cultural traditions of this kind, that is, narratively constituted, context-spanning presentations of societal development, seem, on the one hand, to lose their philosophico-historical basis of legitimization with the definite shattering of metaphysical background certainties. On the other hand, however, there is still no equivalent of post-metaphysical character for the identity-securing and communicating-generating functions of the disintegrating metanarratives. For this reason, there is a danger that, together with the erosion of cultural-normative traditions – as were provided, for instance, by the philosophico-historical constructions of the socialist or religious traditions – the cultural-normative interaction medium of the lifeworld will dry out." HONNETH (1992), p. 165.

¹⁷ In view of the recent events in the rest of the former Soviet empire and in the Balkans, it is particularly important that Beck defines the 'new sources for the formation of social bonds and for the development of conflict': "They lie first in ascribed differences and inequalities of race, ethnicity, nationality, gender, age, and so on: second, in new and changing differentiations which arise from reflexivity in the domain of private social relations and private ways of living and identity. Thus, new social lifestyles and group identities inside persistent social inequalities begin to emerge." BECK (1992), p. 99.

directions. It is particularly important that institutionalized risks heighten the menace and the danger for all mankind; they become high-consequence risks such as nuclear war, ecological catastrophe, terrorism, or the devastating impoverishment not only in non-Western regions of the globe but even in industrialized societies themselves. Through deferment in time or remoteness in space not only contemporary events such as sufferings of populations in civil wars at all the continents, as reported by the media, can be 'bracketed out' but even high-consequence risks; this 'bracketing out' is the only defense mechanism which ordinary men have today against the mind-boggling perspectives of the future. *The evident conclusion is that man, the individual, gained a very large independence with the advent of modernity, but this independence was slowly transformed by the multiplication of abstract, self-referential systems into a new, different type of interdependence, never known before, which concomitantly increased the vulnerability of the individual.* This is true even if individuals today are benefiting of an undeniable measure of reappropriation of possibilities to master nature and to improve their own conditions by having multiple alternatives and plural choices (the 'pluralization of lifeworlds' in Peter Berger's words). Whether in late modernity this represents a true empowerment for individuals, remains, without doubt, questionable.

In consequence, the postmodern individual lives in a world which evolves towards nihilism, – nihilism understood as the fulfillment of the deconstructing and de-structuring enterprise which represent the logical outcome of the 'reign of the individual' itself. Is this, perhaps, the death of the individual, of the Cartesian subject? Foucault describes contemporary reality in Western society as 'heterotopia,' or the coexistence of an infinite number of fragmented, juxtaposed, possible worlds, incommensurable, superimposed on each other. Such a picture of the coexistence of multiple, incommensurable worlds is reflected by the fact that no determinate and identifiable relations between signified and signifier exist any more, and message as well as medium are continuously newly combined, changing the physiognomy of language games. In the age of such a fragmented cognitive state everything is questioned in respect of being; the main concern, in Foucault's words, is "to grant the highest value, the greatest dimension, to the distance that both separates and links thought-conscious-of-itself, and whatever, within thought, is rooted in non-thought" (Foucault 1973, p. 324). This is a direct consequence of abstract individualism because the ontological un-thought is related to the Other, to the unavoidable duality of the I and Thou. Such an orientation has far-reaching consequences, for example, in aesthetics; the interpretation of an artist's work, the signification and meaning of his creation are not considered as defined by him, but is open to popular determination through the impulses of each 'consumer.' Never mind the incoherence which results from a manipulation by the public; it corresponds to the exclusive value judgment of each individual, it is justified by it and is consistent with the postmodern view of life as fragmented and incoherent in itself. This deconstructionist aspect of postmodernism is nihilism; a deconstructed worldview does not even promise coherence because it considers such an effort as illusory.

Is then the postmodern age the age of individualistic nihilism? It is, if one defines nihilism as Vattimo did:

"Nihilism does not mean that Being is in the power of the subject; rather, it means that Being is completely dissolved in the discoursing of value, in the indefinite transformations of universal equivalence" (Vattimo 1988, p. 22).

Postmodernism is sometimes identified as the age of transformation; there is a general search for personal and collective identity, for a 'self-comprehended destiny,' for secure moorings in a shifting world as the individual's insertion 'into a multidimensional set of radically discontinuous realities' (Jameson) becomes more and more difficult. It is possible that human mental capacities, as a result of fragmented discourse and the lack of integrating worldviews will be incapable to match current realities. It is, nevertheless, possible that nihilism gives birth to a completely new world, based on a renewed vision of the human person embedded into its natural community and into an appropriately conceived ontological/cosmic framework.

CONCLUSION: INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY – A RENEWED FORM OF SYMBIOSIS

Following the total breakdown of the reign of the epistemic and liberal individual, and the menace of a creeping nihilism which can lead to a dissolution of the individual itself, the future can only be envisaged as an endeavor to *re-create the symbiosis between the individual and its community*. In fact, such an evolution would also contribute to the re-invention of Habermas's 'world-maintaining interpretive systems' as the community is the proper locus for the construction of a meaningful order of reality and of a corresponding intellectual framework.

This conviction is based on an entirely different conception of the relation between individual and community from the one that dominated our culture since the eighteenth century (in particular in various forms of liberal thinking) which regarded society or a human community as nothing but an aggregation of individuals. This approach is based, on the one hand, on the everyday, continuous interaction of the individual and its community. The individual is issued from the community and is able to live only in the 'lifeworld' in which its existence is integrated with that of the community in a common spatial and temporal form of life. Individuals identify with Others because the Other is integral to their own individuality. On the other hand, the same conception also affirms that the community is strictly nonexistent without the individuals which compose it; it manifests itself, it can solely manifest itself, in the culture, traditions, and actions of the individuals' who are the bearers of the values, beliefs, and institutions shared by the community. *Thus, individuals are constitutive of the community and the community is constitutive of the individual and of its lifeworld.* This is what Heidegger called *Dasein* – being-in-the-world – for which the Other represents a 'potentiality for Being,'¹⁸ and what I call a symbiosis of the individual and of the community.

This does not mean at all that individuals belonging to a community are made uniform and, therefore, disappear as individuals – nothing could be farther from the truth. Evolutionary biology teaches us that every individual is born and grows up as a distinct individuality; similarly, cultural conditioning and integration in a community, in combination with biological givens, contribute to the development of distinct personalities in each individual. Identities are determined and affirmed with reference to differences: this is the reason that it is better to speak of persons, not of individuals, because the term 'person' designs a human being in its difference from other human beings but growing out from, and living in a definite context (the 'lifeworld') which links a person to the others; whereas individuals, freed from any involvement with the community, are united by the nonexistent, that is, totally abstract characteristics which are arbitrarily assigned to them.

The ontological-cosmic perspective, giving meaning to the individual's world and liberating it from the uncomfortable but ever-present feeling of insecurity, consists precisely of the shared traditions and beliefs prevalent in a community as well as the routinized behavior of everyday normal life which makes up the structure of interactions in all societies and communities. It is grounded in a basic trust which man normally acquires during his childhood by establishing firm and emotionally charged social bonds. Because the proper perspective, including a meaningful moral framework, faded away with the global transformation of human existence in modernity, the basic trust essential for ontological security was also weakened, if not totally lost. The great illusion which came to an end after almost 300 years was the belief that existence in a community and in its lifeworld can be replaced by those internally reflexive abstract systems (differentiated social and economic institutions, science, technology, etc.) which were supposed to enable humankind to subject to human control the natural and social worlds and, through this, granting the individual, as depicted in that illusion, preeminence and priority for ever.

¹⁸. Authentic Being-one's-Self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the 'they,' *it is rather an existentiell modification of the 'they' – of the 'they' as an essential existentielle*. But in that case there is ontologically a gap separating the selfsameness of the authentically existing Self from the identity of that 'I' which maintains itself throughout its manifold Experiences". HEIDEGGER (1962), p. 168 (emphasis in original).

To safeguard the advantages of individualism obtained in the course of the last three hundred years, and to maintain and improve the social and economic institutions of an extremely differentiated society which will stay with us, but to avoid at the same time the gliding towards nihilism a result of extreme, 'abstract' individualism and the unfathomable dangers which are at the origins of the rising tide of ontological insecurity, we must turn back to human communities and their values. We have to re-equilibrate the relations between individuals as persons and their communities; we have to stabilize personal and communal identities and ways of life which are falling apart under the impact of deconstructing and consumerist ideologies; and we have to dissipate the rising feelings of ontological insecurity through reinventing our culture, values, and traditions, our 'world-interpreting' perspectives. Through this we would re-invigorate participant citizenship, reduce the role of the omnipotent State, and rediscover true human solidarity – what we need most in the coming millennium.

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RE-APPRAISING UNIVERSALISM*

Universalism is a belief characterizing most contemporary worldviews; it is not an overtly emphasized principle but something which entered the subconscious of people holding these views and emerges only on the surface of their discourse when it is doubted. In Western culture, universalism is such a tenet of the reigning worldview that it can be compared to a religious dogma; it is a universalism not in its pure, genuine form but expressing the conviction that Western beliefs, values and approaches are universally valid, and will be, sooner or later, accepted worldwide. It may therefore be called 'autocentric' or 'instrumental' universalism. This Western universalism penetrated all spheres of life not only in our societies but of some non-Western cultures as well; it is also totally dominating discourse and practice on the international scene.

We shall start the re-appraisal of universalism from the point of view of its relevance today with the definition of the concept and the analysis of its various forms, followed by an inquiry into its origins and by a discussion of its validity and applicability within contemporary civilizations and in inter-civilizational relations as the framework of international discourse and practice. Finally, in our conclusions, we shall examine universalism in comparison to the process of globalization.

1. DEFINITION AND FORMS OF UNIVERSALISM

The meaning given to universalism in this essay is as follows: Universalism is a belief of bearers of a worldview that this worldview – its belief- and value-systems, its cognitive or reasoning style, its ethical convictions and conceptions of the Good Life, its concept of man as individual and as constituting communities, its way of life – is uniquely expressing the human being's essence and its tenets are cognitively valid for everyone and in all times; this worldview, therefore, will have to be adopted by all peoples of the world.

Universalism can, of course, be defined alternatively as, for example, generalization of either cognitive conclusion reached through inference such as hypothetically deduced theories, say the theory of evolution, or empirical facts ascertained through inductive or trial-and-error methods and not yet falsified, like the achievements of the applied sciences. However, I feel that there is an important difference between universalism and generalization as the former implies an irresistible force to conquer the world precisely because of its inherent universalism, whereas the latter describes states of affairs which are presumed to be general in nature's or humanity's life. It is true, as we shall see later, that cognitive or empirical generalizations can as well be imperceptibly transformed into universalisms and, consequently, ready to assume an aggressive attitude.

* Article written in the second half of the nineties; it was never published.

But universalism and generalization are similar in their refusal to recognize contextuality¹ which is the *par excellence* polar opposite of universalism. The essence of contextuality is that it gives priority to the particular over the universal and, consequently, to pluralism. An important characteristic of the contextual approach is that in it no 'pre-conceived principles' ('theoretical axioms and theorems') can be applied to the contingent particularity of things and to the contingent flow of events as such a procedure would change their relational interdependence and their complex environment. The attitude ignoring contextuality is closely related to the dominant modern tendency of formalism and to the overwhelming importance given to epistemological considerations. Contextuality overcomes the purely cognitive perspective; its view of the world is relational and dialectic. Therefore, it excludes dualistic thinking and worldviews as well as the myth of the possibility to be an 'independent observer' in our world, just as this happened in contemporary nuclear physics as well. Thereby, of course, the basic distinction of object and subject is eliminated, – in a way, the context unites them as its component elements. Particulars qua particulars cannot be grasped in their context by the rational but only through a holistic method.

Some modern developments were preeminently instrumental in promoting universalism at the expense of contextuality. Such a modern phenomenon is, among others, the idea of the planet Earth as a 'global village' or the transformation of the place, the *par excellence* contextual framework, into the space of the 'media age' and of the exploration of the starry skies. This loss of contextuality is well expressed by Anthony Giddens as 'time and space distanciation' consecutive to the development of modern means of transportation and communication as described in detail by Stephen Kern in *The Culture of Time and Space 1880-1918*.

Basically, there are only two forms of universalism: the pure or genuine, and the autocentric or instrumental. Genuine universalisms are, first, the ontological-biological universalism; second, cosmic universalism which, in turn, manifests itself in two forms, the religious and the scientific; instrumental universalism is a distortion of the genuine forms of universalism generated by certain cultural and social features of modernity.

Ontological-biological universalism refers to all beings, to the fact of Being under its various forms; it encompasses everything existent as in the philosophical ontology of Martin Heidegger. It suffices to mention here that Heidegger presents Being as the transcendental foundation of everything in the world and categorizes beings into *Dasein*, – the being-in-the-world, the human, conscious presence, – and beings as present-at-hand and ready-to-hand, from *Dasein's* point of view, in the context of worldhood. Ontological universalism is a parallel notion to biological universalism which is, however, relevant only in a more limited sphere of existence. Both are factual in their universality, and their universality is, simultaneously, transcendent and immanent in this world.

The referent of cosmic universalism is the universe, including either all of its aspects, physical, psychological and nonphysical, that is, the mental and spiritual, or its physical and psychological aspects only. The religious version of cosmic universalism encompasses both physical and nonphysical elements of the cosmos. Religious universalism is a logically necessary conclusion of the faith in an omnipotent God as in monotheistic religions; it can also be derived from the idea of the universe and man's status in it, considered ontologically and morally, as in Buddhism and some trends of Hinduism.

In the scientific version of cosmic universalism only the physical and psychological components of the universe are considered because they are proper for scientific study through the application of scientific methods; at the highest levels of scientific inquiry, elements of the universe are treated in a completely theoretical, non-ontological way by applying mathematical formulae. This highest level of scientific inquiry, therefore, represents, from science's own point of view, an absolute, because strictly formal, universalism.

¹ Alessandro Ferrara still believes that universalism can be saved in a sort of prudential form though, nevertheless, recognizing the importance of contextuality; see in: FERRARA (1990), pp. 11 and 33. As for a critique of the contextuality thesis, see: SCHARFSTEIN, Ben-Ami, (1988), *The Contextual Fallacy*. In: LARSON-DEUTSCH (eds.) (1988), pp. 84-97.

The concept of instrumental universalism is linked either to the cultural self-justification of the modern conceptual framework of society which is built on individualism and the destruction of any community as opposed to the State; or it is linked to the 'will to power', the drive to domination, which is the essence of its autocracy. This instrumental universalism is a typically Western phenomenon, be it in its democratic-liberal or totalitarian forms. In fact, Jürgen Habermas's procedural universalism is instrumental as well; it represents the latest effort to save universalism without its objectivistic taint as, for him, universalism does not reside in universally accepted cognitive truth or ethical justice but in the emergence of a rational consensus, under ideal conditions, among all those concerned. Instrumental universalism, therefore, is parasitic on the above described categories of universalism because it distorts their content for its own purposes.

The best example of instrumental universalism produced through the distortion of the religious type is a totalitarian ideology which claims the universal validity of its dogmas based on the pronouncements of its charismatic initiators, frequently also taking on a sort of scientific garb, such as ultra-nationalism or Marxism-Leninism. As far as scientific universalism is concerned, its worst distortion is when it pretends itself to extend the domain of validity of its claims from the physical and psychological elements of the universe to the ontological field and the cosmos though the latter also include the nonphysical, that is, mental and spiritual aspects of the universe. In both cases, universalism becomes instrumental for the justification of specific modern conditions of society with its traditionless, ever-changing values and moral framework; and in other cases, this universalism sustains a reckless strive for power, for the domination of other men and other civilizations, driven by the belief of its own righteousness based on its universalist pretensions. It is the extensive damage brought upon humanity in the twentieth century by instrumental universalism in its political and scientific-totalitarian versions that led many people to reject universalist claims even in their authentic, ontological-biological and cosmic forms.

2. THE ORIGINS OF UNIVERSALISM

Universalism dates back, no doubt, to the most ancient worldviews which were universalist either in the cosmological or in the religious sense. The universalism of cosmic views was, as a matter of course, acknowledged because nothing could be outside the cosmos known by the bearers of these views, and in which they lived in accordance with the symbolism of their myths and rituals. What is more striking is the fact that even in most polytheistic religions in which the belief in their own gods did not exclude that other people believe in different gods, the universalism encompassing the anthropomorphic universe was never doubted. Polytheism is tolerant; its world is limited, thus setting the boundaries for a primitive but genuine universalism.

In more spiritualistic and, first of all, in monotheistic religions, universalism was a *sine qua non* component of belief because no faith in God would be a true faith if it was not to be accepted, imperatively, by the whole world; or, the dogmas of such religions could not be believed as such if their validity was not extending to the universe. Universalism is therefore inherent in the religious worldview, or, in the case of polytheistic religions, universalism was underlying their symbolisms but its concept was cognitively not formulated in their minds.

In every civilization scientific thinking, especially logics, was from the beginning universalist; this is the second source of universalism in various worldviews. In the Greek world, the first universalists were the philosophers of nature of the Milesian school, Thales and Anaximenes. Later, the development of philosophical thinking reinforced universalist convictions striving to explain the simultaneous presence of unity and multiplicity, of order and chaos in the world, reaching its climax in such philosophers as Parmenides for whom 'everything was one.' However, the most important change, from our point of view, was from the 'only partially unified *physis* to a single but complex *kosmos*,' so clearly explained by Louis Dupré in his *Passage to Modernity*:

"The more comprehensive term *kosmos* constitutes the ordered totality of being that coordinates those processes as well as the laws that rule them. *Kosmos* includes, next to the *physis* of organic being, the ethos of personal conduct and social structures, the *nomos* of normative custom and law, and the *logos*, the rational foundation that normatively rules all aspects of the cosmic development ... Clearly, its meaning of ordered totality exceeded that of the physical universe we now call *cosmos*. Moral and aesthetic values were as much part of it as physical (in the modern sense) processes ... The modern translation of *kosmos* as 'physical nature' is quite misleading since originally *kosmos* included theological and anthropic as well as physical meanings. The loss of the former two reflects the disintegration of the ancient ontotheological synthesis" (1993, pp. 17-18).

Western scientific universalism rather followed in the footsteps of the reductive conception of *physis* elaborated by the Sophists who separated from it the cognitive, moral and aesthetic domains; this original imprint of Greek Antiquity remained irremovable from Western scientific thought. For science, universalism means universalism of the functioning of natural things, of the universe, in accordance with the 'laws of nature' unshakably demonstrated by scientific methods.

The universalism of the modern Western worldview, however, had another source in addition to the universalism inherited from medieval Christianity and the universalism which accompanied the breathtaking scientific and technological developments of the last three centuries. This was its gradually evolving individualism. The individual was since times immemorial the bearer of human destiny; it was from the multitude of individuals that human communities were built up and the individual gave sense to these communities' belief- and value-systems to which it contributed during its earthly existence. Individual lives and the life of their communities were closely interwoven; one presupposed and conditioned the other in a truly dialectical and dialogical relationship. If it is true that Christianity emphasized the role of the individual as the sinner and, at the same time, as the receiver of God's grace, it is also true that in the Christian perspective the community of individuals as believers received as much emphasis. Though, on the one hand, the relationship between God and the faithful was direct, the individual person's salvation, and his access to God's grace and to His munificence, on the other hand, was a natural outcome of that person's becoming a member of the community of believers.

This interdependent, dialectical relationship between individuals and their community, – an immediate community such as kinship groups, or larger communities such as nations, – changed fundamentally with the advent of modernity. The absolute preeminence of the individual over community or any other social group became in the West an untouchable dogma since the seventeenth century. Hegel's exposition of the three moments of universality, particularity, and individuality in the *Science of Logic* and the *Phenomenology of Spirit* still clearly envisages their absolute interdependence.² Universality implies unity and commonality, particularity denotes definiteness and distinction, and individuality indicates subsistence, singleness, independence of others and self-sufficiency. The last of the three moments is already an evidently modern formulation as it supposes the possibility of independence of the individual and his self-sufficiency. In fact, Hegel characterizes the relationship of the three moments as a negative relating, that is, as an 'identity of the negative with itself' in the case of the universal, or, for the ego, a negative relation with every particular in the stream of experience, – the ego is the unity not identical with the experienced particular but needing the individual experiences in order to be at all. The three moments exist in and through their mutual distinction and correspondence though they are each self-related and complete in themselves; their separation from each other would leave them without determinate content and as an abstraction because they cannot be held apart, they form an immediate unity. Projecting the Hegelian dialectics in the social field, the social whole stands then for the universal, the particular for a definite role, and the individual for a concrete person; consequently, contemporary society which posits the separation of the universal and of the particular content is formal and empty, modernity is disjointedness as all mediation given through immediateness is lost. The aggregates of the particulars or individuals cannot express the whole without inner unity; – the mediation between the three moments is posited through immediateness. In modern society 'the deeply individualized self faces depersonalized mega structures'.

² In the explanation of Hegel's conception of these three moments I am indebted to: KOLB (1986).

The Hegelian view, therefore, foreshadows the post-modern look at the relationship between the universal and the individual as expressed, with particular acuity, by Seligman. He pointed out that in modernity 'the universal is collapsed into the particular,' modern universalism is a derivative one: derivative of the individual, that is, the particular is invested with the characteristics of the universal:

"The relation between universal and particular is now transformed into the relations between (universal) subjects – each ontologically self-contained and existing in a state of 'metaphysical' equality" (Seligman 1990, p. 124).³

This means that the individual was divested of personality and became an empty concept represented by the common denominator of every individual,⁴ namely, the fact that being an individual who is the ultimate standard because no other universal criteria exist, or no meta-level moral principles transcending the individualistic ethic's requirements are accepted. But the concept of the individual as ultimate standard gradually became completely empty as well, abstracted, as it were, from the living human being and invested by theoretically formulated universal 'preferences' or 'interests' (Bowles-Gintis 1986, p. 123).

There were two main elements in this crucial modification of the Western man's situation: first, the irresistible desire, accompanying the gradual loss of influence of the Christian churches in Western society and the overwhelming success of the sciences, to shake the 'yoke' of religious traditions and with them of all other traditions too, in order to liberate the individual to follow his own inclinations and desires; second, the formation of nation-states which strived to eliminate any and all other social institutions, communities or groups which could have attracted people's allegiance as against the powerful, omnipotent State with universalist pretensions (Bauman 1990). The secularization or disenchantment of Western societies is almost complete, leaving as the sole source of values and moral norms individuals as autonomous units⁵ whose competence is only limited by the State which, though it pretends to serve individuals' will or the 'general will' invented by Rousseau, also claims to be through its laws the unique source of cultural, ethical and value norms and standards. Thus, the conflicting claims of individuals and of the State give importance to the issue of 'civil society' in our days. 'Civil society' is expected, at least in some minds, to secure the existence, concurrently, of different groups in society with divergent belief- and value-system and allegiances.

One of the main effects of the limitless modern individualism was the so-called 'atomization' of Western society which is a 'heap' (with Louis Dumont's expression) of autonomous individuals. As a result of excessive individualism, cosmic worldviews were replaced by decentered or differentiated worldviews (Wolin 1984). Individuals are only constrained by the laws of the State and by regulations of other public institutions, but are otherwise free to pursue their own interests and inclinations. As a consequence, a sort of universalism is introduced in moral life, because there still exists a need to have some ethical directions governing moral conduct: 'universalizability' as the ethical meta-norm is proposed – a norm is only ethical if it is applicable by all and to all – which includes also a shift of emphasis from rules to 'rights' as the 'ethics of rights' corresponds more to the dignity of the reigning individual.

³ "What becomes a universal in the individualist ethic is thus the individual him/herself. That the particular becomes the universal is the reigning ethic of individualistic societies – hence equality (of individuals/particulars). Hence also *Zweckrationalität* as the sum of quantifiable particulars reduced to their common denominator. But in a social formation governed by *Zweckrationalität* there is no ultimate standard beyond the technical competence of individuals ... *qua* universal entities." ETZIONI (1968), pp. 123-124.

⁴ "The identity of everything with everything else is paid for in that nothing may at the same time be identical with itself ... Men were given their individuality as unique in each case, different to all others, so that it might all the more surely be made the same as any other," said Horkheimer and Adorno in their sharp critique of Enlightenment ideology. HORKHEIMER-ADORNO (1972), pp. 12-13.

⁵ See Axel Honneth's description of the modern cultural evolution which clearly supports my presentation, in: HONNETH (1992), p. 165.

To the atomization of society corresponds, then, the universalism encompassing all humanity. It is destined to compensate the falling apart of a society constituted by autonomous individuals through the creation of a worldwide community which, precisely because of its merely evanescent shimmering on the human horizon, fits perfectly the still surviving longing for community of these autonomous individuals. Nobody wants, of course, to deny the existence of a planetary human community, a community which always existed and which was taken into account by all worldviews in history. What is new, however, is that in the modern worldview this universalism, intended to replace the loss of social cohesion, is 'created' through the alleged universality of everything which is modern and Western; that is, the evocation of a genuine universalism in a completely distorted form. The distortion is, apparently, not perceived. Modern universalism is, then, the combination of two originally genuine, cosmic universalisms in a totally distorted form: religious universalism which was transfigured into the religious belief in progress and the voluntaristic projection of man's pretended omnipotence over nature, on the one hand; on the other hand, scientific universalism originally expressing a comprehensive and unified view of the physical universe (though never formulated theoretically in a satisfactory manner) which was transformed into a worldview encompassing the whole cosmos reduced to its physical aspects. This worldview was complemented, as a corollary, by a de-ontologized, fragmented society existing only in 'atomized' individuals as well as an ethics of 'universalizability' necessitated by the lacking moral orientation in this disenchanting world.

3. RELEVANCE AND APPLICABILITY OF MODERN UNIVERSALISM

A re-appraisal of the concept of modern universalism is indispensable today because it became more and more evident that it is neither relevant in our days nor, consequently, is it applicable in present circumstances in the form and with the content as elaborated in the course of the last three centuries.

First of all, the foundation of modern universalism based on the common human rationality presupposing a single-world vision, praised by philosophers and scientists as well, was totally shattered and the belief in it is waning away.⁶ Rationality means to have reasons for one's thinking and acting as one does because, according to Harold Brown demonstration, "the predicate 'rational' characterizes an individual's decisions and beliefs, it does not characterize propositions and it does not characterize communities" (Brown 1990, pp. 193-194). However, reasons justifying one's thinking and acting are conditioned by one's experience, one's cultural traditions and the community in which one lives, – especially if we accept that man is the result of the interaction of its genetic endowment, of its changing environment, and of its diverse cultural background. Human culture, developed in the course of evolution to complement man's phenotypic configuration through mental and spiritual capacities, is based on a community's common experiences, traditions and shared belief- and value-system; because of the interaction of genetic and environmental factors with the human mind and with the life of human communities, it is eminently variable as much as environment itself is variable as well as the genetic background which evolves through much slower mutations.⁷

Rationality is a cultural phenomenon as it is linked to mental capacities, it is therefore impossible to believe that reasons given for behavior and action can be identical in all different cultures. Or, putting it in another way, different reasoning patterns in different cultures will inevitably produce different behavior and action patterns in different civilizations because reasoning is motivated as much by environmental influences or genetic background

⁶ See Herbert Simon's devastating critique in: SIMON (1983), pp. 5-6.

⁷ Castoriades, examining the diversity of rationalities and their historical and social determinedness, writes sarcastically of those advocating universalism on a rationalistic basis, in: CASTORIADIS (1992), p. 244.

than by varying cultural traditions and conceptual structures; "Rationality is always situated rationality" (Wolterstorff 1983, p. 155). There is no rationality independent from the interaction of genetic, environmental and cultural changes. To give an example, Habermas's theory of communicative action in which conditions of argumentative discourse are the core of common human rationality is entirely embedded in the modernity of the West; openness to critique, argumentation, and validity based on consensus reached in the course of a free and unhampered dialogue, presuppose a modern frame of reference shared between all parties participating in the dialogue. The Western rationality concept reflects, in Hilary Putnam's sense, a 'criterial conception' in that it appeals to 'institutionalized norms,' themselves products of a given culture (Putnam 1981, pp. 110-111). Or, as Ernest Gellner formulated it:

"The essence of the Cartesian tradition was the supposition that a cognitive procedure existed which stood outside the world and any one culture, and was capable of independent judgment of cognitive claims about the world ... So Reason has to be declared extra-territorial by Kant: it thus becomes the only possible bearer of our identity, our responsibility, our cognitive competence and capacity for moral choice. It alone can know Nature; but by the same token, there is no room for it within Nature. Nature has no place for either knowledge or moral choice." And adds Gellner: "If a reason is cogent, it must apply to all like cases" (1992, pp. 82-83).

Rationality, in fact, replaced in modernity nature in the function of directing and coordinating human thought, behavior and action, though nature is still determining our rationality through capacities and limits, innate in the human species. This replacement was the result of the belief that man is above nature in view of his mental and intellectual capacities, that instead of living in harmony with nature he has to overpower and dominate it. However, nature and rationality were not always strictly separated in our culture. What is natural is rational, or, it is rational what is in harmony with nature, are the *Leitmotives* in civilizations which are not religiously inspired.⁸ In monotheistic religions, rational is what is in conformity with God's and the prophets' teachings, and in polytheistic religions rational is what corresponds to the gods' will and behavior. Scientific rationality, on the other hand, resides in objective reasoning concerning matters relating to the physical universe and the application of specific scientific methods in order to test the truth or falsity of theorems and theories. In both cases, rationality and nature are completely separated; rationality is superior to nature.

The rationality of scientific universalism required the belief in a unique truth and denied the possibility of what Ricoeur called 'pluri-dimensional truth'. According to Ricoeur, the evolution of Western thinking, after the promising beginnings of the Renaissance toward pluralism, bifurcated toward 'totalization.' This violence, because the imposition of a specific reasoning is violence, led Ricoeur to envisage the problems of our civilization as follows: "Historically the temptation to unify the true by violence comes and has come from two powers, the spiritual power and the temporal power" (1965, p. 167). It is, of course, possible to consider truth not as a quasi-ontological entity, not as a 'property' of an object or proposition but, as Luhmann suggests, as "a symbolically generalized communication medium, which operates under changing social conditions ... Truth [then] is a medium for conveying experienced selections, whose selectivity is attributed to the world" (Luhmann 1982, pp. 360-361). This corresponds to the 'instrumentalization' of truth but not to relativism as it is generally understood.

In our postmodern age, which is the age of preparing the balance sheet of modernity's successes and failures, the total failure of scientific rationality, or of instrumental reason, is clearly evidenced by the environmental problems our world is facing. The principal merit of science is to be able to foresee, to forecast what otherwise is still the secret of the future, but scientific rationality failed to foresee the demographic consequences of the wonderful advances of preventive and curative medicine, and, even more, it became totally disqualified because of its complete, if not deliberate, ignorance of the environmental damages caused by the industrial revolution and the

⁸ As Dupré explained with reference to Chrysippus, in: DUPRE (1993), p. 28.

consecutive scientific and technological progress. Nobody can and should disregard the enormous benefits that science and technology brought for humanity, but one has to acknowledge that this 'progress' led to such destruction in our environment and to such a loss of the quality of life in many parts of the Western world, especially in urban centers, that one has to remake our vocabulary and speak instead of scientific rationality of meaningful rationality. *Meaningful rationality is definitely contextual precisely because it is meaningful in a certain cultural and environmental context.*

There is a kind of contradictory movement in post-modernity against the acceleration of time and the Giddensian space-and-time distancing; it is the importance gained by place as the context of human activity, including the human body. Giddens summarized best this phenomenon through the concepts of locale and presence-availability (Giddens 1984, p. 118). Locale refers to settings of interaction, that is, indicate the indispensable contextuality, whereas presence-availability describes a situation of being-together, of co-presence, of the possibility of 'coming-together.' The separation of the media of communication from the media of transportation represents, in this perspective, one of the principal characteristics of modern evolution. What is interesting in Giddens's conception of locale and presence-availability is that the imperceptibly changing public attitude in these postmodern years instinctively veers back towards an appreciation of contextuality of earlier epochs. The perception of a not-so-global village and the instantaneity of happenings gradually convince people of the vital importance of the concrete place and of the concrete moment in which we live. Awareness is growing that interaction in determined contexts – co-presence – is an inevitable condition of social integration.

The relativism which is now replacing universalism evolved during the last decades as a result of the opening up of the world not only through the unexpected development of communications but, in particular, because of the movement of decolonization and the entry of non-Western civilizations onto the world scene as independent actors. The universality thesis of Western culture was born in an age when little was known of other cultures and civilizations but the Western.⁹ In addition, cultures of the indigenous populations in countries colonized by Western powers or surviving in remote territories untouched until recently by the impact of Western technology, were not considered at equal footing with our own culture, especially in the glamorous days when infinite hopes were inspired by the progress of science. The Western world really came face to face with non-Western civilizations in the aftermath of the Second World War and in the wake of the accelerating process of decolonization. Due to the internationalization of every problem related to world politics, the West encountered the 'Otherness' of the East. Problems of economic development in the Western sense,¹⁰ and difficulties encountered in the course of technical assistance programs, greatly contributed to an increase of information about the world's other civilizations, their genuine and authentic belief- and value-systems, their ways of life, and their will to affirm their own identity.

⁹ Zygmunt Bauman ties, correctly to a certain extent, Western universalism to Western political domination, in: BAUMAN (1992), p. 96. – Daya Krishna explains the expansion of European epistemological universalism also by the fact that the expansion of European powers "was accompanied not only by phenomenal growth in some of the traditional fields of knowledge but also by demarcation and consolidation of new areas designating new fields of knowledge, [whence] the feeling that the claim that all 'knowledge' discovered by the West held universal validity was justified." KRISHNA, Daya. *Comparative Philosophy: What It Is and What It Ought To Be*. In: LARSON-DEUTSCH (eds.) (1988), p. 72.

¹⁰ The Western conception of development was well characterized by V. Shiva and J. Bandyopadhyay: "The ideology of the dominant pattern of development derives its driving force from a linear theory of progress, from a vision of historical evolution created in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Western Europe and universalism throughout the world, especially in the postwar development decades. The linearity of history, pre-supposed in this theory of progress, created an ideology of development that equated development with economic growth, economic growth with expansion of the market economy, modernity with consumerism, and non-market economics with backwardness." SHIVA, V. – BANDYOPADHYAY, J. 1989.

The Western universalist belief became irrelevant because of the growing awareness in the world of a plurality of co-existing civilizations, each having its right to its own identity and each being entitled to live in accordance with its own cosmic vision, its own cultural framework and traditions which evolved during centuries, if not thousand years. This awareness notwithstanding, whenever possible and feasible, there is a need to adapt Western scientific views, methods and technologies to a given cultural framework, even implying certain changes in the ways of life of the populations if these adaptations and changes are compatible with their inherited values and traditions. Thus, in a world of pluralism of differing civilizations, the dogma of universalism reflecting one, specific culture's standpoint, is no more tenable. Civilizational pluralism is the major force in the dissipation of the universalist belief and its concurrent thesis concerning the one and only rationality which is valid for all peoples at all times. The impact of this pluralism is growing with each day passing and brings new and new proofs, if still needed, of the co-existing but diverging cultural configuration in the world.

However, there is no necessity of looking for a 'bridgehead' between co-existing cultures with their sometimes incommensurable, sometimes compatible mental and behavioral frameworks because some common features of the genetic endowment and the many similarities between different environments in which men live as well as the mental and spiritual capacities which stand for the uniqueness of man among the various species, constitute a 'core' of shared though limited features in different civilizations. This shared 'core' does not justify any concept of universalism, but it is enough to facilitate understanding between persons living in various civilizational orbits. Common features of behavioral patterns such as parent-child relations, or of syntactical similarities on the linguistic plane, or of social institutions like kinship systems, suffice to indicate possibilities of dialogue in inter-civilizational encounters, permitting to avoid the dangers of a Quinean radical translation and interpretation.

4. UNIVERSALISM AND GLOBALIZATION

The juxtaposition of the concepts and phenomena of universalism and globalization is an adequate way to conclude this essay as it permits to emphasize the distinction between a universalistic belief, as intellectual concept and creed, and globalization processes which represent an extension on the world scene of a great number of social, economic and political practices.

Therefore, in contrast to the definition of universalism given above, globalization is the practical process of disseminating, at worldwide level, specific structures, institutions, procedures as well as certain customs under the impact of our civilization's cultural and technological influence. Though this globalization process appears to be identical with a universalization of Western civilizational values, this impression is deceiving because globalization is a phenomenon at the surface of the life of other civilizations, albeit its effects such as pollution can be devastating and enduring, because non-Western cultures are not affected in their depth by the process of globalization.

Good examples of the impact of globalization in non-Western countries are the extended urbanization from the structural point of view, the formation of nation-states from the institutional, the setting up of Western-type judicial processes from the procedural, and, finally, the 'consumerization' of large masses due to the invasion of Western-type products such as clothing or electrical appliances, from the point of view of modification of certain indigenous customs. However, the major impact of the West on Asian, African and Latin American cultures is the penetration of the means of communication and the concomitant domination of medias which are the foremost instruments of the globalization process itself.

Difficulties encountered in the globalization process, showing at the same time, the irrelevance of Western universalistic beliefs, are numerous. I shall briefly analyze such examples from the cultural, social, economic, and political fields, and one example concerning experiences made at international level:

Cultural confrontation. There is a cultural confrontation going on, and in some cases still in the making, between fundamental ideas of our culture, and beliefs and worldviews of non-Western civilizations. There are two clear examples of this confrontation:

— First, all other civilizations are based on religious or metaphysical worldviews which are rarely disappearing but are rather re-invigorated under the attacks of the Western secular, rationalist and 'disenchanted' overall approach to life. One type of increasing reaction against the West is the mushrooming of various religious fundamentalisms, especially in the world of Islam, which try to save the faith and the values inherited from their forefathers. It is important to be aware of the fact that these fundamentalisms are supported, in particular, by the popular classes and the resistance to them is limited to the middle- and upper-classes of the society. This is a form of self-defense because it defends the fundamental tenets of those peoples' collective identities.

— Second, another form of self-defense against the onslaught of Western ideas is the rebirth of nationalisms based on the defense of the other major component of collective identities, ethnic solidarity. The nationalist revival is not only manifest in countries belonging to non-Western civilizations but also in the orbit of the West itself, as the recent war in the Balkans attested to it. What is instructive in all cases of nationalist conflicts or ethnic strives is the fact that not only the popular classes are involved in them but the middle classes as well, especially the so-called intelligentsia; it is, of course, a historic experience that the middle classes and the intelligentsia, if they existed, were always among those who led nationalist revolts and ethnic-popular uprisings.

Social de-structuring Traditional social structures are always modified in the course of economic development. However, such a modification presupposes a corresponding change in the reigning worldview because the gradually emerging new social structure must be embedded in a global mental framework which sustains and justifies it. As a consequence of the conflictual situation between traditional and imported cultural frameworks, the emerging social groups, normally weak and limited in numbers, are 'lost between two worlds', as Albert Hourani said, because they cannot be freed, and do not want to be freed, from their traditional ties, on the one hand, and cannot adopt a new cultural approach in its entirety which is not adapted to their circumstances, on the other hand. As a result, in most countries belonging to the orbit of non-Western civilizations, there is no middle class which could be the bearer of a new but foreign cultural vision and the actor in new but foreign social roles.

Economic stagnation. Enormous expectations accompanied the gaining of independence by Asian, African and some Latin American countries though it was realized that political independence is not viable without economic independence. The hopes of rapid development of the 'underdeveloped' countries did, however, not materialize, in part at least, because of the non-congruence between these countries' cultural and social framework and the methods of economic development borrowed from the West. The copying of Western principles, in the name of universalism, went so far that it was not even admitted that these countries looking for a betterment of their earthly destiny could follow a path of growth not corresponding to the theories of Western scholars and politicians, for example, the path of the so-called 'unbalanced growth', that is, a disproportionate growth in the economy's various sectors. A concrete case of the impossibility of copying the Western model without adaptation is the actual drive for privatization, or making of the local private sector the engine of the country's growth. There is practically no middle class, in the Western sense, in the countries of non-Western civilizations, no private entrepreneurs; whom should the efforts of privatization aim at? The long bureaucratic tradition, of non Western-origin, in most of these countries produced a great mass of (i) employees in public administrations and (ii) managers and workers in mostly State-owned enterprises, but no private sector can be developed with people who are accustomed to work in a bureaucratic administration. It should not be forgotten that in the West it took more than two centuries for the bourgeoisie to acquire a strong enough position to assume the role of private entrepreneurs.

Political dilemma – disorganization or dictatorship. Two factors play an important role in respect of the dilemma of political organization in countries of the non-Western cultural world. First, the absolute irrelevance of the nation-state formula in the different civilizational and social frameworks; the nation-state is, in fact, without a referent. The second factor is the cultural disorientation and social de-structuring in those countries due to the impact of Western influence.

It is evident that in different and changing environments, in Asia and Africa especially, the constantly modified and fluctuating system of various State-formations, or the longer or shorter existence of more or less vast empires, was the best adapted political organization in the past. The colonial occupation did not introduce a new political organizational pattern but simply extended to the colonies the nation-state organization as it existed in European countries in the nineteenth century. After independence, the former colonies adopted, naturally, the political system of parliamentary democracy within the existing borders of colonial territories, borders which were declared untouchable to avoid the break up of these territories into small units on lines of ethnic and tribal divisions. There was no effort undertaken by the decolonized territories and the intelligentsia of the concerned peoples to re-formulate the political organization of their societies, and adapting the democratic forms of power to their own cultural standards and cosmic vision. Or, perhaps, there was nothing else to do than to continue in the mold of political forms established by the colonial power.

Be it as it may, today the non-congruence between peoples' belief- and value-systems and their whole civilizational background, on the one hand, and the political society organized in a nation-state and a parliamentary democracy, on the other hand, is undeniable. All the more so, that in most of the formerly colonial territories numerous ethnic groups, frequently divided by religious differences as well, are lumped together; it is only natural that the same problems as those plaguing Europe since the establishment of nation-states on territories where several nationalities lived together, are gradually disorganizing the newly independent States' administrative and political systems. In Europe, we have the successive crises of national minorities living within unified national States, – even in Western Europe but in attenuated form; in countries belonging to non-Western civilizations, we have the escalating ethnic warfare, secessionist movements, and almost continuous bloodletting in the form of so-called 'local' conflicts. Parliamentary democracies function only in those non-Western countries where a charismatic personality unites the population under the banner of a one-party State, and where the disappearance of such charismatic leaders – who mostly belonged to the vanishing generation which fought for independence and obtained it – leaves behind a disorganized society and a weak State administration, to be grabbed by anybody who has the only really powerful instrument under his control, that is, the generals. In consequence, this means that with a few exceptions, like India, parliamentary democracies exist only in name in these countries, whether they are led by a charismatic leader or by a military dictator.

Local conflicts, peacekeeping, and the international community. The United Nations system was created in a world entirely different from ours today. Its main purpose being the maintenance of international security through collective measures and large-scale cooperation of all its members, safeguarding, however, the principle of non-interference into one another's internal affairs, the Charter understandably envisaged carrying out peacekeeping operations in case of localized conflicts between members. This mechanism was paralyzed during the cold war era, but became one of the most important activities of the United Nations since rivalry between the great powers, at least temporarily, disappeared. There are more and more local conflicts, the number of peacekeeping operations soars as well as their financial burden for which the richer members of the international community, who pay for them, were not prepared. These operations frequently represent involvement in the internal affairs of the countries concerned such as in Cambodia or Somalia, though they are justifiable in humanitarian terms. Protagonists of humanitarian intervention openly claim already that the right of intervening, under the umbrella of the Security Council, in the affairs of members of the UN which are not ready to guarantee the protection of human rights within their boundaries, should be officially recognized.

It is not even this turn taken by recent events related to peacekeeping operations which is the most worrisome; the most preoccupying aspect of those recent operations is the conspicuous but inevitable lack of success. Inevitable because all the above enumerated factors make in advance impossible the success of United Nations peacekeepers – as only the symptoms of the underlying fundamental problems were addressed and not the problems themselves. Suffice it to look at the present situation in Cambodia, where the Khmer Rouge never accepted the settlement and elections imposed by the United Nations and the so-called world community; or in Somalia, where the ethnic strife and the fight between warlords resumed as soon as the presence and pressure of the United Nations was reduced, and the media's attention was diverted to other conflicts. Finally, the treatment of the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis by the United Nations and the great powers was the most inefficient of all, witnessing a complete ignorance of history, cultural antagonisms in the region, and the possible and effective impact of measures taken such as the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro.

In conclusion of this article, we can say, then, that

- Universalism is an outmoded perspective in our contemporary world as it does not apply in circumstances in which there is a plurality of great civilizations co-existing in the same space and age;
- Reasons for its original impetus are not relevant anymore, namely, the long forgotten fight to liberate human beings from the strong intellectual and spiritual discipline of the medieval Church as well as the need for a monopolistic hold on power by the nation-state, which is today quasi-omnipotent and has in face of it a multitude of 'atomized' individuals and a very weak 'civil' society.
- Western universalism, which is the worldview giving pre-eminence to Western civilization over all other cultures and civilizations in the world, is not adapted to settle problems which emerge on the international scene because the actions undertaken by the international community are based on irrelevant principles.

Therefore, it is unavoidable to return to contextuality which, of course, implies a considerable degree of relativism. Contextuality in this sense means that each question, each problem has to be envisaged taking into account the cultural framework and the social and economic conditions prevailing in the civilizational world concerned.

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Aspects of Contemporary Politics

TRANSLATION OF IDEOLOGY INTO FOREIGN POLICY*

1. THE CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY.

During the preceding weeks we have discussed about the essence, the meaning and the nature of ideology. Since the subject is rather philosophical, it needs a certain philosophical treatment and more precision.

At first, however, I wish to define my thoughts and intellectual methods. As to the method; I try to apply dialectics, not in a narrower, Hegelian, but in a much broader sense, which is nearer to the ancient Greek view. Dialectics means as view and method that one sees things interdependent and interrelating, but always moving and changing. Contradictions resolve into solutions, and solutions transform with the changing time and space into contradictions. So, penetrating in a subject, it is never possible to loose from our eyes the whole perspective, the entire inner structure of the question dealt with and, therefore, either the inductive, or the deductive methods – in the sense of Bacon and Descartes – have to be excluded.

Once having accepted the dialectical standpoint naturally follows the *dislike of definitions*. I remember the statement of the great Danish philosopher, Soren Kirkegaard, who said: "To ask definitions is a lack of tact," – but I think that one can go further and say: To give definitions is to surrender ourselves to the fallacy of simplicity. The phenomena of the human world are so numerous, so complicated that to give a definition signifies to cut the interrelation of the defined thing with the others, to simplify reality. The methods of natural sciences are, therefore, never applicable in the research concerning human phenomena. However, it is indispensable to accept some working concepts, but always keeping in mind their limitations and the purposes which they serve.

What is then the philosophical standpoint from the perspective of which we can handle the problem of ideology? Which one have I chosen among the numerous philosophical -isms? It is *realism*. It means that I do not accept the separation of ideas and material facts; I cannot give preference to spiritual or material factors in human life, – I am convinced that they are interrelated, two sides of the only reality and the tension between these two sides gives the dynamics of our existence. So, it is impossible in my opinion to discuss ideology and to define its nature and, then, separately envisage it's becoming a fact in human life. There is no pure idea and all phenomena can only be understood in the general historical, economic, political etc. context. This does not mean that the only scientific approach to a subject is the historic or genetic one; I certainly prefer the systematic enquiry of a given question, at the same time always situating it in the human context.

Leaving now these introductory remarks, let us see for a moment the interpretation of the nature and meaning of ideology.

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Until now we had the occasion to hear two entirely different definition of the ideology. It is either taken in a very large sense as a set of beliefs and values, or a narrower is proposed considering ideology as a coherent political doctrine represented by an organized group – possibly a party – which tries to seize power in a human community. The latter coincides with the Marxist-Leninist conception. In my understanding the first proposition is too large and, therefore, vague. The second takes into account such elements which are totally irrelevant to the problem; there is no inner and structural interdependence between an ideology and a political action: the seizure of power. The historical survey which we had the pleasure to hear two weeks ago proceeded in the same manner employing the inductive method in order to prove its final conclusion, that is, the above-mentioned second concept of ideology. It failed because the method was in reality not inductive but deductive, as the author's conviction about the nature of ideology – the second version – predetermined the conclusion of the inquiry which simply served to explain the historical facts by the preexisting conceptualization of the phenomenon. The great danger of deductive analysis is the arbitrary choice of historical examples and the artificial limitation of the horizon.

In trying to precise the nature of ideology it is very useful to stress a comparison between *Weltanschauung* and ideology and between ideology and religion. This seems to be a logical sequence of our proceedings.

What is *Weltanschauung*? It is a system of thoughts, beliefs and values, a coherent explication of all phenomena observed by a human being. Consequently, it is a general view of the world by an individual. Ideology is in fact the same, not in the case of an individual, but of a community. In this perspective, ideology is a system of a community's thoughts, beliefs and values formulated by individuals, accepted and adopted by their community in the course of a historical process by the community which construed the elements of the *Weltanschauung* of its members into a coherent whole. But this characteristics of the nature of ideology is accompanied by another, inherent in the former, namely that the community's set of thoughts, beliefs and values is sanctioned by the community itself. The community – and I use consciously this word which comprises all possible kind of social groups, parties, religious groupings, or nations – controls either by moral obligation or by material and physical means its members ; if they deviate from the commonly accepted set of thoughts, beliefs and values, they will be condemned.

I think that this first point is fundamental. In a certain sense it represents the bridge over the gap between the above-mentioned two conceptions, safeguarding the very characteristics of a particular view of the world, but elevating it to the community level, thus rendering possible its putting into practice in the social world.

However, when we speak of a sanctioning a set of thoughts, beliefs and values, we have to distinguish between immanent and transcendent sanctions. A common set of thoughts, beliefs and values of a group of men, which is believed to be sanctioned not by the inner psychological forces or material means of the group, but from the outside, – forces coming from beyond this human world, – this is religion. Therefore, when we speak of ideology, it means always a system of thinking and evaluation endorsed by the proper forces of a human community. This must be added in order to avoid all misunderstandings between religion and ideology ; religion, a transcendentally sanctioned set of thoughts, beliefs and values, is in all cases followed by an ideology, because the transcendent principles are always implanted in human worlds which develop them into institutions, aiming at the realization of the believed truths and giving them immanent sanctions. Religion and ideology are similar, on the other hand, from the point of view of validity. They both claim to be absolutely valid without limitation in time and space. If it were not so, there would be no community sanction, and no ideology or religion.

2. IDEOLOGY IN POLICY MAKING

Turning to my proper subject I must begin with a double avowal. Thinking of ideology and foreign policy I have to recognize that all foregoing considerations might seem a sort of *l'art pour l'art*, because for the purpose to identify the means by which ideology is transplanted into foreign policy, the best adapted concept is the one considering ideology as a set of beliefs and values. It is without importance that the translated ideology is an individually developed view, a *Weltanschauung*, or the cultural heritage of a human group, with whatever sanction, – it influences a nation's foreign policy or, possibly, the whole of international relations through individual actors or communities.

Translation of ideology into foreign policy appears to be an autonomous problem, standing in itself, and being the proper subject of scientific research. But, if we are thinking logically, we are obliged to recognize that the problem in such a concrete form does not exist. There are other very important questions of detail which have to be resolved once the research is finished and a general idea of the matter was worked out in order to enable us to draw conclusions as to the translation of certain ideology into a specific policy. My task is not to enumerate all eventual problems one can encounter when translating an ideology into foreign policy, and, therefore, I confine myself to raise questions and touch upon some vital points to be indicated suggesting an answer to the question dealt with.

The core of the problem is the policy making process. Here comparative studies of governments and politics are very useful; especially the new efforts unveiling the secrets of decision-making. Ideology, taking the word in its largest sense, may influence in two respects a nation's foreign policy: (i) In defining the aims of a country's efforts, and (ii) In directing the choice of the methods with a view to realize the aims set in advance. This is the basis of a long controversy between the legislative and executive branches of power.

The first represents the nation and has the authority to define in general the aims of the country's foreign policy, but the executive organs implement always the policy determined; and they may modify the objectives set by the legislative power in the process of their realization. According to Kenneth W. Thompson, Research Fellow of the Rockefeller Foundation in New York, "foreign policy has been viewed as the legislative aspect and diplomacy as the executive aspect of managing foreign relations. Diplomacy has called for experts with freedom of action; policy is a matter of the most responsible branch of government, including at some point the legislation." (*Foreign Policy in World Politics*, p. 368.) The discrepancy between the aims and their realization is always possible and the impact of ideologies on several echelons and thorough individual and collective organs may lead to a totally different foreign policy in comparison to the one proposed. The realization of the aims of a nation's foreign policy requires special qualities. An effective intervention in relations between States, the art of diplomacy "calls for an intimate knowledge of the mechanics of negotiation, for endless patience in the use of numberless expedients in working out agreements, and for consummate skill in adjusting national proposals and making them acceptable at home and abroad without sacrificing vital objectives" (*ibid.*, p.369). Therefore, the essential part of the foreign policy making process is the work of individuals, most probably by teams of experts and the choice of the latter offers another possibility for the influence of ideologies on diplomatic action. Thus, without engaging ourselves in a discussion over the role of personality in history, I think that we may firmly establish the preponderant role of the individual in foreign policy making.

Ideologies are thus translated into foreign policy by collective institutions – legislative bodies, teams of experts and advisory committees – or by individuals, that is, all kinds of diplomatic representatives and officials. This division is very important because through the individual actors even a personal *Weltanschauung* or a particular religious belief, and not only an ideology in stricter sense, may have an impact on foreign policy decisions. To understand the individual's decisions and actions, we have to find out their background. The education of a man, his culture, his religion and the entire tradition of the environment in which he lived and lives, must have contributed to the formation of his complicated set of beliefs and values. The ideology of the social group from which he comes and the ideologies of other entities to which he is or was related, are, therefore, to be studied.. In this way we shall have an overall view of the social pressures on him.

The ideologies of different social groups in a country, or nationwide accepted ideas of moral values and the aims to be followed in international relations, are transplanted into foreign policy decisions by collective organs, their decisions, including the preparatory or advisory work. The fundamental principles of a country's orientation on the international scene, laid down by legislative bodies, set, nevertheless, limits to the activity of the executive organs as indicated before.

The picture we now have embraces the whole extent of public opinion besides the proper ideology of the eventual individual actors. The case of the public opinion is, however, not so clear. The recent evolution of modern technologies offers a powerful propaganda network in the hand of governments. The radio, the press and other medias such as the film, the television, and – last, but not least – the possibility of almost entirely controlling all aspects of life, even in democratic states, increased the power of the governing groups to an unbelievable degree. Therefore, in my opinion, it is not enough to speak today of the pressure of public opinion on the policy making bodies and individuals, but we have to consider the power of governments in shaping the public opinion, too. In fact, there is certainly an interrelation between the two effects; individuals, coming from a determinate environment, represent – consciously or unconsciously – the commonly accepted set of beliefs and values and act according to them: but it also happens that governments in order to obtain a large popular support for their domestic and foreign policy decisions use the propaganda machine at their disposal in order to imprint a new reorientation to public pressure. This is the case when a government faces an entirely new situation which is not familiar to the public with all its consequences; a good example is the Roosevelt Administration's situation at the end of the thirties. As Snyder, Bruck and Sapin point out in their work (*Decision-making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics*. Princeton, 1954) on the objectives in making foreign policy, sometimes the objective is an "image" of a future state of affairs, – a set of conditions to be fulfilled, or a set of specifications to be met. In their view, foreign policy objectives have a fourfold aspect:

- i) A target-element, with military expression, the specific achievement element;
- ii) A generalized directional element which refers to the ultimate state of affairs envisaged and to the relationship to other objectives or to a total strategy;
- iii) Expectations concerning certain consequences when action is initiated;
- iv) The time dimension.

The indeterminate quality of the objectives of foreign policy derives from two factors. The first is that a directional shift may always occur along the path of action; the second consists of the existence of different – though not unnecessarily competing – interpretations of the components of various objectives. It is at this point that ideology may influence to a large extent foreign policy making.

According to the decision-making approach, ideology is very important in the motivation of the actions in foreign policy. "Motives are" – write the above quoted authors – "words which are adequate, adequacy depending on whether such words satisfy other actors who do question or might question an act. Motive statements thus function to coordinate social action by persuading some participants to accept an act or acts. Motives are, then, acceptable justifications for present, past and future programs of action."

Motivational data can be classified as follows:

- a) Functions and objectives of the overall foreign policy making structure and of any substructure;
- b) Objectives of particular units;
- c) Socially defined norms and values internal to the decisional unit (called also vested interests);

d) Socially defined norms and values external to the overall decision-making structure and internalized by the decision maker, who "enters a complex system of objectives, preferences and rules and becomes also an institutional member. Yet it is true too that the decision-maker enters the government from the large social system in which he also retains membership (as a culture bearer)."

e) Material needs and values of the society or any segment thereof not internalized by the decision maker.

Summing up all what I said about the decision making approach, there are two fundamental propositions of this theory which are the most interesting from the point of view of my subject. The Princeton research group points out that "two vital kinds of effects of major common value orientation on decision-making behavior may be noted:

1. Effects on the ways in which decision-makers perceive the world and the unproblematic (i.e. not open to doubt or choice) ends which they bring to their deliberations;

2. Verbal formulations, which decision makers employ to render official policies acceptable to the society. One extremely important role of basic values is to legitimate policies, i.e. verbalized values are employed to satisfy citizens as to the desirability of pursuing certain courses of action." When rulers are 'imported' men from abroad, imposed by external forces on a country, they try to transform public opinion and introduce new beliefs and values by the media discussed above (see, for example, totalitarian states or imperialist conquests).

Finally, we can state that there is a dialectic interplay between public opinion and the modern means of those in power to influence it, – an interplay which also depends upon the actual position of other determining elements such as the degree of centralization or the governmental build up, etc.

LA DEMOCRATIE CHRETIENNE*

Quelques réflexions à l'occasion de la dernière réunion du Comité Central des Jeunes Chrétiens-Démocrates d'Europe centrale et orientale

Le monde souffre d'une grave crise. Elle embrasse toute la vie humaine. L'apparition successive des systèmes totalitaires, l'impuissance de leurs adversaires, la recherche d'une vérité par l'homme qui veut mais ne peut pas croire, les efforts incessants visant à découvrir une voie nouvelle pour l'expression artistique, sont tous les signes de cette crise. Une caractéristique tout particulière se rattache encore aux symptômes bien connus qui rendent assez difficile à reconnaître la vraie nature et la profondeur de la crise, c'est le progrès de la technique à un degré encore jamais atteint dans l'histoire. Nous ne voyons pas l'issue des troubles de l'époque, nous ne savons pas si le monde et nous tous, sommes déjà dans l'état de guérison ou non. Mais, néanmoins, nous pouvons constater l'existence de quelques signes révélant le début d'une *katharsis*.

A cette époque ceux qui prétendent être chrétiens ont une responsabilité particulière. Ils doivent voir, en vivant dans la maladie et la misère de ces temps, une perspective plus large de l'existence. Ils doivent distinguer, avec un jugement plus solide que ceux des autres, parmi les grandes antinomies contemporaines les phénomènes conduisant vers un dénouement ou représentent des forces rétrogrades. Ils doivent, surtout, participer aux efforts de trouver une issue, avec la fermeté et le dévouement de la foi.

Toutes ces constations sont en premier lieu valables aux chrétiens-démocrates. Au lieu de l'idéologie des systèmes totalitaires, laquelle réduit l'horizon de l'homme dans un cadre fixe et étroit, c'est seul le christianisme qui peut constituer la base d'une conception cohérente du monde. Mais ceci ne sera jamais une idéologie, car la liberté de la volonté, la liberté du jugement et de décision reste toujours des attributs de la personnalité humaine. Si quelqu'un se rattache au christianisme et à la démocratie, la seule forme politique qui correspond à la vision chrétienne, il lui faut remplir avec un contenu réel cette prise de position. Donc, c'est le devoir de concrétiser, dans les détails, les principes généraux, c'est-à-dire de tirer de ceux-ci des conclusions concernant les faits de la vie quotidienne. La dernière réunion du Comité Central a montré que nous avons étonnement peu d'idées de la démocratie chrétienne. Notre première tâche, à côté de retrouver l'unité au sein des Jeunes Démocrates-chrétiens, est de chercher et de développer le contenu de cette conception. C'est vrai qu'en Europe, et dans les autres continents où le mouvement chrétien-démocrate est représenté par des partis importants et par des personnalités éminentes, personne ne peut nier qu'à l'heure actuelle la démocratie chrétienne est l'une des forces décisive de la politique européenne. Mais il y a une différence entre les vues et les conceptions. C'est déjà important en vue de la réalisation de la liberté conçue selon l'enseignement chrétien.

Si nous voulons définir ce que signifie d'être chrétien, nous devons dire que non seulement nos idées, notre perspective, mais aussi notre attitude humaine, notre comportement de tous les jours nous marquent. Nos confessions les aspects transcendants de la vie, l'existence d'un Etre éternel auquel notre foi et sa force se rattachent, — et nous affirmons, que pendant notre vie terrestre, nous sommes obligés de servir, avec tous nos efforts, l'avenir commun de l'humanité.

* Discours prononcé à l'occasion de la réunion du Comité Central des Jeunes Démocrates-Chrétiens de l'Europe centrale et orientale au cours de l'année 1965.

Notre conception de la politique est déterminée par les traits prédominants de notre pensée indiqués ci-dessus pour orientation, car c'est la tâche de la théologie chrétienne de les développer. Cela va sans dire que la position définie par ces traits, comme celle de l'exigence de l'honnêteté, est valable pour chacun de nous dans notre comportement quotidien. Mais, malheureusement, il faut les mentionner ici, justement en vue de la réunion de notre Comité Central. La politique est la science du possible, comme on l'estime généralement. Ceci doit être, évidemment, accepté par les chrétiens-démocrates aussi, puisqu'une politique, une activité qui ne tient pas compte des réalités, par exemple des nécessités pratiques et difficultés financières, sera condamné à mort. Mais cette acceptation ne peut se faire que dans certaines limites. Afin qu'on puisse arriver à des solutions, à des arrangements convenables à tout le monde, on nous confrontent quelquefois à des décisions qui ne peuvent être acceptées par nous, car elles trahissent notre confiance et notre bonne foi. Il n'est pas possible de définir les limites de la bonne foi, elles dépendent de la responsabilité personnelle, de l'homme qui est obligé de prendre la décision.

Dans le même ordre d'idée nous devons aborder un problème, en soulignant son importance, c'est le problème des intérêts et des aspirations individuelles. Là — franchement dit — nous touchons le point faible de tous les mouvements politiques de l'émigration. La plupart des efforts échouent sur de pareilles questions: qui obtiendra telle ou telle position, qui sera chargé de certain travail rémunéré ? Le tableau est consternant : d'une part, nous voyons des hommes, des politiciens qui s'intéressent seulement à leur chance, qui courent après l'argent — heureusement, il y en a aussi des hommes très honnêtes, tous mes respects à ces nombreuses exceptions. Les élections deviennent un marché de dupe, ou on achète et vend les différentes fonctions. D'autre part, nous nous tournons vers nos pays ligotés par les forces de domination où les hommes meurent, souffrent, et où les valeurs de la vie humaine disparaissent. Dans l'étranglement mortel du pouvoir illimité périclète la création de Dieu : la personnalité humaine. Avons-nous de la place dans cette danse macabre ? Non. La mission de la démocratie-chrétienne, une mission de très grande portée, peut être seulement le maintien de la pureté tant dans les actions politiques que dans la vie interne. On ne peut tolérer aucun genre d'abus, aucune sorte de corruption, — mais si quelqu'un accuse un autre ou met en cause un procédé, il doit le justifier et prouver par des faits, sinon c'est lui qui doit être tenu responsable. Quoi qu'il en soit, l'air des insinuations et de la 'propagande chuchotée' n'est pas digne de la démocratie chrétienne.

Le fondement moral de notre mouvement implique aussi l'impératif d'être courageux. Il faut particulièrement mettre en évidence aujourd'hui cette exigence, parce que c'est ce qui manque sur la plus grande échelle dans la politique occidentale contemporaine et dans l'attitude européenne. On est trop souple, on évite les décisions, on ne prend pas — même s'il le faut — la responsabilité. Le fantôme — le pouvoir totalitaire — est devenu une réalité et parcourt toute l'Europe — la Russie, l'Allemagne, l'Italie, l'Espagne et les pays de l'Europe centrale et orientale; elles étaient ou elles en sont les victimes, — et l'esprit du compromis et de la lâcheté hante de plus en plus, d'une année à l'autre, partout. Aux chrétiens-démocrates ne reste que de donner l'exemple, d'avoir le courage de dire la vérité, d'oser à prendre des décisions d'une portée historique et de briser l'apparence de l'entente achetée au prix du sang des hommes et des souffrances des peuples. Toutefois, cela ne signifie pas que nous devons être des partisans des méthodes brusques et sans tact dans la vie internationale, ou de mettre en danger facilement les résultats obtenus au cours de l'intégration européenne. Ladite exigence de courage est valable dans les cas semblables à ceux de Munich et à ceux qui se sont produits en Europe centrale en automne de 1956.

De plus, une autre caractéristique de notre attitude politique, qui tire son origine aussi du christianisme, doit être l'effort de ne pas chercher les choses qui nous séparent, mais de chercher celles qui nous unifient. Ce n'est pas impossible, même pas difficile, parce que nous donnons aux questions fondamentales la même réponse, étant tous chrétiens. Cet effort nous offre aussi la possibilité de trouver un accord avec les autres hommes qui ont un différent point de vue quant à l'activité nécessaire à l'heure actuelle, à l'exception des croyants du pouvoir et de la destruction, les représentants des régimes dictatoriaux. Nous ne pourrions jamais accepté la négation des valeurs que nous respectons. Cette prise de position, cette recherche de nos

intérêts communs se réalisera dans notre conception politique de la manière suivante. Nous considérons que le monde s'achemine tant vers les grandes unités politiques qu'économiques, et nous sommes convaincus que c'est notre affaire de servir cette évolution par l'élimination de nos anciennes inimitiés et haines mutuelles en Europe centrale. Nous soutenons avec toutes nos forces la construction d'une Europe unie, en espérant que nos peuples libérés seront aussi membres de cette grande communauté européenne. Cette communauté ne doit pas être une organisation qui supprime tous les caractères nationaux en uniformisant la langue, la culture et les coutumes, mais seulement une unité multicolore, laquelle — conformément aux exigences de l'époque — assure les chances économiques et politiques par une gestion et par des efforts communs.

Dans toutes ces réflexions se manifeste clairement et nettement un trait essentiel de notre démocratie chrétienne, ce qui nous distingue le mieux des autres mouvements et conceptions, la mesure qui nous est imposée par l'ensemble des idées du christianisme. La mesure signifie que nous ne céderons jamais aux extrémismes, mais nous voudrions comprendre toutes les aspirations. La démocratie chrétienne n'exprime pas la vue et les sentiments ni d'une classe, ni d'une nation, ni d'une race, mais se base sur une conception commune du monde, confessée par des hommes venant de différentes classes, de toutes sortes de nations et de diverses races. C'est sa force et sa faiblesse. Les partis, qui représentent des intérêts, les revendications et la volonté d'un groupement social sont beaucoup plus cohérents, beaucoup plus efficaces. Ils ont eu à certains moments de l'évolution historique un rôle décisif, mais — justement en raison de leur attitude et orientation unilatérale ils ne peuvent pas proposer des solutions satisfaisantes à l'époque d'une pleine crise. Pour le moment c'est le devoir de la démocratie chrétienne de cristalliser les différentes approches, parce qu'elle examine les problèmes en profondeur, et elle dispose d'une mesure générale avec son système des valeurs, et même la liberté de peser, de mesurer les choses.

En revenant à un exemple qui se réfère aux élections du Comité central, cette mesure chrétienne nous permet une interprétation inhabituelle de la technique des élections démocratiques. Nous ne pouvons admettre ni au sein de nos organisations, ni sur le plan des délibérations internationales, le mécanisme simple d'une, soit disant, majorité démocratique. Selon les principes chrétiens, on ne peut pas justifier l'oppression d'une minorité par la majorité. Donc, notre tâche est de viser à une harmonie de tous, une entente à une échelle aussi grande que possible. C'est extrêmement difficile de réaliser, il nécessite beaucoup de patience et beaucoup de dévouement, mais nous ne sommes pas chrétiens-démocrates effrayés par de pareils devoirs.

Ces considérations que je termine maintenant, ne sont pas plus que l'indication des pensées que m'avaient inspirées les derniers événements au sein de notre union. Ces pensées n'offrent pas une solution à nos problèmes et se présentent seulement comme l'initiation d'un travail de réflexion sérieux pour rectifier le tir dans les années qui viennent.

ETHIOPIE*

Feuilleton de voyage

L'avion — un grand Boeing 720-B de la compagnie aérienne d'Ethiopie — part d'Athènes vers une heure du matin. En survolant la Méditerranée il fait deux escales avant d'arriver à Addis-Abeba : au Caire et à Asmara. Au-dessus de la mer, du delta du Nil, il vogue lentement — nous semble-t-il — dans la nuit sombre ; en vérité, il fonce à une vitesse hallucinante de 1'100 km par heure.

L'escale au Caire cache déjà quelques surprises. J'ai cherché en vain les petites lampes à huile qui bordaient encore l'année passée les pistes de son aéroport donnant vraiment l'impression qu'on atterrit au monde d'Aladdin, — elle sont disparues. Maintenant, comme d'ailleurs, une signalisation lumineuse suit les contours des pistes. L'aéroport lui-même avait tout à fait changé. C'est un énorme édifice moderne — 5 à 6 fois plus grand que celui de Genève — qui porte le nom en lettres géantes : Cairo International Airport. Nous entrons dans la salle d'attente où des garçons en costume oriental servent de boissons rafraîchissantes ou du café ; j'ai voulu changer quelques dollars éthiopiens en piastres pour acheter des journaux, mais ce n'est pas possible. On change seulement les devises étrangères de haute valeur, — le pays en a certainement besoin, — ainsi je DONNE mes derniers francs suisses. Après trois quart d'heure d'attente nous retournons dans l'avion ; en allant je jette encore une coup d'oeil sur cette construction imposante et constate une fois de plus qu'il y a des régimes qui ont le sens de réalisations spectaculaires.

Asmara, la capitale d'Eritrée, était la prochaine escale. Nous y sommes arrivés vers 5 heures du matin en voyant la ville seulement du haut, car l'aéroport est situé loin d'elle. Cet atterrissage, on ne peut jamais l'oublier. L'édifice de l'aéroport est en construction à demi achevé, moderne, mais assez petit. Ce qui est saisissant c'est le paysage qui l'entoure. Autour des pistes bétonnées s'étendent les champs de la savane colorés de groupes de ses arbres typiques. Sur l'horizon se dressent les montagnes arides, tellement caractéristiques contrées éthiopiennes, rasées par la dureté du temps au cours des siècles interminables. Et tout ce panorama se baignait dans la lumière timide du soleil levant.

Addis-Abeba, la nouvelle fleur d'Ethiopie, est comme le pays — pleine de contradiction ! L'étranger qui met son pied sur le sol de l'empire du Lion Vainqueur du Juda, Sa Majesté Impériale Haïlé Selassié I., trouvera pleine satisfaction de son sens de beauté, de ses besoins esthétiques et en se délectant jouira d'une hospitalité conquérante, mais s'il est imbibé des idées de l'humanisme européen et considère comme indispensable une certaine responsabilité collective dans la vie sociale, sa délectation des beautés inoubliables ira au pair avec une désillusion grandissante.

Ce n'est pas seulement la nature, — la savane, les montagnes et les vallées larges avec une végétation parfois abondante, mais en général très arides, — qui est belle. Ce sont les gens eux-mêmes, la population d'origine amharique. Il ne serait peut-être pas exagéré de dire que les plus belles femmes du monde se trouvent en Ethiopie. Elles sont fines, gracieuses et fragiles, leurs profils comme ciselés en pierre sur nos marquises. Les hommes de même, avec leurs longues mains artistiques, représentent une race magnifique, primitivement hamite, puis subissant une influence profonde sémitique.

En contrepartie de l'attrayante beauté de l'Ethiopie, on y trouve une réalité sur le plan économique et social qui effraye à juste titre les étrangers y passant en mission officielle ou en touriste, surtout s'ils viennent de l'Europe ou de l'Amérique. Le naïf voyageur penserait volontiers que ce pays qui était toujours indépendant, exception

* Article paru dans la revue suisse, *L'Illustré*, en 1963.

faite aux quelques courtes années de l'occupation italienne, doit être à l'avant-garde du progrès africain en marchant devant les autres territoires qui avaient subis les effets des colonialismes généralement incriminés. Il en est tout autrement. L'Ethiopie, le pays le plus ancien d'Afrique avec sa culture et ses traditions rayonnantes, est aujourd'hui aussi parmi les plus arriérés.

Son économie, malgré certaines réalisations, reste stagnante et c'est une pauvreté choquante qui saute aux yeux à première vue. Selon les informations reçues, le revenu annuel d'un paysan n'est plus que 45 francs suisses en argent liquide ; ils vivent, en fait, des produits de la terre, mais leurs méthodes agricoles sont des plus vieilles. C'est une véritable économie de subsistance. En face de cette pauvreté des larges classes populaires la richesse fabuleuse de l'empereur, des 300 grandes familles de propriétaires terriens ainsi que de l'Eglise orthodoxe tout-puissant constitue un contraste éloquent. La différence est énorme et rien à étonner que le sens de la responsabilité sociale qui découle de notre interprétation du christianisme et de nos traditions séculaires humanistes se révolte à la vue d'une telle inégalité. Il est significatif que tous les commentaires qui sont parus dans la presse occidentale de la plume des correspondants ayant assistés à la conférence de chefs d'Etat africains à Addis-Abeba en 1963, sont unanimes dans leurs critiques concernant la réalité économique et sociale éthiopienne.

Les effets sociaux de la pauvreté sont tangibles. A Addis-Abeba, on ne conseille pas aux étrangers de sortir seul dans la rue après la tombée de la nuit. D'innombrables cas se sont produits, même dans le passé récent, qui en font preuve ; ceux qui ne se tenaient pas à cette recommandation avaient été attaqués, malmenés et privés de tout ce qu'il avaient sur eux. Ils devaient retourner à leur domicile ou dans leur hôtel littéralement nus. Ces faits ne sont pas des contes racontés par des étrangers malveillants ou par les opposants du régime actuel (d'ailleurs, il est rare de rencontrer des éthiopiens qui admettraient facilement que ces choses peuvent se passer dans leur capitale, par peur ou par un patriotisme excessif) et ne pourraient nullement servir de base à des jugements hâtifs à l'encontre de la population. Le manque de la sécurité ne peut être éliminé par un renforcement des mesures policières, et il démontre d'une manière irréfutable où peut amener une situation économique et sociale désastreuse, une société foncièrement corrompue laquelle tolère que des couches entières de la population vivent dans une misère désespérante.

Un autre aspect troublant de la vie éthiopienne d'aujourd'hui est l'état de la santé de la population qui indique une carence totale des services de la santé publique. Il n'est pas un secret que la plus grande partie du peuple souffre de diverses maladies vénériennes, — selon les statistiques de l'OMS 92% des 22 millions d'habitants. On est forcé de conclure que si cette situation continue, elle doit obligatoirement entraîner un dépérissement de tout le peuple.

Le système social absolument rigide et plus que féodal, — où, même si l'empereur proposait certaines réformes sa volonté est contrecarrée par les groupes dominants, — nécessite une organisation policière forte, surtout une police secrète étendue sur tout le pays, qui réprime toute opposition effective, et les simples paroles critique ou l'expression de désaccord avec les décisions des autorités.

Ce qui est peut être unique en Ethiopie, c'est l'estime envers et l'attachement à l'ancien envahisseur du pays, auquel le peuple, avec son empereur en tête, opposa une résistance farouche. L'influence italienne est très forte et se manifeste partout. La grande partie des produits manufacturés importés vient de la Péninsule ; la langue étrangère la plus parlée est l'italien ; à Addis-Abeba ainsi qu'aux provinces de dizaines de milliers des anciens immigrants italiens restaient, se mariaient avec de jeunes filles éthiopiennes et s'intégraient dans la société du pays.

Un tournant décisif s'impose à l'Ethiopie, dans un avenir très proche, en faveur des changements fondamentaux dans le domaine économique et social, comme ses impressions trop fragmentaires avaient, peut-être, pu refléter. La politique d'un équilibre calculé tenant compte d'une situation intérieure stagnante, mais projetant une politique dynamique panafricaine sur le plan extérieur, n'amènera pas très loin. Dans la renaissance africaine d'aujourd'hui, l'Ethiopie a aussi sa place tout en remplissant ses devoirs envers le continent — comme ceci s'est passé autrefois.

PORTRAITS AFRICAINS*

Impressions de la Conférence des Chefs d'Etat africains de 1963

Il n'y rien de plus séduisant que d'assister à une conférence panafricaine et de voir, dans ses représentants, ce continent multicolore, cette Afrique avec ses vieilles traditions et, toutefois, en pleine marche vers l'avenir. On était par trop accoutumé en Europe de parler de l'Afrique comme d'une entité, unie dans sa misère et par son état de sous-développement, par ses conditions moyenâgeuses et par ses habitudes sauvages et, surtout, classée, en général, par la couleur de ses populations. L'Afrique: restait dans nos idées pour toujours le continent noir.

La conférence d'Addis-Abeba présenta un tableau entièrement différent. Elle a révélé l'Afrique en toute sa diversité, ses qualités et ses défaillances humaines, ses héritages ancestraux vivant encore dans ses fils d'aujourd'hui, mais aussi son dynamisme actuel. Elle a révélé ses aspects au-delà des couleurs différentes des participants provenant des régions les plus éloignées l'une de l'autre et, peut-être, contredisant les notions prévalant jusqu'ici au monde extérieur sur ce continent ; l'élément humain a fait perdre son importance à des souvenirs d'une autre époque. Ce sommet africain — première dans l'histoire de l'Afrique et aussi dans l'histoire mondiale en tant qu'une réunion rassemblant tant de chefs d'Etat — témoigna de la naissance d'une Afrique unie à l'échelle continentale par une volonté résolue de sortir le continent, ses pays et ses peuples, d'une dépendance politique quelconque, et d'un état économique arriéré, de le doter d'une civilisation moderne en sauvegardant sa culture, ses propres valeurs et son style de vie authentique.

Toutefois, cette unité africaine ne signifie pas une uniformisation des peuples et des leaders, en somme de toute la vie africaine. On comprend mal quelquefois que l'unité de volonté, de l'état d'esprit, d'un style de vie et des traditions, ne fait pas disparaître la diversité humaine des personnalités, de certains caractères nationaux, des conceptions et des préférences. Ils sont trop nombreux les observateurs étrangers qui attendaient de la conférence d'Addis-Abeba pas seulement le point de départ de l'unité africaine, mais une Afrique uniformisée, — au moins c'est la conclusion logique qu'on peut tirer de leurs comptes-rendus qui soulignent les différences et les contradictions entre les hommes d'Etat du continent et tout ce qui les divise au lieu de mettre en relief ce qui les unit. Mais une telle incrédulité accompagnait et accompagne toujours les efforts d'intégration européenne en dépit des résultats concrets réalisés, en premier lieu, sur le plan économique. De ceux qui sont contre ces efforts d'intégration, la plupart commettent l'erreur fondamentale de ne pas pouvoir distinguer entre l'unité et l'uniformisation.

Donc, Addis-Abeba représente le premier, mais décisif pas sur le chemin vers l'unité politique et économique sans toucher à la diversité multicolore du continent. C'est cette mosaïque africaine que nous essayons maintenant à mettre en relief brièvement par l'esquisse des conceptions défendues et du rôle joué par cinq hommes d'Etat à la conférence au sommet, qui représentent dans leurs diversité la réalité africaine, et qui construisent, chacun à sa façon, l'Afrique de demain.

La réunion ayant eu lieu dans la capitale éthiopienne a été d'emblée imprégnée par l'esprit des propositions radicales et intransigeantes du président de Ghana le Docteur Kwame Nkrumah. C'était le

* Article paru dans la revue suisse, *L'Illustré*, au courant de l'année 1963.

troisième jour de la conférence qu'il prononça son grand discours d'une heure et demi dans lequel il invita ses collègues avec une force puissante et en faisant preuve tous ses dons oratoires, d'adhérer à ses conceptions. Ces dernières avaient été déjà connues bien avant du sommet, car il avait adressé une lettre — restée à l'époque secrète — à tous les chefs d'Etat africains quelques semaines avant le rassemblement d'Addis-Abeba dans laquelle il a exposé son point de vue et soumis ses propositions. Lui, le père — comme on l'appelle maintes fois — du panafricanisme, chef du premier état d'Afrique noire devenu indépendant au cours de la dernière décennie, ne pouvait admettre ni dans ses proposition initiales, ni dans les débats pendant la conférence, aucun compromis, aucune concession. Il exigeait la création immédiate d'un état unifié africain, avec un gouvernement et un parlement, avec des institutions communes comme l'organisation de la défense, une banque de développement, un marché commun et une seule monnaie africaine.

« L'accroissement de notre nombre [des Etats africains indépendants] en un espace de temps si court » — a-t-il dit — « est le témoignage évident de l'élan indomptable et irrésistible de nos peuples vers l'indépendance. C'est aussi un signe de l'accélération révolutionnaire de la marche de l'histoire au cours de la deuxième moitié de ce siècle. Dans la tâche qui est la nôtre, unifier notre continent, il nous faut soutenir ce rythme, ou alors nous serons distancés. Cette tâche ne peut être entreprise au rythme d'une autre époque que la nôtre. Si nous ne soutenons pas cette cadence sans précédent, nous allons à notre échec et à notre défaite. C'est un continent entier qui nous a imposé ce mandat impératif — jeter les bases de notre union à cette conférence même ».

Il est naturel qu'à une première rencontre des chefs d'Etat africains les projets proposés par Kwame Nkrumah ne puissent être réalisés. Toutefois, ils ont accompli une double mission : de projeter ce que sera l'Afrique de demain — état à l'échelle continentale — et par les principes maximalistes qu'ils représentaient, ils ont poussé les récalcitrants et ceux qui voulaient procéder beaucoup plus lentement en préférant de soutenir les bases minimalistes de l'unité de signer la Charte. Le président du Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, ancien professeur de théologie, n'est pas un politicien réaliste ou astucieux, c'est un prophète. Le prophète de l'Afrique contemporaine.

La personnalité la plus applaudie de la conférence d'Addis-Abeba avait été le président d'une des plus jeunes républiques africaines, Ahmed Ben Bella de l'Algérie. Les sept ans de la lutte pour l'indépendance et les sacrifices énormes de son peuple ainsi que son propre sort qui le conduisait dans les prisons françaises pendant de longues années, lui ont assuré un respect sans réserve des autres participants et une influence décisive dans les délibérations. Il est vrai que ce passé a naturellement déterminé toute sa conception. Les souvenirs d'une lutte cruelle et dévastatrice pour la liberté sont encore tellement vivants dans son pays qu'il est prédestiné à devenir l'avocat de la cause des mouvements de libération des territoires encore dépendants du continent africain. C'était sa préoccupation majeure durant la réunion d'Addis-Abeba : de créer les bases d'une assistance efficace et soutenue aux peuples encore en lutte pour leur indépendance afin qu'ils puissent obtenir leur libération au plus bref délai.

« Il est de mon devoir de dire, au nom du peuple algérien et au nom d'un million et demie de martyrs tombés au champs d'honneur, que cette charte [La Charte de l'unité africaine] restera lettre morte si nous ne prenons pas des décisions concrètes » — a-t-il déclaré — « si nous ne donnons pas un appui inconditionnel aux peuples de l'Angola, de l'Afrique du Sud, du Mozambique et autres territoires, appui inconditionnel que ces peuples encore sous le joug colonialiste sont en droit d'attendre de nous ».

Il a surtout exhorté les pays limitrophes aux territoires encore dépendants à se mettre au service de la lutte de leurs frères :

« Il faudrait que ces pays périphériques sachent qu'ils ont une rançon à payer à l'unité africaine. Il y a eu une rançon à payer pour la libération de l'Algérie. C'est parce que des frères tunisiens sont morts à Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef, c'est parce que des frères marocains sont morts à Oujda, c'est parce que des frères

égyptiens sont morts à Port-Said et parce que des frères libyens et autres sont tombés, que l'Algérie a été libérée ... Ainsi pour que l'Algérie ait pu devenir un Etat indépendant, des frères africains ont accepté de mourir un peu. Ainsi pour que soient libérés les peuples encore sous domination coloniale, acceptons tous de mourir un peu ou tout à fait, afin que l'unité africaine ne soit pas un vain mot ».

Les paroles du Frère Ben Bella, comme on l'appelle communément, ne restait pas de vains mots. Il a renouvelé l'offre de dix milles volontaires algériens prêts à joindre les forces combattantes du mouvement de libération angolaise et a informé l'assemblée que l'Algérie versera aux fonds d'assistance des peuples en lutte un million de francs français. Plusieurs pays ont suivi son exemple. Il a aussi exercé une pression décisive au cours de la dernière et longue séance de la conférence le samedi, 25 mai, quand il a réussi d'obtenir, par son intervention amère dirigée contre les chefs d'Etat récalcitrants, qu'ils donnent leur appui inconditionnel et total aux mouvements de libération. Contre l'opposition des représentants du Congo Léopoldville, il a obligé les autres Chefs d'Etat d'accepter les clauses de la Charte, concernant l'appui aux mouvements indépendantistes, représentaient le minimum de ses exigences. Dans ce sens, il était le moteur de cette rencontre et symbolisait *l'Afrique révolutionnaire*.

La conférence d'Addis-Abeba s'est terminée officiellement pendant la nuit de samedi à dimanche entre minuit et une heure avec la signature de la Charte de l'unité africaine. Pour la presse internationale la fin véritable a été, toutefois, marquée par une conférence de presse tenue par le président de la Guinée, Sékou Touré, le soir du dimanche, 26 mai. Elle dura trois heures et est devenue à certains moments un dialogue vif entre ce Chef d'Etat jeune et agressif les représentants de la presse internationale.

Sékou Touré a mené ce dialogue avec beaucoup d'assurance et de sérénité, mais n'épargnant pas les journalistes de ses propos directs par lesquels il les a exhorté de soutenir honnêtement et sans réserve la cause de l'unité africaine, en donnant des informations objectives sur les intentions des Chefs d'Etat et se solidarisant avec les efforts de ce continent en tant qu'êtres humains. L'attitude du président guinéen rappela son passé de syndicaliste habitué à de telles confrontations. Toutefois, son rôle à la conférence a démontré qu'en Europe on l'avait trop facilement classé dans la catégorie des leaders syndicalistes arrivés au pouvoir, car à Addis-Abeba il a fait preuve de ses qualités de véritable d'homme d'Etat. Dans son allocution des réflexions philosophiques précédaient ses vues dynamiques sur l'unité africaine. Il a déclaré que

« L'homme, qu'il soit noir, blanc, jaune ou rouge, reste égal de tous les autres hommes, obéissant aux mêmes lois de développement humain et nourrissant les mêmes profondes aspirations à une vie libre et heureuse, à une sécurité et à un développement continu ... Toutes les nations quelles que soient la couleur, la religion de leurs populations, quel que soit le climat du pays qu'elles occupent, quelle que soit l'importance de leur économie, demeurent une partie de l'humanité. Le génie créateur de l'homme, ses facultés de compréhension et ses capacités de réalisation resteront indistinctement répartis entre elles et exercé par chacune d'elles. Or, l'on a voulu convaincre l'humanité de la disqualification naturelle qui marque l'homme d'Afrique et particulièrement l'homme noir ». Sékou Touré considère que l'unité africaine est « un élément indispensable à la qualification humaine de chaque africain et à la promotion politique et économique de chaque nation d'Afrique, car elle servira comme cadre de son épanouissement. C'est 'la communauté de destin' qui oblige les Africains à s'entendre et à comprendre qu'aucune des nations du continent prise isolément ne saurait représenter valablement l'Afrique ni réhabiliter totalement ses peuples. La civilisation africaine, la culture africaine, l'humanisme africain, en un mot la contribution de l'Afrique à la vie de l'humanité requiert de tous les peuples africains leur présence consciente et leur unité d'action sur le chantier de l'édification du bonheur universel ».

Dans ces propos du leader guinéen s'amalgament d'une façon inédite les idées et du libéralisme, et du socialisme européens, et forment la base de son réformisme et de son africanisme. Sékou Touré a avancé une série de propositions concrètes concernant l'assistance aux mouvements de libération africains — par exemple, le versement par tous les Etats indépendants d'un pourcent de leur budget annuel national dans un fonds commun à l'aide de ces mouvements — et a mis un très fort accent sur les solutions envisagées à résoudre le problème du développement économique du continent. Il a surpris par son ton réfléchi et par la mûreté de ses réflexions, et s'est révélé comme *le réformateur militant et dynamique* de l'Afrique.

Un journaliste à Addis-Abeba a très justement remarqué que c'est la conférence du flétrissement des grandes stars politiques de jadis et de la montée de nouvelles étoiles sur la scène africaine. Cette constatation est certainement vraie en ce qui concerne le président du Tanganyika, Julius Nyerere. Non pas, comme s'il n'était pas connu de l'opinion publique africaine et internationale jusqu'à maintenant comme le leader incontestable de son pays le conduisant à l'indépendance, mais dans la vie politique du continent il n'a pas été parmi ceux qui donnaient les idées et l'orientation nécessaire aux autres. Or, à la réunion des Chefs d'Etat il s'est affirmé à l'échelle continentale comme un des dirigeants les plus en vue. Il parlait le dernier à la séance plénière, — avant les séances à huis clos où les Chefs d'Etat ont discuté le projet de la Charte élaboré par les ministres des affaires étrangères, — donc il pouvait dresser un bilan des prises de positions de différents états. « Nous avons trouvé notre dénominateur commun » — a-t-il déclaré — « qui prenait corps dans cette Charte que nous allons discuter » et il a insisté auprès de l'assistance pour que tous les Etats signent ce document fondamental de l'intégration africaine. Le président tanganyikais a reconnu que la Charte ne représente que le premier pas vers l'unité continentale ; toutefois, à l'intention de ceux qui l'avaient critiqué comme n'étant pas assez révolutionnaire dans sa forme proposée, il a cité l'exemple d'un maçon qui commence la construction d'une maison par la pose de la première brique et ne se plaint pas qu'avec cet acte toute l'édifice n'est pas toute de suite prête. « Il faut construire l'unité africaine aussi brique par brique » — avait-il constaté avec la réflexion d'une sagesse séculaire.

Julius Nyerere a, naturellement, soutenu avec force les appels qui demandaient un appui inconditionnel et une assistance satisfaisante aux mouvements de libération et il a lancé le mot d'ordre — à l'exemple de celui du Tanganyika — « liberté dans l'unité et uni dans la liberté » lequel a provoqué des applaudissements nourris de l'audience, surtout, des journalistes et du public présents dans les galeries, et la salle retentissait longuement des cris d'« uhuru, uhuru », l'expression en langue swahéli de la liberté. L'homme d'Etat tanganyikais s'est révélé à Addis-Abeba à tous ceux qui ne le connaissaient pas encore comme un orateur très doué et spirituel, rayonnant la noblesse d'une foi profonde.

« Les ennemies de l'Afrique sont en prière maintenant » — avait-il dit — « il prie pour que cette conférence échoue. Les peuples d'Afrique prient, eux aussi, pour que cette conférence soit un succès, pour que l'idée d'une Charte embrassant tout le continent triomphe sur celle de Monrovia et de Casablanca ou n'importe quelle autre charte régionale ». Et il a terminé son allocution avec les paroles tellement inhabituelles à une réunion politique : « Que Dieu blesse l'Afrique »!

Julius Nyerere incarne *la sagesse profonde et croyante* de l'Afrique.

En Afrique dite au-dessous du Sahara, à n'importe quelle rencontre concernant les problèmes de l'évolution politique ainsi que concernant ceux du développement économique et social, les yeux tournent toujours vers le géant du continent, le Nigeria, en se demandant quelle sera sa position, ou quelles seront ses propositions ? C'était le cas à Addis-Abeba aussi, la tendance nigérienne de forcer les autres d'être pratique et de descendre des nuages sur cette terre très sûre a, certes, beaucoup contribué aux résultats acquis. La voix pondérée du premier ministre Sir Abubakar Tafewa Balewa, a donné un trait très important et valable aux délibérations. Il a clairement indiqué que son pays « appuie l'approche qui tend à réaliser l'unité du continent africain d'une manière pratique », mais il a aussi souligné avec force que cette unité projetée ne peut reposer que sur le respect mutuel des états africains existants, soient-ils grand ou petit. Cette affirmation faite par le premier ministre du géant d'Afrique qu'est le Nigeria, a pris une valeur exceptionnelle et apaisa certainement l'inquiétude de beaucoup de pays — en comparaison très petits. En citant un proverbe nigérien — « La vérité est amère » — Sir Tafewa Balewa a évoqué avec une grande franchise le fait que plusieurs pays africains soutiennent des activités subversives dans d'autres pays frères du continent, et il a posé la question : comment peut-on lancer l'unité africaine si ces activités seront continuées, si les Etats ne renoncent pas d'intervenir dans les affaires intérieures des autres ?

Dans le même ordre d'idées l'homme d'Etat nigérien a, en outre, aussi condamné les tendances qui se manifestent et qui visent à imposer la suprématie d'un pays africain à un autre. En parlant de l'aide qui doit être fournie aux mouvements de libération et de l'accélération du processus de la décolonisation auxquelles

il a souscrit au nom de son peuple sans condition, il a observé qu'en donnant assistance à un pays qui lutte pour son indépendance :

« Certains de nous ont l'habitude de lui imposer des obligations. C'est faux. Si nous donnons de l'assistance à un peuple africain de n'importe quel territoire dépendant, nous ne devons pas demander une contrepartie de leur part ; car, ceci représentera alors le cas évoqué par nombreux orateurs, c'est-à-dire que l'aide étrangère ne peut être acceptée que si elle est inconditionnelle. Je ne crois pas que n'importe quelle aide, d'où elle vient, peut être inconditionnelle ... Si nous avons l'intention de créer une solidarité africaine, il est extrêmement important que nous garantissons que toutes les formes de l'assistance doivent être libre sans engagements imposés ».

Ce ton sincère et s'attaquant à des problèmes vitaux pour le continent du point de vue de son unification, n'a pas été des plus populaires à la conférence et, surtout, parmi les gens plutôt excités que raisonnés des galeries, mais il a certainement contribué à l'équilibre des délibérations et à l'atmosphère sereine de la rencontre. La sincérité de Sir Abubakr Tafewa Balewa a aussi étonné quand il a parlé de ses conceptions de l'Afrique et de l'Africain dans la communauté humaine. Il a déclaré :

« J'ai toujours dit à tout le monde que je ne crois pas en la personnalité africaine, mais en la personnalité humaine. L'Africain est un être humain et, pour cela, nous devons chercher l'épanouissement de la personnalité humaine en Afrique. Je crois que tout ce qui est dit sur la personnalité africaine se base à un complexe d'infériorité. Je ne considère aucun autre être humain — soit-il rouge, blanc, brun, jaune ou vert — comme supérieur de moi. Je me considère comme égal à n'importe qui. Je suis un être humain ».

Cette confession de l'humanisme africain intégral montre la hauteur des vues de cet homme maigre, tranquille et silencieux, mais énergique si nécessaire, qu'est le premier nigérien. Quelquefois, peut-être, il choque les Africains eux-mêmes avec son humanisme sans réserve, surtout ceux suivent les traces des prophètes de la négritude, comme Léopold Sedar Senghor et les autres qui affirment l'autonomie et les valeurs particulières de la personnalité africaine. En tous cas, dans la mosaïque africaine, Sir Abubakr Tafewa Balewa symbolise *l'humanisme intégral* du continent en même temps il représente le *politicien pratique* à l'anglo-saxon.

L'Afrique a commencé à peine de dévoiler toutes ses richesses, toutes ses couleurs et les multiples aspects de la vie de ce continent, jusqu'ici tellement méconnu, qui se dégagent lentement dans la vie politique, économique et sociale de ses différents pays ainsi que dans les relations interafricaines. Il est impossible d'en broser un tableau complet, mais — peut-être —avons-nous réussi à faire comprendre le degré de sa diversité surprenante par l'esquisse du rôle joué par quelques-uns de ses plus grands représentants à la conférence au sommet d'Addis-Abeba.

LA POLITIQUE SOVIETIQUE AU MOYEN-ORIENT*

Mesdames, Mesdemoiselles, Messieurs,

Le sujet de nos préoccupations communes aujourd'hui est « La politique soviétique au Moyen-Orient ». Ce sujet me paraît si vaste que je dois — comme tous les conférenciers — commencer par fixer les limites de mon exposé dans le temps et dans l'espace.

La politique soviétique vis à vis des pays arabes et, plus précisément, des pays du Moyen-Orient a une longue histoire. Après les efforts bien connus de Lénine et de ses contemporains pour engendrer la révolution parmi les travailleurs de l'Orient, — je pense en particulier à des occasions comme celles du Congrès organisé à Bakou en 1920 pour ces travailleurs, — il y a encore un domaine important qui, lui, est tout à fait ignoré, c'est celui des relations des Soviets avec les syndicats d'Extrême-Orient et avec les mouvements d'indépendance des pays colonisés. Théoriquement, le marxisme-léninisme a toujours reconnu et souligné l'importance d'une éventuelle explosion révolutionnaire dans les colonies et a prôné les efforts visant à encadrer par les mouvements ouvriers du monde capitaliste, l'avant-garde du mouvement révolutionnaire mondial.

Notre but n'est pas de passer en revue ici, même de façon fragmentaire, la politique soviétique face aux peuples colonisés, à leur réveil nationaliste et à leur lutte pour l'émancipation ; nous ne tenterons pas non plus d'esquisser l'attitude soviétique à l'époque stalinienne ni d'énumérer les diverses étapes de l'activité du Kominform. Nous nous proposons maintenant d'examiner le chapitre le plus récent et aussi le plus passionnant de l'histoire soviétique : la politique à l'heure de Khrouchtchev, à partir de la mort de Staline et plus particulièrement depuis le XX^e Congrès du Parti Communiste russe.

Ayant défini notre sujet dans le temps : « Politique soviétique à l'heure de Khrouchtchev », il nous faut le limiter dans l'espace.

Ainsi que l'indique le titre, nous voulons traiter de l'action soviétique au Moyen-Orient. Or la définition de cet espace géographique est tout à fait fluide. Je crois que nous devons donc convenir de comprendre sous le terme du Moyen-Orient, la région qui s'étend de la Turquie à l'extrémité sud de la Péninsule Arabique et de l'Iran jusqu'aux côtes méditerranéennes du Levant et de l'Egypte. Quoique cette dernière se situe déjà en Afrique du Nord, historiquement, politiquement, économiquement, culturellement, elle appartient plutôt à la région que j'ai définie tout à l'heure. L'Egypte a en effet une situation-clef entre l'Asie et l'Afrique ; ses dirigeants actuels en sont pleinement conscients, mais de notre point de vue, cet aspect de sa situation n'est pas d'une importance primordiale.

* Conférence donnée à l'Institut de Hautes Etudes Internationales de Genève au cours de l'année 1966.

1. LES LEÇONS D'APRES-GUERRE

C'est une des traditions politiques séculaires de la Russie tsariste que de s'être toujours efforcée de gagner les mers chaudes, en renforçant son influence dans les pays limitrophes comme la Turquie ou l'Afghanistan, d'abord, puis dans les pays arabes. Cette poussée vers le Sud, vers la Méditerranée, a toujours effrayé les puissances de l'Europe Occidentale, surtout la Grande-Bretagne. Il suffit de se souvenir de la rivalité russo-britannique en Afghanistan tout au long du XIX^e siècle, et de l'habileté de la diplomatie britannique qui a toujours réussi à barrer la route à l'expansion russe dans les pays du Levant.

On connaît bien la longue histoire de la lutte pour les sphères d'influence, mais — sous l'effet de l'idéologie marxiste-léniniste et des rêveries socialistes du siècle passé — on a trop souvent oublié que les données géographiques, démographiques et économiques demeurent et qu'après avoir été à la base de la politique expansionniste de la Russie tsariste, elles restent l'un des éléments essentiels de la politique de l'Etat des Soviets. Sous le couvert idéologique, sous des formes diverses, l'URSS a suivi et continue à suivre la ligne traditionnelle de la politique russe. Cette ligne est définie par des éléments objectifs et cherche à s'établir dans la région des mers chaudes. La seule différence que l'on trouve entre l'ancienne et la nouvelle formule de cette même orientation politique, c'est que la nouvelle a eu beaucoup plus de succès que l'ancienne.

Cette première considération que je vous sou mets tend donc à dissiper le mythe créé autour des intentions de la politique soviétique, mythe qui veut que l'Union Soviétique intervienne dans les affaires du Moyen-Orient — comme d'ailleurs n'importe où dans le Tiers Monde — dans le seul intérêt des pays colonisés ou nouvellement indépendants pour soutenir leur lutte contre l'impérialisme, appuyer leurs mouvements de libération nationale, et les aider à acquérir l'indépendance économique après l'indépendance politique.

Une étude sérieuse démontre la naïveté et le caractère propagandiste de ce mythe. Certes, l'Union Soviétique peut parfois se présenter comme champion de la libération nationale et de l'indépendance économique des pays du Tiers Monde, car ses intérêts tactiques sont identiques à ceux des peuples en question. Mais cette coïncidence ne peut être que provisoire, car les politiques des divers pays définies par des réalités différentes. Les fautes commises par les adversaires de l'Union Soviétique — les puissances occidentales — contribuent en outre à confirmer cette apparence d'identité entre les intérêts de l'Etat communiste et les pays anciennement colonisés. L'étude de la politique soviétique au Moyen-Orient est particulièrement révélatrice à ce sujet. Elle nous montre clairement que cette politique ne doit pas être jugée selon les apparences mais selon les intentions. Elle nous prouve que c'est son statut de grande puissance mondiale et les objectifs qui en découlent qui dominent toutes les initiatives politiques de l'Union Soviétique.

C'est après la deuxième guerre mondiale, dans l'affaire de l'Iran, que l'intérêt soviétique pour le Moyen-Orient s'est manifesté clairement. Selon l'accord tripartite passé le 29 janvier 1942, entre les Etats-Unis, la Grande-Bretagne et l'URSS, l'Iran était sous le contrôle des Alliés, mais devait être évacué par toutes les forces étrangères dans les six mois suivant l'armistice avec l'Allemagne et ses alliés. Cependant, les troupes russes ne quittèrent pas le Nord de l'Iran à l'échéance prévue et établirent sous leur contrôle, deux républiques indépendantes : la république autonome de l'Azerbaïdjan et la république de Maharabad. Le gouvernement iranien, alors présidé par le Premier Ministre Qavam, joua un jeu extrêmement nuancé et habile. L'affaire fut portée devant le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies en hiver 1946-1947. Devant l'attitude ferme du gouvernement iranien et des Alliés occidentaux, l'URSS dût reculer et peu à peu retirer ses troupes, perdant même les avantages économiques qu'elle avait obtenu auparavant par des accords bilatéraux conclus avec le gouvernement iranien.

Les résultats de l'aventure turque furent similaires. Pendant que les Alliés poursuivaient leur lutte contre le Japon, le gouvernement soviétique avait en 1945 exigé de la Turquie, la cession des provinces de Kars et d'Ardahan ainsi que la permission d'établir des bases russes dans les Détroits. La Turquie résista et à la Conférence de Postdam on ne parla pas de ces exigences. Ce sont donc là deux échecs indéniables de la diplomatie soviétique.

A ces deux échecs s'ajouta, durant l'ère stalinienne, le problème particulièrement embarrassant de la Palestine. Je ne rappellerai pas ici tous les détails de la cession du mandat britannique en Palestine, de la guerre arabo-israélienne et de l'établissement de l'Etat d'Israël. Je veux seulement attirer votre attention sur la position particulièrement délicate de l'Union Soviétique dans la discussion du Conseil de Sécurité sur le problème de la partition de la Palestine. En effet, les soviétiques devaient se prononcer dans une querelle qui ne relevait absolument pas des principes énoncés par l'infailible idéologie puisque les deux parties — juifs et arabes — étaient toutes deux des minorités opprimées et toutes deux soutenues auparavant par les Soviétiques, le choix était donc extrêmement difficile. Les idéaux dits sionistes se retrouvaient dans les théories et l'idéologie de l'Union Soviétique et influençaient une grande partie des politiciens de l'époque stalinienne. Aussi n'était-il pas possible pour l'URSS de se séparer des principes de la déclaration Balfour et de décevoir les espérances séculaires d'une minorité opprimée. La décision fut donc prise : vote pour le plan de partition préparé par les occidentaux. Les Partis Communistes locaux se trouvèrent alors devant un cruel dilemme : ou s'opposer à la décision de Moscou, défiant ainsi les seules autorités du communisme mondial en prenant partie pour le nationalisme intransigeant arabes ; ou respecter les directives émanant du centre en risquant de perdre leur base populaire et de devenir les ennemis des idéaux du nationalisme arabe. Les partis — selon les témoignages et les documents que j'ai pu recueillir au cours de mon récent voyage au Moyen-Orient — se sont définitivement alignés sur les ordres de Moscou. En Jordanie par exemple, on a même publié des brochures d'inspiration communiste qui appelaient les membres du Parti à la lutte contre les nationalistes arabes, opposés à la partition.

Les deux cas d'intervention directe de l'Union Soviétique en Iran et en Turquie, ainsi que la position délicate des communistes et de la politique officielle soviétique dans le cas de la Palestine, ont amené Staline, pendant les dernières années de son règne, à se désintéresser des problèmes du Moyen-Orient et à se concentrer sur les questions européennes. D'autre part, ces échecs essuyés par l'Union Soviétique ont entamé une évolution, un changement d'attitude parmi les hauts fonctionnaires du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de l'URSS, qui, déjà à l'époque du vieux dictateur, envisageaient la recherche d'une nouvelle orientation plus apte à gagner les peuples du Moyen-Orient et, surtout, les Arabes. L'importance de ces leçons tirées entre 1945 et 1954 a été amplement soulignée par le Colonel Wheeler, Directeur du Central Asian Research Center à Londres, qui fut l'un des inspirateurs de mes recherches.

2. LES OBJECTIFS

Il s'agit pour l'Union Soviétique de préparer cette région à la révolution communiste ; ce but lointain doit toutefois s'effacer devant des objectifs plus immédiats, objectifs proprement politiques qui relèvent du domaine du possible.

A côté des leçons d'après-guerre qui ont sûrement poussé les dirigeants soviétiques à rechercher de nouvelles formules, d'autres événements ont influencé l'attitude russe au Moyen-Orient. Nous pouvons énumérer ici : la rivalité des puissances occidentales et des intérêts du monde dit capitaliste — je pense, par exemple, au conflit autour de l'oasis de Buraimi — les fautes commises par ces mêmes puissances vis à vis du nationalisme arabe toujours en progrès, et surtout leur position ambiguë dans l'affaire de Palestine, ou la Conférence de Bandoeng établissant un front commun des pays nouvellement indépendants d'Asie et d'Afrique. Mais je crois que ce qui a le plus contribué à la formation de la nouvelle politique khrouchtchévienne, ce furent les plans de défense successifs proposés par les pays occidentaux aux pays du Moyen-Orient, plans qui touchaient directement aux intérêts stratégiques de l'Union Soviétique ainsi que la réponse que fit à l'Occident le Président Gamal Abdel Nasser, le neutralisme positif, seule adaptée aux besoins psychologiques de la région.

Cependant, au cours des années 1953-1954, la politique soviétique n'était pas encore très claire. Le gouvernement soviétique hésita assez longtemps entre les différentes possibilités qui s'offraient à lui. On le voit même, en 1954, amorcer un rapprochement à la Turquie ce qui est en contradiction évidente avec son attitude conciliante envers le nationalisme des pays arabes de la région. Cette hésitation est particulièrement marquée en ce qui concerne l'évaluation du nouveau régime égyptien instauré par la révolution de 1952. Tout d'abord les

soviétiques sympathisèrent plutôt avec le général Néguib et considérèrent très longtemps Nasser comme un dictateur fasciste et son régime comme un régime militaire, rétrograde, oppresseur, et, surtout, après la conclusion d'un accord sur le Canal de Suez avec la Grande-Bretagne et la solution du problème soudanais en commun avec les britanniques. Le tournant de leur politique est intervenu lors de l'achat des armes tchèques par l'Egypte en septembre 1955. Les dirigeants soviétiques furent alors définitivement rassurés sur l'orientation que prenait le pays le plus en vue de la région et purent se féliciter de l'identité des objectifs de leur politique avec ceux de la politique nassérienne, identité consacrée par le neutralisme. Ils ne manquèrent pas cette occasion de mettre en application la nouvelle approche soviétique en amorçant l'évolution qui a complètement bouleversé la situation politique du Moyen-Orient.

Naturellement, les soviétiques n'ont jamais reconnu d'avoir des intérêts vitaux dans cette région. En d'innombrables occasions, les dirigeants de Moscou ont nié les prétentions de leurs adversaires en ce qui concerne l'intérêt primordial de l'Union Soviétique au Moyen-Orient. Khrouchtchev, dans un discours prononcé le 30 avril 1958 à Moscou, au déjeuner donné en l'honneur de son invité Gamal Abdel Nasser, a dressé la façade de leur politique, de la façon suivante :

« Notre politique étrangère est désintéressée. Elle doit apparaître ainsi clairement. Ce n'est pas une politique contemplative, mais une politique active, en lutte contre les forces mauvaises, les forces agressives, monopolistiques et coloniales qui n'ont pas renoncé à perpétrer l'esclavage colonial, à continuer de piller et d'exploiter les peuples d'Asie et d'Afrique ... Déformant grossièrement notre politique de paix, les cercles impérialistes s'élèvent contre les intérêts 'particuliers' de l'Union Soviétique dans cette région. Nous démentons avec indignation ces assertions entièrement fausses. Notre aide désintéressée aux pays du Moyen-Orient n'a jamais été conçue dans des buts égoïstes. Les conceptions et les méthodes des colonialistes qui sont convaincus que s'ils n'oppriment pas telle ou telle nation d'autres s'en chargeront, sont tout à fait étrangères à l'Etat socialiste des Soviets ».

Khrouchtchev précise aussi ce qu'il entend par désintéressement dans une interview donnée à feu Aneurin Bevan. Selon lui — et cette constatation nous paraît sincère — l'Union Soviétique n'a pas besoin du pétrole Moyen-Orient. Cependant il ne parle pas de l'intérêt que porte et que doit porter l'URSS à la question suivante : Qui exploite et qui reçoit le pétrole dans cette région ? Le renforcement du potentiel occidental par les ressources des pays arabes — surtout avant l'ère des armements nucléaires — ne pouvait laisser indifférent l'adversaire des puissances de l'OTAN. Elle pouvait en tous cas utiliser le problème de l'exploitation pétrolière comme une arme puissante de propagande.

En résumé, les objectifs poursuivis par l'Union Soviétique à l'heure de Khrouchtchev au Moyen-Orient sont les suivants :

- (a) Ecarter définitivement les puissances occidentales de la région ;
- (b) Empêcher les pactes défensifs ou les alliances inspirées par ses antagonistes ;
- (c) Maintenir le statu quo territorial entre les Etats indépendants ;
- (d) Renforcer les tendances socialisantes, et, parallèlement,
- (e) Affirmer sa présence et ses intérêts dans la région.

On peut dire que l'Union Soviétique essaie d'accélérer l'évolution qui mène au vacuum — théorie à juste titre réprouvée par les Arabes qui se sentent traités en objet sans voix au chapitre pour décider de leur propre avenir. Parallèlement, elle affirme sa présence dans la région pour pouvoir remplir peu à peu ce vacuum, créé par le recul des puissances occidentales.

D'aucuns diront que le maintien du *statu quo* territorial est sans importance pour la politique soviétique qui se soucie peu qu'un de ces Etats en annexe un autre ou que les frontières tracées pendant l'ère coloniale soient révisées. A cet égard, je démontrerai le contraire dans la seconde partie de mon exposé que l'URSS ne

soutiendra pas éternellement les régimes actuels des pays du Moyen-Orient qui sont de caractère « bourgeois ». En tous cas, elle ne peut rester indifférente devant une unification territoriale qui accroîtrait de façon sensible l'influence de l'un ou l'autre de ces Etats. Le morcellement actuel dans la région convient mieux à la politique soviétique qu'une forte organisation régionale sous n'importe quelle forme.

L'intérêt que porte l'Union Soviétique à l'évolution de la République Arabe Unie vers un capitalisme d'Etat se dégage clairement d'une étude des opinions exprimées par les spécialistes soviétiques du Moyen-Orient. L. N. Vatoline, en particulier, analyse, de ce point de vue, l'évolution égyptienne dans ses articles publiés dans la revue *Sovremennyy Vostok*. Le développement du capitalisme d'Etat est considéré comme un phénomène de caractère « progressif » car, d'une part, il affaiblit la position du capital étranger dans ces pays, et d'autre part, par la planification poussée qu'il implique, il sert les intérêts de tout le peuple égyptien et non pas seulement les intérêts de la bourgeoisie nationale qui est au pouvoir. Les grands projets d'industrialisation qui sont entrain de se réaliser dans cet esprit progressif, assureront le cadre nécessaire à l'accroissement du prolétariat très peu nombreux actuellement, ce qui, à longue échéance, conduira à une transformation socialiste de l'économie, c'est à dire à la victoire de la révolution.

Pour atteindre les objectifs ainsi définis, Khrouchtchev a donc rompu avec les traditions molotoviennes d'après-guerre. L'Union Soviétique est entrée dans l'arène du Moyen-Orient. Cette nouvelle orientation khrouchtchéviennne s'est amorcée sur trois plans différents : idéologique, politique et économique. Je suivrai donc dans mon exposé cette triple structure, en essayant d'esquisser tout d'abord :

3. LA « NOUVELLE APPROCHE » IDEOLOGIQUE

Selon la conception orthodoxe, c'est à dire l'interprétation stalinienne du marxisme-léninisme, les mouvements de libération nationale dans les pays coloniaux ne peuvent être dirigés que par la classe ouvrière et son avant-garde, le Parti communiste. Les perspectives de leur développement sont définies par la situation internationale, c'est-à-dire la division du monde en deux camps, le camp de la démocratie et le camp de l'impérialisme. Cette situation tend à accentuer la lutte des classes, non seulement dans les pays d'Europe et d'Amérique, mais également dans les pays coloniaux et dépendants de métropoles où se développe une opposition nette et sans équivoque des forces sociales. Ye. Zhukov, dans un article publié en 1949 dans *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, analysait les problèmes de la lutte nationale coloniale après la deuxième guerre mondiale et définissait le rôle de la bourgeoisie de la façon suivante :

« L'Impérialisme s'appuie de plus en plus sur la grande bourgeoisie des colonies et semi colonies, en plus des éléments féodaux et des propriétaires terriens. Epouvantée par la lutte des peuples pour la libération nationale, lutte qui atteint actuellement une phase particulièrement aigue sous le leadership de la classe ouvrière, la grande bourgeoisie de ces pays, face à l'activité révolutionnaire croissante des larges masses ouvrières passe maintenant de façon décisive dans le camp de la réaction impérialiste, trahissant ainsi les intérêts de ces pays et de ces peuples ... La propagande bourgeoise nationaliste joue un rôle essentiel dans l'accomplissement des plans rapaces des impérialistes. Elle s'acharne à désunir les peuples des colonies et semi colonies dans l'intérêt de l'impérialisme. Elle s'adjuge également la tâche de neutraliser le mouvement de libération nationale, le guidant sur le chemin d'un faux nationalisme sous le leadership de la bourgeoisie réactionnaire et des nationalistes réformistes qui détournent les masses des méthodes et des objectifs révolutionnaires de la lutte ... Le nationalisme bourgeois vise plus spécialement à empêcher les mouvements de libération nationale des pays coloniaux et semi coloniaux de s'aligner sur le camp anti-impérialiste et démocratique ; ainsi le nationalisme bourgeois est l'arme idéologique la plus importante qu'utilise le bloc agressif anglo-américain en vue de renforcer le système colonial bouleversé de l'impérialisme. C'est pourquoi une présentation impitoyable de l'idéologie de la bourgeoisie nationaliste et réactionnaire sous ses diverses formes — Kémalisme ou Ghandisme, Sionisme ou Panarabisme — contribue à accélérer le processus de libération nationale et sociale des peuples coloniaux et dépendants et à faire échouer les desseins de provocation des impérialistes et de leurs agents ».

Zhukov ne voit donc qu'une forme possible d'organisation étatique et sociale dans les pays coloniaux pendant la période transitoire qui relie l'époque capitaliste à l'époque socialiste et c'est la forme des démocraties populaires. Elle assurera l'exécution des réformes démocratiques bourgeoises — réforme essentielle au premier stade de la transformation des structures sociales (par exemple la réforme agraire), ainsi que les réformes démocratiques. Ainsi, par stades successifs de développement, la révolution démocratique des pays coloniaux se transformera en une révolution socialiste.

A partir de 1950-1951, et contrairement à la conception traditionnelle marxiste-léniniste, une nouvelle approche du problème se fait sentir dans les écrits et les déclarations soviétiques. Ces nouvelles idées indiquent un changement dans l'orientation politique du régime et constituent la preuve la plus convaincante de la thèse selon laquelle ce n'est pas l'idéologie qui prévaut, mais les réalités d'aujourd'hui, réalités évidemment imprévisibles il y a une dizaine d'années ; les impératifs découlant de la situation géographique et économique de l'Union Soviétique, de sa position en tant que grande puissance, prévalent par rapport aux exigences d'une théorie préfabriquée. L'application de cette nouvelle approche entraîne nécessairement un changement d'équipe politique et, éventuellement, du leader unique. C'est ce qui s'est passé en Union Soviétique à la mort de Staline, l'ère khrouchtchévienne a vu donc s'affirmer la nouvelle tendance ; toutefois, la majorité des théoriciens est restée la même. Ces volte-face sont assez fréquentes dans le monde communiste, mais il est pour le moins surprenant de les voir révélées de façon aussi manifeste.

Ce même académicien, Zhukov, que j'ai cité comme autorité sur le point de vue orthodoxe soviétique, a joué un rôle considérable dans la mise en place des bases théoriques de la nouvelle approche. La justification marxiste-léniniste d'un rapprochement soviétique des pays « capitalistes » ou « bourgeois » du Tiers-monde a été pour la première fois formulée par Khrouchtchev au XX^e Congrès du Parti Communiste Soviétique en 1956. Il a donné à cette occasion, une confirmation officielle et formelle aux ajustements nécessaires de la politique du Parti. Zhukov, quatre ans et demie plus tard, le 26 août 1960, publia un article dans la *Pravda* qui passait en revue toutes les expériences faites au cours des années écoulées depuis les premiers signes du changement d'attitude soviétique à l'égard de la bourgeoisie des pays en voie de développement.

Le XX^e ainsi que le XXI^e Congrès du Parti Communiste Soviétique, ont souligné l'importance de la thèse léniniste sur la coexistence pacifique avec des pays dotés de systèmes économique et social différents et ont promis l'appui total de l'URSS pour la lutte des peuples contre le colonialisme. En outre, et c'est là le grand changement, les deux Congrès ont rejeté certaines notions dogmatiques telles que celle qui prétend que, et je cite Zhukov :

« La bourgeoisie nationale des pays coloniaux et dépendants s'est toujours et partout transformée en une force réactionnaire, incapable de participer à la lutte anti-impérialiste ni même de la diriger ... Seuls les petits bourgeois gauchisants et dogmatistes sans espoir » — continue-t-il — « peuvent nier l'énorme signification historique de la formation d'Etats nationaux en Asie et en Afrique, même si plusieurs de ces Etats n'ont pas encore acquis l'indépendance économique et ne peuvent pas encore résoudre les urgents problèmes sociaux qui sont le corollaire de la vie... Il est vrai » — devait-il reconnaître — « que la majorité des pays d'Asie et d'Afrique a un régime nationaliste dirigé par des bourgeois. Cependant, cela ne diminue en rien l'importance de la percée du front impérialiste ». D'ailleurs, écrit-il, Lénine lui-même considérait comme naturel « qu'au début de tout mouvement national la bourgeoisie prenne le leadership », et ceci en dépit du fait que la classe ouvrière est l'ennemi le plus intransigeant de l'impérialisme. « Les doctrinaires et les 'gauchisants' qui se permettent de se moquer des diverses formes que peuvent prendre les mouvements de libération nationale, qui ne s'accordent pas toujours avec les schémas sociologiques habituels, oublient que les développements révolutionnaires 'purs' n'existent pas dans la nature. Il est tout à fait naturel que dans un mouvement anti-impérialiste de libération, le front des participants soit beaucoup plus large que dans une révolution sociale ... Ne pas comprendre cette multiplicité, affecté une attitude hautaine, académique faces aux actions anti-impérialistes quand, dans des conditions historiques déterminées, des éléments non-prolétariens occupent le premier plan, représente un sectarisme du type le plus dangereux qui conduit à un complet isolement ».

Selon cette nouvelle orientation de la pensée soviétique il est impossible de se refuser à reconnaître que les différents pays sont à un stade différent de développement ainsi que de vouloir leur faire sauter tout un stade historique. De ce fait, la transformation socialiste ne peut pas être appliquée de façon mécanique et simultanée à tous les pays. Dans la plupart des pays sous-développés, les paysans forment la majorité de la population ; la tâche principale sera donc pendant longtemps de lutter contre le féodalisme et non contre le capital. Ainsi, pendant une longue période, une coopération entre ouvriers, paysans, intelligentsia et bourgeoisie progressive, sera nécessaire.

Les tâches des forces nationalistes unifiées incluront à ce stade de développement, la réforme agraire, la création d'une industrie nationale, l'abrogation des anciens accords d'asservissement et une politique étrangère de paix et de non-engagement dans les blocs militaires.

On reconnaît donc que le marxisme-léninisme condamne résolument, comme une utopie réactionnaire, la prétendue possibilité de l'exportation de la révolution dans les autres pays, et on rejette l'imposition à d'autres pays tout système social et de toutes institutions qui n'étaient pas conformes au développement interne de ces derniers.

La question de la transition sur la voie non— capitaliste de développement n'est tout de même pas renvoyée de façon indéfinie. Après la solution des grands problèmes nationaux, les dissensions sociales se manifesteront, la lutte entre le capital et les travailleurs commencera et il y aura — selon l'expression de Khrouchtchev — « des opinions différentes sur les méthodes de développement ultérieur de ces Etats ».

Une évolution analogue de la pensée se dégage chez tous les spécialistes des questions des pays d'Asie ou d'Afrique comme, par exemple, dans les écrits de Vatolina et mêmes dans les déclarations des leaders communistes locaux, comme Khaled Begdash, Secrétaire Général du Parti Communiste syro-libanais. Le point culminant de cette évolution idéologique a été atteint à la Conférence des Quatre-vingt-et-un Partis Communistes à Moscou, en novembre-décembre 1960 dont la déclaration finale proclame la doctrine des démocraties nationales, démocraties revêtant les caractéristiques déjà décrites et assumant les tâches indiquées tout à l'heure.

La théorie a donc été diversifiée sous l'impulsion des faits et des développements récents du monde actuel, l'atténuation de l'antagonisme absolu des classes, au prix de l'accentuation des contradictions internes présentes du marxisme-léninisme.

4. LA NOUVELLE APPROCHE POLITIQUE

C'est sur ce fonds idéologique transformé que s'est dessinée la politique soviétique au Moyen-Orient. Je vais maintenant souligner certaines de ses caractéristiques :

(a) *Reconnaissance des régimes féodaux ou bourgeois quand ils sont anti-impérialistes :*

Ce n'est pas une chose tout à fait neuve dans la pratique soviétique. Déjà à l'époque stalinienne, l'URSS appuyait le Yémen et elle fut la première à reconnaître le nouveau royaume d'Arabie Séoudite. Pendant la guerre, l'attitude de ce pays fit l'objet de critiques parce qu'il sympathisait avec les puissances de l'Axe et cette opinion persista jusqu'à l'époque khrouchtchévienne. Depuis, le Yémen bénéficie de la faveur et de l'appui de l'URSS ; les deux pays ont signé le 31 octobre 1955 un nouveau traité d'amitié et en 1956 un accord économique. Les expressions dont on taxait auparavant « la clique dominante et féodale » du Yémen ont disparu pour laisser place à la déférence dont doit jouir normalement une famille régnante. On ne parle plus des sentiments anti-féodaux du peuple ni de mouvements démocratiques par considération pour la sensibilité de l'Iman et de son entourage. La position officielle consiste simplement à constater que le Yémen est un pays effectivement arriéré et qu'il est nécessaire de le soutenir puisqu'il appartient au front anti-impérialiste.

(b) *Appui à la politique du neutralisme positif :*

Cette tendance qui s'est fait jour depuis 1955 et qui fut inaugurée par le Président Gamal Abdel Nasser, rencontre l'appui total des Soviétiques. Elle répond aux besoins les plus impérieux des dirigeants de Moscou au Moyen-Orient. En écartant toute ingérence politique des grandes puissances dans les affaires intérieures de la région, elle a dissipé leurs craintes et rassuré les intérêts stratégiques de l'URSS. Cette dernière, en effet, considère qu'il est d'une importance vitale pour sa propre défense que cette région demeure dans une stricte neutralité et elle a mis tout en œuvre pour empêcher la formation de pactes ou d'alliances qui auraient pu constituer une menace pour elle. Ainsi, l'Union Soviétique n'a pas imposé sa présence stratégique au Moyen-Orient, mais elle s'est contentée d'en écarter les autres puissances, espérant remplir le vide ainsi créé par une pénétration essentiellement économique. Elle a parfaitement compris les besoins psychologiques des pays indépendants de la région et a identifié ses propres intérêts aux leurs.

Le neutralisme n'a en effet rien de commun avec les visées suprêmes de la politique soviétique. Il est à la fois une négation et une affirmation : négation d'une situation mondiale polarisée créée sans le concours des pays neufs ; affirmation de leur capacité et de leur volonté de se constituer en une troisième force et de contribuer activement à la construction de l'avenir. Les chances de succès de cette entreprise sont encore imprévisibles. Nous voulons toutefois affirmer que ces tactiques et ces buts sont identiques à ceux de la politique soviétique dans cette région. Grâce à cette identité, les Soviétiques, faisant face aux divers plans de défense communs proposés par les Occidentaux, et je pense particulièrement au Pacte de Bagdad, ou à des actes unilatéraux comme la doctrine Eisenhower, n'ont qu'à soutenir les protestations et l'opposition des pays moyen-orientaux, et condamner avec eux ceux qui se sont joints à de tels pactes ou à de telles doctrines.

De toutes manières, la prise de position des pays de cette région vis-à-vis de ces tentatives occidentales a toujours été le point crucial de la politique soviétique quant à sa propre attitude à l'égard de ces pays. Ce n'est qu'après la signature du traité turco-pakistanaï auquel l'Iraq de Nouri Saïd est adhérent, que l'URSS a attaqué ce pays avec autant de résolution et de fermeté, tant sur le plan diplomatique que sur le plan de la propagande. Jusqu'en 1954, son attitude vis-à-vis de la Turquie n'a pas été non plus très déterminée, mais ce sont dans ses relations avec l'Egypte révolutionnaire qu'on retrouve ses plus grandes hésitations. En effet, à l'époque de la signature du traité anglo-égyptien sur le Canal de Suez et le Soudan, l'Egypte était considérée comme l'ennemi numéro un des intérêts des peuples au Moyen-Orient. Mais, à partir de son opposition aux projets occidentaux et, surtout, au Pacte de Bagdad, elle est devenue le « bastion de la lutte contre l'impérialisme ».

(c) *Soutien déclaré au nationalisme arabe :*

Il nous faut, tout d'abord, préciser que le terme « nationalisme arabe » n'est pas souvent utilisé dans les déclarations officielles, les études ou les articles de presse soviétiques. On préfère en général parler du mouvement de la libération nationale des peuples arabes. Quand on parle de l'unité arabe, cette expression a, elle aussi, une signification particulière. Elle ne couvre pas l'idée de l'unification arabe en général, mais l'unité des Arabes dans leur lutte contre l'impérialisme. Une définition parallèle nous donne le sens qu'attribuent les Soviétiques au nationalisme arabe : ils le conçoivent en opposition aux puissances occidentales, aux plans de défense communs qu'elles proposent, en un mot, en fonction de leur propre intérêt tactique.

Théoriquement, il a toujours été à la mode en URSS de soutenir les mouvements nationalistes des peuples coloniaux. Pratiquement, à part quelques aventures mal réussies, jamais cette intention ne s'est concrétisée avant la deuxième guerre mondiale. Depuis, la situation a beaucoup changé, surtout après la Conférence de Bandoeng qui a marqué la prise de conscience définitive du Tiers Monde. Le Communiqué final dit clairement : « La Conférence déclare d'un commun accord que le colonialisme sous toutes ses formes est mauvais et que l'on doit y mettre fin le plus vite possible ». C'est le point souligné par tous les théoriciens praticiens soviétiques : ils définissent donc le nationalisme du Tiers Monde par sa contradiction aux puissances coloniales, adversaires en même temps de l'URSS, et, en conséquence, ils donnent un appui politique total au nationalisme intransigeant ainsi interprété.

En pratique, cela se traduit au Moyen-Orient, tout d'abord, par le soutien marqué donné au nationalisme arabe dans le processus de décolonisation. Je me réfère entre autres, au complexe problème d'Arabie du Sud, d'Aden ou à l'affaire de l'oasis de Buraimi : dans tous ces cas, les intérêts économiques opposent en un conflit permanent quelques chefs d'Etat locaux et, à travers eux, certaines puissances occidentales. Ici, la position soviétique, exprimée au cours des débats des Nations Unies sur Buraimi ainsi que dans la propagande dirigée vers Aden et ces protectorats britanniques, est nette : un anti-colonialisme orthodoxe, mais payant parmi les peuples qui n'ont pas encore accédé à l'indépendance.

La seconde forme du soutien soviétique au nationalisme arabe est la fourniture d'armements aux différents pays arabes. L'affaire des armes tchèques livrées à l'Egypte en septembre 1955 a marqué le véritable tournant des relations soviéto-moyen-orientales. Cet acte signifiait que l'Union Soviétique avait décidé d'entrer sur la scène de cette région et qu'elle prétendait intervenir dans ces affaires au même titre que les autres grandes puissances. Que ce soit la Tchécoslovaquie qui ait fourni les armes, ne change rien à l'affaire. L'URSS s'est déjà

servie plusieurs fois de ses satellites pour ses interventions au Moyen-Orient afin d'éviter toute ressemblance si lointaine soit-elle avec une intervention de type impérialiste. En outre, si l'expérience réussit mal, elle évite ainsi les difficultés avec les autres grandes puissances. La fourniture d'armes en septembre 1955 a donc été suivie, à plusieurs reprises, par d'autres livraisons à l'Egypte et à la Syrie, et, après l'unification de 1958, à la République Arabe Unie ainsi que, depuis la révolution de juillet 1958, à l'Iraq. Des offres ont été faites et des négociations engagées avec d'autres pays également, tels que le Liban ou l'Arabie Séoudite, mais on n'est jamais parvenu jusqu'au stade des livraisons effectives, ces pays étant très soucieux de maintenir leurs bonnes relations avec l'Occident.

Certes, ces livraisons d'armes ont une signification stratégique et politique générale et ont considérablement renforcé la confiance des pays concernés, ainsi d'ailleurs dans autres états arabes. C'était un geste et une prise de position très importante de la part de l'Union Soviétique envers les peuples arabes, si l'on considère, en particulier, le conflit arabo-israélien. Il est bien connu que depuis 1948, un antagonisme irréductible oppose les peuples arabes à l'Etat d'Israël (quoique pas aux Juifs en général), car ils considèrent qu'Israël, en occupant le sol de la Palestine, leur a volé une partie de leur patrimoine et a privé des millions de leurs frères de la possibilité de survivre. Ils accusent les nations occidentales d'avoir contribué à la création de cet Etat étranger au sein de la nation arabe, et de vouloir maintenir un équilibre dans le domaine de l'armement en faveur d'Israël et à leur détriment. En effet, toutes leurs demandes d'armes ont été refusées, ou, quand elles étaient acceptées, les livraisons étaient restreintes à des armes à portée limitée. Dans ce contexte, les livraisons d'armes soviétiques ont été regardées comme le geste sauveur qui réparait dans une certaine mesure l'injustice commise par les adversaires de l'URSS.

La troisième forme de l'appui soviétique au nationalisme arabe a été la prise de position claire et sans équivoque de l'Union Soviétique dans l'affaire de Suez, en particulier après de l'attaque tripartite contre l'Egypte. Je ne peux pas entrer ici dans les détails, d'ailleurs trop connus, de cette crise. Notons en passant que par la faute des puissances européennes, elle s'est ouverte, hélas, au moment même où mon peuple luttait pour la liberté contre l'impérialisme bien camouflé des Soviets. J'aimerais souligner quelle chance inespérée cette intervention tripartite avait représentée pour l'URSS. A la suite de la renaissance des relations soviéto-arabes en 1956 et la visite de Chepilov, ministre soviétique des affaires étrangères, dans les capitales des pays moyen-orientaux, Suez acheva d'assurer à la politique de Moscou le soutien d'une opinion publique très favorable et une attitude des gouvernements enthousiasmés par la prise de position de l'URSS. Toute la région s'engagea dans une activité fébrile sur tous les plans. Le grand flirt qui avait commencé à la fin de 1955, évolua avec une rapidité étonnante et atteignit son apogée pendant les années 1957 et 1958. On ne pourra pas imaginer les résultats et les bénéfices qu'en aurait pu tirer l'Union Soviétique si ses dirigeants n'avaient pas commis l'erreur d'autoriser les communistes irakiens à s'opposer aux nationalistes arabes en vue de leur prise du pouvoir après la révolution victorieuse du 14 juillet 1958. Ses événements ont interrompu l'évolution qui s'était esquissée à partir de l'achat des armes tchèques par l'Egypte, et surtout depuis la crise de Suez en 1956 ; en conséquence, la majorité de l'opinion publique arabe se refroidit vis-à-vis de l'URSS et les nationalistes éprouvèrent l'une des plus grandes déceptions de leur vie.

(d) *Le choix délibéré d'un pays modèle*

Comme dernière caractéristique de la nouvelle politique soviétique au Moyen-Orient, je voudrais attirer votre attention sur une tactique employée à la fois sur le plan politique et sur le plan économique. Au cours de ces dernières années, l'URSS a fait un choix délibéré de pays modèles au sein du Tiers Monde et même dans une région plus limitée. Ce pays modèle fut tout d'abord l'Egypte ainsi que la Syrie, et après leur fusion, la République Arabe Unie. Depuis sa révolution, l'Irak est également considérée comme un pays modèle et il apparaît même aux observateurs que le centre de gravité de l'intérêt soviétique s'est plutôt déplacé en sa faveur. Le pays modèle signifie que politiquement l'URSS favorise à tout prix ses relations avec ce pays, lui donnant un appui total et inconditionnel, même aux dépens du Parti Communiste et des mouvements de gauche locaux.

5. LA NOUVELLE APPROCHE ECONOMIQUE

La politique économique de l'Union Soviétique fait partie intégrante de sa politique en général et va de pair avec la réalisation des objectifs politiques qu'elle s'est fixée. Elle assure dans une région déterminée, la pénétration d'abord, puis une présence constante et indépendante des fluctuations de la politique de tous les jours. L'étude de ses buts, de ses méthodes et de ses perspectives dépasse le cadre de cet exposé qui est essentiellement destiné à vous donner une vue d'ensemble de l'action soviétique au Moyen-Orient. Je ne peux qu'énumérer ici les principes essentiels de cette nouvelle approche économique :

— Elle favorise l'industrialisation rapide des pays en voie de développement, une attitude qui est accueillie chaleureusement par les intéressés ;

— Dans le cadre de cette approche, les exportations soviétiques se composent en grande partie d'installations industrielles et d'équipements complets en vue justement d'accélérer cette industrialisation :

— Dans le même cadre, l'URSS maintient ses importations en provenance du Moyen-Orient ainsi que des autres pays du Tiers Monde à un niveau toujours plus élevé que ses exportations. En effet, l'URSS achète les produits essentiels de ces pays de monocultures, même au-delà de ses besoins réels, mais en vue d'atteindre ses objectifs politiques ;

— La nouvelle approche économique intervient toujours aux points névralgiques, c'est-à-dire quand un pays du Tiers Monde a des difficultés à placer ses produits sur le marché mondial ;

— L'approche — comme du point de vue politique — sélectionne des pays modèles, en donnant toute l'aide possible à ces pays, and créant l'effet de propagande bien supérieur à ses engagements réels.

Une telle activité économique n'existait pas avant l'ère khrouchtchévienne, il est donc juste, je crois, de parler, là aussi, d'une nouvelle approche.

CONCLUSIONS

Pour conclure, j'aimerais vous proposer deux résultats de mes recherches dans le domaine de la politique soviétique au Moyen-Orient et qui ressortent également de cet exposé quoique trop bref.

Tout d'abord il est clair que la politique soviétique au Moyen-Orient est toujours resté indécise en ce qui concerne le conflit israélo-arabe et n'était pas capable de sortir de ce dilemme embarrassant. En dépit de ses livraisons d'armes, de ses prises de position en faveur de la cause arabe, les représentants de l'URSS avaient toujours évité de prendre un engagement net vis-à-vis de leurs interlocuteurs arabes. Les déclarations officielles, les conversations entre politiciens, les articles de la presse soviétique manifestent une même répugnance à s'aligner sur la politique et l'argumentation arabe. Cette hésitation est une des faiblesses de la politique soviétique vis-à-vis des grands problèmes du Moyen-Orient, car elle démontre que l'URSS ne peut avancer une solution valable et acceptable pour les deux parties, mais qu'elle ne veut pas non plus prendre parti en faveur de l'une ou de l'autre des peuples opposés. Cette attitude peut passer à un observateur superficiel pour une diplomatie habile ; en vérité, à long terme, elle est vouée à l'échec.

L'étude de la politique soviétique au Moyen-Orient nous permet aussi de déceler que, dans la phase actuelle de l'évolution de la situation mondiale, les intérêts de l'URSS ne sont pas identiques à ceux du communisme mondial. Ceci résulte en un conflit grave entre « la mère-patrie du socialisme » et ses représentants dans le monde arabe.

Mesdames, Mesdemoiselles, Messieurs, je vous remercie de votre attention.

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST*

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Such a vast subject must, for the purposes of this article, be limited in terms of time and space. Soviet policy towards the Arab countries, or more precisely the countries of the Orient, has a long history. The attempts of Lenin and his contemporaries to instigate a revolution among the workers of the Orient are well known, e.g., the Congress of these workers organized at Baku in 1920. But concerning this early tentative of Soviet leaders towards people of the Orient, there is another field that has been hardly investigated at all. This are Soviet relations with the labor unions of the Far East and with the independence movements in colonial territories. Theoretically, Marxist-Leninism has always recognized and, indeed, emphasized the importance of an eventual revolutionary explosion in the colonies and has advocated that efforts be made to organize it through workers movements in the capitalist world, the avant-garde of the world revolutionary movement.

The purpose of this study is not to review, even in a fragmentary way, Soviet policy towards colonial territories in their nationalist awakening and in their struggle for emancipation, nor is it to attempt an outline of the Soviet attitude during Stalin's reign, nor is it to enumerate the various stages of activities of the Cominform. Rather my aim is to examine the most recent and the most fascinating chapter of Soviet history; the policy in the Khrushchev era starting with the death of Stalin, but more particularly since the 20th Congress of the Russian Communist Party.

Having limited the subject in time as "Soviet Policy in the Khrushchev era" it remains to limit it in space. As the title indicates the subject to be considered is Soviet policy towards the Middle Eastern countries. However, the definition of this geographical area is extremely elastic. The Middle East is understood to extend from Turkey to the southernmost extremity of the Arabian Peninsula and from Iran to the Mediterranean shores of the Levant and Egypt. The latter forms part of North Africa, but historically, politically, economically and culturally she belongs more to the region defined above. Egypt is, in fact, in a key position between Asia and Africa; her present leaders are fully aware of this, but for the purposes of this article this aspect of the situation is not of primary importance.

1. THE LESSONS OF THE POST-WAR PERIOD

It was one of the centuries-old political traditions of Tsarist Russia always to try and strengthen her influence in neighboring states such as Turkey or Afghanistan, and later the Arab countries, in order to gain access to the warm seas. This expansion towards the South and the Mediterranean always caused the powers of Western Europe, especially Great Britain, some concern. It suffices to recall the Anglo-Russian rivalry throughout the nineteenth century in Afghanistan and the skill of British diplomacy, which always succeeded in blocking the route of Russian expansion into the countries of the Levant.

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The long story of the struggle for spheres of influence is well-known, but the geographic, demographic, and economic factors have been too frequently forgotten – because of the influence of Marxist-Leninist ideology and because of the Socialist dreams of the last century. Having been at the base of the expansionist policy of Tsarist Russia, those factors remain one of the essential elements of the policy of the Soviet State. Under an ideological cloak and in various guises, the USSR has followed and continues to follow the traditional line of Russian policy. This line is determined by objective elements and the only difference between the old and the new form of this political orientation is that the new form has had much more success than the old one.

The myth concerning the intentions of Soviet policy seems to be eliminated by the considerations set out below. This myth sees the intervention of the Soviet Union in the affairs of the Middle East – as everywhere else in the developing countries – as having the sole intention of aiding the colonies and newly-independent countries in their struggle against imperialism through supporting national liberation movements and helping those countries to acquire economic independence after political independence has been achieved.

A serious study shows the naiveté and propaganda-like character of this myth. Certainly, the Soviet Union may sometimes appear as the champion of national liberation and of economic independence of developing countries, for her tactical interests are identical with those of the peoples in question. But this co-existence can only be temporary as the policies of the various states are determined by different realities. Moreover, the errors of the adversaries of the Soviet Union, the Western Powers, confirmed this apparent identity of interest between the Communist state and the former colonial territories. The study of Soviet policy in the Middle East is particularly revealing on this point. It shows clearly that this policy should be judged: by its intentions rather than by its appearances. It proves that it is her status as a great world power and the corresponding aims of its status, which dominate all political moves of the Soviet Union.

After the Second World War, the interest of the Soviet Union in the Middle East was clearly shown concerning the Iranian question. According to the tripartite treaty of January 29, 1942, between the United States, Great Britain and the USSR, Iran was placed under the control of the Allies, but all foreign troops were to be evacuated within six months of the armistice with Germany and her allies. However, Russian troops did not leave the north of Iran within the time-limit and established there two independent republics under their supervision: the autonomous republic of Azerbaijan and the republic of Mahabad. The Iranian government under Prime Minister Qavam played an extremely skillful game. The question was put before the Security Council of the United Nations during the winter of 1946-1947; confronted by the firm attitude of the Iranian government and the Western Allies, the USSR had to retreat. She slowly withdrew her troops and even lost the economic advantages that she had previously obtained through bilateral agreements concluded with the Iranian government.

The results of the Turkish adventure were similar in 1945, while the Allies were continuing their struggle against Japan, the Soviet Government had demanded from Turkey the surrender of the provinces of Kars and Ardahan as well as permission to establish Russian bases in the Straits. Turkey resisted and no mention was made of these demands at the Potsdam Conference. These were undeniable failures for Soviet diplomacy:

Added to these two failures during the Stalin era was the particularly embarrassing problem of Palestine. It is not necessary to relate here all the details of the termination of the British mandate in Palestine, the Arab-Israeli war and the establishment of the State of Israel. The particularly delicate position of the Soviet Union in the discussions among members of the Security Council on the partition of Palestine should, however, be noted. In effect, the Soviets had to declare their position in a quarrel which in no way corresponded up to the principles and theses of their infallible ideology, since both parties, Jews and Arabs, were oppressed minorities and they had both been supported previously by the Soviets. The choice was thus extremely difficult. The so-called Zionist ideals were not contrary to the Marxist-Leninist views dominant

in the Soviet Union and they influenced a great many of the politicians in the Stalin era. Moreover, was it possible for the USSR to depart from the principles of the Balfour Declaration and thus destroy the secular hopes of an oppressed minority? The decision was thus made to vote for the partition plan prepared by the Western Powers. The local Communist Parties were then faced with a cruel dilemma: should they oppose the decision of Moscow, thus defying the sole authority of world Communism and taking the side of intransigent Arab nationalism, or should they implement the directives of the center and become the opponents of Arab ideals? The Parties – according to the witnesses interviewed and documents seen by this writer on a recent visit to the Middle East – definitely took the latter course. In Jordan, for example, brochures from Communist sources were even published which called on Party members to struggle against the Arab nationalists opposed to partition.

The two cases of direct intervention by the Soviet Union in Iran and Turkey combined with the delicate position of the Communists and the official Soviet policy in the Palestine question led Stalin to drop the problems of the Middle East and to concentrate on European questions during the last years of his reign. On the other hand, these failures of the Soviet Union caused an evolution, a change of attitude in the senior civil servants of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. Even in the epoch of the old dictator they were considering to adopt a new attitude that would be more suitable to win over the peoples of the Middle East and especially the Arabs. The importance of these lessons learned between 1945 and 1954 has been fully underlined by Colonel Geoffrey Wheeler, the Director of the Central Asian Centre in London who was one of the inspirers of this writer's research.

2. THE OBJECTIVES

It is certainly the aim of the Soviet Union to prepare the Middle Eastern region for the Communist revolution; this long term goal, however, had sometimes to be set aside in the face of more immediate objectives, – objectives which are eminently political and appear to be in the realm of the possible. Besides the lessons of the post-war period which surely induced the Soviet leaders to look for new formulas, other events have influenced as well the Russian attitude towards the Middle East. Mention can be made here of the rivalry of the Western powers; the interests of the so-called capitalist countries in, for example, the Buraimi oasis conflict; the errors made by these same powers in face of growing Arab nationalism, especially of their ambiguous position on the question of Palestine, and the Bandung Conference, which established a common front of the newly independent Afro-Asian States. The most important factor contributing to the new policy of Khrushchev was, nevertheless, the successive defense plans proposed by the West Middle Eastern countries. These plans directly affected the strategic interests of the Soviet Union as did the reply of Gamal Abdel Nasser to Western proposals, namely, that positive neutralism was the only policy meeting the political needs of the region.

During the period 1955-1954 Soviet policy was, however, still not very clear. The Soviet government hesitated a long time facing different possibilities of action which were open to it. A good example of this hesitating attitude was the rapprochement with Turkey which was in evident contradiction with the approach to the Arab countries of the region. This hesitation was particularly marked concerning the evaluation of the new Egyptian regime installed by the revolution of 1952. At first, the Soviets sympathized with Naguib rather than with Nasser whom they considered for a very long time to be a fascist dictator. They also considered his regime a military one, and a retrogressive and oppressive one at that. This was especially so after the conclusion of the agreement on the Suez Canal with Great Britain and following the solution of the problem of Sudan. The turning point in Soviet policy towards Egypt finally was the purchase of Czech arms by President Nasser's Government in September 1953. In consequence, the Soviet leaders were reassured as to the orientation of the most important country of the region and were able to congratulate themselves on the identity of their aims with those of Nasser – an identity which based on the ideology of neutralism. They did not miss the opportunity to apply the new Soviet approach by setting in motion the evolution which completely transformed the political situation in the Middle East.

Naturally the Soviets never acknowledged having any vital interests in this region. On innumerable occasions Moscow denied the allegations of their adversaries concerning the interest of the Soviet Union in the Middle East. In a speech delivered on April 30, 1958 at a dinner in the honor of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Khrushchev explained the new Soviet policy by saying that

"Our disinterested foreign policy – a policy based on principles – should be clear to you. It is not contemplative but an active policy of struggle against the evil forces – the aggressive, colonialist forces which have not abandoned their hopes of perpetuating colonial slavery, of continuing to plunder and exploit the peoples of Asia and Africa ... Grossly distorting our peaceful policy, the imperialist circles scream about the Soviet Union's 'special' interest in this area. We indignantly deny these utterly false assertions. In our disinterested aid to the Middle Eastern countries we have never pursued any selfish aims. The concepts and methods of the colonialists who believe that if they do not oppress this or that nation, others must do so, is alien to the Soviet Socialist State."

Khrushchev defined what he meant by being disinterested in an interview given to the late Aneurin Bevan. According to him – and this statement seems sincere – the Soviet Union did not need the oil of the Middle East. However, he did not mention the point which is behind and which must be behind the following question: Who exploits and who receives the oil of this region? The strengthening of Western potential by the resources of the Arab states – especially before the era of nuclear weapons – could not leave the adversary of the NATO powers indifferent. In any case, the USSR could always use the problem of the utilization of oil resources as a powerful weapon of propaganda.

To sum up, the aims of the Soviet Union in the Middle East under Khrushchev are as follows:

- a) To definitely eliminate the Western Powers from the region;
- b) To prevent defense pacts or alliances instigated by her opponents;
- c) To maintain the territorial *status quo* between the independent states;
- d) To strengthen Socialist tendencies in the Arab countries, and simultaneously;
- e) To affirm her presence and her interests in the area.

It can be said that the Soviet Union is trying to accelerate the evolution that is leading towards a power vacuum – a theory rightly disapproved of by the Arabs who feel as being treated as objects without a voice in deciding of their own future. At the same time, the Soviet Union by asserting her presence in the area, is preparing herself to fill this vacuum little by little.

Some may maintain that the continuation of the territorial *status quo* is of no importance for Soviet policy which is little concerned if one of these States annexes another or if the frontiers drawn in the colonial era are revised. In this regard, it will be shown in the second part of this article that the USSR would not continue to support for ever the present regimes of the Middle East which are of a bourgeois character. In any case, she cannot remain indifferent to any territorial unification which increases the influence of one or another of these States. The present parceling up of the Middle East suits Soviet policy better than a strong regional entity, whatever form such an organization might take.

The interest of the Soviet Union in the evolution of the United Arab Republic towards state capitalism is clearly revealed through a study of the opinions expressed by Soviet Middle Eastern experts. L.M. Vatolina, in particular, analyzes the Egyptian evolution in this respect in the articles published in *Sovremennyy Vostok*. The development of state capitalism is considered as a "progressive" phenomenon because, on the one hand, it weakens the position of foreign capital in these countries, whilst, on the other hand, by means of the elaborate planning that it entails, it serves the interest of all Egyptian people and not only the interests of the national bourgeoisie which is in power.

The great projects of industrialization, which are in the process of being realized in this progressive spirit, will assure the necessary growth of the proletariat which is, at present, very small. This will in the long run bring about a Socialist transformation of the economy, that is to say, the victory of the revolution.

Thus, in order to attain these objectives, Khrushchev has broken with the traditions of Molotov that dominated the post-war period. The Soviet Union entered into the arena of the Middle East. This new orientation of Khrushchev implied fundamental changes in the ideological, political and economic fields. I will review these changes in the same order in the present article.

3. THE NEW IDEOLOGICAL APPROACH

According to the orthodox conception, i.e. Stalin's interpretation of Marxist-Leninism, movements of national liberation can only be directed by the working class and its avant-garde, the Communist Party. Their outlook is limited by the international position within the division of the world into two camps, the democratic camp and the imperialist camp. This situation I tends to accentuate the class struggle not only in Europe and America but also in colonial territories and in dependencies of the metropolitan areas where a clear and unequivocal opposition of social forces develops. In an article published in 1949 in *Voprosy Ekonomiki* Ye. Zhukov analyzed the problems of the national-colonial struggle after the Second World War and defined the role of the bourgeoisie as follows:

"The imperialists are relying to an even greater degree not only upon the feudal-landowner elements but also upon the national bourgeoisie in the colonies and semi-colonies. Terrified at the national liberation struggle of the peoples which has now reached a particularly high level and is being waged under the hegemony of the working class and in the face of the ever growing revolutionary readiness of the broad masses of people, the big bourgeoisie of the colonies and semi-colonies is decidedly going over to the camp of imperialist reaction, betraying the interests of its own countries and peoples ... The bourgeois nationalist propaganda is playing the most essential role in the rapacious plans of the imperialists. It not only is called upon to divide and disunite the people of the colonies and semi-colonies in the interests of imperialism, but considers as its task the neutralizing of the national liberation movement, guiding it along a false nationalist path under the leadership of the reactionary bourgeoisie and national reformists who divert the masses from the revolutionary methods and objectives of the struggle ... Bourgeois nationalism is especially aimed against the alignment or the national liberation movements in the colonies and dependent countries with the anti-imperialist democratic camp. Bourgeois nationalism is a most important ideological weapon employed by the Anglo-American aggressive bloc for the purpose of strengthening the shaking colonial system of imperialism. This is why a ruthless exposure of the reactionary bourgeois nationalist Ideology in its various forms – Kemalism, or Ghandisim, Zionism or Pan-Arabism – quickens the process of the national and social liberation of the colonial and dependent peoples and foils the provocative designs of the imperialists their agents."

Zhukov thus sees people's democracies as the only possible form of state and social organization in the colonial countries and in the period of transition which links the capitalist epoch with the age of Socialism. It will ensure the execution of bourgeois democratic reforms, e.g., essential reforms for the first stage of structural transformation such as agrarian reforms. It will also render possible the initiation of democratic reforms. Thus, the democratic revolution will be transformed into a social revolution by consecutive stages.

Beginning with 1949-1951, and contrary to the traditional Marxist-Leninist conception, a new approach to the problem became evident in Soviet writings and declarations. These new ideas indicate a change in the political orientation of the regime. They are the most convincing proof of the thesis that it is not ideology which prevails but present day realities, realities evidently unforeseeable ten years ago. The necessities deriving from the geographic and economic situation of the Soviet Union and of her position as a great power, command attention rather than the requirements of a prefabricated theory. The application of this new approach necessarily entails a change of the political team and, eventually, the coming to power of a single leader. This is what happened in the Soviet Union after Stalin's death. The Khrushchev era has thus

seen the new approach assert itself. Nevertheless, the majority of theoreticians have remained the same. These about-turns are very frequent in the Communist world but, to put it mildly, it is surprising to see them revealed in such a blatant manner. The same academician, Zhukov, who was quoted above as an authority on the orthodox Soviet point of view, has played a considerable role in the establishment of the theoretical bases of the new approach. The Marxist-Leninist justification for a Soviet rapprochement with the 'capitalist' or 'bourgeois' countries of the politically uncommitted world was formulated for the first time by Khrushchev at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956. On that occasion, he gave an official and formal confirmation of the adjustments that became necessary in the Party's policy. Four and a half years later, on August 26, 1960, Zhukov published an article in the *Pravda* reviewing the experiences made since the first announcement of the change in the Soviet attitude towards the bourgeoisie in the developing countries.

Both the 20th and 21st Congress of the Soviet Communist Party have stressed the importance of Lenin's thesis on peaceful co-existence with countries having different social and economic systems, and have promised the total support of the USSR in the struggle of these peoples against colonialism. Furthermore and there lies the great change, the two Congresses have rejected certain dogmatic notions such as that which maintains, and I quote Zhukov:

"The national bourgeoisie of the colonies and dependent countries has everywhere and always turned into a reactionary force, unable to participate, let alone to play a leading role, in the anti-imperialist struggle." "Only the leftist petits bourgeois and hopeless dogmatists," – he continues, – "can deny the great historic significance of the formation of national states in Asia and Africa, even though many of these states have not yet attained economic independence and have not solved a number of pressing social problems produced by life." Zhukov remarks that "most national states of Asia and Africa have a nationalist regime under bourgeois leadership but this cannot diminish the importance of the breakthrough against the imperialist front." Moreover, Lenin himself considered it natural "that at the beginning of all national movements the bourgeoisie may take the lead despite the fact that the working class is the most intransigent enemy of imperialism. 'Doctrinaires' and 'leftists' who sneer at such forms of the national liberation movement which do not fit into their customary sociological schemes, forget that 'pure' revolutionary processes do not exist in nature. It is natural that in the anti-imperialist liberation movement the front of participants is much wider than in a social revolution... Failure to understand its multiplicity and a haughty attitude towards anti-imperialist actions when, in determined historical conditions, non-proletarian elements come to the forefront, represents sectarianism of a most dangerous kind leading to self-isolation."

According to this new orientation of Soviet thought it is as impossible to refuse to recognize that different countries are at a different stage of development as it is the intention to make them jump an historical period in their evolution. In this sense, the socialist transformation can be applied neither mechanically nor simultaneously in all countries. In all developing countries, the peasants form the majority of the population and so, for a long time the main task will be to combat feudalism and not capital. Thus, for a long period, cooperation between workers, peasants, the intelligentsia and the progressive bourgeoisie, will be necessary.

At this stage of development, among the main tasks of the unified nationalist forces will be: to induce agrarian reforms, the creation of a national industry, the abrogation of unequal treaties of the past and a foreign policy of peace and non-engagement in military blocs.

Thus, it could be shown that Marxist-Leninism resolutely condemns as a reactionary utopia the supposition that "to export the revolution to other countries is possible and that it rejects the imposition of any social system and institution on another country which would not grow out naturally from the internal evolution of the latter."

The question of the transition to the non-capitalist stage of development is, however, not delayed indefinitely. Following the solution of the great national problems, social dissension will appear, and the struggle between capital and labor will begin. There will be, in Khrushchev's words "some different opinions on the subsequent methods of development of these states."

A similar evolution of thought is revealed by all the specialists of Afro-Asian questions as, for example, in the writings of Vatolina and even in the declarations of local communist leaders, e.g., Khaled Bagdash, Secretary General of the Syro-Lebanese Communist Party. The culminating point of this ideological evolution was reached at the Conference of the 81 Communist Parties at Moscow in November and December 1960. The final declaration proclaimed the doctrine of national democracies – democracies invested with the characteristics described above and assuming the tasks indicated below.

The theory thus underwent great variations due to developments on the contemporary world scene such as the softening of the doctrine concerning the absolute primacy of class antagonisms, provoking, simultaneously, a deepening of the internal contradictions of Marxist-Leninism.

4. THE NEW POLITICAL APPROACH

It is on this modified ideological foundation that the new Soviet policy in the Middle East has been based. Certain of its principal characteristics were.

a) *Recognition of feudal or bourgeois regimes when they were anti-imperialist.*

This is not a completely new thing in Soviet practice. The USSR was supporting even in Stalin's time the Yemen, and she was the first to recognize the new kingdom of Saudi Arabia. During the war, the attitude of Yemen was the object of criticism because of the fact that it was sympathetic towards the Axis powers, and this opinion persisted until Khrushchev's coming to power. Since then Yemen benefits from the favor and the support of the Soviet Union. The two countries signed a new treaty of friendship on October 31, 1955 and an economic agreement in 1956. The expressions with which the "dominating feudal clique" was hitherto condemned have given way to the deference which is normally shown to the reigning family. Out of consideration for the feelings of the Iman and his entourage mention is no longer made of the anti-feudal sentiments of the people or of democratic movements. The official position consists of simply stating that the Yemen is a backward country and that it is necessary to support it as it belongs to the anti-imperialist front.

b) *Support for the Policy of Positive Neutralism*

This policy which first appeared clearly in 1955 and which was inaugurated by President Gamal Abdel Nasser was received with enthusiasm and openly supported by the Soviets. It responds, in the eyes of Moscow's leaders, to the most imperative needs of the Middle East. It prevents all political interference of the great powers in the internal affairs of the region; it dispels fears and serves the strategic interests of the USSR. In effect, the latter considers that it is of vital importance for her defense that this region remains strictly neutral and the Soviet leadership worked hard to prevent the formation of military pacts or alliances which could constitute a threat to their country. Thus, the Soviet Union has not imposed its strategic presence in the Middle East, but was content to ward off the other powers, hoping to fill the vacuum thus created with an essentially economic penetration of the region. She has perfectly understood the psychological needs of the independent countries of the Middle East and has identified her own interests with theirs.

Actually, neutralism has nothing in common with the supreme aims of Soviet policy. Neutralism is at once both a negation and an affirmation: a negation of a polarized world situation created without the participation of the newly independent countries, and an affirmation of their ability and their desire to constitute a third force as well as to participate actively in the shaping of the future of the world. In this article, we cannot evaluate the chances of success of this policy of neutralism.

Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that its goals and tactics are identical with those of Soviet foreign policy. When faced with the various plans of common defense proposed by the West (particularly the Baghdad Pact), or unilateral acts such as the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Soviets had, thanks to this identity, to uphold only the protests and opposition of Middle Eastern countries, or join them in condemning those who have joined such pacts or subscribed to such doctrines. In every case the position taken by the countries of the area concerning Western policy has been the crucial aspect for Soviet policy in its own attitude towards these countries. It was only after the signature of the Turco-Pakistani treaty and the joining it by Nuri Said's Iraq that the USSR attacked the latter country with such resolution and firmness diplomatically and in its propaganda. Neither was her attitude hostile and clearly defined against Turkey until 1954. And it was in her relations with revolutionary Egypt that the Soviet leadership showed the greatest hesitations. In fact, at the time of the signature of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty on Suez and the Sudan, Egypt was considered as the number one enemy in the Middle East. But, beginning with her opposition to Western plans of regional defense, and especially the Baghdad Pact, Egypt became the bastion of the struggle against imperialism.

c) *Declared Support for Arab Nationalism*

It is necessary, first of all, to state that the term "Arab nationalism" is not often used in official declarations, studies or articles in the Soviet press. Generally, the term "national liberation movement of the Arab peoples" is preferred. The term Arab unity, too, has a specific meaning. It does not mean the idea of Arab unity in general, but rather the unity of the Arabs in their struggle against imperialism. The Soviets conceive the term Arab nationalism in opposition to Western powers, to the common defense plans that the latter propose, or, in a word, according to their own tactical interest.

Theoretically, it has always been a conventional attitude in the USSR to support the national movements of colonial peoples. In practice, apart from some ill-fated adventures, this theory was never put into practice before the Second World War. Since then the situation has changed a great deal, especially since the Bandung Conference which marked the political awakening of developing countries. The final communiqué clearly states that "the Conference unanimously declares that colonialism in all its forms is bad and that an end must be put to it as soon as possible." This is the point of view which was most appreciated by both Soviet theoreticians and politicians. As they define the nationalism of the developing countries by the measure of its opposition to those powers which are also adversaries of the USSR, they always gave total political support to the intransigent nationalism of the Third World.

In practice this means, in Middle Eastern terms, strong support for Arab nationalism in the process of decolonization, for example, in the complex problem of Southern Arabia, Aden or the Buraimi oasis question where economic interests put the local heads of states, and through them certain Western powers, in a state of permanent conflict. In this case, the Soviet position, as expressed in the debates on Buraimi in the United Nations, or in the propaganda drive directed towards Aden and the British protectorates, is plain: an orthodox anti-colonialism, particularly successful with those peoples which have not yet obtained independence.

A second form of Soviet support for Arab nationalism was furnishing of arms to different Arab countries. The delivery of Czech arms to Egypt in September 1955 was the real turning point in Soviet-Middle Eastern relations. It signified that the Soviet Union had decided to play an active role in this area and that she intended to intervene in these questions on the same basis as other great powers. That it was Czechoslovakia, who in fact furnished those arms, was of no great importance. On several previous occasions the USSR had used her satellites for her interventions in the Middle East in order to prevent any impression, no matter how faint, that it might be an imperialistic intervention. Moreover, if the attempt had failed, she would thus avoid any difficulties with the great powers. The sale of September 1955 has been followed by several other deliveries to Egypt and Syria, after their unification in 1958 to the United Arab Republic, and after the revolution of July 1958 to Iraq as well. Offers have also been made and negotiations undertaken with other countries such as Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, but they have never reached the stage of actual delivery as these countries were very careful to maintain their good relations with the West.

Certainly, these arms deliveries had a general political and strategic significance, and they have considerably increased the confidence of the countries concerned, and, through them, of the other Arab States. It was a gesture expressing an important stand on the part of the Soviet Union in favor of the Arabs, particularly when considered in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is well known that since 1948 there has been an unyielding antagonism between the Arab peoples and Israel (but not to the Jews in general). The Arabs considered that Israel has stolen a part of their inheritance by occupying the soil of Palestine and had deprived thousands of their brothers of the possibility of surviving. They accused the Western powers of having contributed to the creation of this foreign state in the heart of the Arab world and of wishing to maintain a balance of armaments in favor of Israel. In point of fact, all Arab demands for arms have been refused by the West or, if satisfied, restricted to small armaments. In this context, the Soviet arms deliveries have been regarded as a gesture which, to a certain degree, made up for the injustice of the adversaries of the USSR.

The third form of Soviet support for Arab nationalism has been the taking of a clear and unequivocal stand by the Soviet Union during the tripartite attack on Egypt at the moment when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal. The details of this crisis are well known and there is no need to repeat them here; only the unexpected luck of the Soviets should be mentioned. After the renaissance of Arab-Soviet relations in 1956 and the visit of Shepilov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, to the capitals of the Middle Eastern countries, the Suez affair resulted in assuring to Moscow the support of a very favorable public opinion in Arab lands and an enthusiastic attitude of their governments. This entire region was engaged in a feverish activity. The great flirtation which had begun at autumn of 1955 evolved with an astonishing rapidity and reached its climax in 1957 and 1958. It is not possible to estimate the results and the benefits that the Soviet Union may have been able to make of this development, if her leaders had not committed the error of authorizing the Iraqi communists to oppose the Arab nationalists hoping to seize the power after the victorious revolution of July 1958. Those events interrupted the evolution which started since the purchase of Czech arms by Egypt and, especially, since Suez in 1956. Public opinion generally cooled down and the Arab nationalists experienced one of the greatest disillusiones of their history.

d) *The Choice of Model Countries*

Finally, attention must be drawn to the tactics used by the Soviets, both on the political as well as the economic planes: this consisted in deliberately choosing model countries in the uncommitted world as a whole and even in more limited regions: The model country was first of all Egypt as well as Syria, after unification the United Arab Republic. Later Iraq was also considered a model country, and it even appears that the center of gravity of Soviet interest had definitely moved in her favor. A model country signified politically that the USSR promoted her relations with it at any cost, giving it total and unconditional support even at the expense of the Communist Party and local leftist movements.

5. THE NEW ECONOMIC APPROACH

The economic policy of the Soviet Union is an integral part of her foreign policy and is in line with its general political objectives. First of all, it secures the penetration and then a continuous presence in an area; independently of the fluctuations of day to day policy. The study of these aims, methods and their prospect of success are not within the scope of this article which only attempts to present a general view of Soviet activity in the Middle East. However, the main principles on which Soviet economic relations with Middle Eastern countries were based may be listed as follows:

- i) Promotion of rapid industrialization of developing countries, an attitude that was warmly welcomed by those interested in such a development;
- ii) Exporting to these countries industrial Installations and equipment, for the most part, with the avowed purpose of accelerating this industrialization drive;

iii) Maintaining imports from the Middle East as well as from other newly independent countries at a higher level than exports to them. In fact, with her political objectives in mind, the USSR buys more than her real needs would justify the primary products from these countries whose economy was based on monoculture;

iv) Intervening always during crucial periods when the neutral or politically uncommitted country had difficulty in placing its products on the world markets;

v) As in politics, the USSR chooses countries considered as model from the point of view of their economic policy. By giving all possible aid to these model countries a propaganda effect is obtained, which is much greater than her real commitment would warrant.

CONCLUSIONS

Firstly, it is clear from the foregoing that Soviet policy in the Middle East was extremely undecided in respect of the Arab Israeli conflict during the whole period under review. Despite her arms deliveries and her support of the Arab cause, representatives of the USSR have always avoided taking a clear position in this matter. Official declarations, conversations between politicians and articles in the Soviet press all show the extreme reluctance to fall definitely in line with Arab policy and arguments. This hesitation is one of the weaknesses of Soviet policy concerning the great problems of the Middle East for the Soviets could not advance a solution acceptable to both parties, nor did they wish to take the side of one or the other party. This attitude can be seen by a superficial observer as skilful diplomacy, but in the long run, it was doomed to failure.

The study of Soviet policy in the Middle East shows that in the present phase of evolution on the international scene, the interests of the USSR are not identical with those of world Communism. It would not be wise to talk of a divorce of interests, but it is possible to say that if they are not identical, then certainly the interests of the Soviet Union as a world power will take precedence over those of international communism. Khrushchev's era is one of profound transformation in the Communist world. An empire under the control of a single center and under the imprint of a monolithic ideology went through fundamental changes in a polycentric world within which real interests rather than concurring ideas maintain a superficial unity. The trends evident in Soviet foreign policy were corollary to this recent evolution: state interests prevailed over the interests of the revolutionary movement. The case of the Middle East and, especially, of Egypt shows an extremely clear example of this. Abandoning the local Communist parties to the whims of Nasserite nationalism because of the importance of the policy of positive neutralism followed by the new Egyptian regime could not be justified in Leninist terms, but only in the name of the interests of the Soviet State.

Lastly, the hesitation of Soviet policy and propaganda vis-à-vis Israel must be underlined. The leaders of the USSR could but recognize the great force and influence of Islam in the Arab masses whilst, in the same time, they considered it as a reactionary phenomenon opposed to all economic and social progress and, *par excellence*, to socialism. Thus, it is possible to discern a double standard in the new Soviet approach: ideological propaganda related by the broadcasting stations and journals of the Muslim republics of the USSR condemn Islamic faith and tradition as an obstacle to the revolution and continue to follow the orthodox line and argument; political propaganda, proper, on the contrary, recognizes Islam as an important factor in the political life of Arab peoples and from the point of view of Arab nationalism, emphasizing the injustices committed by the imperialists towards Muslim civilization and traditions. The same Soviet radios and newspapers which verve frequently adopting the first attitude was also reflecting the latter. They were putting the accent on the "happy and free life" of the Muslims in the USSR and eulogized the advantages they claimed the Muslims obtained when the Soviet regime came to power.

NATIONS AND NATIONALISMS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE*

The recurrent inter-ethnic fight and raging civil wars in several of the successor States of the former Soviet Union and, especially, the tragic images of the war between the nations and religious groups which hitherto formed Yugoslavia, artificially created after the World War I, focus the attention of the entire world on the question of nations and nationalisms in the region of Central and Eastern Europe. The present article intends only to pinpoint some of the relevant considerations related to the situation in one of the planet's most complex regions, and to indicate what mental changes, and mental changes only, could secure peace and cooperation between its peoples after a long and painful process.

The universalistic-integrating tendencies of the Enlightenment and of the ideology of the French Revolution, despite two long centuries which elapsed since, did not destroy, did not even weaken, the appeal of national sentiment in the Western world. I purposely wrote national sentiment because in order to realistically appreciate present-day developments in Central and Eastern Europe (including the separation of Slovakia from the lands inhabited by the Czechs), it is indispensable to distinguish between national consciousness (and sentiment) and nationalism.

National consciousness is a profound and culturally-motivated sentiment, based on common language and culture, common historical memories and life experiences, shared values and morals, and, frequently, common religious affiliation. National consciousness constitutes the group identity for peoples which are thought of having a common ethnic descent (this, of course, is more a myth than an empirical reality), and which were not only living in the same territory since centuries but were also culturally conditioned by national traditions and heritage transmitted from generation to generation. National consciousness therefore is a genuine human feeling of belonging to a community and of desiring to continue to live in its inherited traditions. Thus it constitutes the basis of a community's solidarity and – this must be emphasized – is not motivated by the hate of others, especially the others living in its midst or on its frontiers. A concept much richer than patriotism, national consciousness is very much alive outside the orbit of the industrialized world; it is always much stronger in the perception and culture of peoples who did not have an independent State of their own as in the perception and culture of those who had the historic chance to have one. It appears, then, that the revival of national consciousness in Central and Eastern Europe after the dissolution of the Soviet empire, together with similar events after decolonization on the Asian and African continents, definitely rings the death knell to the universalistic expectations born out of the Enlightenment's hopes and the success of the ideas of the French Revolution.

Nationalism, frequently also called chauvinism in its most radical forms, drives unbridled passions to the extreme, in particular among populations which were isolated from the world by totalitarian regimes, or populations which lack the minimum level of education and information enabling them to justly appreciate the outcomes of their

* An answer to Vaclav Havel, President of Czechoslovakia, who wrote a letter, in the second half of the 1990s, to *The New York Review of Books* on nationalism in Eastern Europe. The *Review* refused to publish this response because it considered it to be against Havel's liberal views.

actions. It represents an extremist doctrine which entertains the hope of an oppressed national group, or of a nation which never obtained independence in the form of its own State or lost a formerly acquired statehood, to change its destiny through unrestrained political activity in the State they belong to and through propaganda toward the outside world as well as coercive force and violence if necessary.

It is, of course, evident that nationalistic movements in the nineteenth century (Mazzini's and Garibaldi's in Italy, Kossuth's in Hungary, as well as the flourishing of nationalist sentiment among the numerous ethnic groups of the Austro-Hungarian empire) were all genuine and progressive movements in the historical context of the age. They grew out of the Romanticist spirit and epoch which led to the doctrine of self-determination of peoples declared by President Wilson after World War I. Nevertheless, twentieth-century nationalism, in all its forms and appearances, became the most violent and destructive expression of the nationalist sentiment, leading to devastating conflagrations in world history; as a result, in the second half of our century, political means for the solution of national conflicts, at least in principle, were created such as international and regional bodies through which conflicts may be settled by negotiations (although the inefficiency shown in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina requires us to posit a serious *caveat* concerning the possibilities of such co-operation).

The problem is complicated by the fact that current conceptions in international law and customs are all based on the individual human being (following the *Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen* in the French Revolution) and do not include collective rights for groups – ethnic, religious, or cultural – who differ from the majority of citizens in the country they belong to. Human rights are rights of individual persons, but not of persons belonging together because of common identity, shared beliefs and values. There is, of course, the protection of the economic and social rights of States reflected in various United Nations charters and documents, but these rights were proclaimed in favor of developing countries as against the overwhelming influence of the industrialized part of the world. They concerned States and not groups of people living in them. It was only between the two World Wars that international law was completed by provisions to protect minorities, different from the dominant majority in ethnic, cultural, religious or whatever aspects, and this in order to alleviate effects of the unbridled nationalisms which were not foreseen by the Pax Wilsoniana, the settlements reached following World War I. Recent events in Europe and elsewhere show that it would be useful to include some provisions on collective rights in the present human rights agenda.

No satisfactory solution to such complex situations as those prevailing in the former member states of Yugoslavia or of the Soviet Union can be foreseen in the present. As no satisfactory political arrangement appears on the horizon, and certainly no military action could be envisaged, the only real solution which would lead to the elimination of nationalistic crises and civil wars while respecting genuine national consciousness and its requirements, would be the gradual and slow change of mentalities accepting that in the present world the concept and existence of the nation-state is not applicable, not permissible, anymore.

The *nation-state* is a product of European historical evolution since the eighteenth century (one could not designate the States of the *Ancien Regime* as nation-states), especially of the Romantic era. As a concept it expresses the idea that a nation, – an ethnic, cultural and linguistic unity with shared ideals and historical tradition, and occupying a more or less contiguous territory – attains political unity and independence by having its own State. It is, however, true that already at the moment of the birth of the nation-state the French Revolution conceived the latter's essence as the State of the citizens, that is, of all people living in the same territory, supposing tacitly that all inhabitants of the State are French in their culture, but it did not make reference to their ethnic origins. Nonetheless, the nationalist inspiration was stronger and most minority groups in Europe, especially within the boundaries of the Hapsburg Empire, unequivocally aimed at the creation of their own national State with a population exclusively composed by their members.

This desire of possessing a national State survived in a number of nations and minority groups until today, and the settlements after the two World Wars which could not create such States because of the thorough intertwining of populations, were all avowedly unsuccessful. There are even today States which inscribed in their constitution that the population consists of the unique nationality which constitutes the majority, although between 10 to 20 percent of the inhabitants belong to diverse minority groups. Consequently, there is no other solution to the problem of nation-states in Central and Eastern Europe than to definitely abandon this concept and ideal. This means the acceptance by all States that their citizens who belong to different national, cultural or religious groups are entitled to autonomy in matters concerning them (language, education, etc.), including the creation of autonomous regions where large minority populations justify it. This solution would be entirely concordant with contemporary human rights conceptions, and could be codified as collective rights by various international fora. A good example of the success of such a solution is the newly independent Slovenia whose Constitution sanctions the collective rights and autonomy of the minorities (Italians and Hungarians).

The lack of comprehension of the changed contemporary context (in comparison to the situation prevailing until World War I) and of the conditions of international relations in today's world by nationalist leaders and intellectuals of some nation-states or minority groups concerned, is all the more astonishing that all countries and nationalities see their only hope of economic and social development in joining the European Communities and in becoming integrated into a great and strong Europe which definitely would mean for them an abandonment of increasing parts of their sovereignty. Whether Europe will take the road to federalism or turn toward a looser coordination as a confederation (the problem concerning the approval of the Maastricht treaty), the free displacement of persons, labor, goods, and capital will be the cornerstone of the integration, practically abolishing national frontiers as of the next year, – perhaps even in the whole European Economic Space area. What is the point, then, to stick to the antiquated concepts and to try to realize the nation-state at the price of so many human lives and so much sufferance and gruesome cruelty? "We respect your national solidarity but you must abandon definitely the ideal of the nation-state," – that is the message we have to convey with persuasive force at all occasions. Nationalism will destroy itself if the countries respecting human rights and the requirements of genuine national consciousness, hold fast in face of the brutality and intransigence of the extremists; – those who are not representing a true national ideal but are ghosts of a long-buried past.

LA DEMOCRATIE POUR TOUS ?*

Pour sauver la politique, revenons à Machiavel

[Le Hongrois Victor Segesvary, longtemps fonctionnaire de l'ONU, a parcouru le monde et constaté les erreurs fatales de l'homme occidental et de son ordre mondial. D'où ses propositions pour réformer la démocratie.]

_____ NÉPSZABADSÁG _____

Budapest

QUESTION : *D'après votre expérience, quels sont les problèmes majeurs de la mondialisation ?*

VICTOR SEGESVARY : Mon raisonnement et celui d'un agriculteur africain sont radicalement différents. Un Africain vit toujours dans l'ordre de la nature dont il suit le rythme en se conformant au changement des saisons. Il a donc une tout autre idée de la rationalité. Notre universalisme à nous prend ses racines dans le Siècle des lumières. Nos prédécesseurs ignoraient à peu près tout des civilisations non européennes, et il était admis qu'il n'y avait qu'un raisonnement valable : le leur, celui qui représentait pour eux la pensée humaine universelle. Un autre problème est inhérent à la pensée occidentale : sa foi en la rationalité est fondée sur les sciences naturelles et elle nie que la pensée scientifique — qui est matérialiste, méthodologique et qui ne croit qu'aux chiffres — soit seulement une version spécifique de la rationalité humaine.

A mon avis, ce sont la civilisation et les circonstances déterminées par la culture momentanément dominante qui façonnent et influencent le raisonnement humain. Chaque culture élabore inévitablement son propre raisonnement. Voilà pourquoi notre logique n'est pas opérationnelle dans les autres cultures. Car ces dernières peuvent admettre, par exemple, la validité simultanée de deux phénomènes contradictoires. On peut démontrer ce fait aussi bien dans la philosophie indienne que dans le bouddhisme.

Nous avons donc beau promouvoir le développement des pays asiatiques, africains et latino-américains avec les moyens qui ont fait leurs preuves chez nous, d'après ce que j'ai vu, nous ne pouvons pas parler de développement. Jusqu'à ce jour, malheureusement, nous n'avons vu aucune expérience d'élaboration d'une politique sociale et économique conforme aux traditions et à la culture de ces pays.

Q. *Dans quelle mesure la mondialisation menace-t-elle le dialogue entre les cultures ?*

V.S. Il me semble que la mondialisation signifie l'extension de la civilisation occidentale de la fin du XX^e siècle sur le monde entier et qu'elle se manifeste avant tout dans le fait que certains marchés financiers

* Cet article est paru dans le *Courier international (Le Monde)*, Spécial 10 ans, No. 523, 9 au 15 novembre 2000, pp. 82-83. Originellement c'est le texte d'une interview à la Télévision hongroise, diffusée le 31 octobre 1999; le texte, une fois édité, fut publié par le *Népszabadság*. Budapest, Vol. LVIII. No. 218, 16 septembre 2000.

réagissent avec une rapidité incroyable à ce qui se passe sur les autres marchés. C'est la raison pour laquelle certains auteurs anglo-saxons peuvent écrire que l'on n'a plus besoin de la géographie, puisque les frontières sont abolies. Une partie des théories en question souligne que les entreprises supranationales étendent leurs activités sur le monde entier et qu'elles s'installent et produisent là où elles espèrent le plus grand profit. Du coup, l'expansion de l'économie globale provoque de sérieuses incertitudes dans les économies nationales et sur les marchés de l'emploi ; aucune prévision n'est plus possible. Tout cela est en parfaite harmonie avec les principes de l'économie de marché, mais cela revient à dire que nous imposons les caractéristiques de la culture et de la civilisation occidentales aux peuples vivant dans d'autres civilisations. Si l'on se dit que la mondialisation peut faire disparaître l'humanité merveilleusement multicolore qu'avait créée la richesse spirituelle des différentes civilisations, alors, nous sommes exposés à un immense danger. Bien sûr, la résistance à la mondialisation culturelle est très forte et elle prend de l'ampleur au sein des autres civilisations. L'islamisme et d'autres types de fondamentalismes sont les preuves radicales de cette résistance

Q. *Comment voyez-vous le heurt entre la culture mondiale globalisante et les autres grandes cultures ?*

V.S. A mon avis, toutes les cultures et toutes les civilisations se valent. D'un point de vue technique et scientifique, les autres civilisations diffèrent sensiblement de la nôtre, mais elles ont obtenu de merveilleux résultats. C'est indéniable. En même temps, ceux qui vivent dans ces civilisations ont leur propre bien enraciné dans leur histoire et dans leur vie, et c'est à travers de cette idéologie qu'ils ont établi un contact d'une part avec l'univers transcendant, d'autre part avec les hommes, avec notre univers humain. D'un point de vue politique, le problème majeur vient du fait que les Etats occidentaux s'efforcent d'imposer au monde entier la démocratie en tant qu'institution politique et en tant que forme exclusive de la vie publique.

Q. *Pourquoi est-ce le problème majeur ?*

V.S. Je ne crois pas que la démocratie puisse être réalisée n'importe où dans le monde dans la forme sous laquelle elle fonctionne aujourd'hui aux Etats-Unis ou en Europe occidentale. Ne serait-ce que parce que les conditions locales ne sont pas appropriées à l'implantation de la démocratie. La démocratie présuppose — entre autres — un large système éducatif qui forme la mentalité des nouvelles générations. La politique démocratique n'a aucun sens là où les gens votent en ignorant les différentes possibilités entre lesquelles ils peuvent choisir. Car l'essence de la démocratie, c'est la libre expression de la volonté du peuple.

Q. *Dans l'un de vos essais consacré aux problèmes de la démocratie, vous avez proposé une interprétation peu courante du républicanisme.*

V.S. Aujourd'hui, sous le terme de 'démocratie' nous comprenons généralement une démocratie que l'on appelle libérale ou 'participative,' en somme populiste. Il existe cependant un modèle classique, républicain, de la démocratie que je défends. Il s'agit du système politique fondé sur les valeurs communes d'un groupe humain, c'est-à-dire sur une culture partagée depuis des générations. Je dois préciser qu'on ne peut pas appliquer ce modèle aux Etats-Unis, où les immigrés sont toujours fort nombreux et où divers groupes humains apportent continuellement des systèmes de valeur différents.

Dans le premier type de démocratie, la seule valeur — l'expression de la volonté populaire — est que nous votons et que sur cette base se forme un gouvernement qui dirige le pays pendant une période définie par la loi. Or, dans cette forme de démocratie, un élément jugé pourtant essentiel par le théoricien du républicanisme Machiavel n'a même pas de droit de cité : cet élément part du fait que les intérêts contradictoires des individus et des groupes les obligent, à des compromis mutuel.

Q. *On considère Machiavel non pas comme un théoricien de la démocratie, mais comme celui des manœuvres du pouvoir, du 'machivélisme'.*

V.S. Je considère Machiavel comme un des plus grands penseurs du républicanisme classique, même si l'on dit beaucoup de mal du *Prince*, en prétendant qu'il défendait les intérêts des gens au pouvoir. Je ne pense pas que ce soit vrai. Machiavel était un homme politique pragmatique qui avait toujours soutenu que le républicanisme reposait sur deux choses : d'une part, sur le rejet de la monarchie ; d'autre part, sur le fait que tant l'homme public que le simple citoyen doivent œuvrer pour le bien commun. Mais, pour que l'on puisse définir le bien commun, il est indispensable que les communautés humaines — aussi bien un peuple donné que les habitants d'une cité — aient un système de valeurs et une culture communs. Car nous risquons non seulement de voir disparaître le pluralisme culturel — autrement dit le pluralisme des systèmes de valeurs, des croyances, des convictions et des modes de vie — , mais aussi de constater que l'uniformisation détruit toute créativité, aussi bien des individus que des sociétés.

Q. *Dans la diversité actuelle des cultures et des systèmes de valeurs, un tel modèle peut-il encore être opérationnel ?*

V.S. Oui, si l'on pouvait transformer la structure de l'Etat et si l'on réussissait à remplacer les grands Etats par de petites unités politiques — dans lesquelles les gens pourraient mieux se connaître et auraient plus de possibilités d'exercer une solidarité démocratique. Cela conduirait à l'extinction du système étatique qui est en vigueur depuis le XVII^e siècle et au bouleversement des rapports entre Etats au niveau planétaire.

Q. *Comment pourrait-on réaliser un tel aménagement ?*

V.S. Ma conception de la démocratie républicaine, c'est, en substance, que les structures politiques actuelles doivent être décentralisées autant que possible et qu'à l'aide de la technologie — car il est primordial d'en disposer — nous réalisons une nouvelle forme de coexistence sociale adaptée aux circonstances d'aujourd'hui. Il est évident que l'on a besoin de coordonner nos efforts au maximum, aussi bien dans le domaine de la finance, de la sécurité que de l'environnement. La régionalisation de la démocratie signifie donc la prise de décision dans des cadres plus étroits, de façon décentralisée. Ce qui n'exclurait pas qu'elle soit représentative, mais elle serait représentative à une plus petite échelle. Du coup, la distance serait réduite entre la population et les représentants, leurs décisions et les solutions qu'ils proposent. Ainsi, nous pourrions rendre la démocratie plus efficace.

PROPOS RECUEILLIS PAR MESSIEURS ANDRAS MONORY ET JOZSEF ATTILA TILLMANN

A lire

Dernier ouvrage de Victor Segesvary : *Dialogue of Civilization*. University Press of America, Blue Ridge, 2000.

IL VERO REPUBBLICANESIMO*

L'essenza di un repubblicanesimo classico

Il repubblicanesimo oggi non è nient'altro che uno slogan, utilizzato simultaneamente sia dalla destra sia dalla sinistra, per giustificare i loro valori morali e politici. Si può anzi dire che il repubblicanesimo, come un complesso d'idee e d'orientamento politico, in Europa abbia perduto il suo significato. Ad eccezione di paesi come la Francia, dove la chiesa cattolica ha avuto nei secoli scorsi enorme potere e influenza, e dove il repubblicanesimo significa ancora oggi l'affermazione della separazione dei poteri della chiesa dallo stato. In Francia la destra e la sinistra si rifanno parimenti agli ideali e ai valori del repubblicanesimo per dedicarsi a un grande movimento della storia europea. In altri paesi, e anche negli Stati Uniti, i partiti repubblicani si chiamano così solamente per ragioni storiche e per essere distinti da altri partiti o, come in Germania, il partito repubblicano rappresenta il fianco cosiddetto fascista del ventaglio politico.

L'espressione *res publica*, nel senso che le viene dato oggi, è stata utilizzata la prima volta da Cicerone (*De re publica*, I. 25), il quale aveva dichiarato che il sistema politico di Roma corrispondeva soltanto al tempo della costituzione tradizionale alle caratteristiche della *res publica*. Dopo Cicerone, Sant' Agostino fece propria quella espressione spiegandola: « Omnino nullam esse rem publicam, quoniam non esset res populi » (*De civitate Dei*, V. 21). Il significato di questo concetto è rimasto lo stesso fino ai tempi nostri. Quindi, uno dei noti esperti in scienza politica contemporanea, Quentin Skinner, definisce la caratteristica principale della repubblica come un sistema politico fondato sulle elezioni popolari¹.

I grandi pensatori politici del Rinascimento, Macchiavelli, Leonardo Bruni (curatore dell'edizione dei *Politica* di Aristotele, Paris, 1506) e Francesco Guicciardini resuscitarono la teoria politica di Aristotele, mediata, naturalmente, da autori romani come Cicerone e le opere storiche di Sallustio, in particolare la prima parte del *Bellum Catilinae*.

Che le idee del vero repubblicanesimo fossero state dimenticate nel corso degli ultimi secoli, e che anzi fossero praticamente scomparse dal pensiero politico moderno, possono spiegare la sua sostituzione, dopo il settecento, con la diffusa concezione di Rousseau che la sfera politica sia fondata sul « contratto sociale ». Una concezione che, per la sua elaborazione successiva fatta dagli pensatori politici anglosassoni — da John Locke e Jeremy Bentham a John Stuart Mill — diventava l'unica istituzione politica accettabile nella civiltà occidentale del nostro secolo sotto forma di democrazia liberale. Per questa ragione è indispensabile, quando le idee del vero repubblicanesimo sono analizzate in rapporto al mondo d'oggi, riferirsi ad alcune caratteristiche del sistema liberale anche quando il popolo partecipa direttamente nelle decisioni politiche (anche se solo attraverso elezioni periodiche).

1. IL SISTEMA POLITICO DEL REPUBBLICANESIMO

Prima di definire l'essenza del sistema politico repubblicano, è necessario rifiutare la teoria di Immanuel Kant riguardo alla politica repubblicana e al suo posto nella società umana.

* *Clio* (Roma), Anno XXXIX, 2003, N.4, pp. 671-685.

¹. SKINNER, Quentin, *Machiavelli's Discorsi and the Pre-humanist Origins of Republican Ideas*; in: BOCK, Gisela – SKINNER, Quentin – VIROLI, Maurizio (eds.), *Machiavelli and Republicanism*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 133, nota 94.

Kant nella sua opera *Pace eterna*² distingue due categorie di *civitas* conosciute da noi: (i) chi o quale persona ha il potere supremo, e (ii) in quale modo la persona che ha l'autorità suprema l'esercita. Kant definisce la prima categoria come la sovranità (*forma imperii*) che dà luogo a tre possibili forme di potere: l'autocratico, la dominazione di una persona, l'aristocratico (quando c'è un'associazione di parecchie persone che detengono il potere) e, infine, il democratico, in cui l'insieme di abitanti, cioè la società civile, è depositario di ogni attributo del potere politico.

La seconda categoria contiene le forme del governo (*forma regiminis*) e dell'esercizio del potere, con riferimento alle costituzioni dei paesi europei³. Kant definisce così le due forme di governo: il repubblicano e il dispotico. Il governo repubblicano significa semplicemente la separazione dei poteri legislativi ed esecutivi, mentre il governo dispotico è caratterizzato dal fatto che la stessa persona esercita sia l'autorità di legislazione sia quella di esecuzione⁴.

La teoria politica di Kant, descritta qui sopra, non è accettabile, perchè al filosofo tedesco erano sconosciute le vere caratteristiche del repubblicanesimo. Infatti, nel senso classico di quest'ultimo, esso rappresenta insieme la *forma imperii* e la *forma regiminis*; dunque esclude le forme di governo autocratico e aristocratico, nonostante possa succedere che l'élite della comunità (non rappresentando in nulla un potere aristocratico) governi in quanto investita dalla volontà popolare. In ogni caso, il sistema repubblicano non può essere identificato con qualunque forma di governo dispotico, perchè l'autodeterminazione e la tirannia sono concetti che si escludono a vicenda.

Nella generazione inglese dei repubblicani del seicento, James Harrington è stato, a parte John Milton (autore di *Lost Paradise*) e Algernon Sidney, il rappresentante più noto⁵. Harrington ha preso le difese della repubblica con argomenti giuridici, invece di fare riferimento anche alla morale, come avvenne durante il Rinascimento [« la repubblica non è l'impero degli uomini ma della legalità »], e ha concluso che la repubblica dovrebbe essere il risultato di uno sviluppo sociale ed economico⁶. Anche la sua categorizzazione dei sistemi politici era molto originale, perchè egli li divide in monarchie e repubbliche (nella sua terminologia, *commonwealth*). Le monarchie erano divise in: (i) quelle del potere assolutista, (ii) quelle caratterizzate dal dominio congiunto del re e di una parte dell'aristocrazia, e (iii) quelle associate con la feudalità. Un sistema repubblicano può nascere solo quando la borghesia riesce ad ottenere una parte notevole delle proprietà terriere. Infatti, le categorie dei sistemi politici di Harrington corrispondono alle categorie di Aristotele, che aveva distinto i governi tirannici da quelli costituzionali.

² KANT, Immanuel, *Perpetual Peace. A Philosophical Sketch*. In: *Political Writings*. Ed. with an Introd. and Notes by H. Riess. Transl. by H.B. Nisbet. 2. enl. ed. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp. 93–130.

³ Secondo la definizione kantiana della costituzione «quest'ultima è un atto della volontà generale, attraverso il quale la massa diventa un popolo». *Ibid.* p. 101.

⁴ Kant espone in questo testo la sua concezione della democrazia: «La *democrazia*, nel suo vero senso, è necessariamente un *dispotismo*, perchè essa si costituisce come un esercizio del potere che assicura a ogni cittadino la possibilità di prendere delle decisioni che riguardano altri cittadini (addirittura contro i loro interessi) senza il loro consenso; decisioni cioè per tutto il popolo sebbene solo per una parte di esso. Ciò significa che la volontà generale contraddice se stessa e, di conseguenza, contraddice anche il principio della libertà. » *Ibid.* [Tutte le traduzioni in questo articolo sono fatte dall'autore.]

⁵ Riguardo al repubblicanesimo di Harrington, vedi: SABINE, George H., *A History of Political Theory*. 4th ed. Rev. by Th. L. Thorson. Hinsdale, Ill., Dryden Press, 1973, Cap. 26: 'Harrington, Milton, and Sidney', pp. 459–477.

⁶ Non è qui il luogo adatto per entrare nei dettagli dell'argomento estensivo di Harrington. E' necessario però indicare che secondo Harrington un sistema politico corrisponde alla distribuzione nella società di tutti i beni, in particolare delle proprietà terriere. Nella sua teoria — come nelle teorie socialiste moderne — il cambiamento di un regno o di un sistema aristocratico in un sistema repubblicano si fa per la distribuzione estensiva alle popolazioni di tutte le proprietà terriere.

Harrington riteneva che i due fattori determinanti nello spazio pubblico sono sempre stati la costrizione e l'autorità, in cui si è rivelata l'influenza dell'ideazione classica, anche se nel suo pensiero le definizioni di questi due concetti sono stati interamente differenziati da quelli dei tempi passati. La costrizione era stata capita come lo sfruttamento degli interessi comuni della popolazione del paese a favore degli interessi individuali o di gruppi, mentre l'autorità (come nel Rinascimento) ha rappresentato la forma di governo, cercando di realizzare i beni pubblici come il governo repubblicano. Questa forma istituzionale di governo civile è l'unica che assicura, tramite il regno del diritto, una vita libera per le persone e una vita pubblica che rappresenta l'armonizzazione di tutti gli interessi (*'equal commonwealth'*).

Così la repubblica dovrebbe essere governata dall'élite assieme a tutto il corpo della borghesia (riflettendo l'idea di rappresentazione indiretta), seguendo le regole di alcuni pensatori del Rinascimento come Guicciardini. L'élite ha il dovere di elaborare e di eseguire dei programmi di governo, mentre l'insieme della borghesia ha il potere di approvare o respingere le proposte che sono state sottoposte dalle persone incaricate degli affari pubblici. Per evitare la fondazione di una tirannia Harrington, come gli altri pensatori politici della modernità nascente, ha previsto una triplice garanzia: (i) il cambiamento frequente dei governanti, (ii) l'elezione segreta, e in fine, (iii) la separazione dei poteri.

Secondo la convinzione repubblicana non c'è alcuna differenza fra la società e lo stato, perché lo stato è nient'altro che l'aspetto politico dell'interazione della società intera. E' in questo modo che il repubblicanesimo pone l'accento sull'importanza dell'identità politica, data dal risultato dell'interazione tra gli avvenimenti politici e le tradizioni. Così la coscienza repubblicana esprime la coscienza della collettività, visto che gli spazi privati e pubblici sono interdipendenti, diversamente dalle due grandi ideologie della civiltà moderna, opposti al repubblicanesimo : la democrazia liberale, che valorizza innanzitutto l'individuo astratto, e la dottrina collettivista fondata soprattutto sull'idea della lotta di classe :

« Una repubblica è più di un oggetto e allo stesso tempo diverso da esso. Significa contemporaneamente la possibilità della vita pubblica, lo spazio nel quale la vita pubblica si svolge, e la stessa vita pubblica. La repubblica è l'insieme di abitudini, costumi, tradizioni e istituzioni che promuovono e rafforzano la vita pubblica. Mentre la repubblica ha un significato anche come tessuto di relazioni che esistono, nel tempo e nello spazio, tra i cittadini »⁷.

Quindi il vero repubblicano crede nell'affermazione e nella valorizzazione istituzionale dell'autodeterminazione della comunità. In base a questa affermazione il sistema politico del repubblicanesimo si fonda sull'autogoverno della comunità, che Macchiavelli ha designato quattro secoli fa come « il vivere libero ». Questa credenza repubblicana esclude tutte le forme della dominazione di una persona, di un gruppo sociale — classe, casta — o di un qualunque strato sociale che ha attirato il potere su di sé utilizzando alcuni mezzi scientifici-tecnologici o applicando modi burocratici di governare.

Secondo Macchiavelli, la repubblica si fonda in primo luogo sul rispetto dei costumi e delle tradizioni; in secondo luogo sulle circostanze sociali caratterizzate da un'uguaglianza fondamentale e dall'esistenza di una classe borghese numerosa; e, infine, sulle mentalità e virtù civili che unificano l'iniziativa individuale con l'accettazione della disciplina indispensabile alla vita comunitaria.

La descrizione della visione repubblicana descritta qui sopra, mette già in evidenza le differenze importanti tra la costituzione istituzionale di una repubblica e la democrazia liberale. Il sistema politico della democrazia liberale riflette un'idea completamente individualista, e perciò è fondata, dopo Locke e Rousseau, sul « contratto sociale », che esprime l'intesa ipotetica delle volontà di innumerevoli individui. Anche la categorizzazione di Kant, che abbiamo precedentemente indicata, si svolge nell'ambito di questa contraddizione, perché il grande filosofo tedesco aveva totalmente ignorato i principi e la pratica del repubblicanesimo classico elaborati al tempo del Rinascimento sotto l'influsso dei pensatori politici anglosassoni, e delle idee della rivoluzione francese.

⁷. SMITH, Bruce J. (1985), *Politics & Remembrance: Republican Themes in Machiavelli, Burke, and Tocqueville*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, p. 6.

Si ritrovano qui le radici dell'incompatibilità dei sistemi politici repubblicani e liberal-democratici : il primo è l'espressione politica della comunità organica degli individui⁸, il secondo è l'aggregazione di individui completamente indipendenti dagli altri, cioè di coloro che esprimono la volontà comune di una collettività atomizzata, ma non quella della società civile⁹.

2. LE CARATTERISTICHE DEL PENSIERO REPUBBLICANO

Il classico repubblicanesimo si distingue dagli altri sistemi politici per tre aspetti principali del suo pensiero : primo, il rigetto assoluto della monarchia; secondo, che la repubblica è fondata sull'insieme dei cittadini, cioè su una vera comunità, e non sulla collettività degli individui atomizzati (con l'espressione delle nuove critiche della società contemporanea), e terzo, che la volontà della comunità si esprime per la creazione di uno stato di diritto.

(i) Il rigetto assoluto della monarchia

Una repubblica viene immaginata come una entità politica non governata esclusivamente da una persona. Una repubblica non ha re, imperatori, tiranni, o un podestà qualsiasi. Essa è governata da coloro che sono eletti dalla comunità per tutto il periodo che costoro possiedono la fiducia della stessa comunità. Le elezioni periodiche servono semplicemente a verificare che gli eletti — capi dello stato, membri delle assemblee legislative o degli altri organi delle istituzioni politiche — abbiano ancora la fiducia dei cittadini, altrimenti occorre eleggere gli ufficiali che rimpiazzino quelli che hanno perduto la legittimazione del loro ruolo nella vita pubblica. In questo senso la repubblica è l'incarnazione del *vivere civile* e del *vivere libero*¹⁰. John Adams, uno dei più eminenti studiosi della prima generazione di politici americani, aveva anche formulato così l'essenza di un governo repubblicano: « uno stato in cui la sovranità è rappresentata non da una, ma da parecchie persone »¹¹.

Quentin Skinner ha dimostrato che l'idea della repubblica aveva delle radici profonde nella civiltà medioevale e pre-umanista. Gerolamo Savonarola, che finì la sua lotta per il rinnovamento morale dei fiorentini sul rogo, combatte già negli anni 1490 affinché la città salvaguardi le proprie libertà tradizionali ad ogni costo, cioè che essa possa rimanere una repubblica, perché solo le istituzioni repubblicane possono proteggere l'unico valore più grande dell'oro o dell'argento, cioè la libertà pubblica¹². Anche Francesco Patrizzi mette enfaticamente l'accento sulla necessità che tutti debbano difendere la libertà nei loro cuori, perché « nulla può essere più importante alla società civile che la libertà »¹³.

⁸. «Nelle repubbliche, l'uguaglianza è fondata sull'idea delle relazioni civili secondo le quali certe cose sono *possedute e condivise* in comune. Dunque i cittadini sono, in un certo qual modo, simili a se stessi. E' questa similarità che sottintende il dinamismo egualitario ». SMITH, op. cit. p. 256.

⁹. Secondo Macchiavelli, la legislatura democratica funziona solamente quando i cittadini vedono i legislatori come persone di carattere e quando il loro giudizio non è accecato dai loro stessi interessi : «Non il bene particolare ma il bene comune è quello che fa grandi la città ». MACCHIAVELLI, Niccolò, *I discorsi*. II. 2.

¹⁰. Da leggere su questi aspetti del repubblicanesimo l'eccellente analisi di: POCOCK, J.G.A. *The Machiavellian Moment : Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975, Cap. III, 'The Problem and Its Modes, c/ The *vita activa* and the *vita civile*', pp. 49–80.

¹¹. In: EVERDELL, William R. *The End of Kings : A History of Republics and Republicans*. New York, The Free Press, 1983, p. 6.

¹². Il titolo dell'opera di Savonarola in cui parla della libertà pubblica è: *Trattato circa il reggimento e governo della città di Firenze*, in *Prediche sopra Aggeo*. In: SKINNER, Quentin, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978, Vol. I. p. 147.

¹³. *Ibid.* p. 156.

Quindi la repubblica è una istituzione di autogoverno di una comunità umana — una comunità la cui coerenza era designata da Tocqueville come « il patriottismo istintivo », — perchè essa è l'unico sistema politica che possa garantire sia la libertà individuale che la libertà pubblica¹⁴. L'istituzione della repubblica soddisfa tutti i requisiti dei principi più democratici della vita pubblica, e come tali non possono funzionare nelle circostanze demografiche, economiche e burocratiche che prevalgono oggi, ma solamente in una struttura sociale e politica più decentralizzata¹⁵. Se questo aspetto dell'istituzione repubblicana fosse riconosciuto, sarebbe una cosa sorprendente, molto di più dell'affermazione che fanno in molti, cioè che la nascita dello stato nazionale sia la causa della scomparsa della repubblica come istituzione politica. L'esplosione demografica delle popolazioni, come l'estensione considerevole dei territori in tutti gli stati dell'Occidente, hanno veramente richiesto l'invenzione dell'istituzione della democrazia rappresentativa al posto della repubblica. Questa affermazione deve però essere rifiutata senza esitazione, visto che il sistema politico rappresentativo (cioè una rappresentazione indiretta della comunità) non è contrario ai principi del repubblicanesimo¹⁶. Per esempio, Montesquieu, il grande teorico politico francese del settecento, si è fatto protagonista del sistema rappresentativo non solo perchè questo rendesse possibile il governo di vasti territori e di popolazioni numerose, ma in primo luogo perché, secondo lui, la maggioranza delega il proprio potere di governare, o addirittura la propria sovranità, solamente in una repubblica e non in una democrazia¹⁷.

Per contraddire questo argomento, pare evidente che la convinzione repubblicana sia stata sostituita dalla democrazia liberale fondata sul contratto sociale, perché quella corrispondeva alla visione esclusiva dell'individualismo prevalente durante l'epoca moderna. Infatti, la tesi del contratto sociale prevedeva di realizzare l'uguaglianza assoluta nella società, un'uguaglianza che doveva contrapporre l'aggregazione degli interessi individuali atomizzati all'autorità di uno stato onnipotente (vedi qui il *Leviathan* di Thomas Hobbes), rigettando però il principio d'uguaglianza che deriva dalla qualità d'essere membro della comunità, come era stato affermato dai repubblicani. Alla democrazia liberale corrisponde, sul piano economico, il mercato libero dell'autogoverno (l'autogoverno corrisponde alla « mano invisibile »), secondo l'equazione di Jeremy Bentham : voto libero = mercato libero, che tuttavia non esclude la necessità dell'intervento ineluttabile della mano pesante dello stato.

I pensatori classici, ma anche i repubblicani del Rinascimento, non hanno potuto immaginare l'uguaglianza come una relazione formale o materiale, ma come un atteggiamento condiviso da tutti, mettendo al di sopra dei loro propri interessi il servizio dei beni comuni e la partecipazione alla vita pubblica, in tutte le attività della città. Dunque l'ideale d'uguaglianza si manifesta nel rispetto dell'esecuzione dei doveri e degli obblighi, cui tutti coloro che fanno parte della comunità si sono reciprocamente impegnati. Come conseguenza di una tale intesa, tutti accettano senza opporsi le differenze gerarchiche riconosciute della comunità, cioè di alcune disuguaglianze che esistono; mentre coloro che sono incaricati degli affari comuni, non usano i loro privilegi per soddisfare

¹⁴. «L'essenza del repubblicanesimo rinascimentale era che la libertà della comunità politica dovesse avere una responsabilità [accountability] unicamente verso l'autorità costituita da se stessa. L'autonomia è il fondamento della libertà, ma anche il diritto dei cittadini di partecipare nella gestione dei loro stessi affari, secondo il quadro costituzionale che ha definito i propri ruoli per le forze dirigenti della società ». In: HELD, David, *Democracy and the Global Order : From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Government*. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1991, p. 7. — Vedi anche: SKINNER, Quentin, *The State*. In: BALL, F. — FARR, J. — HANSON, R.L. (eds.), *Political Innovations and Conceptual Change*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 105.

¹⁵. Questo pensiero si ritrova negli scritti di James Madison, sebbene egli abbia identificato la struttura istituzionale decentralizzata con il federalismo. Vedi: MADISON, James, [Publius], *The Federalist. No. 51*. In: *The Federalist Papers*. By A. Hamilton, J. Madison and J. Jay. Ed. and Introd. by G. Wills. New York, Bantam Books, 1982, p. 265.

¹⁶. E' molto interessante notare che Rousseau abbia definitivamente rigettato il sistema rappresentativo. Secondo lui, una volta che gli individui accettano di essere rappresentati sulla scena politica, perdono ineluttabilmente la loro libertà. Cfr. *Il contratto sociale*, cap. XV, sui «Deputati e Rappresentanti».

¹⁷. *L'esprit des lois et la querelle de l'esprit des lois*, II. 2, «Du gouvernement républicain et des lois relatives à la démocratie».

i propri desideri e servire ai propri interessi, perché il sentimento profondo d'essere gli uni come gli altri, cioè di partecipare ad una comunità, impedisce loro d'agire in questo modo¹⁸.

Certo non tutti erano d'accordo, neanche nel Rinascimento, con la dottrina e il sentimento d'uguaglianza. Guicciardini, per esempio, era convinto che molte persone del popolo « non sono capaci di decidere affari importantissimi » perché manca loro un pensiero coerente, e perché sono caratterizzati dalla gelosia nei confronti dei ricchi e dei potenti. In qualsiasi repubblica dove il popolo decide sugli affari importanti c'è un declino, e l'instabilità della vita politica e i cambiamenti continui mettono in pericolo la sua esistenza¹⁹.

(ii) Il fondamento morale del repubblicanesimo

Da Atene a Roma a Firenze, i fondamenti delle istituzioni repubblicane erano sempre stati l'esistenza di una comunità, i suoi principi e i suoi valori, particolarmente gli atteggiamenti e gli atti morali²⁰. Questo atteggiamento era caratterizzato dalla ricerca dei beni comuni e dalla preminenza degli interessi della comunità sui propri interessi²¹, il cui opposto è la corruzione, un segno d'inattitudine al vivere libero. Dato che l'unica garanzia della creazione e della sopravvivenza delle istituzioni repubblicane è la qualità morale dei membri della comunità, ogni difensore dell'ideale repubblicano, da Cicerone a Macchiavelli, aveva sostenuto una lotta incessante per promuovere le virtù e per condannare la corruzione, il più grande nemico del sistema repubblicano²². Per questo motivo, l'ideale repubblicano della libertà si fonda inequivocabilmente sulla libertà condivisa dai membri della comunità, e solo in secondo luogo sulla realizzazione della libertà individuale senza limitazione.

Secondo il repubblicanesimo classico, la corruzione è sempre stata descritta come il sopravvento degli interessi e delle ambizioni, non solo degli individui ma anche di qualsiasi categoria particolare della società (classe, partito, ecc.) sugli interessi pubblici²³. La corruzione significa, senza eccezioni, la fine del *vivere civile* e delle repubbliche autogovernate.

¹⁸. Per una visione simile sull'uguaglianza, vedi: McWILLIAMS, Wilson Carey, *On Equality As the Moral Foundation for Community*. In: HOROWITZ, R.H. (ed.), *The Moral Foundations of the American Republic*. 3. ed. Charlottesville, N.C.: University of Virginia Press, 1986, pp. 291–292.

¹⁹. *Considerations on the 'Discourses' of Machiavelli on the First Decade of T. Livy*. In: *Selected Writings*. Transl. and ed. by C. & M. Grayson. London, 1965, pp. 66, 106. In: SKINNER, *The Foundations ...*, op. cit. Vol. 1, p. 161.

²⁰. MACCHIAVELLI, op. cit. I. 18.

²¹. *Ibid.* II. 2.

²². *Ibid.* I. 25.

²³. A questo proposito James Madison aveva scritto: «E' molto importante per la repubblica non solo salvaguardare la società dall'oppressione dei potenti, ma anche di guardare una parte della società contro l'ingiustizia dell'altra parte. Esistono naturalmente interessi differenti tra le classi di cittadini. Se una maggioranza è unificata per un comune interesse, i diritti della minoranza saranno minacciati. Questo male può essere evitato in due modi: il primo consiste nel creare nella comunità una volontà comune indipendente dalla maggioranza, cioè una volontà della stessa società; l'altro è di avere nella società tante descrizioni separate dei cittadini [tante identità differenti], che rende quasi impossibile, o irrealizzabile, la creazione di una tale ingiusta maggioranza ». MADISON, op. cit. p. 264. E Madison spiega che gli Stati Uniti hanno scelto il secondo modo, perché la sua applicazione era ampiamente facilitata dal loro sistema politico federalista. Tocqueville nella sua critica alla democrazia americana è dello stesso avviso : «L'essenza di un governo democratico è l'assoluta sovranità della volontà della maggioranza ... L'autorità morale della maggioranza è fondata sull'idea che c'è più chiarezza e saggezza in una assemblea numerosa che in una sola persona, e la moltitudine di legislatori è più importante che il modo secondo cui vengono eletti. Questa è l'applicazione mentale della teoria di uguaglianza ... Per di più l'autorità morale della maggioranza è anche basata sul principio che gli interessi di molti devono essere preferiti agli interessi di pochi individui ... Quello che trovo molto ripugnante in America non è la libertà estrema che vi regna, ma la mancanza delle garanzie contro la tirannia » Cfr. TOCQUEVILLE, Alexis de, *Democracy in America*. Ed. by J.P. Meyer. Transl. by G. Lawrence. New York, Harper & Row, 1966, Vol. 1: pp. 246–247, 252. Vedi anche: SKINNER, *The State*, op. cit. p. 138.

Per i repubblicani classici, la libertà realizzata in una comunità significa nello stesso tempo autogoverno e libertà individuale, perché non è solo un singolo individuo o un gruppo sociale a detenere il potere. Contrariamente alla teoria di Aristotele, secondo la quale lo scopo dell'esistenza umana libera è di raggiungere l'*eudaimonia*, la buona vita, i repubblicani non avevano definito nessun scopo concreto per il raggiungimento del vivere libero, e quindi hanno concepito la libertà umana come una libertà positiva in maniera quasi moderna. Per loro, il vivere in uno stato libero significava che la comunità, come unità politica (per esempio, una nazione) possa vivere in libertà, e che possa fissare gli scopi delle proprie azioni secondo le proprie idee sui beni comuni. Di conseguenza, il libero vivere degli individui era automaticamente assicurato negli ambiti comunemente accettati. Qui si trova appunto la differenza fondamentale fra i concetti della libertà del repubblicanesimo e della democrazia liberale. Il primo collega la libertà personale al servizio degli affari pubblici tramite il vincolo etico, caratterizzando la cultura della comunità; il secondo pone l'accento sulle libertà individuali senza limiti, buttando in questo modo dalla finestra l'ideale d'una libertà comune e del servizio del pubblico²⁴.

Anche se Macchiavelli non conobbe l'importanza della moralità, — non si pose cioè, usando un'espressione di Nietzsche, al di là « del bene e del male » — ad ogni modo egli rimase scettico nei confronti della natura umana, non avendo nessuna fiducia in essa. Per questa ragione, il grande fiorentino non nutriva più nessuna speranza per il futuro della propria generazione, né per la sua città. Anche il celebre filosofo tedesco, Ernst Cassirer, aveva già notato che

« [Questa convinzione] è stata una parte integrante della sua conoscenza ... ogni uomo possiede aspetti negativi nella propria natura, e sarebbe impossibile trovarne uno che non dia prova della sua depravazione se ne avesse l'occasione ... Solo con la forza armata si può guarire questa depravazione, non con la legge »²⁵.

Però la diffidenza del Macchiavelli nei confronti della natura umana non gli ha impedito di ritenere che l'inimicizia fra i membri della comunità possa essere utile per la repubblica. Roma divenne una potenza grandissima a causa dei « tumulti » tra il senato e la plebe; attraverso la grandezza è diventata così l'esempio di tutte le repubbliche dell'universo. Quelle inimicizie fra l'élite e gli altri membri della comunità furono perfettamente naturali per lui, perché tali contraddizioni hanno stimolato mutue vigilanze, le quali conducevano il popolo a votare leggi che assicurassero la libertà di tutti.

Macchiavelli sostenne questa sua tesi — contrariamente ai suoi contemporanei — con la frequente contraddizione, irrisolvibile, tra il servizio pubblico e la richiesta di giustizia. Siccome mettersi al servizio dei beni comuni significava molte volte trascurare gli interessi di una o di un'altra persona²⁶, Macchiavelli concluse che anche uno sforzo sincero che possa servire ad attuare gli interessi della comunità, può sempre comportare l'abbandono dell'ideale della giustizia.

(iii) La repubblica : uno stato di diritto

I repubblicani sono stati sempre veri realisti, sapendo che non avrebbero potuto avere confidenza in una « mano invisibile » per adattare l'equilibrio tra la libertà individuale e quella della comunità. Come è possibile che degli individui che desiderano solamente la realizzazione dei loro interessi si possano comportare secondo la virtù repubblicana, cioè sovrapporre gli interessi comuni ai loro propri interessi? L'unica risposta a questa domanda (pure in uso nelle democrazie liberali) era che solo il potere vincolante delle leggi può indurre gli individui a servire la realizzazione degli interessi comuni²⁷.

²⁴. Vedi: SKINNER, Quentin, *The Republican Ideal of Political Liberty*, op. cit. p. 308.

²⁵. CASSIRER, Ernst, *The Myth of the State*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1946, p. 148.

²⁶. MACCHIAVELLI, op. cit. II. 2.

²⁷. Mi piace riferire qui la descrizione della situazione americana attuale da parte di Benjamin Barber: «Brevemente, il sistema [politico] ha trasformato la necessità in virtù e ha introdotto la mancanza delle mete nel centro proprio nella struttura

L'importanza dello stato di diritto, lo sforzo di assicurare il regno del diritto è una conseguenza del movimento della secolarizzazione della civiltà europea. Infatti, nella civiltà dell'Occidente fino all'avvento della modernità, e nelle civiltà extra-europee fino a nostri giorni, l'unico strumento che serviva a tenere al guinzaglio la rincorsa sfrenata verso gli interessi individuali erano le regole morali derivate dalla religione. La dimensione trascendentale fondata sulla fede in Dio o su un'etica metafisica (come nel buddismo), ha costituito pure la ragione principale del rispetto delle leggi degli uomini. Visto che la religiosità aveva gradualmente perduto tra le popolazioni europee la sua dominazione su tutti gli aspetti della vita umana, l'obbligo di rispettare le leggi era fondato sul diritto naturale (nelle opere di Grotius e di Pufendorf) fino al 18° secolo, quando l'autonomia della legislazione per gli uomini era generalmente riconosciuta.

Il riferimento dei repubblicani al rispetto obbligatorio delle leggi, era addirittura basato sull'idea che la legislazione nella città servisse agli interessi della comunità e non a quelli degli individui. Secondo Quentin Skinner:

« Costringendo gli individui ad agire in un modo che rispetti le istituzioni dello stato libero, la legge crea e salvaguarda la libertà individuale ad un livello che senza tali obblighi diventerà rapidamente una servitù assoluta »²⁸.

Certo, l'allusione alla legalità e allo stato di diritto non può risolvere i problemi delle repubbliche o di qualsiasi altra istituzione politica, e non può proteggere la loro esistenza da effetti nefasti della corrotta natura umana. Infine, il destino delle repubbliche dipende anche dai principi fondamentali, a patto che i valori e le regole morali trasmessi da generazione a generazione vengano rispettate dai membri delle comunità che la compongono:

« Il successo della sfera politica, che è il creatore e custode istituzionale delle leggi, dipende in primo luogo dall'ultima fonte della validità normativa in una società. Poiché [ella non possiede] una fondazione positiva giuridica e la legittimità di questa sfera dipende interamente da quella fonte »²⁹.

Le democrazie che oggi non possono aspirare a una tale legittimità, scrive Beetham, per le funzioni elettive devono riferirsi alla legittimità ottenuta dalla « massa ». Quest'autore identifica nello spazio pubblico dell'epoca moderna una struttura normativa triplice : (i) la legittimità come norma affermata secondo regole riconosciute; (ii) la giustificazione delle regole secondo i termini delle convinzioni comuni nella società; e infine, (iii) il consenso pubblico e indiscutibile di tutti coloro che sono qualificati a pronunciarsi³⁰.

Perciò l'insistenza repubblicana sullo stato di diritto e sulla moralità pubblica sono totalmente collegate; se le leggi non corrispondono alla moralità comune, si possono solamente far valere per il loro sforzo. Questo problema dello stato di diritto che addirittura caratterizza la democrazia liberale (l'osservazione delle leggi è condizionata dalla loro corrispondenza con la moralità della comunità) ha aggravato l'instabilità, riconosciuta dopo più di un secolo da Tocqueville, che accompagna sempre i sistemi elettorali, perchè i nuovi dirigenti dello stato avevano frequentemente voglia di cambiare le leggi secondo i loro principi e obiettivi politici.

Questa è la spiegazione per la quale i pensatori repubblicani hanno fortemente insistito nel fondare il sistema politico repubblicano sulla comunità e sui suoi valori, e il motivo per il quale hanno condannato, con

dei valori. Questo è il senso del '*proceduralism*', del metodo avversario del pluralismo e del consenso di poter non essere d'accordo ... Questa mancanza di mete non era stata allora il costo rimanente di realizzare una repubblica in mezzo a circostanze ostili, ma il principio che è responsabile per il suo successo ». BARBER, Benjamin, *The Compromised Republic: Public Purposelessness in America*. In: *The Moral Foundations of the American Republic*. op. cit. p. 52.

²⁸. SKINNER, op. cit. p. 305.

²⁹. BEETHAM, David, *The Legitimacy of Power*. London, Macmillan, 1991, p. 70.

³⁰. *Ibid.* pp. 94, 97.

grande sforzo, coloro che al potere avevano servito i propri interessi o quelli del loro gruppo sociale. Le leggi (come anche le costituzioni) e tutte le legislazioni destinate a regolare la vita sociale per far sì che la coabitazione nella società fosse possibile, sono fatte da uomini arrivati al potere tramite elezioni democratiche, e nello stesso tempo da uomini propensi a manipolare le legislazioni secondo il loro piacere. Di conseguenza, i veri repubblicani hanno realizzato che non c'è altra possibilità che avere costituzioni e leggi che resistano al passare del tempo e al cambiamento delle mode politiche, e che corrispondano alle tradizioni della comunità, alla sua struttura di valori sviluppati nei secoli, e a tutti i principi morali dei membri della stessa comunità. Una vera repubblica e una comunità costituiscono fenomeni totalmente interdipendenti nella vita umana.

3. LA DIMENSIONE STORICA DEL REPUBBLICANESIMO

Il repubblicanesimo classico rappresenta, nell'ottica storica europea, il primo passo verso la differenziazione della sfera politica dalla struttura sociale. La differenziazione è, secondo i due grandi teorici della società moderna, Talcott Parsons e Niklas Luhmann, la principale caratteristica dell'evoluzione sociale moderna al crepuscolo del sistema feudale, prima della creazione degli stati nazionali. In questo senso, la repubblica delle città italiane rappresenta una differenziazione evidente rispetto ai grandi imperi e alle monarchie universali che avevano caratterizzato il medioevo³¹.

La differenziazione rinascimentale significa una secolarizzazione della vita politica, un « ritorno sulla terra », abbandonando la visione gerarchica di una sfera politica situata fra il cielo e il mondo naturale, rimettendo così questa sfera in un contesto concreto spaziale e temporale. Perciò l'organizzazione politica repubblicana ha rappresentato una particolarità riguardo all'universalismo dell'impero o della monarchia cristiana, dunque un'esistenza determinata nello spazio e nel tempo. La repubblica non era stata considerata come una parte dell'ordine eterno naturale; vivere in essa e essere un cittadino di una tale entità sono diventate, concettualmente, realtà autonome, in cui la sovranità e l'autonomia di una comunità umana si sono manifestate. Questa era una vera dimensione storica che ha posto la repubblica nell'evoluzione della civiltà occidentale, un esempio della « coscienza effettiva storica » di Gadamer. Questa coscienza storica non aveva scartato l'idea della continuità (una conversazione diretta) con l'antichità greco-romana e cristiana, ma ha affermato l'identità particolare e storica dell'organizzazione dello spazio pubblico della città. Tuttavia, secondo il pensiero aristotelico, l'associazione con i contemporanei come la conversazione con quegli uomini distanti nel tempo o nello spazio della comunità, avevano fatto partecipare i cittadini alla civiltà del mondo, e così il particolare, il contestuale, erano stati inclusi nell'universale³².

³¹. Vedi POCOCK, op. cit. pp. 53–55.

³². Sulle leggi umane con riferimento alla nota discussione medievale sull'*universale*, Pocock annota : «E mentre gli universali possono essere imminenti nelle leggi umane, le leggi umane non sono universali; sono i frutti di decisioni umane (la

Questa nuova visione della vita politica lascia supporre l'impegno di ciascuno negli affari pubblici, una nuova forma della *vita activa* in contrasto con una *vita contemplativa* diventata un *vivere civile* insieme con gli altri cittadini³³, nel senso della *politeia* di Aristotele che per il filosofo peripatetico ha significato la struttura dei rapporti nella città in cui la popolazione avrebbe dovuto avere una cultura condivisa. Il *vivere civile* significa un impegno personale totale del cittadino a favore della città. Eugenio Garin ha ragione nel dire che l'umanesimo rinascimentale anticipa l'idea di Giambattista Vico secondo cui conosciamo il mondo attraverso il nostro atto di crearlo.³⁴

recta ratio agibilitum) e che hanno rilievo in situazioni particolari e esistono in momenti particolari del tempo. Gli universali possono solo essere conosciuti; decisioni e azioni possono solo essere legiferate rispetto ai particolari ». Cfr. POCOCCO, *op. cit.* p. 67.

^{33.} E' tuttavia necessario metter in guardia qui contro ogni giustapposizione delle due forme della *vita contemplativa* e della *vita activa*: «Optare per i valori civili non voleva dire impegnarsi interamente per il repubblicanesimo come per una causa politica, e optare per i valori contemplativi non voleva dire esprimere una disillusione totale per la repubblica ». *Ibid.* p. 59.

^{34.} GARIN, Eugenio, *Italian Humanism : Philosophy and Civic life in the Renaissance*. Transl. by P. Munz. New York, Harper & Row, 1965, p. 55.

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ISLAM AND THE REFORMATION*

A Study Concerning the Zurich Reformers' Attitude towards Islam (1510-1550)

[The present writing is the abstract in English of the author's book with the same title, written in French. It was first published by the Lausanne publisher, L'Age d'Homme; then reprinted by the International Scholars Publications and, later, by the University Press of America. We are planning to publish the book and its Hungarian translation in the near future.]

The study is organized in three parts. The first part describes the subject's historical and intellectual context. It not only traces the vagaries of European history in the sixteenth century, but reviews the main theses of Christian apologetics since the wars against the Saracens and the subsequent, gradual evolution of the Christian position towards Muslims through the writings of some outstanding Renaissance thinkers and humanists, like cardinal Nicholas of Cusa and Erasmus of Rotterdam.

The second part records the circumstances of the publication of the Latin text of the Koran in 1543 and the debates among reformers resulting from it. This is the main body of the study which concentrates on the pronouncements of the Zurich reformers Zwingli, Bullinger and, particularly, Bibliander, concerning the Prophet Muhammad and the doctrines of the Muslim faith, as well as their appreciation and critique of it. Their opinions and pronouncements are completed by those of Martin Luther and, to a lesser degree, other German reformers like Melancthon and Bucer who participated in the debate and gave their opinion in respect of the Koran's publication.

Part three points out the theological doctrines at stake in the confrontation of Islam and its beliefs, and directs attention to the main problems involved for the future of Christianity's relations with other religions. For example, it poses the question regarding the compatibility of the doctrine of predestination and the fundamental belief in God's universal grace, and analyzes the belief in the unity of the human race – the *concordia mundi* – advocating tolerance on the European horizon as a spiritual, intellectual, and political necessity.

A bibliography of Theodor Bibliander's works and the table of contents of his famous *Recueil* – the 1543 publication of writings about Islam which includes the Latin text of the Koran – are provided in annex. Notes are placed at the end of the chapters. Finally, an updated bibliography and an index facilitate the work of researchers and users.

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Part One

THE HISTORICAL AND INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT

This introductory part consists of the first three chapters dealing with the main events of European history in the first half of the sixteenth century (Chapter I); a narrative of the successive appearances of the intellectual and religious movements of Renaissance, Humanism, and Reformation, of their relationship and shared or opposing views (Chapter II); and, finally, the understanding of Islam and its criticism in medieval Christianity, the Renaissance, and Humanism (Chapter III).

1543 was a year of striking and bewildering coincidence. It was the year in which Theodor Bibliander, orientalist and successor of Huldrych Zwingli as professor at the Zurich academy, published, for the very first time in history, a Latin text of the Koran – God's revelation through the Prophet Muhammad – with a number of accompanying texts: explanations, refutations, and information about the life and customs of Muslims. In the same year, the political and military alliance between the French king, François I, and the Ottoman sultan, Suleiman the Magnificent, the very first agreement between a Christian king and a Muslim ruler in history, was revealed to the startled and shocked European population (Chapter I). This coincidence underlines the great importance of Bibliander's intellectual enterprise, as it indicates the moment when the opening of the European mind towards other religions and cultures began, along with the undeniable evidence of the Ottoman influence in European political conflicts.

This French-Ottoman alliance was, in fact, part of the decades' long war between Emperor Charles V and the French monarch, complicated by the interventions of the popes who endeavored to re-establish the pontifical authority as supreme arbiter in all political conflicts. The recurring pattern of these hostilities characterized the first fifty years of the sixteenth century. The second major element in European politics was the increasing menace of Ottoman power to the Empire, the nascent nation-states, and the smaller principalities and city States. Since the middle of the fifteenth century, Turkish armies advanced on the European continent occupying the Balkans. During the reign of Mohammed II, the Conqueror, the Ottoman Empire extended its domination to the frontiers of the Habsburg territories, a result of the decisive victory over the Hungarian armies at Mohács in 1526. The European powers had to face the Turkish expansion not only in the eastern part of the continent, but along the western Mediterranean as well, where the Spanish kings defended their North African territories against the attacks of various Barbary States who placed themselves under the protection of the sultans. The two supreme rulers, Charles V and Suleiman the Magnificent, personified two opposing ideals: the grandiose ideal of a universal empire (the Holy Roman Empire) which could never become a reality, and the realistic policies, based on military supremacy, of a ruler at the pinnacle of his power.

The almost unceasing hostilities between the various rulers impoverished and destroyed many parts of the continent. Europe, attacked for the first time in its history on its own territory, was frightened, and the popular mood was well reflected by Martin Luther's sermons and writings against the Turks whom, however, he did not consider as depraved as he did the popes and their followers.

The successive epochs of the Renaissance, Humanism, and the Reformation in European cultural and social life are usually considered as constituting the beginnings of our modern era (Chapter II). They represented a decisive break with the long centuries of the Middle Ages, though this break originated in the era between the twelfth and the fourteenth centuries. These three movements looked in two directions like the Roman God, Janus, because they turned toward the past – the rediscovering of the treasures of antiquity or the return to the simple, biblical faith of the times of the Evangelists – and, at the same time, they also looked resolutely forward, laying the foundations for the great scientific and social advances of modernity: advances in philology; elaboration of scientific methodologies; creation of nation states; the appearance, in city States, of the republican-democratic form of government, and the discovery of other human worlds. As Henri Hauser so clearly formulated it: "The discovery of man became complicated by the discovery of the hitherto unknown human multitudes." (my translation) However, these great movements of social, economic, and political ideas and the concomitant changes were arrested, for a time, at the end of the sixteenth century; this explains the remark of Alain Dufour that the Humanists and the first generation of Reformation represented "a moment between two scholasticisms."

It is necessary, however, to make it clear that if in the age of Renaissance and of the Humanists a certain unity in intellectual renewal and spiritual orientation appeared, these movements remained conservative from the religious point of view. Therefore, it was inevitable that a definite separation, a rupture, occur between them and those committed to the Reformation of Christian faith and practices. This happened in 1536, marked by the death of the great Humanists, Lefèvre d'Étaples and Erasmus of Rotterdam, and by the publication in Strasbourg of Calvin's *Institutions*. The human-centered interest and the evident return to the ideals of antiquity of the first two movements could not survive in the generations of those who wanted to restore the authority of God over the authority of men, who directed all the emotional and spiritual longing of their contemporaries toward the transcendental realm instead of encouraging them to enjoy what the immanent world can offer. The protagonists of the Reformation were only individualists in the sense that they preached God's will to save all believers through the sacrifice of Jesus Christ, but otherwise they encouraged their people to be part of the community of Saints, that is, the community of the visible Church, through their individual experience of God's grace. Only membership in this community could lead a person to the road of salvation, not the acceptance of the institutional hierarchy of the medieval Church and the supernatural authority of its dogmas. In opposition to dogmas and their authoritative interpretation, the Reformation imposed free access to the Bible and free study of the Holy Script for all – though extreme deviance in interpretation from the traditional Biblical teachings was not admitted.

In respect to the knowledge of Islam in medieval Christianity and among the thinkers of the Renaissance and Humanism (Chapter III), the first important element to consider is that apologetics – the defense of the faith against nonbelievers which flourished during the first centuries of Christianity as one of the most important intellectual activities – slowly lost its essential role held since the Christian faith became the dominant religion on the European continent. Finally, it was included in scholastic theology as an integral part, yet serving a limited, secondary function. The revival of Christian apologetics was only stimulated when the expansion of a new religious creed, Islam, once again made it necessary to affirm the tenets of the Christian faith, somewhere around the eleventh century.

The medieval stance was polemical, rather than apologetic in order to discredit the Muslim religion and customs, as well as the person and message of its prophet, Muhammad. All information about Islam, the Islamic people, their ways of life, and their culture was transmitted exclusively by the Church to the European public. The arguments and the value judgments of anti-Muslim polemics did not vary, and remained the same until about 1350. Even later, these same polemical images, arguments, and disparaging criticisms influenced the views of Renaissance and Humanist thinkers and, to a certain extent, of those of the Reformation as well.

There were, however, signs of a changing attitude towards the Saracens, indicated principally by the intention to gather more and more reliable information on all aspects of the Muslim doctrine and life. It is only natural that most of these initiatives were taken by scholars or theologians originating from Spain, where the Moors were expelled from the southern part of the peninsula just a few decades before. Thus, knowledge of their religion, language, and culture were still familiar and remembrances of their presence vivid. In addition, converted Jews who remained in the country played an important role in discovering new information about Islam. Examples from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries include:

- Pierre Alphonse's *Dialogus*, which contained hitherto unknown details about the Muslim faith and practices;

- Peter the Venerable, the great abbot of Cluny, in his path breaking study *Contra Sarracenos*, returned to the view of the early Middle Ages in considering Islam as a Christian heresy. He recruited knowledgeable scholars to translate into Latin a series of documents concerning Islam, among them the Koran, which are known under the name of *Corpus of Cluny* or *Corpus of Toledo* (published by Bibliander in his own *Recueil*);

- Marc of Toledo, the thirteenth century scholar translated the Koran and important writings of Muslim scholars;

– Ramon Lull and Ramon de Peñafort, Spanish missionaries among the Muslims of Spain and North Africa, and Ricoldo da Monte Croce, Dominican friar of Florence, traveled extensively in Muslim countries, and Lull, in particular, promoted the study of Oriental languages.

One has to distinguish from the above commentators of Islamic doctrine and customs three others who did not always follow the lines of the traditional polemical stance and showed some understanding of aspects of the Muslim faith:

- Pascale Radbert, who emphasized the monotheism of the Islamic creed;
- William of Tripoli, who pinpointed similar traits in the Christian and Muslim religious doctrines (for missionary purposes);
- John Wyclif, the English theologian, who in his attitude towards Islam as much as in most other religious matters, was a precursor of the sixteenth century Reformation, as he compared the depravity of the Muslims with that of the Roman Church.

During the Renaissance and Humanism, the study of Oriental languages and literature were not popular pursuits. They regressed, especially in Spain, as compared with preceding centuries, though, in Italy, consideration of an eventual unification of Eastern and Western churches encouraged some interest in them.

Among those particularly interested in a dialogue with the Muslims was the great Renaissance cardinal, Nicholas of Cusa. He abandoned completely the usual apologetical or polemical tone of representatives of the Catholic Church and was the very first in Occident to promote an extraordinarily positive appreciation of the Islamic faith. This was made possible through his conviction that there is one religion only but a variety of ways to worship God (*una religio in rituum varietate*), a conviction based on his medieval concept of the universal church or of the Catholicity of the Christian religion. His *Cribratio Alcorani* shows that he appreciated the monotheism of Islam, and was also confident that the truths of the Evangelists can surely be discovered in the Koran. His example encouraged others to contribute to the dialogue with other religions, among them John of Segovia, who translated the Koran and represented a unique stance, as his only interest was to examine whether the Koran is God's revelation or not.

The 'Prince of the Humanists,' Erasmus of Rotterdam, like many other Humanists – Lefèvre d'Etaples, Juan Luis Vives, Paracelsus – did not know much about Islam and the Muslims. He based his pronouncements on what his beloved writers of the antiquity said about non-civilized, primitive, barbaric peoples; he considered Muhammad's religion a mixture of creeds from Judaism, Christianity, Paganism, and of the old Christian sect of Arianism.

The only real connoisseur of the customs of the Muslims, and the first true protagonist of the study of Arabic and other oriental languages was Guillaume Postel, professor of Greek, Hebrew, and Arabic in the *Collège de France*, established in the early decades of the sixteenth century. Postel traveled in Muslim countries several times, and had first-hand knowledge of people's way of life there. He insisted on the necessity to reach out to the sources of the Islamic doctrine and Muslim worldview, in order to obtain authentic and objective knowledge about them – hence the need to start with philological and linguistic studies. Like Nicholas of Cusa, Postel also believed that Islam contains many elements of the Christian doctrine, and he praised the Muslims' charity towards the poor and their non-discrimination among those who received the alms.

Part Two

THE ATTITUDE OF THE ZURICH REFORMERS TOWARDS ISLAM

This part represents the main body of the study and deals with its subject proper: the attitude towards Islam during the first generation of the Reformation in Zurich and the outcome of the debate on a new vision of Islam represented by Theodor Bibliander's *Recueil* (Collection), containing a Latin translation of the Koran, published in 1543. Part Two is introduced by a short description of the status of Protestant historiography during the first decades of the Reformation and the knowledge of the Muslim world by the first generation of Reformers (Chap. IV). Then, the Reformation image of the Prophet Muhammad is analyzed (Chapter V), and the criticism of the Koranic doctrine in the writings of Zwingli, Bullinger, and Bibliander is described (Chapter VI). Finally, the history of the publication of Bibliander's *Recueil* and of the debate it provoked is summarized (Chapter VII).

At the onset of the sixteenth century, *historiography* represented a milestone in the epochal transformation of European life (Chapter IV). Historical writings reflected the deep intellectual mutations in contemporary culture and, under the influence of the Renaissance, were increasingly characterized by a return to the original, authentic sources of events in order to be up to the standard of what Jean Bodin called true narrative (*vera narratio*) in the second half of the century. This was also the age of *artes historicae*, methodological compendiums which described the best ways to write and understand history. However, history as a secular enterprise, as an expression of interest in this-worldly events, came to the fore only at the end of the sixteenth century, as Bodin's remark indicated it.

Some particular traits of Protestant historiography, reflecting the medieval heritage, include:

- The belief that all of humanity was initially monotheistic;
- A certain unhistorical view of history was adopted in the footsteps of Saint Augustine and other theologians of the Middle Ages, in which history is employed as an illustration of the history of salvation, of the history of the Bible, and of the Christian faith, although Luther and Melancthon were truly interested in history as the unfolding of God's action, and as a witness to His grace and to His wrath;
- Chronological speculations like the calculus of the exact beginning and age of the world;
- An imaginary historical periodicization in the form of the theories of 'four monarchies;' and, finally,
- A historical outlook entirely directed towards eternity, ignoring immanent existence for the transcendental destiny promised by God.

The importance of the publication of Bibliander's *Recueil* is clearly demonstrated by the fact that it opened new vistas for such a dominant historical perspective. But this importance becomes even greater if one takes into account the almost complete ignorance of Islamic doctrine and of the realities of the Muslim world by the generation of the Reformation. Bibliander, successor of Zwingli in the latter's chair at the Academy, was the only one who really had a genuine interest in Islam and who provoked the great debate surrounding the publication of the *Recueil*. Heinrich Bullinger's interest was motivated by his close friendship with Bibliander, whose orientalist activities he fully supported. But Zwingli, who perished in the Battle of Kappel in 1531 did not have much opportunity to learn about Muhammad and his religion. Outside the Zurich circle, the reformer who wrote and talked most profusely about Muslims was Martin Luther, who felt the danger that the Ottoman conquest represented for the Christian Europe.

The image of Arabia – where the Prophet lived and promulgated the divine message – that dominated most Protestant academic and ecclesiastic circles was one inherited from medieval literature, rather than from scholarly works, even apologetics or polemics. Thus, Islam is nothing but a deviation from the Christian doctrine, an apostasy; consequently, people in the peninsula were believed to have been Christians before the conquest of Muhammad's armies. It is truly astounding that the first generation of the Reformation borrowed without hesitation and without any criticism this 'romantic' description of Arabia, especially as there was another one, more realistic and more documented by Arab historians of the *djāhiliyya*. The latter supported the view that tribal populations were, before the birth of the Prophet, primitive, ignorant, and idolatrous, without any civilization (social organization, government, etc.), represented by Medina, but which also pointed to the existence of a large commercial society in Mecca, at the outskirts of the Byzantine empire, more cultivated and sophisticated though idolatrous as well. It should be noted, however, that the first description of Arabia at the advent of Islam mentioned above, permitted the protagonists of the Reformation to criticize the state of the Christian churches at that time, and reflected their belief in the existence of a universal Church.

Both Bibliander and Bullinger reproduced medieval narratives of the life of the Prophet, but omitted the endlessly repeated fables, invented histories, and erroneously interpreted events of his life (Chapter V). This omission already indicates an imperceptible but important change in their views of Muhammad, even if the general description remained the same. They, of course, entirely accepted suppositions concerning the influence of a certain monk, Sergius, in the formation of the Islamic doctrine, as much as concerning the deep impression the teachings of various Christian sects made on Muhammad. Pursuing his activities as a trader, Muhammad traveled extensively in several countries of the Near East. Borrowings from Sergius and from these sects were then incorporated in his Prophetic revelations; therefore, the syncretic character of Islam and its inauthenticity as a divine message seemed undeniable. It is also remarkable that both theologians of Zurich avoided focusing on the details of Muhammad's sexual life, as many writers and polemicists of the Middle Ages and, later, Martin Luther in particular, did with such delight. Luther found in these details of the Prophet's life a proper subject for his fertile imagination, and for his verbal violence, in general.

The whole generation of the Reformation identified the Prophet Muhammad with the Antichrist. The latter designates, in Bibliander's conception, all those who oppose the Christian message and teachings, the enemies of the true faith rejecting, under whatever guise, Biblical orthodoxy. Unbelievers were led in their attack on Christianity by Satan himself. Many representatives of this generation, including Bullinger, identified the Antichrist with Muhammad (or the Turks) and with the pope, simultaneously. Luther is the only one who denied the quality of Antichrist to the Prophet of Islam because, according to him, Muhammad committed idolatry in such an ostentatious way that he could not lead into error faith or reason. For Luther, the head of the Catholic Church, the pope, can be the only Antichrist.

Protestant criticisms of various aspects of the Islamic doctrine (Chapter VI), extensively documented in this study with quotations from the writings of the Reformers, were conditioned by the monotheistic belief that only one faith can secure salvation, interpret correctly the will of God, and indicate the way of life which corresponds to what God expects from us; and, therefore, all other sects or heretics, like Islam, are simply deviations from the Christian revelation and way of life.

In consequence, the first criticism addressed to the Prophet and his followers is that they represent a heretic sect separated from Christianity (outside of which there is no true religion) by the depraved doctrines of the Islamic faith. It is interesting that Zwingli, under the humanistic influence of Erasmus, and following him, Bibliander, treated pagans of the distant past in a different way because the latter, who lived before Jesus Christ was born, benefited from possessing the commandments of the natural law (*lex naturae*), and thus could live a life in accordance with God's commandments. This was thought to be possible because when pagans lived only the natural law was imprinted in the hearts of men, whereas the Christian message was already announced and could already be embraced by all people when Muhammad's prophetic message was proclaimed. It was the seed of religion (*semen religionis*) which was, therefore, implanted by God in the hearts of the pagans. For this very reason, the heretics and other deviants from the Christian doctrine had to be condemned without hesitation.

The second criticism of Islam focused on whether the Koran, seen as the counterpart of the Bible, could be recognized as God's revelation. The Reformers never realized that the Koran, believed by the Muslim to be the direct revelation of God through His own voice, of which the Prophet was only an obedient channel, should be considered as the counterpart of God's revelation in and through the living person of Jesus Christ. As Islam was considered a heretic sect deviating from true Christianity, the Koran could not be accepted as divine revelation. Four points of the Koranic doctrine were particularly criticized:

- i) The strict monotheism of Islam, rejecting the divinity of Jesus and the Christian belief in Trinity;
- ii) Justification as a result of good works (respect of religious obligations and of moral prescriptions of the Koran), and not by the sole grace of God;
- iii) Polygamy as an institution and the pretended sexual libertinism among Muslims;
- iv) Destruction of the social order and forms of political organization which were adopted in medieval Christendom (this was not a criticism of an article of faith but a defense of Western civilization).

The christological controversy with Islam touched upon an essential aspect of Christian theology, as christology and soteriology were inseparably linked; though, as it is well known, the christological beliefs of various Protestant tendencies were different in many aspects. Thus, the theology of Zwingli was clearly theocentric and not christocentric: Christ's mission was to restore the depraved 'image of God in men' (*imago Dei*). For the others, – Bullinger, Bibliander, and Luther – the person and deeds of Jesus Christ constituted the real foundations of the Christian faith, and represent the truly dividing line, the unbridgeable abyss, between Christians and Muslims. The gravest consequence of Islam's negation of the doctrine of the Trinity is the negation of the role of Christ as Savior, of His sacrifice on the cross. This fundamental difference could not be compensated by the Muslim belief in the resurrection of those who merited. For the Reformers, that was not simply a doctrinal difference, but a question of life or death; there could be no salvation by deeds and acts of men, but solely by the grace of a sovereign and omnipotent God. It was the principal source of their fierce condemnation of the Prophet's religion. In addition, they devoted a great number of writings to the rejection of Muslim polygamy, forms of piety, and, in general, the purportedly depraved individual and social morality in Muslim society. However, it is evident that they used these polemical arguments against Muslim customs and morals to exhort their Christian contemporaries to amend their lives and act in accordance with the commandments of their Christian religion.

Finally, an important aspect of the Reformers' criticism of Islam is their rejection of violence and war with reference to the Islamic duty of the holy war (*djihād*). This was basically a moral argument but, at the same time, it was also linked to their defense of Christian civilization, of the world as they inherited it from medieval Christendom. However, their principal interest in attacking the Muslims' warrior status and the religious duty of holy war was that military and political successes obtained by representatives of one religion cannot be referred to in the justification of their faith. Violence and coercion cannot be criteria of truth. If God permitted the victories of Turkish armies against their Christian adversaries, it was in order to punish them for their sins, for their turning away from the divine commandments; this was a recurring refrain in their writings, like in the admonishments of the prophets in the Old Testament.

The final chapter of the Second Part (Chapter VII) recounts the dramatic circumstances and debates surrounding the publication of Theodor Bibliander's *Recueil*, of which the central piece was the Latin text of the Koran. Printing of this work was planned by the Basel printer John Oporin in 1542. It aroused a great debate because of the eight experts, church ministers and jurists, consulted by the city council; four were in favor and four against it. The council's decision was negative: previously printed texts had to be confiscated, and Oporin was thrown into prison for a short period. However, he made an appeal to one of the judicial instances of the Empire (*Kammergericht*), in order to obtain an 'imperial privilege' which would supersede the council's decision, but the imperial authorization was delivered only in 1543.

Meanwhile, a miraculous conclusion to the crisis was reached due to the intervention in favor of the publication of the *Recueil* by most great Reformers, especially Luther, who even wrote to the Basel Council to change the opinions of its members. The same pressure was exercised by the leaders of the Reformation in Strasbourg, Bucer and Hedio. As a consequence, the council revised its decision in December, 1542, authorizing the publication and distribution of the volume on three conditions: the city's and printer's name should not figure on it; a renowned scholar should sponsor the publication, with his name figuring on the title page; and, finally, it should not be sold in this city.

Bibliander, who prepared the publication, naturally accepted to be the sponsor (with the support of all his Zurich colleagues). Le *Recueil* finally appeared in the spring of 1543, three parts in one volume. The first part contains a *Praemonitio*, written by Melanchthon or Luther (both versions exist), Bibliander's defense of the publication (*Apologia pro editione Alcorani*), and the text of the Koran. The Latin translation was based on that of Robert of Keten, figuring in the collection of Peter the Venerable, which was finished in 1143, exactly 400 years before Bibliander's enterprise. The refutations of the Koranic doctrine, that is, the Greek or Latin polemical writings constitute the second part, completed by a refutation written by an Arab Christian (the *Risâla* of pseudo-Kindi). Finally, the third part consists of various documents concerning Turkish customs and institutions, as well as a letter from Luther to the 'pious reader' and a letter from Pope Pius II to the sultan Mohammed II, the conqueror of Constantinople.

Bibliander's arguments in favor of the publication of his *Recueil* can be grouped under five headings:

1. The need to obtain an objective knowledge about such an important subject by most Reformers, a requirement which was part of the intellectual climate of the age and was promoted in all scientific domains;
2. The necessity of a global historic vision, as history explains the evolution and the difficulties of the present and helps us to understand all human problems (an argument made only by Bibliander who, with his broad comprehension of history's role in human existence, was clearly a pioneer in the middle of the sixteenth century);
3. The conviction, against his master Zwingli's humanistic preference for the pagans of antiquity, but supported by the Reformers from Strasbourg, such as Bucer and Hedio, that one has to show the same interest in all doctrines different, or even contrary, to the true Christian religion, whether Muslim, Jewish, Pagan, or Roman Catholic;
4. The resolute stand against all forms of violence and, especially, against the most dangerous sort of violence: prohibitions in spiritual and intellectual matters which never obtain the expected results because heretical ideas survive in the depth of human souls. Luther was also opposed to the war against the Turks and the infidels, and instead of prohibitions preferred polemics to combat them;
5. The knowledge of the Islamic doctrine and of the life and customs of the Muslims is practically useful, as in Bibliander's time the Turks became part of everyday life for all Christians in the Western world.

The arguments against the publication of the *Recueil* were few. They referred mainly to two considerations: the danger presented by putting into the hands of the uneducated public information about such an impious and perverse doctrine; and the insistence, mainly by some jurists who were consulted, on former imperial and theological (even papal) prohibitions.

Part Three

THEOLOGICAL PROBLEMS AND NEW PERSPECTIVES

This fundamental part of the study deals, in particular, with theological oppositions: war or missionary activity (Chapter VIII), universal grace and predestination (Chapter IX); and with the twofold perspective implicated by the new attitude towards the Muslims – *Concordia mundi* or a universalist vision of the world (Chapter X), and tolerance towards others who profess a different faith or belong to a different culture (Chapter XI).

Concerning the Christian attitude toward war (Chapter VIII), the discussion is introduced by a review of three medieval conceptions of war: the Augustinian view of the 'just war'; the 'holy war' or 'crusade' for the protection or extension of faith; and, finally, the pacifism of mainly Franciscan inspiration which rejected war as a means of converting non-Christians. The pacifist tendency was further strengthened and developed by the radicalism of Erasmus of Rotterdam, who attacked the 'Christian Turks,' conducting war for war's sake, and Paracelsus, who, in a very modern manner, contested the legitimacy of war as much as of capital punishment.

Since his early years, Luther had attacked the crusades led under the aegis of the popes, and his intransigency in this respect never weakened throughout his life. Although he recognized the Turkish menace to the German peoples and other nations of Europe, he took it as God's legitimate punishment for the inexorable sins of the Christian populations. He integrated his view into an eschatological and cosmic perspective; the war became an aspect of the paradoxical and contradictory situation of Christians between the two Antichrists, the popes and the sultans. However, he did not incite people to disobey orders of the authorities and, by this distinction, acknowledged the necessity of participation in defensive wars against the armies of the sultans. Other representatives of the nascent Protestant churches were much less preoccupied by the problem of war than Luther.

The missionary concept of the first Reformation generation was characterized by one feature shared by all: the Christian message had to be brought to all peoples. This is paradoxical in view of the fact that they were influenced by the erroneous conviction inherited from the Middle Ages that all peoples on earth had the opportunity to become familiar with Christ's teachings and to believe in Him as the Savior, also reflected by their profound belief in the existence of the universal Church which was, for them, an existential reality. For Calvin and his followers, missionary activities were the duty of Christian princes and civil institutions – a logical consequence of their theocratic conceptualization of the State. The Reformers' stance can only be explained by the doctrine of the so-called 'double predestination': those who hear and accept the Christian message will be saved, those who reject it or submit to it only in appearance are condemned (or predestined) to be forever pagan or heretical. It is in this conceptual framework that missionary activities among Muslims are discussed, if at all.

The fundamental contradiction between the belief in the universality of grace and the belief in predestination – God's advance decision about whether an individual will be saved or condemned to eternal punishment independently of the person's acts and behavior – came to the fore in the course of the Reformers' spiritual encounter with Islam (Chapter IX). Uthred of Boldon, a medieval theologian from Oxford, set forth a bold proposal to solve this contradiction in the fourteenth century: all non-Christians can be saved if they embrace the faith in Jesus Christ at the moment of their death. The great Humanist, Lefèvre d'Etaples, squarely stated that the redemptive will of God cannot be limited to one group of people; whereas Nicholas of Cusa affirmed, in concordance with his universalistic perspective that anyone who confesses at least part of the truth will be saved at the hour of judgment. For Guillaume Postel as well, divine grace is destined to save all humans, both Christian and non-Christian, and, like a modern rationalist and liberal thinker, he not only believed that anybody who is doing good and lives an appropriate life will benefit of God's forgiveness, but he was also convinced that sin is a consequence of ignorance, because someone who knows what is good does it without hesitation.

In contrast to the universalists, the great majority of the Reformation generation followed the austere Pauline and Augustinian view that all those who do not believe in Jesus Christ are condemned to eternal damnation. The Protestants belonging to the current dominated by the Wittenberg Reformers – Luther and Melanchthon – and those adhering to Calvin's even stricter standing in this respect (reflected in his insistence on predestination), therefore forever rejected Muslims, Jews, Catholics, and the pagans of antiquity from being saved. In his Preface to Bibliander's *Recueil*, Luther clearly stated that all creeds of all nations which do not conform to the views and doctrines espoused by the prophets and the Apostles must be rejected and condemned. Bullinger firmly declared himself to be in agreement with this judgment, but Bucer introduced some nuance in it by affirming that the Evangelists could certainly not reach everybody on this earth, and those who ignore them may be saved by God's grace. In the same vein, Zwingli, who otherwise unconditionally accepted the rejection of all non-Christians, made exception for innocent children and the pagans of antiquity. The destiny of the first, if they die before having learned about Jesus Christ, depends on their predestination, while the destiny of the second is decided in accordance with natural law, inscribed in their hearts.

Bibliander, however, belonged to those, like Sébastien Castellion, who broke with the rigorist doctrine of their generation. In his writings, especially in those of the last years of his life, he made clear his belief in the universality of divine grace. He had a strong belief in God's redemptory will and in the sacrifice of Christ, but he never felt that such a belief could be in contradiction with his conviction that God wants to save all his children – whatever their faith, and whatever way they follow in order to reach Him. Bibliander confessed that in his eyes only the belief in the universality of grace is compatible with God's justice, and attacked with all his force the dogma of double predestination.

The great debate about the universality of grace leads directly to the first of the new perspectives opened by the controversy over Islam and the Muslims, *concordia mundi*, the universal harmony in humankind (Chapter X). The universalist orientation – universalist meaning here the permanent interdependency of human consciences due to the common features in human nature and the shared environment of human beings in this world – first appeared in the transcendentalist speculations of the Renaissance, like the syncretistic writings of Marsilius Ficino or Pico della Mirandola, and in the works of the universalistic humanists of the age like Nicholas of Cusa or Erasmus of Rotterdam and, in the generation of the Reformation, Zwingli and Bucer. Its greatest representatives were, however, Guillaume Postel, on the side of the humanists, and Bibliander, on the side of the Reformers. For Postel, this metaphysically motivated belief in *concordia mundi* was rooted in his conviction of the fundamental unity of all things, the fundamental interdependence of all particularities in the universe. In his understanding this meant the inner unity of all religious faiths, expressed in his credo about the double aspect of the church: on the one hand, the external, visible church, on the other hand, the mystical church of those who belonged to it through the unity of their convictions. William Bouwsma characterized this vision of Postel in the most comprehensive way: "Postel's universalism was an aspiration towards an inclusive unity and not towards an exclusive uniformity."

Bibliander was the sole representative, in the circle of the Reformers, of religious universalism. This was evident, for example, in the greeting with which he prefaced one of his unprinted works, *De monarchia totius orbis suprema legitima et sempiterna*: "To all Christians, Jews, and Muslims, followers of Muhammad, grace, peace, and many greetings in the name of God, our Lord" (my translation). He enumerates ten characteristics shared by all religions (among which he also mentions the creeds of the Scythians and of the population of India), which constitute a treasure of the sages and cannot be exclusively possessed by any one faith and its believers. Studying the doctrines of various religions, he discovers many common elements in them, thus giving a new life to Nicholas of Cusa's belief in *una religio in rituum varietate*. This spiritual universalism penetrates and conditions, for Bibliander, not only the lives of individuals but also the existence of their communities, the different nations and States.

This religious universalism of the Humanists and of Bibliander was, however, entirely different from another type of universalism based on the principles of natural religion and tolerance, of which Jean Bodin's *Heptaplomeres*, published at the end of the sixteenth century, was one of the first texts. Bodin, in contradiction to the Humanists, did not believe anymore in the *concordia mundi*, the harmony in the world, and, in this sense, his work marks the end of an epoch. The only way leading to a harmony among men is not to discuss at all one another's religious beliefs, but leave each person to decide about matters of faith and salvation to his conscience. This more secularly oriented universalism became dominant in Western culture, in the French *Siècle des lumières*.

Finally, it is in this perspective that the examination of Islam and the Reformation in the sixteenth century leads to a discussion of the problem of tolerance (Chapter XI). Tolerance was born simultaneously with the beginning of the comparative study of religions, and it first appeared in the works of some Humanists and reformers, from Nicholas of Cusa's *De pace fidei*, to Bibliander's writings, to Bodin's above-mentioned dialogical essay between representatives of various religions. But the large majority of Christian ecclesiastical and political authorities, including the new Protestant churches and governments, did not show any tolerance towards those who deviated from the official dogma; rare were exceptions like the decision of the Transylvanian diet in 1568 that legitimized all Protestant faiths – Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists, and Antitrinitarians. Nevertheless, those who practiced tolerance toward believers of other faiths were the so-called *Politiques*, people playing a great role in political life and realizing that in an age when Christendom itself was divided, tolerance was a means to restore and maintain peace in society. Among such great men were the chancellor Michel de l'Hospital who issued the decree of January 1562 to create peace among Christian denominations in France, and William of Orange, whose decree issued in 1576, known as the *Pacification de Gand*, intended the same result in the Netherlands.

Of the great forerunners, Nicholas of Cusa's tolerance was a consequence of his theory of human knowledge: no human being can have a perfect, objective knowledge of transcendental reality; no formulation of religious beliefs can be anything else than conjecture, because mortal men cannot adequately capture the sense of the infinite. Erasmus of Rotterdam, the prince of Humanists and the head of what then was called 'the sect of tolerants,' was a protagonist of tolerance in order to avoid violence, but tolerance was only a transitory phase toward the realization of his ideal – the universal harmony of mankind. Postel's attitude of tolerance was linked to his rationalism; man finds his way to God through his capability of reasoning, but such approaches to the transcendental are multiple and equally legitimate, hence the necessity of tolerance.

Among the generation of the Reformation not too many professed tolerance. Bibliander was certainly tolerant, as demonstrated by his promotion of the knowledge of other religions and his belief in the possibility of a mutual comprehension. Sébastien Castellion, the apostle of tolerance because of his condemnation of Calvin for the execution of Michael Servet ('to kill a man is to kill a man,' said he, whatever theological justifications were advanced), used the rationalist argument that a distinction has to be made between essential and non-essential elements of faith and religious doctrine. In this sense, he was, with Postel, a precursor of the Enlightenment. He believed that only those tenets of religions which lead to the salvation of man are essential. He insisted upon free discussion of the theses of different faiths and so-called heresies and addressed himself to believers of all monotheistic religions – Christians, Jews, and Muslims – to promote a spirit of mutual understanding. For this reason, the great French historian, Michelet wrote of Castellion: "This poor foreman of a printer shop set for the whole future the great law of tolerance."

THE HISTORY OF A PRIVATE LIBRARY IN 18TH CENTURY HUNGARY*

The Library of Pál and Gedeon Ráday

[The present writing is the abstract in English of the author's book with the same title, written in Hungarian and first published in 1992 in Budapest. The editor of the original publication was Kálmán Benda. The English translation was performed in 2004 by Enikő Jókay-Zoltáni. We plan to publish the book's original Hungarian version and its English translation in the near future.]

[Between 1953 and 1956, the author worked in the Ráday Library of the Reformed Theological Academy in Budapest as librarian together with Endre Zsindely. Comissioned by László Pap, dean of the Academy and director of the library – during 2-3 afternoons per week and in his free time – he explored the hitherto unused archived material and wrote the history of the library in the 18th century. His manuscript, with the support of Kálmán Benda, was accepted by the Institute of Literary History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, on the recommendation of Professor József Szauder, for publication by the Academy's publishing house. In the meantime the author went into exile at the end of November 1956 because of his participation in the Revolution of 1956 and settled down in Geneva, Switzerland. Because he became a political refugee, the Academy refused the publication of his treatise, and his manuscript was hidden by Kálmán Benda, director of the Ráday archives at the time, in the library of the college of Sárospatak. Following the collapse of the Communist regime, he published it in 1992 on behalf of the Ráday Collection of the Academy at the occasion of the 200th anniversary of the death of Gedeon Ráday.]

THE ROLE OF THE LIBRARY IN HUNGARY'S CULTURAL LIFE

The eighteenth century in Hungary was the age of great book collectors. However, among the sumptuous libraries which greatly contributed to the country's cultural life only one was a collection made by a nobleman of the gentry and not by aristocrats or church princes. But this library, the Ráday Library at Pécel, was equal with the others from the point of view of the value of its collection and was among the first in sustaining cultural developments and widening education for all interested people.

The lives of two outstanding figures of Hungarian culture throw a dazzling light on this century – those of the two Ráday. The life of Pál Ráday, chancellor of Rákóczi, leader of the Hungarian struggle for independence against the Hapsburgs, and after the suppression of the revolt by the Austrian army, one of the heads and protectors of the Hungarian Reformed Church against the arbitrary policies of the Viennese court; and the life of Gedeon Ráday, the Hungarian nobleman with a wide European culture who, beside continuing in his father's footsteps in defending his church, created a famous library which became the center of literary activities in the second half of the 18th century. Simultaneously, Gedeon Ráday greatly contributed to the literary revival in the country, and both father and son made considerable sacrifices in assisting young Hungarians to complete their studies abroad at the best Protestant universities of the age. The role of the Rádays was all the more important from the point of view of Hungarian culture that the Viennese court knew very well how much the knowledge and development of the national language could be dangerous for the politics of the Hapsburgs. In comparison with the 16th century, the century of the Reformation, in the 17th century Latin reconquered the lost terrain – its domination since the Middle Ages and the age of Humanism – under the impulse of the Hapsburg emperors, and the number of publications in Hungarian diminished to a great extent. In this perspective, the collecting of old Hungarian books, support for their new editions and assistance to new authors and scholars in all branches of the sciences, has to be considered a most important task for the nation's culture. The Rádays were precisely instrumental in the implementation of this task.

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Another similarly imperative task was to link Hungarian cultural endeavors to the new trends in European thought and cultural creation. The fact that in the Library at Pécel everybody could find the best scientific publications of the time, for example, the *Acta Eruditorum* or the *Journal des Savants*, or the flagship publication of the Enlightenment, the *Encyclopedia*, meant an invaluable contribution to the intellectual life in Hungary.

It was natural that the personality of the collectors, their cultural upbringing and their life experiences deeply influenced the nature of the collected materials in their library. Thus, Pál Ráday collected, first of all, theological, legal and historical books, as well as those which were linked to his work and experience such as the *Vita Aulica* or *Hermes Aulicus*, or Castiglione's *Il cortegiano*, because his activities as Rákóczi's diplomat made him sensitive to the importance of knowing the life and etiquette of contemporary courts. On the other hand, Gedeon Ráday, because of his encyclopedic knowledge, was interested in everything, even in such subjects as military strategies or the secrets of gardening, but his overwhelming interest in literature and the arts had as a natural consequence that these subjects, together with history and theology, represented the majority of the works acquired. In respect to Gedeon Ráday it has to be particularly mentioned, because it was such a rare thing in contemporary Hungary, that he knew well not only the German but the French language as well, and in this way the radiant light of the *Siècle des lumières* reached Hungary, the country situated somewhere in faraway Central Europe. He was immersed in French culture during his study years in Francfort-on-the-Oder, at the German university, which following the Enlightenment became the center of the study and the dissemination of French culture in eighteenth century *Mitteleuropa*.

THE BOOK COLLECTORS RÁDAY

The Rádays came from a well-to-do noble family which lived in the northern part of the department of Pest. In the course of the wars with the Turkish invaders the family lost good part of its lands and, therefore, transferred more to the north in the department of Nógrád, where its members participated in politics and public life in general. They did not belong to the very rich, aristocratic noblesse; their economic situation was comparable to that of other gentry families, but as they managed their lands in an up-to-date manner exporting greater and greater quantities of wine and grain, their revenues largely surpassed those of the latter.

Already Pál Ráday introduced manorial cultivation, increasing production through more intensive laboring of his lands, leaving far behind his fellow gentry in modernizing his estates; in addition, from the upper part of Hungary where soil was less productive and the lands were overburdened by people, he shifted his activities towards the Great Plain with less people, but more fertile soils. Following his death in 1742, and the passing away of his younger son, Pál, Gedeon and his sister, Eszter, who was married to László Teleki, inherited the Ráday estates. Gedeon paid his sister considerable sums for keeping a good part of the inheritance, thus the major part of his father's lands remained in his possession.

The Ráday estates reached their largest extension during Gedeon's time, because to the inherited lands he joined those, located in the department of Gömör, received in dowry at the time of his marriage with Katalin Szentpétery. The overburdening task of management of these estates dispersed in 75 villages, sometimes separated by distances of 200 km or more, was in the hands of Ferenc Fatavich, the 'bonorum director' or intendant, who served the Ráday family with dedication during several decades. Fatavich developed further the methods of estate management practiced by Pál Ráday; during his time are formed major centers of cultivation in the lands of the Great Plain, with Pécel being developed as the major center for estate management. Gedeon Ráday decided from the 1750's on, following the proposal of Fatavich, to develop market oriented production; and it is a proof of the progressing, intensive cultivation that in 1741 on half of the lands, in 1765 on all of them, the three times a year sowing system was practiced. It has to be added that the two Rádays, Pál and Gedeon, lived on their estates, as against the high noblesse which passed the whole year in Vienna and was only interested to draw as much revenue of the lands as possible: "Thus, it became possible that, ready for new initiatives, they looked always for, and applied better and more profitable methods of production, those agricultural innovations which corresponded the best to the natural givens of their region" – has written some fifty years ago Balázs Németh, member of the staff of the Ráday archives.

The library of Pál Ráday was not significant for its size. The acquisitions and binding of books did not overburden the collector – although if we compare the price of binding a Bible in Pozsony which cost 25 fl. with his yearly cash revenue of 240-250 fl., it becomes evident what a sacrifice a 18th century Hungarian nobleman had to make in order to collect valuable printed matter. The acquisitions of Gedeon Ráday, on the other hand, were enormous and obliged him to encounter immeasurable financial difficulties. In order to measure the extent of his love of books and the greatness of the sacrifices he made in the interest of national culture, one has to take into account the problems in the family circle ensuing from those financial difficulties, the obligation to pay multiple interests on the inevitable borrowings during all the years. These difficulties and sacrifices also attest to the different circumstances in which the Library of Pécel was born, in comparison to the libraries of the Telekis, of the Széchényis or of the Festetics, or of the huge libraries of the high clergy.

Let us compare, for example, the revenues of the gentry nobleman Ráday with that of Count Ferenc Széchényi to really understand why the collector from Pécel had to have continuously financial troubles, why his indebtedness increased from year to year. The library of Széchényi was, without doubt, richer, and contained more valuable manuscripts – the printed materials in the Pécel collection were, however, in no way less valuable and, perhaps, even surpassed in diversity, the library in Cenk, where the castle of Széchényi was located. The difference between those two collections, therefore, does not reflect in any manner the difference between the financial means their respective collectors disposed of. The yearly income of Gedeon Ráday, shared with his son, was around 15'000 fl. at the end of the 1770's. In proportion to his estates, this revenue can be considered as relatively high, and could be achieved, as indicated above, only with the intensive, manorial cultivation of the lands. Between 1760 and 1775, the age of the most intense collection activities, his yearly spending on the library reached around 2-3 thousand fl. At the same time, the annual revenue of Ferenc Széchényi was around 250-300 thousand fl. According to a summary account concerning the period between the years from 1775 through 1812, Széchényi spent on acquisition of new lands and his family's living in accordance with the customary standards in the imperial city of Vienna, the amount, incredibly high for the age, of 3'826'699 fl., of which the cost of buying books, manuscripts, and numismatic pieces as well as the printing of catalogues absorbed 160'000 fl. and 22 krajcár. The conclusion of these data is simple: even if Ráday spent much less on his library than the 160'000 fl. that Széchényi paid, during the 37 years reviewed for the collection of various items, proportionately to their yearly income Ráday made an incomparably greater sacrifice, as his spending for the library amounted to about twenty per cent of his annual revenue of 15'000 fl.

PÁL RÁDAY

THE FAITHFUL OF RÁKÓCZI, THE DIPLOMAT OF THE 'KURUC' WAR AND A STAUNCH CHRISTIAN

Pál Ráday received an excellent education and has grown up in a truly pious family atmosphere. He was a member of the delegation of Nógrád which went to the camp in Tokaj to swear allegiance to Rákóczi. The Prince at once recognized his excellent character and qualifications and made him his private secretary. He soon gave proof of his capabilities in writing the famous manifesto, entitled *Recrudescunt vulnera inclitae gentis Hungariae*, and made all the preparations on behalf of the Prince for the parliamentary sessions of Széchény, Huszt, Marosvásárhely and Ónod. Later he became, first, head of the secret chancery, than of the Transylvanian and military chanceries, too. Rákóczi had such a confidence in him that he entrusted Ráday with all the important diplomatic negotiations. Consequently, he was in contact with the Prussian, Swedish and Polish courts and guided the work of Rákóczi's diplomatic representatives there. In negotiations with the representatives of the emperor he was among the Prince's envoys.

His particularly striking writing and journalistic capabilities were evidenced in his other work, *Explosio punctoriae replicae caeserae*, a manifesto which informed the world of the deceitful behavior of the Viennese court, or another pamphlet he has written, describing the fateful activities of the Jesuits in Hungary. In addition, he wrote and edited the first Hungarian newspaper, published until 1710, under the title *Mercurius veridicus ex Hungaria*.

When the War of Independence was crushed by the Austrian armies, Ráday took refuge in Poland, but finally decided to accept the imperial amnesty included in the peace treaty of Szatmár, and returned to Hungary. For the rest of his life he avoided politics, but defended his Reformed church and continued to collect books, especially old Hungarian publications. Until his death, he directed the fight of the Hungarian Protestant churches against efforts of re-catholicization of the Hapsburgs and he left behind numerous evidences of his literary talents. He was also known as a Protestant religious songwriter, whose *Lelki hódulás* [Spiritual Devotion] was the most printed book in Hungary during the 18th century.

Pál Ráday's Book Collecting Activities

Two characteristics of Pál Ráday's book collecting remained constant during the entire history of the Library: first, the Agents of the Hungarian Reformed church in Vienna were his agents for book collection, too; and, second, in the great university cities abroad – the centers of intellectual ferment and of book printing – young Hungarians, mainly theologians and pastors, who studied there with his financial help, not only carried out his orders for purchasing of books, but regularly informed him of the novelties on the market and communicated to their benefactor the new editions which were announced. Collection in Hungary, for both collectors, was the work of friends, relatives and acquaintances, first of all men of the church, who were as much interested as the Rádays in new products of Hungarian literary life.

Pál Ráday systematized the collected materials in accordance with the cataloguing habits of his time, in which philology was already treated as a separate branch of the sciences; this was extraordinarily important because it is considered today as the signal of the appearance of the modern age. An interesting feature of his catalogue is that he deals with geography as a separate subject as well, though the cataloging systems in the first half of the 18th century still considered it as part of history or philosophy. Was this an unconscious conclusion of his thinking of the destiny of his nation? – who knows ...

In general, the printed materials collected by Pál Ráday are characteristic of the Protestant gentry's culture of the epoch – at its highest level. On the other hand, the search for, and collection of, Hungarian books of the last 150 years was a confession of the unchanged political stance of Rákóczi's chancellor, who remained kuruc as he was before, and who defended steadfastly his church against the forceful re-catholicization measures of the feudal absolutism of Vienna.

The religious and theological works show very strong puritan traits, and evidences the fact that Pál Ráday was among the last, but outstanding, representative of Hungarian Puritanism. The orthodox treatises are complemented by the literature of religious debates and a few writings characteristic of the Catholicism of his age. Ráday classified the numerous historical works in four categories: first, those related to Antiquity, including the great Roman historians like Tacitus and Livius, but also Josephus Flavius, who wrote the history of the Jews; second, the historical works of the 16th and 17th centuries, that analyzed recent historical events on the European continent, especially concerning the great powers with which he had to deal when he was engaged in diplomatic negotiations; third, Hungarian history written by Hungarians or foreigners, the works of Bonfini or Istvánffy as well as Caspar Ernst or Balthasar Hant; and, fourth, the history of the church, of which the majority concerned the situation of Hungarian Protestantism since 1680 and the various edicts and regulations in respect of it. Ráday paid special attention to the destiny of Czech Protestantism, obliged to live underground, attention shown by such works as *Historia persecutionum ecclesiae Bohemicae*.

Beside theological and historical books Ráday was most interested in legal and political treatises. In consequence of his own social and political situation, the legal works almost exclusively consisted of the *Tripartitum* of Werbőczy and related commentaries, or compendia of Hungarian jurisprudence – indispensable in his activities when directing Rákóczi's various chanceries. These books give to his Library the character of belonging to a Hungarian nobleman as they reflect a certain legal formalism of his class. We can also find among the works on legal matters some of the classics like Iustinian's *Institutiones* and a few representatives of the new natural law theories such as a treatise of Grotius – nevertheless, some lacunae are evident. Under political sciences, classified together with law, the sciences of the State were understood in the 18th century, and in Ráday's collection we find a few works regarding government or, more precisely, how to govern, for example the *Prince* of Machiavelli and the already mentioned books on court life, typical products of his age.

A great difference in Pál Ráday's classification, in comparison to the one of his son, was that he still ranged works of the natural sciences with philosophy, meaning that products of theoretical thinking and those of empirical research were not yet separated from each other.

There are some very valuable books among the literary and rhetorical works, among others, first or second editions of Gyöngyösi's writings, as well as the Library's only exemplar of the oldest printed books – an *incunabulum* – a volume containing the sermons of Pelbárt Temesvári, published in Hagenau in 1499.

GEDEON RÁDAY

THE MAN, WRITER AND SCHOLAR, OF EUROPEAN CULTURAL DIMENSIONS

Gedeon Ráday received an excellent and varied education following the intentions of his father who, according to Kazinczy, directed his son, upbringing in such a way that "he should dedicate all his efforts to the promotion of national culture." He attended first the Lutheran high school of Pozsony the director of which at the time was Mátyás Bél, the well-known scholar and writer; a school in which the fresh and modern principles of the pietistic movement were put into application. He acquired here his knowledge of German and Latin and the bases of his vast culture; in addition, he attended parliamentary sessions – Pozsony having been the capital of Hungary until the second half of the 19th century – and got there his first impressions of the ongoing political debates in the country. Later, Pál Ráday has sent his son to Berlin, where Daniel Ernest Jablonski, preacher at the Prussian court and his old friend since the time when he carried out diplomatic missions, took care of him. This decision, again, was a political statement of Pál Ráday's kuruc feelings because, instead of directing his son towards one of the smaller German principalities on friendly terms with the Viennese court, he sent him to the capital of Prussia, a hostile power from the point of view of the Hapsburgs. During the last phase of his travels abroad, Gedeon Ráday went to Francfort-on-the-Oder where Pál Gyöngyösi, the exiled writer and former pastor in Kassa, was university professor. As I already mentioned before, this university city was the center of the French culture's radiance in Central and Eastern Europe, and the young Ráday received here a decisive cultural orientation for his whole life. The fact that he chose among the subjects he studied even statistics, instead of church history political history, and instead of classical legal theories and orthodox theology courses on the freshly developed natural law concepts and on the so-called natural theology – all this indicates his thirst for knowledge and the openness of his intellectual horizon.

After returning home, Gedeon Ráday participated in political and church life, and was several times elected to office in his department, but never desired to obtain higher State offices or honorary posts. He was solicited several times to accept decorations from the Hapsburg court or honorary appointments, but he steadfastly refused them: "Why should I solicit such shadowy opportunities, which even if one tells good things about them, do not mean anything but useless benefits, and if one tells bad things about them, are nothing else but infamy?" The most important part of his activities in ecclesiastical politics took place under the reign of Joseph the Second, as he was fully implicated in the debates about the emperor's Edict of Tolerance. As the head warden of the Danubian district of the Hungarian Reformed church, he directed the work of the church's Agents working with the imperial court not only in ecclesiastical, but also in political matters; when the Edict of Tolerance was issued, a permanent Protestant delegation had to stay in Vienna to settle all outstanding matters, of which his son was a member, they asked him all the time for his advice. The memorandum of Hungarian Protestants conveying to the emperor the thankfulness of the Hungarian churches reflects the ideas and the language of Gedeon Ráday. In the defense of his Church, he never referred to the new ideas and the characteristic principles of the Enlightenment, but his arguments are expression of the old Protestant legal thinking, of the customary views of the feudal society. He was a protagonist of the educational reform, hoping that "together with Transylvania, we could introduce uniformity in the education in our two homelands." His son living permanently in Vienna, became an outspoken supporter of imperial politics; because of his activities the two Rádays received first the title of baron, later that of count, thus becoming members of the aristocracy.

Beside the collection of books, the cultural importance of Gedeon Ráday's activities is the greatest from the literary point of view. He brought in the country new European poetic forms, slowly eliminating the

pleasant, but empty, so-called leonin rhythms. He created what one called the Ráday rhythm, and 42 of his printed poems survived until today. However, his activities in the literary field are not so important because of the poems he has written, but his role as characterized by Lőrinc Orczy who called Ráday 'the father of all literary creators.' Until his death in 1792, he remained the supporter and source of inspiration of new initiatives and literary endeavors, and similarly to the role played decades later by Kazinczy, he was the leader and guide of our literary life. Kazinczy himself described him as 'the nation's sacred, old man.' The writers asked him for advice, submitted to him their works for criticism; in this way Pécel became, from the 1780's on, a center of literary and scholarly life – as a large circle was formed around the old Ráday of noted writers and scholars of the country. He was the main collaborator of Kazinczy's paper, *Orpheus*, first published in 1790. He established contacts between Kazinczy and Batsányi and the literary circle in Marosvásárhely – György Aranka, Sándor Kovásznai and Sámuel Zilai. Ráday was also a convinced promoter of the Hungarian theatre, and was intent to bring to life a permanent theater in the country. His contemporaries did not forget him, and Kazinczy justly prophesized that 'later ages will desperately try to find news about Ráday.'

The golden age of the Library was the six decades between 1733 and 1792, during which Gedeon Ráday collected books. The extant archival material gives us a detailed picture of how a Hungarian nobleman of the 18th century constituted his library. A wide, colorful and spontaneously formed circle of agents is revealed as well as the passion of a man to collect books; at the same time, we also learn of the limits of such activities due to societal and technical conditions characterizing the age.

The areas of collection

Concerning the areas of collection two important changes occurred in the age of Gedeon Ráday in comparison to the preceding period: on the one hand, a shift in importance from one to the other areas and between the principal agents; on the other hand, the ever-growing importance of booksellers in collection activities in Vienna, Pozsony and Leipzig. Vienna became the most important market, complemented by acquisitions in foreign university cities, centers of intellectual life – Basel, Zurich, Utrecht, Leyden, Leipzig, Dresden, Gotha or Francfort-on-the-Oder – as well as, during the two last decades of the century, the book market of Pest. Transylvania remained important only for purchases of old Hungarian literature, whereas the limited role of Pozsony remained the same as before. This was a natural development because the home market for publications was still in its infant stage, and could not satisfy a sophisticated buyer like Ráday. It was, therefore, inevitable that he turned towards the nearest capital city, Vienna, where in the second half of the eighteenth century a large book market existed already, with regular auctions, with booksellers who had extensive relationships abroad, and where traders of other cities – Leipzig, Nuremberg, and Basel – opened branches or had permanent representations. In connection with Pozsony it has to be noted that its role was particularly important during the whole period as the transit center between Vienna or other cities and Pécel, and where the control of 'forbidden' books made it especially difficult, just as in Vienna, to forward consignments to Hungary.

The circle of agents

The characteristics of the agents working for Gedeon Ráday did, however, not change since the collecting activities of his father; they were, as before, pastors, professors, students who benefited from Ráday's support as well as the Agents of the Hungarian Reformed church in Vienna. Among them a special place has to be assigned to Sámuel Nagy who was the Reformed church's Viennese Agent from 1763 through 1792, who – in addition to his short stay in Basel – faithfully executed the orders of his benefactor during thirty years, and whose role from the point of view of the constitution of the Library was crucial. Sámuel Nagy and this is evident from his letters, was as much a book lover as Ráday, and made purchases, and supervised binding of the books with as much care as the collector himself. He took frequently the initiative concerning auctions or in negotiating with a bookseller, precisely because he knew that he himself and Ráday think in the same way. This loyal agent, who worked with Ráday in all matters concerning the affairs of the church as well, lived very modestly though being a successful businessman, and lent or

advanced money on many occasions for book acquisitions, and there were periods when Ráday owed him 8 to 10'000 fl. It was most important for the collector of Pécel that Nagy, as also the other agents and friends, informed him of the literary and scholarly events in the cities where they lived, of the auctions announced in advance, and in this manner they involved the nobleman living in Pécel in cultural developments, in the hectic life of the book markets and of the book trade in faraway places. In Vienna and in Pozsony István Nagy was also agent of Ráday for a longer period. In Pozsony, there were in addition István Szerentsi Nagy, the literary man, pastor and friend, János Szászky-Tomka, rector of the Lutheran college, and, occasionally, Dániel Cornides, a good friend of the family. Sámuel Szilágyi, a friend of Ráday from their student years, bought books and manuscripts for him first in Vienna, then in Transylvania, when he was nominated judge at the royal court of Szeben. In Transylvania special mention has to be given to Péter Bod, historian and the pastor of Árva [Orphan] Kata Bethlen, as well as the professors Sándor Kovásznai Tóth and Sámuel Zilai. Friends and relatives wanted, as a matter of course, please to the collector with books. Thus, Kazinczy looked for him for the first editions of Hungarian authors printed by the press of Kassa, or his grandson, Pál, nominated judge at the district court in Eperjes at the young age of 20, whom the grandfather pushed to try to discover products of the very famous printing shop in Lőcse, editions which one could not find anywhere else.

Auctions and booksellers

An agent's role was particularly important in the case of the auctions of large private libraries. It depended on his skill and inventiveness whether he could buy for Ráday the books he indicated in the auction's catalogue. It was, therefore, imperative that they obtain in time these catalogues, send them to Pécel, giving Ráday enough time to peruse them and indicate which books he wanted to buy – considering not only the content of the books, but the place and time of their publication as well as their price. At such big auctions as those which took place in Vienna, they had in many cases to fight with the agents commissioned by other collectors, who had incomparably larger financial means at their disposal as, for example, those of Ferenc Széchényi. We read in great detail of fifteen Viennese auctions in the archival material; the reading of these pages of the Library's history are as full of surprises and are as arousing as the pages of a detective story. We have only two reports from auctions in Pozsony in the letters of István Nagy and János Mihályfalvi; this is not at all surprising because the limited book market of Hungary's capital did not offer many possibilities for would-be sellers.

From the more distant places of book collection many books landed in the Pécel Library which were bought at auctions. It is certain that Gedeon Ráday himself participated at some auctions during his student years in Francfort-on-the-Oder, though we do not have any written proof of this, because the great number of books he took home when returning to Hungary appears as an evidence for it. Sámuel Nagy, the most successful agent, already during his short stay in Basel, reports about auctions, where he bought books for his benefactor; at the same time he established contacts with other university cities as well, and informs the latter of auctions, for example, in Strasbourg. Mihály Blasek acted in the same way in Basel, from where he went to Utrecht (no letters are in the archives from there). He had to terminate his study trip early as the Hungarian churches decided to send him, as a minister having as mother tongue the Slovak language, to the Czech lands, to serve as pastor in the reviving congregations of the followers of John Hus after the Edict of Tolerance. Finally, there are also some letters in Ráday's correspondence which show that he contacted some old friends when he heard about a great auction in Francfort-on-the-Oder, from where he wanted to buy some books as well.

Ráday was personally in contact with booksellers during long years, except for Vienna where his agents handled business with them, though even in these cases he corresponded directly with the Viennese traders concerning more serious problems. The Viennese booksellers who played the greatest role in the constitution of the Library at Pécel were Friedrich Bernhardt, Emerich Felix Bader, Ernest Klopstock, the Artaria Co. (publisher of Mozart's works), Newenstein (the manager of which was Herinnes), and the Vienna branch of the Nuremberg traders, Bauer and Monath. The periodic publications, of course, were subscribed by the agents not only through merchants in Vienna or the post office there, but from publishers in faraway cities, in Francfort, Göttingen, Leipzig or Regensburg, while Rousseau's *Journal encyclopédique* was ordered first from Liège in Belgium, then from Bouillon in the same country.

Ráday made acquisitions at Anton Löwe's shop in Pozsony during decades. Löwe endeavored to satisfy his requests through a large network of contacts, for example in Francfort and Leipzig. The students supported by Ráday contacted everywhere the booksellers in the city where they stayed, – thus, for example, Sámuel Nagy in Basel (getting through them the catalogues of book merchants even from Zurich and Bern), or Mihály Blasek, traveling in Switzerland, contacted them in Basel as well as in Bern and Lausanne.

The most important relation of Ráday with a bookseller, besides Vienna and Pozsony, was with Abraham Christoph Thiele in Leipzig, – a very skillful but not always trustworthy businessman, as we learn it from their correspondence. Leipzig was at the time the second most important book market in Germany after Francfort, and the city's book fairs had a deservedly good reputation. Thiele bought not only books for his client, but paintings and old numismatic pieces; it was through him that Ráday could buy the beautiful Lucas Cranach painting which, surviving the long, stormy centuries, even today decorates the Library's room where the old collection is installed. It was also through Thiele that Ráday could buy publications at the auctions of Saxony – in Leipzig, Dresden and Gotha. The archival material indicates seven such auctions; it was in Leipzig, among others, that were auctioned the books and manuscripts of Károly Bél, son of the professor from Pozsony and friend of Ráday. Thiele bought at this auction for Ráday seven partially autograph manuscripts of Mátyás Bél, and two of Károly Bél, which were delivered to Pécel after a long delay and a lot of difficulties. It is certain that Ráday purchased through Thiele books from other booksellers of Saxony, too, but we have no data concerning such purchases.

The role of Pest in Ráday's collecting activities became important from the 1770's on, exceeding the purchases made in Transylvania or Pozsony or other parts of Hungary. As a result of the studies conducted by Albert Gárdonyi, there can be no doubt that in the second half of the 18th century Pest was the center of the Hungarian book trade, and here, in the heart of the country, was born the most important book market. This explains the fact that Ráday, who lived in nearby Pécel and sojourned frequently in his house at Pest, made the bulk of purchases by booksellers there, in particular at Weingand & Köpff. It was a great advantage that he could deal with them face to face; tell them personally his desires and his objections as well as to settle in person outstanding accounts. In fact, he also had relations with the very first bookseller of Pest, Gellért Mauss, who established his shop in 1748, and bought from him publications during the fifties. His major supplier in Pest was, however, the firm Weingand & Köpff, and from the end of the seventies through the eighties he purchased such a large amount of books from them that Weingand, one of the owner, told Ábrahám Komjáthi who taught Kazinczy in his youth, that "they earned from Ráday as much as from all other clients altogether." There is a detailed account in the Ráday archives which shows how many books the firm sold to Ráday and at what price from spring 1774 through spring 1775; the number of books amounted 762 for which the collector paid the sum of 2'850 forint and 22 krajcár.

THE EXTERNAL VIEW OF THE LIBRARY

The library hall was an inevitable complement, a major decorative element of a Baroque chateau. For Rádays' late Baroque chateau as well the large library hall represented a major piece of aesthetic element with its frescoes and beautifully bound books. This sumptuous external arrangement almost contradicts the inner character of the Library, since the main characteristics of the collection, the function of the Library and, first of all, the intentions and visions of the collector, do not reflect a Baroque perspective, but the intellectual approaches and wider horizons of the 18th century, the ideas of Enlightenment and the ever larger needs of education through culture.

Pál Ráday ranged the books he collected in his manor house in Ludány and, later, when he built a larger house in Pécel in the second half of the 1730s, in the new building. The Ráday Library was definitely accommodated, between 1762-1763, in the spacious hall and some smaller rooms of the Pécel chateau. This famous, great hall was part of the huge construction carried out by Gedeon Ráday between 1755 and 1766, when he let rebuild the manor house of his father in Pécel by János Meyerhoffer, son of one of the best known architects of the time, András Meyerhoffer, into a beautiful Baroque chateau.

We cannot go into the details of this enterprise, and will simply trace the story of fresco painting in the large and smaller Library rooms, complementing with this the picture already given of Gedeon Ráday's

character. Ráday contracted Mátyás Schervitz for the fresco painting. From the contract signed between the two it becomes evident that the painter accepted to execute the work in nine separate spaces "in accordance with the plan given by his Lordship," – and it shows Ráday's imagination as well that the books figuring in the frescoes, painted in the monumental Baroque style, were those, for example the *Acta Eruditorum*, which were on the shelves of the Library. In this way, the frescoes referring to the content of the Library materials, represented the encyclopedic image of the sciences, expressed by allegorical personages well-known to the person who made the design. In the middle field, Pallas Athena, sitting on clouds, announced the triumph of the sciences. This central figure is surrounded, in eight adjacent fields, by representations of individual sciences from grammar to theology, and in the hands of the numerous amoretti, or in a standing position, the most important books related to the science depicted can be seen. The ceiling and the walls of the smaller Library room are also decorated with frescoes, painted by Schervitz, too. On the ceiling one can see Arion, the poet, with his lyre, as he escapes from the sea sitting on the back of a dolphin. Above the doors and the window a well-known detail of mythology – Orpheus in the underworld – is narrated on the walls. The model for these frescoes was taken from the engravings of Bernard Picart, the French artist working in Amsterdam; they must have pleased to Ráday so much that even the great reception hall of the chateau was decorated with frescoes based on Picart's engravings.

Ráday was also anxious to have in his Library decorative book shelves. They were made in the rococo style; only four of the great sized and entirely similar decorated book shelves survived until today, placed in the part of the Library which is declared national monument. The shelves and the smaller, glass covered cupboards were all white, decorated in gold.

In telling the history of private libraries, one has to particularly emphasize book bindings, as for collectors of all ages the aesthetic point of view is as important as the content of the books. During the epoch of the Baroque, when the huge library halls contributed in the first place to the sumptuousness and impressive beauty of the chateau, the collector could not do otherwise but to have in his collection elegantly and beautifully bound books; in addition, as a result of the Enlightenment the book lover, aesthetically alert person could not imagine not to have books with great contents without bindings corresponding to their excellence. The bindings in the Ráday Library can be divided in two categories: the products of preceding centuries, among which there are some true jewels of the old Hungarian art of book binding, and the books in typical, 18th century bindings decorated with gold, which constitute the main element in the external image of the Library.

The Library with its more than ten thousand volumes was taken away from its solitude in Pécel in 1862 as a result of the action of Pál Török, bishop of the Danube district of the Hungarian Reformed Church, who succeeded to establish the Reformed Theological Academy in Budapest. The modest institution did not have a library, therefore Pál Török – when he heard that the Ráday family wanted to put up for sale its famous collection – initiated a national subscription with a view to acquire this cultural treasure for the Academy. The family, when it became aware of the church's intention, decided to give half of the total price requested, 40'000 fl., as a gift to the church. The remaining sum of 20'000 fl. was collected as donation from parishes and individuals, and the Library was acquired finally by the church in 1861. At present, the Ráday Library is part of the Ráday Collection of the Danube district of the Reformed Church. The books originally collected by Pál and Gedeon Ráday are on the 18th century shelves in a special room, separated from the other library material.

THE REALISM OF KHRUSHCHEV*

Soviet Foreign Policy versus Arab Nationalism, 1953 – 1960

[This study was the author's doctoral dissertation in political science at *the Graduate School for International Studies*, Geneva, Switzerland. It was published in 1968 in French in traditional book form. Within the *Bibliotheca Mikes International* we published it in electronic format on 6 April 2005. – *Ed. Mikes International*]

The study deals with the epoch-making change in Soviet foreign policy after the death of Stalin, initiated by Khrushchev between 1953 and 1960. This new approach in Soviet policy towards States which already obtained independence from colonial powers (including those which were not colonies but were so-called protectorates before), in the first place the Arab States of the Middle East, was an essential part of the worldwide movement of decolonization. Therefore, its conclusions point to future Soviet policy initiatives in respect of the Third World – designating the rest of the world falling outside the orbit of Western civilization's two hostile camps, the capitalist and anti-totalitarian, on the one hand, and the socialist-communist blocks, on the other.

It is also evident from the lecture of the book that the Soviet Union, as any other great power in any period of history, pushed aside, whenever necessary, its ideological convictions and the defense of the parties related to it as banner-holders of the world revolution, in order to safeguard and promote her own interests as a State and aspiring world power. This was like an earthquake after the long reign of Stalin who, as his attitude towards the Iranian bourgeois-nationalist reformer Mossadeq in 1953 proved it, rejected such an approach to emerging nation-states whose independence was menaced by the former 'imperialist' powers. In one word: *the new approach meant giving priority to the objectives of the national revolt in former colonies or protectorates over the realization of the aims of the social revolution, the radical changes to be achieved in society.*

What were the most important elements which influenced Soviet policymakers in their decisions? One can mention here, briefly, three:

- The polycentric evolution on the international plane which followed from the Soviet military role at the end of the Second World War, on the one hand, and the polycentric evolution in the orbit of the Communist world (mainly illustrated by China's rising to eminence), on the other.
- The enormous military power of the USSR which was a new phenomenon in the international system, and,
- The gradual emancipation of Asian and African countries hitherto colonized by the West.

1. THE NEW APPROACH OF SOVIET POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD

The new approach towards nationalist movements in the Third World was overtly adopted at the 20th Congress of the Russian Communist Party, following the success of the Egyptian revolution in 1952, the Bandung Conference declaring the principle of peaceful coexistence in April 1955, and Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's radical attitude when he nationalized the Suez Canal. In fact, the Supreme Soviet ratified in February 1955 already the *Pancha Shila*, the five principles on which peaceful coexistence was to be based – mutual respect of each State's territorial integrity; non-aggression; non-intervention in the affairs of other States; acknowledgment of the equal status of different States on the international plane, and their outcome: the peaceful coexistence of States – spelled out in the 1954 Treaty between China and India.

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E. Zhukov, member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, formulated the ideological justification of the new approach when writing that "this great [nationalist] movement aims at the destruction of imperialist domination and therefore represents, objectively, the forward march of history." To explain his argumentation, Zhukov naturally referred to the Leninist tradition according to which "it is mandatory for the politically awakened proletarian class of every country to give particular attention to the national sentiment, in particular in countries which suffered from the oppression [by colonial powers]."¹

If Third World nationalism was accepted with, however, some reservations, civilizational differences, and the consequences engendered by them, were subject of a serious debate. Soviet adherence to the bloc of the Bandung group of States raised naturally the question whether she belongs to Occident or Orient (the latter designating all non-Western countries)? In fact, Soviet representatives never admitted that such a question could even be considered. According to Bagramov, one of the specialists in this matter, "Occident and Orient are geographical concepts and do not contribute at all to an understanding world civilization and the history of social development."² In his writings, Bagramov nevertheless reveals the Soviet point of view that Occident and Orient are for the Soviets political concepts, ephemeral because disappearing after the worldwide triumph of the working class and of Communism. In addition, it is also evident from reading Soviet authors that they are defending the cause of African and Asian States from the outside, that is, as Europeans as much as the French or English. Several writers, like the already mentioned E. Zhukov, vehemently criticizes the point of view of many Orientals who are convinced that their cultures are superior to the Western on the spiritual plane, especially protagonists of the theses of non-violence, although they recognize the moral superiority of the Orient as compared to the morals of the imperialist Occident.

In respect of Third World nationalisms, the major preoccupation of the Soviets was that their representatives claimed to possess an independent and autonomous ideology, satisfying the just aspirations of their people, as the prophecy of Stalin concerning the role of the October revolution in bridging the divide between a socialist Occident and an Orient subdued by the colonialists, did never become a reality.

The Soviet Union therefore established a temporary, though strategic, alliance with some States in Africa and Asia, but could not handle and dissipate the contradictions between human beings belonging to different civilizational worlds. This antagonism of the theses of Marxism-Leninism, on the one hand, and political realities on the other, became already evident during the year 1959 in Iraq in the conflict between Arab nationalists and Iraqi communists.

This explains why Soviet politicians and writers never spoke of Arab nationalism, but of the national liberation movement of Arab peoples. In the same vein, 'Arab unity' has for the Soviets also a different, but very precise meaning of the one attributed to it by the Arabs, namely the unity of the Arabs in the merciless fight against the colonialists and imperialists. Consequently, Arab nationalism as such does not possess, in their eyes, a proper value; its historical function is nothing else but the preparation of the triumph of the Socialist revolution and the joining by the Arab countries the bloc of Communist States. This means, then, that Arab nationalism and aspirations towards unity can only be accepted if they serve the interests of the Soviet State in the immediate future, and the objectives of world revolution in the long term.

Even in this perspective, however, it became inevitable to take a stance towards the national bourgeoisie of the Arab and other African and Asian countries, because in the neutralist political orientation of these countries this bourgeoisie played the leading role. The propagation of a social revolution, even of some socialist reforms, could only hinder the fight against the colonialists as the bourgeoisie could have been afraid by such efforts and make a deal with the bourgeoisie of the colonial powers. The Soviet dilemma of the epoch after Stalin's death was therefore whether to give preference to the national liberation movements or to the activities of the local Communist parties and other political groups on the extreme left which, inevitably, were promoting the socialist revolution against the bourgeoisie of their respective countries? *In face of this fundamental choice Khrushchev realistically chose to support the national liberation movement in order to gradually weaken the Western powers' grasp on Middle Eastern Arab States. Real interests are more important than ideological principles. This is what I call in the study under review the fundamental option of Soviet policy during the Khrushchev years.*

¹ ZHUKOV, E. "The Bandung Conference of African and Asian Countries and Its Historic Significance." *International Affairs*, Moscow, 1955, N 5, p. 28.

² BAGRAMOV, E. *Miff protivopolojnosti Zapada i Vostoka*. Moskva, Gospol., 1958. *Mizan Newsletter*, 1960, N 6, p. 9 (all translations from the Russian original were made by the author).

It must be added that the decision was not an entirely original one. Already Lenin recognized that in the ideology of national liberation movements there is always "a general democratic content," consequently the communists have to support such movements.³ His views are clearly stated in his "theses on the international revolutionary movement." He points out in this text that "the revolutionary movement [in the colonies] finds itself in the democratic-bourgeois phase, that is, in the phase of preparation for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of launching the societal revolution. The democratic bourgeois revolution there differs from the revolution in independent countries mainly in that it is organically linked to the fight for national liberation from imperialist domination. The national element considerably influences the revolutionary process in all colonies, as well as in the semi-colonies, where the people suffer from the slavery maintained by the imperialists though, in some disguised forms, and arouses the masses to revolt against it."⁴

E. Zhukov, one of the outstanding experts on questions related to newly independent countries, in a tirade against the 'dogmatists' and 'sectarians' published by Pravda in August 1960 situated the new approach favoring the national liberation struggle instead of societal revolution and, consequently, the acceptance of political regimes dominated by the national bourgeoisie, in the worldwide context of pacific co-existence. He recognized that the socialist transformation cannot be achieved automatically and simultaneously in all countries.⁵

The clearest definition of the national bourgeoisie was given by G.I. Levinson in a debate which took place in Tashkent in 1957: "The national bourgeoisie is a class, of which the interests coincide, during a given period, with the interests of the nation, that is, with the realization of the objectives of economic and social progress in the country. However, it should not be forgotten that the identification of the interests of the national bourgeoisie with those of the nation can never be complete. The class divisions and the contradictions are not eliminated. It is possible to say that normally the national bourgeoisie can only exist in colonies or other dependent countries."⁶

In order to show the importance of the realist choice made by Khrushchev in regard to Third World nationalism and the role of the national bourgeoisie in the liberation movements, it is necessary briefly to mention one of the greatest mistakes Stalin made before his death in 1953. This was his decision not to support the Mossadeq government in Iran against Western efforts aiming to eliminate it – with success. It is well known today that Stalin at the end of his life adopted more and more ideologically conservative policies. He decided, as became evident in the Mossadeq case, that the capitalist classes, that is, the national bourgeoisie in developing countries cannot be reliable allies in the fight against imperialism. This bourgeoisie is a virtual traitor whatever its role may be in the nationalist movement. Only the working class can lead the struggle for national liberation under the leadership of the Communist parties. Mossadeq personified, in the eyes of Stalin, this type of questionable nationalism, and he decided not to support him in the face of Western attacks. Soviet policies at this time, as well as the policies of the Communist party of Iran, the Tudeh, indicate that Stalin's intention was to discredit the bourgeois nationalism of Mossadeq and his government in the eyes of the West and of his own people."⁷ The divorce between an authentic nationalistic orientation of Soviet policy and the communist movements in Middle Eastern Arab countries became, at least temporarily, complete.

³ LENIN, V. I. *Sotchinenija*, Moskva, Gos-izd-vo polit. lit-ry, 1941, vol. 20, p. 384

⁴ *The Communist International, 1919-1943; documents*. Selected and edited by Jane Degras. London, Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1956, p. 537. The subtitle of the section is: *Thesis on the Revolutionary Movements in the Colonies*. Mao Tsé-Toung as well divided the Chinese revolution in two distinct phases: "The nature of the Chinese society being colonial, semi-colonial, semi-feudal, it is evident that the revolution has to have two phases. The first is constituted by the transformation of this colonial, semi-colonial, semi-feudal society into an independent and democratic society; the second is constituted by the revolutionary development towards the construction of a socialist society." MAO TSE-TOUNG. *La nouvelle démocratie*. Paris, Editions Sociales, 1951, p. 47.

⁵ ZHOUKOV, E. "Znamjenatel'nyj faktor nasego vremeni." *Pravda*, 26 August 1960.

⁶ "Diskoussija ab ekonomitcheskih i politicheskikh pozitzija natzional'noj-bourjouazii v strana Vostoka." *Sovjetskoje vostokovedenje*, 1957, No.1, p.176.

⁷ DALLIN, D. J. *Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin*, p. 206. See also: WHEELER, Geoffrey. "Russia and the Middle East." *Political Quarterly*, 4 June 1957, pp. 132-133.

2. THE DOCTRINE OF 'NATIONAL DEMOCRACY'

The realistic approach initiated by Khrushchev finally took the form of the so-called 'doctrine of national democracy.' I explained in the study under review the essence of the 'doctrine of national democracy' as follows: "Thus, the concept of national democracy has to satisfy two requirements of Soviet policy. First, it was designated to reduce the distance between Moscow's foreign policy [the new approach] and the position of local communist parties. Second, and simultaneously to this reconciliation of divergent interests, it had to preserve the position and interests of the Soviet Union as a great power. In other words, once independence achieved and the problems of development and the future of the liberated countries have to be considered, Soviet policy will again need the Communist forces in these countries in order to be able to influence, from the inside, the evolution of the Third World. This will have to happen without jeopardizing the State to State relations between the Soviet Union and the newly independent countries. In this perspective, national democracy, which was expected to be the instrument for the realization of these objectives, is a concretization of pacific co-existence as much in the external as in the internal domains."⁸

The democratic regime is the most fundamental characteristic of this type of State, and its description does not differ in anything from the one given, in general, of European parliamentary democracies. Its main function is to secure the vital freedom of action for the local Communist parties and extreme left movements, but in addition it has also an important intermediary function as the momentary framework of national unity. In the words of Khrushchev himself, the national democratic state "serves the interests not only of one class but of the widest strata of the population," with a view to entirely realize "the tasks of the anti-imperialist revolution and of national liberation."⁹

The doctrine of national democracy, finally, consisted as well in the adoption of the *non-capitalist way of development*, an indispensable corollary of the democratic regime in the eyes of Soviet politicians and writers. This particular term implied:

- First, the complete economic independence, that is, the liquidation of the strongholds of foreign capital and of all foreign economic assistance (except, of course, the assistance given by the Communist bloc); in the language of the Soviets economic independence equals the adoption of the non-capitalist way of development.

- Second, some structural reforms of the economy oriented towards socialism.

- Third, an ever-increasing role of the State in the country's economic life.¹⁰

One has to be conscious of the great difference between the non-capitalist way of development and what one called frequently then 'socialism of a national type.' The nuance is of importance. These particular socialisms were vehemently criticized by the Soviets because reflecting petty bourgeois illusions and not having recognized the inevitability of war between classes. It was pointed out that this kind of socialisms is not identical with the Marxist-Leninist conception of socialism, and is frequently in contradiction with the latter.

⁸ SEGESVARY, Victor. *Le réalisme khrouchtchévien; la politique soviétique à l'égard du nationalisme arabe, 1953-1960*. Neuchâtel, Ed. de la Baconnière, 1968, p. 153.

⁹ KHRUSHCHEV, N. S. *Le programme*, pp. 126-127.

¹⁰ "The creation of an industrial State sector is the most efficient way to secure economic independence ... The constant increase of the State sector in a national democracy, its becoming a decisive element in the country's economic future, may prepare the material basis for the gradual adoption of the non-capitalist way of development." PONOMAREV, B. "O gosudarstve natsional'noj demokraztii." *Kommunist*, May 1961, p. 44.

3. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW SOVIET APPROACH IN THE MIDDLE EAST

a) *Prevention of the Creation of Defensive Pacts or Alliances*

In strictly strategic terms, the changing Soviet policy framework aimed principally at

- i) Affirming the presence of the USSR in the Middle Eastern region,
- ii) Accelerating the process of adoption of a neutral stance by the Arab States between the evolving two power blocs; and
- iii) Maintaining the *status quo*, that is, the colonial parceling out of territories between these States.

These general objectives meant in practice: the preservation of peace in the region through negotiations with the participation of the Soviet Union; the non-intervention in the internal affairs of the Arab States and respecting their sovereignty and independence; the abandonment of any effort trying to imply Middle Eastern countries in military blocs in which the great powers are participating; the liquidation of foreign military bases and the retreat of all foreign military forces from the territories of the countries concerned, and, finally, the promotion of economic development in the region without imposing on the States which request assistance, any political or military conditions.

The realization of these objectives made it mandatory to Soviet politicians *to prevent or to hinder the creation of any military blocs and alliances through the promotion of political neutralism among the States constitutive of the region*. The first step in this direction was the successful action to impede the Middle East Command to become efficient and to attract a great number of States as members. But the great confrontation between the Soviets and the Western powers came with the creation of the Baghdad Pact which the USSR opposed with all the means at its disposal. From the end of the Korean War in 1953, the Soviet Union tried to influence the events in the Middle Eastern region in order to avoid the creation of a military alliance of Western powers and regional States.

The Baghdad Pact covered a vast territory from the southern frontiers of the Soviet Union at the Black Sea to the highest peaks of the world, the Pamir, and its creation offered to the USSR an excellent opportunity to implement its new policy in the Middle East, because the apparent success of the Western initiative contained already the elements of future crises and tensions between the Arab world and the West. In fact, only the former allies of the United States and of European countries adhered to it, extremely weak States from political, economic and social point of views and surviving only with the West's material assistance and political support. From among the Arab countries only Iraq joined it, whose regime was attacked and rejected by the nationalists. As a consequence, Iraq's joining of a regional defensive pact created at the proposal of the former colonial powers or their allies, provoked a unanimous condemnation of the Arab States – with the exception of Lebanon – and the division of the Arab world into two blocs became reality. Furthermore, this division gave a new inspiration and a new strength to the regional unification efforts encompassing all Arab countries and fought for by all nationalists, – an opportunity for the new Soviet policy which it exploited to the utmost. A triple argumentation was put forward by the Soviets: first, they argued that the Baghdad Pact is a new form of colonialism; second, that it divides the Arab States instead of uniting them, and, third, that it is entirely contrary to the principle of Islamic solidarity.

Militarily, the USSR having become a nuclear power, it did not have to be afraid of an 'encircling,' an eternal obsession of Soviet leaders in the past, and the emphasis was rather put on the establishment of foreign military bases possessing nuclear armament near the southern frontiers of the USSR. The Baghdad Pact's role was only that it gave the legal justification to the setting up or continued maintaining of these bases.

b) *Unconditional and Overt Support to Arab Nationalism*

The Soviet's support to Arab nationalism is dealt with under two headings:

- i) Delivery of arms and other military equipment; and
- ii) Diplomatic intervention in conflicts between Arab States and Western powers and, at these occasions, extensive propaganda campaigns at international level, though mainly concentrated in the region, in favor of independentist and nationalist policies.

1. Deliveries of arms and military equipment

The arms delivery to neutralist Arab States, like Egypt and Syria, started in 1955 when Czechoslovakia, on behalf of the Soviet Union (as it happened many times later), delivered to Egypt some armament. This delivery was, in effect, the very first manifestation of Gamal Abdel Nasser's policies of non-alignment and positive neutralism as defined at the Bandung Conference. This was an undeniable challenge in the face of the West and a resolute rejection of the Western mentality and politics which did not want to acknowledge, after the emancipation of formerly colonized or 'protected' countries, that not only the regional political scene but the entire configuration in world politics fundamentally changed. The States which acquired sovereignty wanted to establish their own armies, to affirm their own personality and to satisfy the exigencies of their national pride. In addition, they were eager to compensate psychologically for the humiliations suffered in the past. The Lebanese daily, *Le Matin*, concluded in a few words: "Of all the stirring caused by the acquisition of arms, the most important phenomenon is the entry of the USSR in the Middle Eastern political game."

The bilateral accord concerning the delivery of Czech arms to Egypt was never published, nor exact information and figures about their types and value of the armament concerned. However, some observers estimate the total value of this arms purchase by an Arab country in the autumn of 1955,¹¹ at between 80 to 150 million US dollars, and it was also known that they had to be paid for by cotton of which the quantity was determined in advance. The conclusion was nevertheless justified, in the eyes of the observers of the Middle Eastern political scene, that this was not a commercial affair for the Soviets, but a gesture towards Arab nationalism.

The study contains some more detailed information about arms sales to Egypt and Syria, and brief indications for Saudi Arabia, the Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq following the 14 July 1958 nationalist revolution which abolished the Hashemite Kingdom with the assassination of the king and of his prime minister, Nouri Said.

2. Intervention in Conflicts between Arab States and Western Powers

It is not possible to review here in detail the intervention of the USSR in all the political crises juxtaposing Arab countries to Western powers, in which the Soviet Union intervened vigorously and thereby affirmed her presence in this vital region of the world. The various crises which took place during the period under review were:

¹¹ The *Middle Eastern Journal* gave in its issue of Winter 1955, p. 65, different estimates of the total value of Czech arms delivery; in addition, the *Washington Star* published some figures on 11 May and 2 September 1956, as well as the official publication, *Foreign Assistance Activities of the Communist Bloc and their implications for the United States*, Washington Government Printing office, 1957, p. 92. Walter Laqueur indicated the amount of 300 millions to 350 millions dollars in his article published by the *Problems of Communism*, 1957, N 4, p. 22, whereas the February 1957 issue of *Middle Eastern Affairs*, p. 77, put the value of the transaction in autumn 1955 at 100 million to 250 million US dollars.

- The controversy between Egypt and Great Britain in respect of Sudan;
- The skirmishes in the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula;
- The only armed conflict: Suez,
- The Syrian crises in 1957 during which President Eisenhower declared his 'doctrine,' and
- The Lebanese Civil War in 1958.

I shall deal here, only briefly, with the armed conflict of Suez, the Eisenhower Doctrine declared during the Syrian crisis in 1957 and the Lebanese Civil War in 1958.

The Eisenhower Doctrine. It was proclaimed in January 1957, at the occasion of the political crisis in Syria, requesting the Congress of the United States some special authorizations with a view to confront the Soviet advance in the Middle East. This doctrine spelled out the following objectives:

- Cooperation with, and assistance to, any Middle Eastern State enhancing its economic development and safeguarding its national independence;
- Military cooperation, including assistance, with any Middle Eastern State requesting help;
- In the framework of military cooperation, the possibility of using American forces in order to censure and protect its territorial integrity and political independence, whenever a nation requests help against an armed aggression from a State under control of international Communism;
- Elimination of restrictions on the use of funds which were included in the Mutual Security Pact of 1954, in order to be accessible for the realization of the above objectives; and, finally.
- Additional funding, up to 200 million dollars, for the years 1958 and 1959 at the disposal of the President, for eventual needs in the Middle East.

In fact, the Eisenhower doctrine made official the concept of a 'vacuum' in the Middle East by pointing out that, following the process of decolonization, there is a lack of leading powers in the area. It goes without saying that no country, no people with national pride could accept such an insult; therefore, the Arab States resolutely opposed it. This, of course, offered a new opening to Soviet policy to attack the imperialists' meddling in the affairs of the region.

The nationalization of the Suez Canal. Egypt nationalized all possessing of the Compagnie Maritime Universelle du Canal de Suez on 26 July 1956, intending, by this gesture, to take the leadership in the Arab world. It was most important for President Nasser that he could count on the support of the Soviet bloc and, thus, declare his independence in his relationship with Occident, at a time when the Western powers were more and more recalcitrant to grant her the requested military and financial assistance. The Egyptian and Western positions concerning this act of sovereignty were completely contradictory. For the first, the concessions granted by Egypt to the Compagnie and the Convention of Constantinople were two entirely different things, and Egypt had its sovereign right to nationalize the Compagnie, however, maintaining, in accordance with the Convention, free shipping on the Canal. For the second, the Suez Canal and the Compagnie which is in charge of its management, possess an international status guaranteed by the Convention of Constantinople, therefore, the nationalization was an illegal act unacceptable to the so-called international community.

The first Soviet declaration in respect of the Suez crisis came from Khrushchev personally: "We consider that nothing illegal happened. What is the subject of discord? The Suez Canal. Where is it? In Egypt. On whose territory does it pass through? On Egyptian territory. By whose hands was the Canal constructed? By the hands of the Arabs who live in Egypt. However, it does not belong to Egypt ... However, today we live in an age in which relations established by conquest and occupation are not anymore

considered to be sufficient reasons to maintain people in subjugation."¹² There were many diplomatic notes exchanged between the USSR, on the one hand, and the Western powers and Turkey, on the other hand, and Shepilov, the Soviet minister of foreign affairs, participated in the two London Conferences which preceded the tripartite attack of Egypt by Israel, France and Great Britain. In the Soviet diplomatic and propaganda offensive the Middle Eastern Communist parties, first of all the Syrian Communist party, played an important role.

The Security Council of the United Nations took up the matter already at the end of September, but, as negotiations did not produce any results, Israel's, France' and Great Britain's tripartite attack was launched against Egypt, officially to maintain the freedom of navigation on the Canal. The moment for the attack was well chosen because at the same time took place the Hungarian Revolution against Soviet domination, the greatest shock ever experienced by the Communist world, and it could be thought that the Soviet Union will be just too occupied to repress the revolt occurring in its empire, instead of dealing with the Suez crisis. However, the Soviets remained as active as before in their support of the Arab cause, and condemned the attack, together with the United States, on 30 October as gravely discrediting the international organization's efforts. Nevertheless, the diplomatic action outside the UN and the propaganda campaign aiming at the public opinion of Arab countries never ceased.

The Lebanese Civil War. The Lebanese Civil War of 1958 was in the making since the September 1952 elections, when the radical Christian leader, Camille Chamoun, who confessed a strongly nationalist stance, was elected president of the republic. From 1956, the Lebanese government adopted a pro-Western foreign policy, contrarily to previous governments that attempted to maintain equilibrium between the two power blocks. In the July 1957 elections, the opposition, consisting mainly of Muslim parties, which preferred absolute neutrality taking into account the evolving interarab relationships dominated by the idea of a United Arab Republic (created by Egypt and Syria at the beginning of 1958), suffered an unexpected and heavy defeat. The civil war between the two opposing sides broke out in May 1958 as, according to reliable sources, there was interference into the country's internal affairs by Egypt and Syria. The Lebanese Government requested the intervention of the United Nations during the same month, and also asked the United States to send their troops into Lebanon to protect the country's independence against foreign interference. The American forces consequently landed there on 15 of July, but left the country already on 20 October 1958. The arrival of American soldiers in Lebanon was accompanied by the landing of British troops in Jordan that also sent itself menaced.

Again, this event, inspired by hostilities between local political forces, offered the Soviet Union a new avenue for intense diplomatic action and propaganda campaigns. The opportunity was too tempting not to intervene as protector of Arab interests and of the region's States against the former colonial powers of Occident. The opposing camps fought against each other in the Security Council and in the General Assembly of the United Nations, and provoked the revelation of an entirely new attitude of the Americans: the United States was no longer opposed to Arab nationalism as such, if it affirmed itself in the UN and other international fora. The UN was, once again, incapable to find a solution to the crisis which was finally resolved by the peaceful evolution of the Lebanese domestic situation. The United States announced that it will contribute a substantial aid package to the development of the country, and this showed that they are not only supporting the regime of Camille Chamoun, but signaled their interests in Lebanon's internal stability as well.

4. THE NEW ECONOMIC APPROACH AS COROLLARY OF THE NEW POLICY

The new economic approach of the USSR towards the Arab States had a clearly capitalistic character, though the role assigned to it was to enhance the success of the new policies favoring the establishment of national democracies. The principle adopted in setting up a new type of economic relationships was to 'achieve maximum political advantage with minimum economic investment.' It is, of course, very difficult to evaluate whether the increase in both ways of foreign trade represents a value in this regard, or whether the growing percentage of the Soviet Union in the total imports or exports of a country is a contributing factor to her political influence – only, naturally, if this percentage is above a certain threshold.

¹² *Izvestia*, 1st of August, pp. 1-2. Khrushchev repeated almost word by word President Nasser's declaration in Alexandria: "The Suez Canal is located on Egypt's territory and is Egypt's possession." *Survey*, 1956-1958, p. 5.

The three main principles of the new Soviet economic policy towards nationalist and neutral regimes were the following:

- It is disinterested – without taking into account the long term perspectives;
- It is very advantageous for the partners – low interest rates; payment to be made during a long period, generally 12 or 15 years, in the principal products of the country concerned; and, finally, economic advantages offered have to be framed in development plans;
- It has to have a political effect, that is, economic cooperation with the Soviet Union has to enhance the international esteem enjoyed by the partner State.

In accordance with the model prescribed by the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, industrialization is the main element in economic development because only it can serve the reconstruction of national economies devastated by colonial exploitation. In addition, industrialization also meant nationalization of all means of production, including agriculture that is expected to be mechanized as rapidly as possible. As a corollary, industrialization guaranteed the rapid increase of the working class which would then assume a growing role in the society. All this was also covered by the designation mentioned above, the non-capitalist way of development and had to be realized in the course of democratic-bourgeois reforms. As a result, Soviet economic policy aimed always at promoting economic relationships in the framework of development plans, giving priority to political profitability instead of economic profitability.

The study analyzes Soviet-Arab trade during the period under review in value terms, from the point of view of structural changes in commercial transactions, the framework of bilateralism with its advantages and disadvantages for the Arab partners, and, finally, the main points of eventual contestations.

The last problem to be dealt with from the point of view of Soviet economic policies is the financial assistance granted to various Arab countries. A detailed analysis is given of the conditions on which credit could be obtained from the USSR, especially the interests paid and the time span generally prescribed for reimbursement. A particular feature of Soviet financial assistance was, because of the political undertones, that the Soviets did not interfere with the elaboration and execution of the projects they financed, except in cases when the credits granted covered financing of technical assistance through their own experts and personnel. A country by country enumeration of financial assistance given to Arab recipients closes the chapter on the new economic approach, indicating some special cases which were extensively reported in the world press, like the construction of the Aswan High Dam in Egypt.

5. THE SORE POINTS OF THE NEW SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The new Soviet foreign policy towards Arab nationalism, though enormously successful, had its sore points as well. In the political, economic and social conditions that prevailed in the Middle Eastern region at the time, the Soviet policy makers were mainly preoccupied by three intractable problems. These were:

- Arab unity as reality and not as an ideal, a theoretical construct;
- The Arab-Israeli conflict, and
- The reconciliation of the regional interests of the USSR as a great power and of the Communist parties in some Arab countries.

We dealt already to some extent with the first and the third of these problems in the preceding pages; therefore I shall elaborate here more in detail only the Soviet attitude concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Soviet attitude was, in fact, very hesitant and undecided in respect of this conflict during all the years following the Second World War, with a slight inclination towards promoting the Arab position. In theory, the conflict for them was nothing else but a result of Western imperialist policies, that is, artificially

created by the British before and when they left Palestine, and then aggravated by the Sionist bourgeoisie.¹³ V. B. Loutskij summarized well the Soviet opinion in a lecture he gave in August 1946 in Moscow where he categorically declared that "the Palestine is an Arab country," immediately qualifying his judgment that Arabs and Jews could live in peace and friendship on the same land because "the fundamental interests of the Jewish population are not at all contradictory to the interests of the Arab masses."¹⁴

The Soviet attitude changed radically, in comparison to the former statements, during the debate about Palestine in the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948. The speeches of Andrei Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, clearly show that his country supported unconditionally the Jewish claim to create an Israeli State in Palestine. His words reflect a true, human compassion and he concluded that "the legitimate interests of Jews and Arabs in Palestine cannot be protected without the establishment of a democratic Jewish-Arab State, independent, reflecting a double character, but homogenous. This State has to be founded in the respect of the equal rights of the Jewish and Arab populations, which would lead to a cooperation of the two peoples in the service of their mutual interests and at the benefit of both. It is known that protagonists of such a solution exist even in Palestine."¹⁵ He also suggested that if, but only if, such a solution could not be realized, then two independent States should be created, a Jewish State and an Arab State.¹⁶

Thus, the USSR not only agreed to the partition of Palestine as proposed by a commission in which Western nations had the majority, but suggested this solution herself. Gromyko refuted accusations that such a decision was against the Arabs, by affirming that the decision was in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and that it is the only one which meets the interests of both ethnic groups. In addition, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs emphasized that it is a historic decision because it satisfies the legitimate claims of the Jews.

When the Israeli State was proclaimed in 1948, the Soviet Union recognized it *de facto* as well as *de jure* even before the United States, and immediately exchanged diplomatic representatives with the new State. It supported the young State during the months of fight between the Jewish and Arab armies from May 1948 until February 1949, supplying it with arms, through Czechoslovakia as intermediary, and assisting it in its economic development with considerable deliveries of oil.¹⁷

It is almost certain that the attitude of the USSR towards Israel was influenced by the fact – one should not forget that at this time Stalin was still alive – that there was in Palestine a Jewish Communist party, though numerically not strong but entirely following Moscow's ideological orientation, which could be useful in the framework of an orthodox Marxist approach to promote the Soviet Union's internationalist policies in the Middle East. In this perspective, an independent State of Israel could have been useful against the growing nationalist movement in Arab countries especially that its Communist party was a European-type of organization which could rapidly acquire a great influence in an increasingly industrialized society and, from this base, extend its activities to the whole of the region. This hypothesis may be correct and its effect clearly was that the pro-Israeli stand of the USSR had a disastrous effect on the situation of the Communist parties in the Arab world.

The new Soviet policy towards Arab nationalism initiated during the years 1954-1955, coinciding with the arguments of the Arab States, designated Israel as the obedient tool of imperialism, and thus gave an ideological justification of the policy change decided in the post-Stalin era. The *volte-face* of the Soviets went so far that, despite their known support for the partition of Palestine, Khrushchev pretended that the Western powers were responsible for the creation of the Jewish State as they wanted to have an outpost in the middle of Arab populations, which could be a bulwark against the latter's' ever increasing nationalist claims. The 1956 Suez crisis constituted the apogee of the rapprochement between the USSR and the Arab nations and, simultaneously, the lowest point ever reached in the relations between the Soviet Union and Israel.

¹³ K. IVANOV et Z. CHEJNYS. *The State of Israel, its Situation and its Policies*. Moscow, 1958. Quoted in: *Mizan Newsletter*, N° 11, November 1959.

¹⁴ United Nations, General Assembly. 1st session. *Official Documents*, Vol. 2, 121st session, 14 May 1947, pp. 131-134. The reference is evidently to the Palestinian communists who were in favor of such a solution.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ BERNARD, L. "The Middle East Reaction to Soviet Pressures." *ME Journal*, Spring 1956, pp. 125-126.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

However, as of spring 1957, the Soviet-Israeli relations improved and were slowly normalized. The Soviet ambassador in Tel-Aviv, Abramov, recalled during the Suez crisis, returned to his post and negotiated with the Israeli authorities the resumption of oil deliveries. This attitude showed that the Soviet leadership never really wanted to be part of the insoluble conflict between two peoples claiming their right to live on the same land.

Khrushchev's policy in favor of Arab nationalism started in 1954 was expected to erase the effects of the policies followed during the Stalin era, especially the Soviet attitude in 1947 when the State of Israel was created. However, as it was mentioned above, Soviet policy remained always hesitant between the two parties of the Palestinian conflict: on the one hand, a pro-Arab stand in bilateral relations and at international fora, conveyed to the Arab populations and international public opinion by an intense propaganda campaign; on the other hand, a quiet support of Israel, without any publicity, in particular by deliveries of oil and of industrial products necessary for its development. This stance of non-engagement was clearly evidenced by the declaration of the Soviet Government in April 1956 as well as during the visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin in Great Britain during the same year. This declaration spells out the Soviet view that "one has to find a solution to the question of Palestine *on a mutually acceptable basis*, taking into account the justified national interests of both parties."¹⁸

¹⁸ *Pravda*, 18 April 1956.

REFORMED PREACHERS DURING THE INDEPENDENCE WAR OF FERENC RÁKÓCZI, 1703 – 1711*

A Study Based on 18th Century Manuscripts Containing Their Sermons

[The essay was written in the summer of 1953 when its author was in the last year of his studies at the Reformed Theological Academy in Budapest. With it, presented under the motto 'God's People,' he won the first prize of the nation-wide competition in Hungarian church history. The study was published for the first time by Mikes International on August 6, 2005. Only a substantial review of it appeared in the January 1997 issue of the *Theological Review* (Theologiai Szemle). – Ed. Mikes International]

The Independence War led by the Prince Ferenc Rákóczi at the beginning of the eighteenth century started a series of uprisings and revolutions of the Hungarian people against foreign domination, – first against the Hapsburgs in 1703 and in 1848, after against the Soviet power and Communist rule in 1956.

The main reason for the uprising against the Hapsburgs in 1703 was their merciless persecution of Hungarian Protestants, first of all of those belonging to the Reformed confession, since the victory over the Turks in 1686. The Hapsburg emperor Leopold, and his chancellor the archbishop Kolonits, ruthlessly applied the principle of Catholic restoration, following the Council of Trent, *cuius regio, eius religio*. In fact, in the seventeenth century a considerable number of Hungarian aristocrats, especially the greatest landowners who earlier embraced Protestantism, returned to Roman Catholicism because the political influence of the Austrian Empire became stronger with the retreat of the Turks, and in this way they hoped to keep their land holdings and social status. Therefore, for the Viennese court the application of this principle seemed to secure the victory of the Catholic faith and the destruction of the Reformed confession which was sometimes called 'the Hungarian religion,' as the great majority of the peasants and of the urban population still belonged to the Protestant churches. In consequence, the defense of the religion and the defense of the nation were intertwined in the mind of the soldiers and the lower- and middle ranks of the officers.

Although Rákóczi himself was a faithful member of the Catholic Church and most of his generals and other high ranking officials also belonged to Roman Catholicism, nine out of ten of the rank-and-file soldiers and petty officers of the *kuruc* army (as the revolutionaries were called) were members of the persecuted Reformed confession. Rákóczi – next to being the Prince of Transylvania was also elected, during the Independence War, Prince of Hungary still under Hapsburg rule – knew very well that the success of the War depended on the courage of his combatants and the dedication to the aims of the uprising of the numerous lower officers. Therefore, he was keen to give all the guarantees to his army that he – in truth, a uniquely tolerant person in an infinitely intolerant age – really wanted to establish the so much desired religious freedom in the territories under his rule.

The study describes the religious situation during the Independence War in general, and Rákóczi's policies as well as the intentions and decisions of the various sessions of the National Assembly, in particular. Each unit of the *kuruc* army had to be accompanied by a Protestant minister or a Catholic priest, according to the religious affiliation of the majority of the soldiers in the unit, and the commanding officers were in charge to recruit such persons for their men. In the prevailing situation, such efforts encountered enormous difficulties, but it was important that most of the Catholic generals accepted the new rules and did their best to satisfy the requests made by the rank-and-file. A long list of Reformed preachers (and some of their Lutheran colleagues) serving in the *kuruc* army is given – among them one of the ancestors of the author – and their sometimes perilous situation is evidenced.

* Published in the October-December 2005 issue of MIKES INTERNATIONAL

It is most impressing how much the preachers, the ecclesiastical authorities, and the soldiers as much as the civilian population trusted their beloved Prince, how they addressed to him requests for protection, for encouragement and consolation, or for the restitution of their stolen or damaged properties, even giving him advice on how he should protect himself against some traitors who served the cause of the Emperor (called, in contradistinction to the *kuruc*, 'labanc').

However, the main theme of the study is the way how the Reformed preachers addressed, in those horribly difficult times, the faithful in their parishes or in the military camps, how did they interpret the events of such long years of war carrying all usual devastation, misery and sorrow with them, but also how they all hoped for a better future for their nation and for their churches. The hand-written volumes of their sermons bear witness to contemporary events of religious feud and fraternal love, and, above all, to the Reformed preachers' unshakable faith in God, His Grace, and in our Lord Jesus Christ.

Almost in unison they repeat over and over again the principal message they had to transmit to their people – in accordance, as they believed, with God's intention – that the bad times have fallen on the Hungarian people because of their disobedience to the divine will, because of their bad behavior, their swearing, drinking, and, most importantly, because they abandoned the faith in the omnipotent God who sent His Son into this world to save us. As in the Hungarian Reformed tradition the Old Testament played a considerable role, they addressed their nation as 'Hungarian Israel,' like the great prophets of the Old Testament, Isaiah or Jeremiah, spoke to the Jewish people. Their own attitude, their sermons for all occasions, was eminently prophetic.

Their sermons, with a few exceptions, evidence that they whole-heartedly supported the War of Independence, the cause of the nation taken up by the greatest Hungarian of their age, Ferenc Rákóczi. How would they not stand for national independence those preachers many of whose predecessors paid with their life, during decades, for their Reformed faith, taken, as they were, by the Emperor's troops into slavery on the galleys? How would they not support any effort expected to reinstate in the country the liberty of all religions, the free exercise of worship according to each of the Christian confessions?

They knew, however, that only God can give for the army of Rákóczi the victory, only God can gracefully grant the Hungarian Protestants a new lease on life in liberty if, and only if, every Hungarian returns to His Lord, becomes again a good Christian and proves with his life his faith and his convictions. If not, and in their condemnation of unfaithfulness and sins they are, again, much like the Old Testament's prophets, there is no way out of a horrendous, difficult situation; the enemy will win, the churches will anew be emptied because of the fear of reprisals, the persecutions of the Reformed believers and, first among them, of their pastors, will reduce more and more the number of those who belong to 'God's people.' They did not doubt that the God of love is as well the God of revenge ...

Rákóczi's War of Independence was lost and a peace treaty was signed in 1711. The Prince left the country forever, and finished his life in exile in Turkey. However, the situation of the Hungarian Protestant churches gradually improved in the course of the century, perhaps also as a result of the fierce fight of the *kuruc* army and the spiritual resistance of the future generation of preachers and the faithful. But the messages transmitted to us by the hand-written volumes of sermons of the Reformed ministers living during the War of Independence, did not lose their prophetic strength and their importance for us who live in the twenty-first century – they withstood time because they reflect the truth.

Economic Perspectives

THE GOLD PRICE PROBLEM*

OUTLINE

Since the Second World War, and especially between 1949 and 1953, there was a great debate on the problem of the gold price. Many economists claimed that a remedy to equilibrate the deteriorated international economic relations was the all-round increase of the price of the gold. In their view, this could be the first step to give a new impetus to international multilateral trade, or to re-equilibrate the international balance of payments, and to readjust the exchange rate of different currencies. Furthermore, the economists supposed that this rise could be used to greatly alleviate the dollar-shortage in Western Europe and in the sterling area. They also proposed through this measure to raise the ratio of the proportion of gold reserves to the enormously grown money supply. Almost all economic, financial and commercial reviews published articles dealing with the question; thus the *South African Journal of Economics* published a whole series of them in 1951. The argumentation followed the protagonist or antagonists lines of argument, and, therefore, the writings do not differ in their essentials, only in the more theoretical or more practical point of view, or in the diversity of the utilized statistical data.

Here, I do not propose to deal with the problem of gold price in general, or to treat the functioning of the gold standard in the monetary domain, but I confine myself to the question whether it is necessary or not to raise the gold price in the present situation of the world economy?

PROPOSALS

First we have to make clarify what does increasing of the gold price mean? With the creation of the International Monetary Fund the official price of gold is determined in each member country by the par value of the currency concerned. Under the arrangements with the Fund, each member country has declared the par .value of its currency, while the price of gold per ounce is the inverse of this value. According to those who are in favor of increasing the gold price, the existing par values of the principal currencies are too high, and it is in the interests of the world's future prosperity that they should be lowered. The stabilization of currencies through linking them to gold has, therefore, two main aspects, namely:

- a) The price of gold in terms of each national currency (i.e. the inverse of the declared par value of the currency);
- b) The exchange rates between national currencies which, within a margin of elasticity, is the ratio of their par values.

Within this general statement the emphasis is not on the rise in the local official gold prices in terms of non-dollar currencies, but a rise in the United States gold price that would be accompanied by a proportionate increase in gold prices of other currencies. In fact, a substantial increase in official gold prices has taken place since the end of the war in those countries which had devalued their currencies. These local gold price rises have of course been merely an incidental result of currency readjustments, but they have had marked domestic effects, especially on the position on the gold-mining industry in the devaluing countries. Thus, since the readjustments of national currencies in terms of the United States dollars in 1949, the debate concerning a higher dollar value of newly-produced gold and existing private hoards as well as official monetary stocks has become more intense.

* Paper presented at the Graduate Institute of International Studies (Geneva) in 1958. It was never published before.

1. THE FIRST ARGUMENT: EQUITY OF PRICES

The first but not the most important argument for a rise of the gold price is a consideration of equity. In the opinion of many economists, and especially those of countries where gold mining is one of the principal source of national income. It appears inequitable to keep the gold price in dollars on a pre-war level, when the price mark of the products exported by the United States had increased by 2.1 and the price index of imported products has climbed to 293 /1938=100/. The gold producers argue that in the face of rising cost of living the gold price is unduly low. In the first place, because the prices of other metals and commodities have increased considerably in the last fifteen years and, in the second place, because higher gold prices prevail on the free and black gold markets. As Mr. Frédéric Jenny points out in *L'information* (June 28, 1952), the 35 dollar per ounce price of gold, prevailing since 1934, is its undervaluation.

In connection with this two above mentioned arguments, it was asserted many times that the world must have adequate quantities of gold for monetary purposes. "The rightful price of gold is, in broad terms, the price which will secure the amount of the precious metal needed for monetary and quasi-monetary purposes. The extent of the world's need is a difficult question to answer." ("The Future Trend of Gold Prices." *Capital*. Vol. 118. 1947. p. 117.)

In order to be in a position to evaluate whether or not these views are right, we have to consider some statistical data concerning the development of the gold-mining industry and the factors involved in their production process.

According to reports of the United States Bureau of Mines, the total world output of gold was 1'226 million fine ounces between 1493 and 1936. From this quantity, the Rand mines of South Africa produced 303 million ounces between 1882 and 1936. In the last 50 years, from 1892 to 1941, the world production of gold reached 1'030 million fine ounces. On a weight basis, gold has the smallest output of all well-known metals and minerals, but in terms of value it is the fourth after coal, oil and pig iron. The price of gold was almost unchanged from 1'344 to 1'717, and till 1934 we do not know of an official rise of its price.

On 1st February of 1934, President Roosevelt who was authorized by Congress to change the gold price, stabilized it at 35 dollar per fine ounce (31.1 g in the United States) in order to restore the commodity prices to the 1926 level. The former price was 20.67 dollar per fine ounce since 1832. This re-valuation of the dollar gold price had a very stimulating effect on the gold mining industry and the world output reached its peak in 1941. However, there was no "flood" of gold owing to this increase in production, because it was indispensable to treat leaner ores at greater depths and expenditure and capital charges increased considerably. So, it is evident that from 1934 through 1941 the increased world gold production was in balance with the world's needs. In the first stages of World War II, to maintain a large gold output throughout the British Empire became of paramount importance as a means of obtaining the necessary dollar volume to finance war imports from the United States. By the end of 1940, however, the exhaustion of Britain's gold reserves and the overwhelming magnitude of the war supply program demonstrated the futility of continued reliance on gold or on traditional, orthodox method of finance. The belligerent governments detached their currencies from a gold metallic base and managed directly gold prices and production. Pressure on supplies and manpower also led to diversion from gold mining to production of other strategic commodities. With the entry of the United States into the war, equipment and supplies for gold mining became increasingly scarce, and by 1942 world gold production began to show a general decline. Annual world gold output in the twelve principal producing countries, with the exception of Russia, averaged 861 million dollar between 1934 and 1939, then rose to a peak of 1'096 million dollars, but dropped to 675 million in 1945. At the end of the forties 13 new mines were opened in Orange Free State, which are geologically a direct continuation of the old lines from Johannesburg. This event marked a turn in world gold output, namely the one-year production of these mines was 250'000 kg., that is 70 per cent of the former total output. (Goldbergbau und Goldpreis in den letzten Jahren. *Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung. Wochenbericht*. 19. Jahrg. 1952, 86 p.)

The gold production costs in the South African Union were in 1939 19s. 5d. per ton of ore and in June 1947 24s. 11d. Profits have fallen simultaneously from 12s. 3d. per ton to 10s. 1d. while the Union governments share has risen from 5s. 10d. to 6s. 5d. ("The Future Trend of Gold Prices." *Capital*. Vol. 118. 1947, p. 78.)

It is true that there is gold trading and gold hoarding in those areas of the world, where private gold hoarding and internal trade of gold are legal, or where the emotional and instinctive predilection for gold is so strong that legal prohibition of gold hoarding merely results in large scale clandestine gold trading. In the Middle East and the Far East gold holding appears as part of the normal saving pattern of the people, and the popular demand for gold in these countries is therefore determined more by the level of income than by the anticipation of gold price changes. When prices of the goods produced in these countries are raising the hoarding demand increases; when prices are low relative to the official domestic gold price, as after the devaluation of the early thirties, there is a wave of dishoarding. On the continent of Europe and in some parts of the Americas, the hoarding appears essentially as a means of minimizing losses that are expected to result from political, economic and social upheavals and the concomitant inflationary pressures and currency depreciations. Finally, along the routes of the international premium gold traffic, there are various centers where speculators buy and sell gold in order to derive a profit from short-term fluctuations in the market price of gold that depend in turn largely on the actual and anticipated changes in the gold supply and demand in those countries where gold is hoarded in large amounts.

The net absorption of gold by nonmonetary uses, i.e. the professions, arts, and industry, as well as private hoards, had apparently fallen to a low level by 1950, prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. Since then, however, large amounts of gold have been again used for nonmonetary purposes. The high point of gold price – 55 dollars per fine ounce – had been reported in May 1949. By the mid-1950, the quotations most frequently reported were in the neighborhood of 36 dollars, or very close to the United States Treasury price; but following the outbreak of the Korean war, they rose sharply to a peak of about 44 dollars early in January 1951, but by December the price had declined once more to somewhat less than 39 dollars, and by mid-May 1952 to about 37 dollars. (Data derived from the essay of Miroslav A. Kriz who quotes *The Annual Report*, 1951, of the International Monetary Fund.) The gold premiums in free and black markets reflect, in the first place, the cost of overcoming the restrictions that impede the flow of gold between countries and within countries where internal trade is restricted. To an even larger extent, however, they also reflect the monetary habits of the population, the efficiency and the stability of the local monetary system and government finances, as well as the varying prospects of the national government's economic policy. In their very essence, gold prices are therefore a reflection of local conditions in various countries, and cannot be looked upon as an indication of the intrinsic value of the United States dollar.

In any case, this very low premium price of gold on free and black markets does not justify at all the second point of the producers' argumentation. This is especially true, if we take into account the extraordinary chances offered by the monetary authorities who bought at a fixed price all quantities of gold in time of uncertainty and economic difficulties.

Critics of this argument say that the analysis rests on the assumption that gold is a commodity. However, gold is not primarily a commodity, but a monetary metal since it is sold at a price determined not by market forces – supply and demand – but by actions of governments. It is for monetary reasons that there is a fixed official gold price to which national currencies are related directly or indirectly, the mutual links between currencies in turn reflecting their relation to gold. The price of gold in terms of any currency has, therefore, a monetary significance of great importance both domestically and internationally. Whether the fixed gold price continues to serve fully its purpose must be judged solely from the monetary viewpoint. "To change the price of gold would represent an extension of the generally undesirable practice of subsidizing specific interests, and in this case would appear to be inconsistent with the continued use of gold as an official monetary metal, a prospect with really serious implications for the gold mining industry." (R. Craig McIvor: "A Note on the Price of Gold." *Canadian Journal of Economic and Political Science*. Vol.19. 1953, p. 232.)

2. THE SECOND ARGUMENT: MONETARY CONSIDERATIONS

The second and more important argument in favor of increasing the price of gold proceeds from considerations of monetary policy. Mr. Busschau summarizes in his article, published in the *South African Journal of Economics* in the March 1951 issue (Vol.19, 1951, p. 2), the main points of the protagonists of the increase in gold price: "The case submitted here is, in its simplest form, that because of the growth in incomes and credit (particularly long terms obligations), increases in gold prices are necessary in order to obtain that degree of banking liquidity which will ensure the maintenance throughout the world of high levels of incomes and employment and that failure to increase gold prices sufficiently and in time will lead, as did the similar failure after World War I, to a severe credit deflation with its inevitable consequences of wide-spread unemployment and human misery." He compares the post-war position regarding banking liquidity with the corresponding position existing in 1938, in 23 countries outside the Soviet orbit. For this purpose, the measure of liquidity taken by him is that of gold to money supply, consisting of free currency and free bank deposits. In terms of gold or United States dollars the ratio of monetary supply to gold was 2.21 in 1938 had increased to 5.69 in 1948. In other words, with existing gold prices money supply is now equal to almost six times the size of gold reserves, while in 1938 money supply was only just over twice the size of them. Thus, the price of gold would have to be raised very substantially in order to restore the 1938 position, the percentage increase varying over the range of 12 per cent in the case of Switzerland to 1'271 per cent in the case of Sweden. The same ratio would be in the United States 111 per cent. The ratio here used is only a very rough indication of banking liquidity, but it does indicate that the growth of gold stocks has been disproportionately lower than the growth in the credit substitutes which pass for money from the point of view of national income.

In relation to population, the stock of gold money a century ago was about 5 ounces, while in 1947 it was about 40 ounces per 100 persons. The stock of monetary gold has, however, increased not only in terms of ounces but even more in terms of currency value. One can say broadly that monetary gold stocks in physical volume are now almost three times what they were in 1914. In terms of currency value in United States dollars they are about five times what they were in 1914, while in terms of the English pound they are about six times what they were in 1914. The figures of 1939 compared with those in 1929 show the combined effects of volume and price increases, but in comparison of 1947 to 1939, the price of gold being constant, the stock in terms of currency increased by about one-fifth.

While the increases in gold production and gold stocks have been substantial, the adequacy of the rise of gold stocks must be considered in relation to changes in other magnitudes such as those of national incomes and volume of credit. Between 1939 and 1949, the growth in national income of the major countries is probably in the order of fifty per cent or more; the increase of bank credit is in the range of more than two hundred per cent, while national debt figures also skew increases in the order of magnitude of hundred per cent. As regards the whole of the twentieth century, the picture seems to be that the growth of credit is quite disproportionately larger than the growth in the currency value of monetary gold stocks.

The required re-evaluation is, in consequence, of two kinds:

- a) An adjustment in relative exchange rates,
- b) An increase of the price of gold in all countries.

Contrarily to the above, there is an argument which refutes the necessity to obtain a much greater international liquidity by the rise of gold price. It is, in the first place, represented by Miroslav Anthony Kriz, member of the staff of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, whose thinking is so solid and convincing that I accepted myself his point of view.

According to him, the metallic concept of money which treats gold as the only real medium of exchange in domestic as well as in international trade appears an exceedingly narrow one in the light of modern economic history of the Western world. Money is generally defined by its acceptability, which in turn is not necessarily related to gold as an ultimate means of payment. Final payments in international trade were made even under the 19th century gold standard through a complicated network of credit arrangements in sterling; and under the gold standard as it existed just before the outbreak of World War II, the acceptability of the sterling, which even then was the principal international medium of payment, was entirely divorced from the convertibility into gold at a fixed rate, as the whole history of the sterling area clearly illustrates. Since World War II, it is the United States dollar that is widely sought, not for conversion into gold, but as an international means of exchange. The reason for this appears to be, in the final analysis, the ability of the United States economy to produce – more abundantly, promptly, and cheaply than any other country – many of the goods that the world needs. Conversely, the current difficulties of sterling as an international currency reflect in general not the lack of gold as such but Great Britain's inability, despite a considerable rise in its exports, to meet fully the sterling area's demand for imports, and the resulting need by that area to import goods from the United States.

Secondly, it is by no means certain that a mere increase in liquidity would make any direct contribution to solving of the world's current economic difficulties. The fundamental need today is for a realistic step-by-step approach everywhere to implement the necessary structural readjustments in productive capacity – within countries and in the patterns of trade among countries – rather than a further dosage of cheap money and greater liquidity. It is up to each individual country to establish conditions conducive to higher economic productivity and greater monetary stability. A gradual return to currency convertibility and its maintenance requires, too, a reasonable monetary stability in the short-run, and, in the long-run, sustainable production and trade patterns, of the 'key' countries. The roots of the present currency disorder run much deeper than the apparent lack of international liquidity.

The case for higher international liquidity has, however, been made also on grounds of sheer expediency, in the belief that an upward revision in the world gold price would add considerably to the easing of the so-called dollar shortage. In this sense, the increase in the amount of United States dollars that the rest of the world gets from sales of gold to the United States either from current production or from monetary reserves, would considerably improve the latter's balance of payments position. As a remedial measure is required the upward revision of the world gold prices.

To this contention the rejoinder was already made, namely, that the current problems of international trade appear to be more those of structural readjustment than of the lack of international liquidity. The added dollars that would be injected into the monetary reserves of other countries through a rise in the United States gold price would soon be dissipated if the serious unbalances in the foreign trade positions of those countries were not corrected through measures aimed directly to correct the problem. This can be refuted indirectly as well, namely that the increase in the prices of internationally traded commodities should be offset by a gold price rise is statistically less convincing than it superficially appears. The question is which year was chosen as the basis of comparison? For instance, if we do not make a comparison between the 1937 and present price levels in the United States, but take 1926 as basis, the result is that wholesale prices at the end of December 1951 were 78 per cent above the 1926 level, against the 69 per cent rise in the gold price. The statistical argument, to say the least, is inconclusive. The rise of prices does not constitute a cause of the dollar-shortage.

Moreover, there is a final problem of distribution. The benefits of a higher gold price would be quite uneven. Countries with low gold reserves would gain little, those with large reserves, as well as the principal gold producing countries – Russia particularly – would gain disproportionately. No less small and unevenly distributed would be the increment deriving from the existing monetary gold stock. The greatest benefits would accrue to those countries already holding the most gold and not necessarily to those in the greatest need. Yet even these additions to monetary stocks, however considerable at first sight, would by no means be large enough to provide a basic remedy for the dollar shortage.

Finally, it remains to consider briefly the appropriateness of the world gold price from the viewpoint of the permanent economic interests of the United States itself. In effect, the United States' gold policy cannot be divorced from domestic monetary and fiscal issues. Those who are for the rising of the dollar price of gold pretend that it would be for the United States a painful way to extend its financial aid to those countries having a weak currency. Instead of such a measure, raising the funds necessary for foreign aid through taxation, the dollar price of gold might be increased; and by the same token the re-evaluation of the United States monetary stock would make possible an enlargement of the credit base of the banking system. However, this possibility cannot be envisaged because it would constitute a way to perpetual inflation; it could only be realized if the United States did not take steps to eliminate the impact upon its own bank reserves, and even then the cost would be borne indirectly by American consumers through rising domestic prices. What matters is therefore the size of the United States export surplus and the expansion of incomes to which it gives rise; but the problem of making goods available to foreign countries by reducing American domestic demand would remain. As to the monetary argument that the gold inflow would provide a base for further credit expansion, the answer is that the American banking system is in no need of further expanding its credit base. Even under the conditions of declining economic activity and growing unemployment it would not necessarily be in the national interest of the United States to raise the dollar price of gold merely to sustain an export surplus for the sake of domestic employment, because within the framework of the United States economy, the foreign demand is merely supplementary. Under present day conditions neither the fiscal argument of alleviating the tax burden, nor the monetary argument of providing a base for credit expansion, can be used persuasively in support of a rise in the United States gold price.

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SOCIALISM AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE*

A Study in the History of Socialist Thinking

INTRODUCTION

Before going deeper into the subject I would like to define my understanding of the expression "socialist thinkers," in order to give it a definite content. This is made necessary not only by the necessity in our days to use precise terms, – as so many are misused, transposed and deprived of their original value and meaning, – but especially in respect of the conception of socialism which became a political watchword. It is clear and unquestionable that the emphasis on words, or on certain aspects of concepts, is completely different in the sphere of human thinking, in the domain of l'esprit, than for the purposes of political activities.

Nowadays the commonly accepted view of socialism identifies it with contemporary realities and understands by it whatever features of the ideology of one of the existing world powers serves its march towards world hegemony and, therefore, depends of the necessities of the moment. On the other hand, some writers in the history of thinking include in the long series of socialist theoreticians Plato and Thomas More, too, without taking into account the change of time and the great turning point that recently transformed our culture.

Socialism, in my opinion, is a definitely modern phenomenon, i.e. it grew out from the recent development of European civilization. Nobody could deny that already long time ago theories have been born with the purpose to find a better organization of society, as the Republic of Plato. We know even some tentative of state intervention in the antiquity, as in Rome where, at the time of Claudius, the distribution of corn was taken out of the hands of private speculators and carried out by functionaries of the State (see Jacques Pirenne: *Les grands courants de l'histoire universelle*). However, the Republic of Plato was not a Socialist State, as we know it from books or from reality, the organized interventions in the economic and social life in Antiquity have not been planned, they emerged accidentally and concerned only a particular age or a particular phenomenon. Socialism in our sense exists since the 18th century only. A detailed and minute enquiry into ideas of the Socialist literature – what I cannot undertake here – would show that they are firmly rooted in the philosophical concepts of the Enlightenment, in the nascent industrial revolution and in the social antagonisms provoked by fundamental economic changes in human life. Socialism is inconceivable without the historical context it sprang out of. It is so with all other things in human life: the most dissimilar concepts and events are thoroughly and inseparably interrelated. But we would also commit the same mistake, if we tried to limit Socialism to the contemporary political interpretation of those thinkers, who were predecessors of the ideas and movements prevailing in our age. The Socialist epithet embraces all kinds of writers and politicians whose motives were the following:

- a) A strong sense of community;
- b) A search for a solution of recently emerged problems in society through economic and social reforms;
- c) A predominant interest in these fields;
- d) A philosophical approach based on the ideas of the 18th century; and
- e) An avowed internationalism which seeks to find the solutions hoped for not in the interest of a social group or in a national framework, but for the whole mankind.

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Accordingly, I would include among socialist thinkers liberal and Marxist socialists as well as Utopians (though I do not like this expression because in their eschatology all Socialist are utopians), and humanists whose thinking reflects a particularly Socialist bending.

As an extreme case and example may be mentioned Carey who, as a well-known economist of the type of Friedrich List, advocated protection for his young country, the United States, together with several other American scholars (e.g., Simon Patten). His argumentation, however, is much wider in scope than that of the German economist. He did not fight for the idea of a single national economy by means of so-called "educational customs" (*Erziehungszölle*), but he considered protection as the policy best suited to a diversified economic world. The basis of his reasoning was the Aristotelian thesis expressed in the *Principles of the Social Sciences* as follows: "Man strains necessarily to gravitate towards his fellow" (*op. cit.* Vol. I, p. 41).

Having defined the essential criteria of a socialist writer as I understand them to be, I turn now to my subject *par excellence* and I propose a tentative classification according to which we shall be able to examine the different point of views. Concerning the problem of international trade Socialist writers adopted a fourfold attitude:

- 1) The first group is composed of thinkers who fervently mistrusted all kinds of trade, or foreign trade only and wholly rejected it. They planned an international society without trade;
- 2) There were, and they constitute the overwhelming majority, defenders of free international trade, – especially in view of safeguarding the interests of the consumer;
- 3) Socialists who, though theoretically in favor of free trade, considered that there could be situations in which protection of an infant industry or the maintenance of a high degree of employment can be achieved only by means of a protectionist policy. Their ideology was, in any case, strongly influenced by nationalistic considerations;
- 4) Thinkers who represent the contemporary conception: though free trade is not in principle against the interests of the proletariat, i.e. against social evolution, it, however, is impracticable in the present situation, in the age of imperialism, as the highest stage of capitalism.

I shall take these groups of Socialist writers and politicians one after the other, and shall try to show on the basis of a detailed analysis of their writings that the above classification is correct. In accordance with the nature of my subject, I shall have recourse to many original quotations which will throw a much clearer light on the ideas of these thinkers than if I tried to resume them in my own words I shall leave the French quotations in their original form, but I shall translate the German ones in English, though the texts may lose from their value through translation.

1. THE ENNEMIES OF TRADE

It is rather difficult to believe in our days that there are people who deny the absolute necessity of the exchange of goods, who would prefer to cut out of the body of the national and world economy their artery, i.e. trade. We can meet them even today in certain religious or mystic groups; a hundred and fifty years ago their existence was much more understandable. Such a point of view was born out of two sources at that time:

- a) Romanticism; one of the great intellectual movements of the 18th century; it was based on the feeling, or rather belief, that man should return to the basic form of its existence, an unrefined natural life. Rousseau's

scheme oversimplified the phenomena of human relations in the belief that the return to nature and the turning away from a vicious civilization will be the remedy for all human misfortunes;

b) The national feeling. In the second half of the 18th century began an enormously forceful movement which attained its climax in Western Europe about one hundred years later, and later gradually spread to other regions. It could be called 'the era of nationalism,' like Elie Halevy called the nineteen thirties 'l'ère des tyrannies.' This is the age of awakening, of self-assertion and of the formation of a number of European nations and of the United States of America.

Charles Fourier, the French utopian Socialist writer, discusses trade in his great treatise *Nouveau monde industriel et sociétaire*, under Section VI. Notice X. *Caractères de base et de lien*; in Chapter XLIII: *Caractères du commerce, en genres*; and in Chapter XLIV: *Caractères du commerce, en espèces*. For him trade, whether within the boundaries of a country or among different national entities, is essentially the same: it is wrong. He rejects it and in his system there is no place for it. The two characteristics of the anarchical trade as, according to him, free competition should be called, are: "Le refoulement pléthorique" and "le contre-coup d'avortement" These are the main causes of the misfortunes arising out of trade; it refers according to Fourier as well as many other economists of the beginning of the 19th century, to the problem they envisaged in common: the equilibrium between production and consumption. They sought to protect the interests of the consumer at any price, but it was Fourier who had chosen the most extreme solution: he proposed the elimination of trade and to replace it by a centralized state distribution. On the other hand, he paid much attention to the whole process of production, and concluded that there is a diversion of capital from the production process to an unproductive class and thus a degenerating abundance is created. In this way, the world for Fourier presented itself as a world turned upside down and he affirmed the absolute necessity to have a preventive monopoly against trade.

Johann Gottlieb Fichte, German philosopher at the beginning of the 19th century, formed with Hegel and Schelling the well-known trio of German idealist thinkers at that time. His book *Der geschlossene Handelsstaat* gives an ideal picture of the State. He based his concept on rationalistic and nationalistic principles. On this basis he built up an organization which could be wholly satisfying to his imagination, but it is – already at the first sight – clear that it would be never possible to realize such a project. It is supposed that he did not write the study with this purpose. The relationship of his work with the other utopian conceptions cannot be denied; it adopted, however, a quite different approach being written using legalistic notions. In the State of Fichte, there are three professional orders of people: producers, craftsmen, and merchants. He considers the trade inside of the State as a necessity which assures the circulation of goods. The merchants, as an order, represent the tie between the two other professions. To obtain a closed State he intended to cut it away of the outside world. That meant to cease gradually all trading activities of the citizens and of enterprises with foreign people and organizations, aiming at entirely interrupting trade relations with abroad. This is the most important point of the whole process underlying *Der geschlossene Handelsstaat*. He thus recognizes indirectly his high appreciation of the free exchange of goods. The closed national State would not be dangerous to his neighbors or to more distant foreign countries; it would not attack them because it would be entirely introverted and its people would have nothing to do with others. Of course, because it could attain that degree of closeness it would have to "round off" its boundaries, i.e. to be in the possession of real, natural boundaries which separate it from the other parts of the world. After having cut commercial relations with foreign countries, the government would have to fulfill difficult tasks in endeavoring to create of a home market and as well as to issue a national currency which would be the only means of exchange in the country.

2. THE FREE-TRADE SOCIALISTS

As I mentioned in the introduction, the overwhelming majority of Socialist writers were partisans of free trade. This point of view was derived from the really fundamental conviction of Socialist thinking, that is, from its internationalism. There can be no question that a true Socialist, who thinks in terms of mankind, ought to oppose

all efforts limiting to a national or to whatever other scale the free intercourse among national groups. A qualification, however, has to be made here. We must introduce the time element in this perspective because there is a big difference between economic, social and political environments in which the 19th century Socialists lived and those in which the Socialists at the turn of the century and the Socialists after the First World War professed their doctrine. During the 19th century, until the late eighties, the development of capitalism was in its initial or middle stages in several countries, when within the framework of a freely competitive economy, it was possible to support the policy of free trade without hurting the interests of the working class. But, – contemporary Socialist writers, even if they are theoretically defenders of the principle of free trade, – today live in a completely different world. Capitalism reached its highest stage; there is no free competition, monopolies and cartels rule over the economic life, and corresponding to their interests, governments pursue an imperialist policy. Free can be a desirable or undesirable thing according to personal conviction, but in practice it cannot take place because of the monopolistic and imperialistic structure of the world economy.

In connection with this thesis, I would like to quote a non-Socialist explanation of the decisive change in human society, which puts the emphasis on the role the Socialists played in this change. It makes clearer to us and more comprehensible the interrelations between thinkers and their historic environment! Professor Röpke writes in his study *Economic System and International Order* the following: "The Socialism of those early ages did not assume wrongfully that the words about the triumph over national sovereignty would be taken seriously. It took the benefit of the international order of that liberal epoch and of those liberal ideas against which the whole affected pathos of its fight is directed. Conversely, it is the same Socialism which in the late 19th and, above all, in the 20th century, definitely contributed to the destruction of that international order of the liberal age thorough its 'nationalizing' effects. The same Socialism from the idealistic reflections of which the theoretical internationalism of socialism derived. At that time, more than a century ago, the first Socialist appeal to internationalism did not appear as a strange utopia, contrary to the scientifically provable 'development,' because this ideal corresponded to the liberal reality in the greatest extent. It became a utopia in proportion to the degree in which the social reality itself – in whose name the internationalism was claimed – contributed to destroy the extent of internationalism attained in the age of liberalism" (*Ordo*. Bd.IV. p. 267).

From the many Socialist defenders of free trade, I chose the most characteristic examples and those who are the best known. At first, we have to study the profound analysis carried out by Sismondi. This man, born in Geneva, living in Italy, Great Britain, France and, at the end of his life, once again in Switzerland, had an overall view about the economic life of his age. He became Socialist because seeing the harmfulness of industrial development, but this did not push him into such extremes in which fell many other thinkers of the time. Two of his books reveal the great interest for our point of view, *Nouveaux principes d'économie politique ou de la richesse dans ses rapports avec la population*, and *Etudes sur l'économie politique*. His main interest concerned the equilibrium between production and consumption. (That is by the way one of the main problems of whatever Socialist thinking; today it appears in the more complex form of planning). Trade is the relation between the two. Sismondi is convinced of the necessity of trade in the economic life of modern society: "Le commerce s'efforce de calculer assez juste la consommation de tous ... Ce n'est pas tout; plus le commerce acquiert d'activité, plus, selon les notions communes, la société s'enrichit, et plus son fonds de réserve se diminue. Par une conséquence singulière de son activité, la société possède d'autant moins de marchandises accumulées qu'elle les produit plus vite" (*Etudes*, Vol. II. pp. 71-72). He did not, however, lose from sight the possible misfortunes due to trade which serves only its own interests and not the needs of society: "Aussi longtemps que la richesse commerciale ne s'accroît que proportionnellement aux besoins qui déterminent sa formation, elle répand le bien-être sur tous ceux qui contribuent à la faire naître; elle ne cause, au contraire, que misère et que ruine, du moins pour toutes les classes inférieures de la population, dès que sa formation devance le besoin" (*Nouveaux principes*, Vol. I. p. 245).

As to international trade, he determines the two kinds of restrictions constituting obstacles of the free exchange of merchandise between nations. In general, there are customs duties destined to impede the export of raw materials needed by national industries, and others to stop the entry of products of foreign manufacturers, or, at least, to charge them with a tariff which gives a considerable advantage to national producers. He rejects in defense of consumers both kinds of restrictions: "Le principe lui-même sur lequel ces prohibitions successives à la sortie sont fondées, est faux. Ce n'est pas sur les producteurs que le commerce doit faire des profits, ce

n'est que sur les consommateurs. Tout bénéfice qui n'est obtenu que par une épargne sur les gains des producteurs, n'est qu'un déplacement de revenu, et non un profit 'réel'" (*Nouveaux principes*, Vol. I. p. 325). It is always the last producer who gains and not the trade or the country. His gains are composed of the losses of the previous producers: "Mais si chaque manipulateur parvient à faire regarder" – continues the reasoning of Sismondi – "toutes les opérations qui ont précédé la sienne, comme n'ayant fait que préparer pour lui une matière première, et s'il obtient de nouvelle: prohibitions de sortie, il est difficile de savoir ou s'arrêteront les contre-coups au'il porte ainsi a la production" (*Nouveaux principes*, Vol. I. p. 326).

He also turns against the second form of limitations which hinder the entry of foreign products in the country in order to assure the market for the home industry: "Les prohibitions à l'entrée sont aussi imprudente et aussi ruineuses que les prohibitions à la sortie; elles ont été inventées pour donner à une nation une manufacture qu'elle n'avait pas encore, et on ne saurait nier qu'elles équivalent, pour une industrie commerçante, à la plus forte prime d'encouragement. Cette manufacture produit peut-être à peine la centième partie de ce que la nation consomme de marchandises analogues; mais les cents acheteurs devront rivaliser l'un avec l'autre, pour obtenir la préférence du seul vendeur, et les quatre-vingt-dix-neuf qu'il aura refusés, seront obligés de se pourvoir de marchandises entrées en contrebande. Dans ce cas la perte sera pour la nation comme cent et le bénéfice comme un; quelque avantage que l'on puisse trouver à donner à une nation une manufacture nouvelle, il en est peu, sans doute, qui mérite de si grands sacrifices, et l'on pourrait trouver toujours des moyens moins dispendieux de la mettre en activité ... Il ne faut enfin ne jamais perdre le but qu'on s'était proposé en favorisant le commerce" – and I would like to emphasize the following words of Sismondi where he shows himself a marked Socialist – "c'est: d'augmenter le revenu de la nation proportionnellement à sa population, et de lui procurer ainsi plus d'aisance. Une manufacture nouvelle, à quelque perfection qu'elle ait porté ses produits, et même quelque bénéfice qu'elle donne a son entrepreneur en chef, n'est point prospérante, si le salaire des ouvriers ne les maintienne pas dans une certaine aisance, ou si elle ne se soutient qu'en faisant exister une population dont la vie même est une souffrance" (*Nouveaux principes*, Vol. I. pp. 327-328).

Sismondi refuted all arguments in favor of a policy of protection and made clear that there is no case in which restrictions of free trade could have a favorable effect. From the pure economic point of view, he finds that an industry which exported already its products will lose this ability once protected, having the home market exclusively for itself and possessing there, with today's current word, a monopolistic position. This signifies the degeneration of this industry, called a century later by Lenin as parasitism. And if an industry was able to export to far away countries under conditions of free competition, finding its profit notwithstanding high transports costs, it ought not to fear the competition on the home market where it produces. According to Sismondi, it is proven that finally the whole process turns against the: producers in favor of consumers. The latter, after having obliged to make big sacrifices, become abundantly supplied with the products of the protected industry. The effects of this policy and the: future development of the world without free trade lead inevitably to autarky. "Cette émulation de tous les gouvernements pour faire établir partout des manufactures, a produit sur le système commercial de l'Europe deux effets étrangers et inattendus: l'un est l'accroissement démesuré de la production, sans aucun rapport avec la consommation; l'autre est l'effort de chaque peuple pour s'isoler, pour se suffire à lui-même, et se refuser à tout commerce étranger ... Les producteurs ne peuvent donc plus compter sur la pratique des étrangers, et il s'étudient seulement à trouver dans leurs propres Etats des consommateurs pour leur propres ouvriers ... Ce système de politique, qui est plus ou: moins suivi aujourd'hui par tous les peuples de l'Europe, détruit tous les avantages de commerce: il empêche chaque nation de tirer parti des prérogatives qu'elle doit à son climat, à son sol, à sa situation, au caractère propre de ses citoyens; il arme l'homme contre l'homme, et il brise ce lien qui était destiné à adoucir les préventions nationales, et à accélérer la civilisation du globe" (*Nouveaux principes*, Vol. I. pp. 328-329, 331).

Karl Marx, the father of the main stream of contemporary Socialism, was also the partisan of free trade. But his motives were completely different from those of Sismondi. In his great analysis of capitalist development, he does not speak of the problems of trade between nations; he was much more interested in the inquiry into the fundamental economic facts and changes which served – in his understanding – as the basis of social evolution. However, he made some statements concerning free trade. In his speech delivered on the 9th of January, 1848, in Brussels, he said: "Le libre-échange, lui, développe la concurrence et, par là, exaspère les conflits sociaux. C'est en ce sens qu'il est révolutionnaire et que le socialisme doit lui apporter son adhésion." He appreciated

free trade, as he did other phenomena of economic life, from the point of view of class struggle, his principal preoccupation. He wrote an article in *The New York Herald Tribune* in 1860, entitled: *Pauperism and Free Trade*. (Published in *Oeuvres politiques*. Vol. 2. Trad. Molitor. Paris, Ed. Costes).

Friedrich Engels followed the line of Marx, but concerning the change in their economic policy practiced by different States, i.e. their turn from free trade to protectionism, he did not have a clear view. In his letter to Nikolaj on the 18th June, 1892, he took a position which was strongly denied by later Socialist writers, especially by Rosa Luxemburg. He pointed out that English writers of his age dare not answer the question why a great number of States are inclined to abandon the principle of free trade, because; "the almost general protectionism today is simply a more or less reasonable – in certain cases even absolutely crazy – means of defense against that English free trade which carried the English monopoly in industry to its highest stage ... I do not consider this general return to protectionism as a simple hazard, but as a reaction to the unbearable English industrial monopoly. The form of this reaction may be wrong, badly accommodated, or even worse, but the historical necessity of this reaction seems to me to be quite clear and evident" (*Briefe*, p. 71). On another occasion, he expressed a different view, according to which protectionism is a consequence of the monopolistic development of capitalism. I shall quote him later in connection with the fourth group.

Henry George regards free trade as a reaction against malignant patriotism. He particularly examined problems related to tariffs in regard to the situation of the working class.

Nikolai Bukharin, the famous Soviet politician who was liquidated by Stalin, was also a partisan of free trade. In his book *L'économie mondiale et l'impérialisme* he follows in general the argumentation of Lenin, but he does not omit the question of trade, and deals at length with this important aspect of economic activity. His analysis has a peculiar character in the Socialist literature of the Leninist epoch, therefore I shall quote some interesting passages of the book. He gives a brilliant description of the role of the changed character of the production process and the goods produced: "La division internationale du travail est exprimée par l'échange internationale ... Le travail social de l'ensemble du monde est divisé entre pays. Le travail de chaque pays séparé devient partie de l'ensemble du travail social au moyen de l'échange qui s'effectue sur le plan mondial. Cette interdépendance des pays sur le terrain de l'échange n'est nullement accidentelle, elle est la condition nécessaire de l'évolution sociale ultérieure, moyennant quoi l'échange internationale devient un phénomène régulier de la vie sociale économique, Les pays n'échangent pas seulement des produits de nature différente mais aussi des produits similaires ... en faisant concurrence à la production étrangère. Dans ce cas l'échange international a son fondement non pas dans la division du travail, qui implique la production des valeurs marchandes de diverses natures, mais uniquement dans la différence des frais de production, dans la différence des valeurs individuelles (pour chaque pays), qui, dans l'échange internationale, se résument dans le travail socialement nécessaire dans le monde" (*op. cit.*, pp. 13, 16).

He takes on Werner Sombart, "the most paradoxical of contemporary economists" (in Bukharin's view), who wrote of the mortal effects of international ties" and supported the tendencies towards autarky, towards the formation, on an immense scale, of a vast system of self-sufficiency. This conception is basically false: "Les tendances de l'évolution nouvelle favorisent au plus haut degré le développement des canaux d'échange (et, par conséquent, des autres canaux) d'une part industrialisant, à une allure surprenante, les pays agraires et semi-agraires et en faisant naître en eux le besoin et la demande de produits agricoles étrangers; d'autre part, en forçant, de toutes les façons, la politique d'exportation des cartels. L'expansion des liens commerciaux mondiaux va à pas rapides reliant de plus en plus solidement les divers parties de l'économie mondiale; les domaines isolés se soudent, nationalement et économiquement, toujours plus étroitement, et la base de la production mondiale, dans sa nouvelle formule non-capitaliste, se développe à une allure de plus en plus accélérée" (*op. cit.* pp. 30-31).

In spite of this singular position he took concerning the problem of the trade among nations, Bukharine does not disavow the Leninist lesson of imperialism, as the highest stage of capitalism. He describes, too, the new protectionism; he points out the differences between the 19th century defensive system of custom duties and their transformation into offensive ones in the 20th century. His attacks against the system of customs duties are, however, more violent, because he is convinced of the necessity of free trade. Even the State became a means

in the hands of monopolies nowadays: " Le protectionisme supérieure de nos jours n'est pas autre chose que la formule étatique de la politique économique des cartels" (*op. cit.*, p. 68). The monopolies get a supplementary profit thanks to protection; the fight begins to conquer new markets in which backward countries resist and reply with an increase of their duties. Reciprocal actions follow each other and the so-called 'unlimited screw' is put in motion. In the age of free trade it was a penetration of the markets by goods, today the penetration, wholly different in nature, is realized by aggressive politics. "Les intérêts du capital financier exigent, avant tout, l'expansion du territoire national, c'est-à-dire dictent une politique de conquête, de pression directe de la force militaire, d'annexion impérialiste ... Ainsi, parallèlement de l'internationalisation de l'économie et du capital, il s'opère un processus d'agglomération nationale, de nationalisation du capital, un processus gros de conséquences " (*op. cit.*, p. 74). The final result of this evolution is not disputable as it leads to wars: "Le développement prodigieux des forces productives et l'étrécissement extrême des débouchés libres au cours de ces derniers temps, la politique douanière des puissances liées à l'hégémonie du capital financier et, l'aggravation des difficultés pour la réalisation des valeurs marchandes créent une situation où le dernier mot appartient à la technique militaire" (*op. cit.*, p. 82).

3. THE HALF-A-WAY SOCIALISTS

Carey, whom I mentioned already in my introduction, could be taken as one of the most outstanding examples of this type of Socialist thinker. Having in sight the differences and consequent misery caused by free competition, he thinks it necessary to admit temporarily a protectionist policy which would lead to a diversified world economy, giving the chance to the national economies to find their own way and to strengthen themselves. The diversification having been reached, one could remove the defensive customs duties and to open a free course to foreign trade. His basic idea is the association of fellowmen who have similar occupations; their association assures for them the largest possibility of individual life and a big, shared power. One of the greatest obstacles to this association is free competition. It gives the chance to a few countries for an excessive development at the cost of others, obstructing in this way to increase their productive forces. The striking example for this is the case Great Britain. Carey stresses: the augment referring to indigenous consumption that will be capable to absorb the production of home industry. This would signify that the associations of the agricultural and industrial activities in the same country would mutually serve to each other a sufficient market. Another advantage would be that one could avoid the transport costs. He did not believe in, and count with the future technical progress of society. His special argument against free trade is not only invalid but rather ridiculous. If there is trade with distant countries, – according to him, – the agricultural products will be consumed there and then the manure will be utilized in the country of consumption. It will not be returned to the earth of the country of production, thus its productive force will diminish, and, finally, its impoverishment will be the consequence. Besides this considerations Carey deems the protection necessary from the point of view of labor, too, in order to increase the demand of workers in the country of production and, in this way, obtain a rise of the demand for goods and services. The protection which satisfies all these claims is the 'adequate protection'; it is a pity that one cannot find anywhere in his work an explanation of the meaning of this term. The protectionist policy can only be appreciated as a temporary and provisional measure which leads to a state of world economy in which free trade is possible: "La protection ayant pour but, et pour but unique, de produire la diversité dans le modes d'emploi, les droits protecteurs sont temporaires de leur nature – leur nécessité tend à diminuer par degrés et à laisser le commerce libre" (*op. cit.*, Vol. III. p. 447). He defends his point of view against the liberals who are incapable to seize the logic of his thinking: "Plus la production d'une communauté est variée, plus il y aura commerce domestique, et plus il y aura faculté pour entretenir commerce avec le monde." (*op. cit.*, Vol. III. p. 476). The true freedom of trade is the ability to maintain direct trade with all parts of the outside world.

Franz Oppenheimer, the liberal socialist of the first half of our century and professor at the university of Berlin, makes a not clear and justifiable distinction between pure and political economy, revealed by the title of his book: *Theorie der reinen und politischen Ökonomie*. Under the term pure economy he understands an ideal economic situation in which political convictions and tendencies do not influence the development of economic life. I would not engage myself in a discussion about this aspect of the theory, it would be beyond the scope of

my paper, but I had to mention this conception in order to make his ideas understandable. He points out, and the statement puts him in this group of Socialist writers, that "in a pure economy all kinds of protection must work out harmfully, whereas in capitalism, namely at its beginning, it could be decently defended as 'protection for education' (*Erziehungszoll*) ... In a pure economy, in which all advantages of intellectual efforts are equally distributed to all members of the society, imports of cheaper foreign products may damage temporarily certain traders. On the whole, however, it has to offer to the national economy the greatest advantages and through this even those who had been damaged before will obtain a better position than before. Could a significant portion of the collective needs be satisfied cheaper by imports from abroad, a good deal of manpower as well as purchasing power would thereby be liberated. The consumer must be satisfied by the new products, and through the availability of these new products the labor force which became free, would immediately find another occupation as a compensation, because the widest international cooperation means always a higher productivity" (*op. cit.*, pp. 519-520). The intervention of State administration, dominated by monopolistic class interests and operating through the complex, non-economic means of power, would only disturb such a self-governing mechanism" (*ibid.*, p. 518).

The greatest numbers of those Socialists who were convinced of the rightness of free trade, but who admitted that in particular situations protective customs duties can be used, were politicians of the end of the last century and of the period preceding the World War I. Their point of view could be summarized with the words of the economist Roger Berg: "Le tarif accentue les inégalités sociales, en faisant les riches plus riches et les pauvres plus pauvres. Il amène la classe dominante à son plein épanouissement et renforce la conscience que doit avoir le prolétariat de son unité ... Le libre-échange ouvre les frontières internationales aux marchandises étrangères. La concurrence élimine souvent les produits de l'industrie nationale qui, dans son déclin, entraîne un avilissement du sort des travailleurs. Le chômage s'en trouve accru" (*Le socialisme*, p. 187). This opinion was already expressed a century earlier by J. Renaud: "Les uns y perdent leur jouissance, les autres leur salaire" (*Revue encyclopédique*. Publiée par H. Carnet et Pierre Leroux. Tome LIV, Nos. 4/6. 1832, p. 718).

The attitude of Socialist leaders, particularly in Germany and France, was influenced by the vital needs in their countries. Several of them looked upon this problem as if it were futile discussion bourgeois politicians totally irrelevant from the point of view of the struggle of the working classes. The first protectionist sympathies of Socialist party leaders go back to the eighties and nineties of the 19th century. Paul Brousse wrote in 1885: "Nous sommes d'accord avec les protectionnistes bourgeois; nous enregistrons leurs aveux que l'initiative privée se montre incompétente et impuissante et que la société organisée, c'est-à-dire l'Etat, doit intervenir dans l'élevage du bétail comme dans le reste" (*Le Prolétariat*, le 21/3/885). Jules Guesde emphasized his support of a protectionist policy in election campaigns (*Le Socialiste*, le 25/6/897). Jaurès declared that "la protection et libre-échange ne sont que deux modes de fonctionnement d'une société dont le parti socialiste conteste et veut modifier le principe même ... Les travailleurs souffrent dans les pays de libre-échanges comme dans les pays de protection" (Berg, *op. cit.*, p. 190).

The German social democracy was in its ideology internationalist and in principle confessed the necessity of free trade. But, for the sake of the workers it was ready to allow important concessions: "La protection, le libre-échange ne sont pas des questions de principe; ce sont des questions pratiques, il faut les traiter suivant la situation prévalant à un moment donné, " – said in the German Parliament Karl Liebknecht and continued as follows, – "Si on demande des droits protecteurs pour protéger les grands industriels et les grands capitalistes, notre parti sera naturellement opposé à une intervention de l'Etat en ce sens. Mais on peut imaginer aussi une législation douanière favorisant le travail et les travailleurs" (le 22/11/1875, 20. séance du Reichstag, Compte rendu, p. 263). The theoretical question became soon for them a practical problem and their position became more and more similar to the reasoning of the Leninist socialists.

PROBLEMES DE L'ECONOMIE MOYEN-ORIENTALE : LA JORDANIE*

Parmi les pays du Moyen-Orient, c'est la Jordanie qui en Europe est le plus inconnu, ou, peut-être, le plus méconnu. Sa formation, après la première guerre mondiale, sur les ruines du grand empire ottoman en fonction des intérêts des grandes puissances qui y étaient engagées, est seulement connue par le public européen, ainsi que l'évolution qui suivait : le rôle et l'œuvre de l'émir Abdallah, les légendes sur Glubb Pasha, et, surtout, l'intérêt que portait la politique britannique à ce pays. Il est donc l'habitude de considérer la Jordanie comme une création artificielle des grandes puissances, artificielle du point de vue géographique, économique et politiques. A vrai dire, on ne peut pas nier qu'il y avait un élément arbitraire jouant un rôle prépondérant dans la naissance du pays, mais — actuellement — le Royaume Hachémite de la Jordanie est une entité reconnue sur les plans international. Pour l'analyse économique objective elle représente un intérêt en raison des succès jusqu'ici obtenus par son plan quinquennal. Les efforts entrepris depuis l'avènement au trône de Sa Majesté le roi Hussein, les cadres des plus qualifiés mis par lui aux leviers de commande de l'économie nationale, sont autant de gages d'un avenir promettant.

Depuis les événements de 1948 — la guerre arabo-israélienne — la Jordanie s'est trouvée en face d'une situation entièrement différente de l'époque précédente et les changements socio-économiques l'ont obligé à recourir à des mesures économiques et politiques sans précédent dans son histoire.

La situation s'est caractérisée après les changements décisifs de 1948, par les faits suivants :

— Du point de vue démographique, la population du pays s'est triplée quand ses terres arables ne se sont accrues que d'un tiers ;

— Du point de vue économique, le pays a été obligé de réorienter son commerce et de refaire toutes les lignes de communication, car pendant le mandat britannique de Palestine elles étaient dirigées vers les ports, aéroports, autoroutes et chemin de fers modernes de la côte méditerranéenne, tombés à la suite de la naissance de l'Etat d'Israël entre les mains des dirigeants de ce dernier. Donc, toutes les issues de l'économie jordanienne avaient été bloquées et il est devenu nécessaire de reconstruire son infrastructure à un rythme accéléré. Ce travail exigeait de tels investissements que l'aide étrangère était indispensable.

Le plan quinquennal lancé au début de cette année (1962-1967) s'est fixé en conséquence les objectifs globaux suivants :

- (a) L'expansion de la production nationale,
- (b) La diminution du chômage, et
- (c) La réduction de la dépendance sur l'aide économique étrangère.

Toutes les propositions individuelles venant de différents côtés ont été jugées à la lumière de ces objectifs. Le plan quinquennal était élaboré sur la base d'une vaste étude statistique qui permettait d'établir l'état précis de l'économie nationale et de mesurer les besoins de tous ses secteurs.

* Article publié dans la presse suisse romande en 1963.

1. LES CARACTERISTIQUES DE L'ECONOMIE JORDANIENNE

Les traits caractérisant l'économie jordanienne sont typiques d'une économie sous-développée. Les obstacles du développement sont dans la plupart des pays du Tiers-Monde un manque chronique du capital, de la main-d'œuvre et des cadres qualifiés, ainsi que la dépendance de l'importation de la majorité des produits nécessaires à la population. Le marché local est extrêmement restreint, car la demande ne peut augmenter tant que le revenu per capita reste aussi bas qu'actuellement, comme les statistiques des Nations Unies nous montrent, les marchés étrangers sont très loin, l'industrialisation de ces pays exige donc des sacrifices énormes et des investissements étrangers qui deviennent rentables seulement à long terme.

En Jordanie nous trouvons en plus des données naturelles qui rendent encore plus difficile le développement du pays. Tout d'abord, il y a une carence manifeste des matières premières, à l'exception de la découverte d'importants gisements de phosphate et quelques autres produits utilisés dans l'industrie chimique, un fait qui la distingue de la plupart des Etats africains ou asiatiques. En outre, elle dépend à tel point de l'étranger qu'un tiers de tous les biens nécessaires à la consommation et à la production locale est importé, c'est-à-dire l'importation représente la moitié de la valeur de la production du pays. Comme les exportations et le tourisme ne représentent qu'un quart de la valeur totale des importations, le trois-quarts de ces dernières doivent être couverts par l'aide et l'assistance étrangère. Ce rôle prépondérant des importations a eu, comme conséquence, une structure d'occupation déséquilibrée, car un nombre trop grand des jordaniens est engagé dans les activités tertiaires — commerce, spéculations financières ou service gouvernemental — qui assure l'écoulement des produits étrangers dans le pays.

La productivité est très basse. Le moyen annuel de la productivité par travailleur est environ 200 dinars jordaniens (1 dinar équivalant 12 francs suisses). En plus, il y a un chômage ; les chômeurs représentent un tiers de la main-d'œuvre totale, et les gens qui travaillent ont maintes fois des revenus très réduits à cause de leur sous-emploi. Cette situation a été extrêmement aggravée par l'afflux d'à peu près une demi million de réfugiés de Palestine qui ont presque redoublé la population du pays.

En conséquence, le moyen annuel du revenu per capita n'atteint à peine les 50 dinars jordaniens, — lequel, toutefois, n'était pas parmi les plus bas en comparaison avec les pays du Tiers-Monde ; ceci met, tout de même, en évidence l'insuffisance des ressources et du niveau de vie de la population.

2. L'EVOLUTION ANTERIEURE AU PLAN QUINQUENNAL

Déjà depuis le début de la décennie précédente des signes d'amélioration se sont manifestés dans la situation économique de la Jordanie, par la suite, surtout, d'une certaine stabilisation intérieure.

Entre 1954 et 1959, malgré l'absence d'une planification nationale du développement, — la production domestique augmentait de 51.3 million de dinars jordaniens à 81.8 millions. Toutes les branches de l'économie ont enregistré une croissance remarquable, sauf l'agriculture qui a subi les effets d'une sécheresse pendant la deuxième partie de cette période. A cette même époque, la formation du capital privé à terme s'est quadruplée et la formation du capital public à terme s'est doublée.

En effet, au cours des années 1954-1959, le revenu provenant de l'industrie et de l'exploitation minière s'est augmenté de 80 pour cent, celui de l'industrie de construction a été triplé, tandis que les entreprises de transport ont doublé leur bénéfice, et le commerce de gros et de détail s'est vu développé à un rythme de 12 pour cent par an. Le taux de croissance de la contribution à la production nationale de l'administration publique et de la défense a été, pendant cette même période, de l'ordre de 77 pour cent et le revenu des secteurs de services s'est doublé.

Cette croissance économique s'est traduite, entre 1954 et 1959, par une augmentation du déficit de la balance des paiements de 20.2 millions de dinars jordaniens, provenant de la satisfaction des besoins de la production intérieure en plein développement, couverte par des dons et des emprunts extérieurs.

Cette évolution a eu comme résultat que le revenu national s'est accru, entre 1959 et 1960, de 7 pour cent (y compris l'assistance technique étrangère et les envois des Jordaniens vivant à l'étranger), c'est-à-dire de 87 millions de dinars jordaniens en 1959 à 93 millions en 1960. En même temps, le revenu par tête d'habitant avait atteint 53 dinars par an.

3. LES OBJECTIFS DU PLAN QUINQUENNAL

La Jordanie, comme tous les autres pays du Tiers-Monde, a ressenti le besoin de recourir à une planification du développement de ses ressources et a mis en oeuvre au début de l'année 1962 son premier plan quinquennal. Ce plan a été élaboré par le Jordan Development Board, composé des représentants du gouvernement, des banques, de l'industrie, du commerce et de l'agriculture. Il a été présidé par S.E. le premier Ministre, Bahjat Talhouni, mais sa direction était effectivement entre les mains du vice-président, l'actuel ministre des affaires étrangères, le Docteur Hazem Nuseibeh, qui a fait son doctorat à l'Université de Princeton, et dont la thèse sur *L'idée du nationalisme arabe* représente une analyse profonde de la situation à cette heure cruciale du Moyen-Orient.

Un trait frappant de la préparation du plan jordanien était la convocation d'un collège d'experts internationaux de développement, comme Hoffmann, président du Fonds de Développement des Nations Unies, auxquels le plan a été soumis, et seulement après de longues discussions et des changements effectués selon leurs commentaires, a-t-il été mis en exécution.

Les objectifs principaux du plan sont les suivants :

- L'augmentation de la production nationale brute à 144 million dinars en 1967. Elle représentera un accroissement de 60 pour cent pendant la période de 5 ans et équivaldra à un taux annuel de croissance de 12 pour cent ;

- Cette augmentation de la production nationale brute assurera au moins 60'000 nouveaux emplois, c'est-à-dire un accroissement de 21 pour cent du taux d'occupation de la population active ;

- Les prévisions du plan fixent, en outre, le taux de croissance annuelle de la productivité de l'ouvrier jordanien à 5 pour cent, ce qui semble être tout à fait réaliste tenant compte des possibilités offertes par des mesures techniques et éducatives propices à contribuer d'atteindre cet objectif ambitieux. En vue de réduire la dépendance de la Jordanie de l'assistance étrangère, le plan quinquennal propose d'accroître de 21 million de dinars les exportations du pays jusqu'en 1967, tandis que les importations ne devront augmenter que de 8 millions de dinars, en comparaison de la situation reflétée par la balance commerciale de 1961. Ainsi, le déficit du commerce extérieur se réduira à la fin de la période de 5 ans à 13 millions de dinars jordaniens en moyenne annuelle.

Quoique le Jordan Development Board ait réalisé l'importance d'une amélioration des conditions dans les domaines éducatif, sanitaire et de la sécurité sociale, il avait donné la priorité aux secteurs de base de l'économie nationale dans le cadre de ce premier plan, donc au développement de l'agriculture, et, spécialement, de la sylviculture, de l'industrie minière et de l'industrie manufacturière, en général, ainsi qu'au tourisme. Cette décision s'explique clairement si on prend en considération l'état actuel de l'éducation en Jordanie en comparaison avec les autres pays du Moyen-Orient. Il ressort des statistiques officielles que ce pays a, proportionnellement, le plus grand nombre des écoles primaires, et, indépendamment du plan, le gouvernement avait pris déjà des mesures pour faciliter la scolarisation aux enfants des familles manquant les moyens financiers nécessaires. Ainsi, en été 1962 une loi a été promulguée selon laquelle l'enseignement primaire est devenu gratuit, l'enseignement secondaire également aux jeunes provenant des familles pauvres, et le nombre des bourses assurant la possibilité d'études universitaires à l'étranger a été augmenté.

Le développement de l'agriculture nécessite en premier lieu la continuation des travaux d'irrigation, surtout le projet de l'utilisation du fleuve Yarmouk en vue de mettre l'eau indispensable à la disposition des cultivateurs de toute la vallée du Jourdain ; l'emploi étendu des *wadis*, canalisant périodiquement les précipitations rares, et des sources souterraines ; l'introduction de la culture en terrasse sur les collines qui peuvent se prêter à la plantation fruitière, forestière ou à des pâturages.

L'industrie minière doit se concentrer sur l'exploitation des phosphates du bassin de la Mer Morte et étendre ses activités dans d'autres domaines en fonction des résultats des études géologiques déjà en cours dans tout le pays.

Le développement de l'industrie, tenant compte des ressources naturelles, s'efforcera de créer les bases nécessaires au traitement des matières premières extraites du sol jordanien, avant tout rassurer la production de potasse, des bromines et des autres produits chimiques de bonne qualité pour le marché mondial. Le procédé de la production de phosphate doit être modernisé et sa vente entièrement réorganisée. En ce qui concerne les domaines d'activité jusqu'ici inexploités, il faut mentionner les données naturelles très favorables au lancement de l'industrie verrière et céramique, car le sable et la glaise s'y prêtent par leur qualité, et par leur quantité.

Le troisième secteur de l'économie nationale jordanienne qui sera développé le plus au cours de l'exécution du plan quinquennal, est le tourisme. En effet, cette ressource des devises n'était pas organisée sur une large échelle jusqu'ici, et son accroissement dépend des investissements préalables, tels que l'extension du réseau hôtelier pour l'assurer le confort exigé par les touristes ; une campagne de propagande très intensive dans les pays d'Europe et d'Amérique ; la restauration et la préservation des monuments historiques en plus de la modernisation et de l'élargissement des aéroports. Du point de vue touristique la Jordanie a des chances incomparables. Elle comprend la plus grande partie de la Palestine des temps bibliques, elle est la Terre Sainte. En passant la frontière syro-jordanienne venant de Damas, le premier voyageur ne saurait pas de quel côté devrait-il se tourner et admirer les monuments gréco-romains, — temples, palais, forteresses et tombes, — qui s'étendent à deux côtés jusqu'aux limites de l'horizon. C'est Jerash, source inépuisable des souvenirs du monde antique, comme toute la Jordanie à travers les collines de la Judée, l'aridité de la région de la Mer Morte, les lieux sacrés de Jérusalem jusqu'aux maisons de Petra, l'ancienne ville fortifiée des Nabatéens, creusées dans les roches de la montagne. Il est naturel que le gouvernement veut mettre au profit du pays tout ce capital d'un passé glorieux que respirent les pierres, les vieilles rues, le sable du désert et, même, l'air libre quoique suffocant de temps en temps. Le plan avait fixé, comme objectif, de doubler le nombre annuel des touristes qui visitent le pays et d'augmenter le revenu provenant de leurs dépenses de 3 millions dinars en 1961 à 9 millions de dinars en 1967.

L'expérience jordanienne est très importante. Non seulement à cause de la sérénité avec laquelle le plan a été préparé, non seulement à cause du fait que le pays possède un territoire limité, un certain nombre de ressources pouvant satisfaire les besoins locaux et que ses problèmes sont loin d'être compliqués à tel point que ceux d'autre économie moyen-orientale comme, par exemple, celle d'Egypte, mais, surtout, en raison de l'effort visant à réaliser le développement projeté autant que possible par des mesures démocratiques — comme l'affirment tous les observateurs qui ont eu l'occasion de jeter un coup d'oeil de près sur les réalités sociale et économique de ce royaume.

ON CONTEMPORARY MYTHS AND FALLACIES*

FOREWORD

Our world lives in the straightjacket of myths and fallacies. Some of them came to us as legacy of time-honored traditions, formulated during long centuries of historical and cultural evolution of Europe; some were taken over from other people and civilizations through cultural interchange and communication; but the bulk of these myths and fallacies are of more recent origin and these are the most dangerous ones for our future.

These recent myths and fallacies spring from two major sources which basically influenced the shaping of our modern world:

- The liberal, idealist current which gave birth to the industrial revolution, capitalism and the society of abundance;
- The positivist, materialist thinking of which Marxism-Leninism is the most acute expression, and which led to Socialism, social upheavals and totalitarianism.

In fact, both sprung, at least in part, from the Christian heritage not without interpreting Christian beliefs in a completely devious manner as well as from the philosophy of Renaissance and Humanism and from the principles of Reformation; – they completely ignored their own contemporary setting and intellectual context, and, of course, from the modern economic and political conditions to the creation and development of which the preceding intellectual currents heavily contributed.

In final analysis, both reinforced the faith in human progress which originally proceeded from the liberal ideology, and both are equally responsible for the present state of our society, worldwide.

In order to find a way out of the contemporary spiritual and intellectual wilderness, the first step on the road to *catharsis* (in its original Greek sense), which may be the point of departure of a new age, appears to be an earnest examination of beliefs – myths and fallacies – underlying our behavior, our decisions and our few successes and many failures.

The following essay intends to be a contribution to this process. One salient feature of the writings published in this volume is, perhaps, the cruel will and profound resoluteness to break all barriers, all taboos, which restrict human reasoning, the search for truth in our contemporary world, including even Christian beliefs and attitudes which are related to human conventions and the religion as a human institution, – but not casting doubt on the pure faith, Christian, Muslim, Jewish or any other.

* This study was written in the first half of the 1970s. It reflects a moment of discouragement of the author during his twenty five years of work in development cooperation. It is published here the very first time.

DEVELOPMENT REVISITED

Preliminaries

Since World War II and, especially, as a corollary to the decolonization process, development became a major topic and preoccupation in the contemporary world. This phenomenon is evidenced by the fact that in 1980, development assistance activities enter in the Second United Nations Development Decade.

However, it became also clear at the same time that this overwhelming interest resulted in an astounding miscarriage and the present study aims at analyzing why development efforts are truly a failure – as one has to recognize it today in all earnestness.

I do not intend to make any statistical analysis or a purely economic examination of past experience, although some figures or percentages may be quoted, but rather to give a philosophical-sociological dimension to the problems of development and, above all, to inaugurate a sincere approach to them. Therefore, it fits in a series of essays on contemporary myths and fallacies which, modestly, wants to open the eyes of many a people in the world.

Nevertheless, it is to be pointed out that the forthcoming analysis is not motivated by any particularistic point of view, – religious, ideological or whatsoever, – but is certainly proceeding from what one may call a European humanist stand, in its best meaning. It is notwithstanding springing from a profound compassion with the rural masses in the whole of Asia and Africa, which should be the real beneficiaries of, – but are the most neglected ones in the development process.

This essay is dedicated to them, the millions and millions of peasants of the developing world, suffering without having a say, submitting to their authorities without being capable to formulate and impose their own views.

1. FALLACIES ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT

a) *Underdevelopment is the result of European colonialism and imperialism.*

This is a fallacy so evident that normally no space should be given to refute it. However, it is echoed so many times and by so many people, that it has to be dealt with in this context. It cannot be denied that European colonialism was a means of exploitation of Asian and African countries at the benefit of the economic development of some European great powers (but not the whole of Europe). This is, however, only one factor, and only a minor one, in the present underdeveloped state of the Third World, and the Marxist analysis of the phenomenon is completely one-sided, for evident political purposes.

What is necessary to state without any ambiguity, – even at the risk to be classified as rightist, racist or by whatever other, denigrating label by the so-called progressist circles, – is the fact that the people of Asia and Africa had exactly the same chances to develop their civilization as the Europeans, but failed to do it with the same success – technically and materially speaking. History offers the same opportunities to all communities, – except climatic or other natural conditions which certainly determine the possibilities of economic and social development, – and it is up to them to create their own human environment in accordance with their capacities. It is clear that some peoples created magnificent civilizations in the course of their history, like the Chinese, or the Muslims during the first centuries after Muhammad, but afterwards, during the last centuries, the latter were unable to renew their creative efforts. It should suffice to recall here the problem of *ijtihad* in Muslim history, – the closure of the gates of free thinking among Muslims in the 11th century, – to illustrate the point that major causes of underdevelopment are endogenous and not consequences of outside influences.

It is as well known that some great empires were dominating parts of Asia or Africa at certain ages, but nothing remained after them as a permanent feature of civilization, just as no civilizational effects followed the disappearance of the great empires of Dsinghis, Gulagu, or Timur Lenk.

The rational conclusion is therefore clear: during the last centuries the peoples of Asia and Africa were unable to construct (with the exception of Japan) advanced societies and civilisations in the scientific and technical sense, as the peoples of Europe succeeded to do so in the same span of time. No grievances should, thus, be made to Europeans who were resourceful, inventive and realized a hitherto unknown technological and economic development of their society, – albeit not a new cultural setting, – but to recognize that for sociological, religious, philosophical and economic reasons, peoples of the Third World find themselves now in a backward state in comparison to the Western civilization, and that they cannot blame anybody else than themselves for that.

It is the easiest thing to blame others and by individuals especially, the society for one's own misfortunes and to put the onus for one's lack of success and incapability on other individuals or other nations. And it is comfortable to do so, particularly for ruling elites in developing countries, and hiding their incapability behind a historically unjustified accusation.

Therefore, the widely publicized thesis about the main reasons of underdevelopment can be reversed as follows: Underdevelopment is a consequence of a complexity of historical reasons – civilizational, economic or sociological – but evidences primarily the incapability of peoples who live today in an underdeveloped stage for creative progress and sufficient intellectual and organizational efforts during the last couple of hundred years;

b) *Underdevelopment continues to prevail because of sustained Western domination and exploitation:*

In this context falls all what is said and written about multinationals, the obnoxious effects of private investment as well as the inadequacy of Western financial and technical assistance.

Such theories are obviously contradicted by the facts. First of all, underdeveloped nations remain underdeveloped whether they adopted a socialist or a capitalist model of development. If there are certain nations which are getting prepared for an economic take-off, they can be found at both sides; one can refer for proof to Algeria, on the one hand, and to the Republic of Korea on the other hand. Once again, there could be no justification for excusing sad examples of ruthless policies and actions on behalf of certain types of Western capitalism, nor for believing in such illusions as the idea of a completely exogenous development, such as can be found, for example, in the Ivory Coast.

Consequently, reasons for continuing underdevelopment should be found not outside, but inside developing countries without minimizing the varying impact of such economic factors as fluctuations on the world market of prices of basic commodities exported by countries of Asia. Africa and Latin America, or world inflation and deterioration of terms of trade, and world monetary disorder. It appears then that the major reason of continued underdevelopment the effects of which are becoming more devastating year by year, is the lack of innovative, creative efforts in the developing countries themselves which could produce results in finding endogenous solutions to hard problems of economic and social development; endogenous, original answers, and not imported ones from the West, to questions regarding their own present and future.

The mimesis of Western, basically European, cultural, economic and social patterns of evolution is the greatest drawback on the way to promote a better life, to create a real happiness and to re-define their cultural identity of non-European peoples. It is appalling to see, but even those few countries which approach the stage of economic and social take-off, realize their objective because they succeeded to copy, satisfactorily enough, the Western pattern of development (including the Socialist ones), with little or no creative, innovative adaptation of these patterns to their own conditions and civilizational conditions.

This aspect of development constitutes one of the most flagrant contradictions in the framework of bilateral and multilateral technical assistance. With the exception of some well-known cases such as Brazil, Argentina, India or a few Middle Eastern countries, foreign expertise is the principal promoter of developmental efforts in Asian and African countries. However, foreign experts, including citizens of developing countries whose educational background is entirely Western, apply the notions, methods and techniques they learned and practiced during their whole professional life and are not able to adapt them in an innovative manner, or to create completely novel approaches to particular developmental problems. It would certainly not be reasonable to expect from these experts such almost inhumane efforts adaptation or creation, although one has to recognize that some succeeded in it in some particular areas.

Therefore, the only successful way to sustained development in Asia and Africa could be a gigantic effort in each country or region by the elites or those classes, groups or clans which are in power, to work out development patterns as well as ways and means to realize them, according to endogenous imperatives, i.e. in the country's, region's or civilization's proper, genuine setting. And if this was not yet done, these elites or social groups in power can only be held responsible for it.

2. MYTHS ABOUT THE NATURE OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT

The myth which is worldwide spread and accepted about underdevelopment is that it is an economic and not a civilizational, cultural and social phenomenon.

However, the general evolution of developing countries since the beginning of the decolonization process in the late forties, – Philippines and India, – proves one fundamental fact: *underdevelopment is not a purely economic state; its major characteristics are civilizational and sociological.*

First of all, as it was shortly mentioned in the preceding pages, underdevelopment is a civilizational phenomenon. This does not mean that other civilizations than the European-Western (including the Socialist/Communist variants) are inferior to it in any degrading sense; it simply means that in the present and in the immediate past (as against thousands years of human history), they were and are not capable to set a course for their societies leading toward material, technical and technological progress.

It is not enough and certainly not satisfactory for peoples' well-being to live on recurrently evoking past glory, – past glory does not create present happiness. The great intellectual achievements of Ibn Sina, the wonderfully rich *Weltanschauung* of the *Tao*, or the overwhelming spirituality of the Vedas and the *Bhagavadgita*, are not sufficient to generate progress in the modern sense, but could be and should be the proper setting for creative and innovative new beginnings in their respective civilizations.

Unfortunately, this new departure did not take yet place. Nevertheless, some promising signs can be found, first of all in China, but also in the Muslim world and even in Africa, where the efforts of such outstanding men as Julius Nyerere to relate development to traditional African community structures and values, point towards the commencement of fresh thinking and approaches. It can also be hoped that the new departure in various great civilizations of the world will be done in a way that safeguards the underlying spiritual patterns – by generating what we call an endogenous development – without incurring the dangers faced by the European civilization which realized its prodigious material progress at the price of almost entirely losing its spirituality.

The fact nevertheless remains that the nature of underdevelopment is essentially civilizational.

The second important characteristics of the nature of contemporary underdevelopment, growing out from the civilizational problem but also constituting, surprisingly, the bridge between the civilizational and sociological aspects, is *the complete lack of civic responsibility and discipline in developing countries*. What is meant by this is that each civil servant, including officials of public enterprises and services (and one knows their importance in developing countries), as well as individuals in any occupation, consider as their absolute duty to perform what they are paid for without expecting special benefits and favors. A ministry or municipality official dispensing licenses, a private trader selling its merchandise or representatives of public utility enterprises or private servicing outfits such as hotels, should do what they are expected to do, even if they are not paid enough, because of an innate sense of duty and responsibility towards other fellow members of their society. In sum, this is the terrible problem of nepotism and corruption – let it be clearly said that this is the real cancer of developing countries destroying any prospect of economic and social progress.

It is true that this cancer exists, to some extent, in any society. But in the developing world, with the inflow of huge amounts of funds through various channels of assistance and with the appearance of un hoped for possibilities, for a few to make money, out of their reach before, the phenomenon is aggravated year by year. Of course, and this should not be forgotten, in most countries it does not represent anything new: it is the old Oriental way of life – as we know of the Han or Ottoman empires as well – which not only persists, but is becoming absolutely pervading, even if those in power in developing countries and their ignorant or corrupt allies in the West deny it.

It has to be emphasized once again: no development of the Third World is possible until the pervading influence of corruption and nepotism is not gradually reduced, to finally be eradicated. All the more, the question can be raised as of now: how long taxpayers in Western countries will agree to carry the burden of the major part of unilateral and bilateral assistance flowing in manifold forms into developing countries, if it becomes evident that a large percentage of it does not serve the purposes it is given for – rural or grassroots development, more employment, public health facilities and education – but creates new wealth for the rulers, enriches more the already rich and makes the poor, by reverse effect, even poorer.

One can only be astonished that the phenomenon of corruption is so generally ignored, even by the most perspicacious observers of development: who, supposedly, close their eyes about it because either of misplaced remorse (colonialism), or sheer complacency in respect of the ruling elites in the Third World, if not because of political strategy – corruption leads to subversion, revolt and oppression, all serving definite aims of, for example, Communist expansionism.

Analyzing the main factors of European development and success in the modern era, nobody can deny the important role played by civic responsibility and discipline having, undoubtedly, its roots in the Christian moral attitude towards society, especially in countries having adopted Protestantism, as the well-known Weberian writings demonstrated it. It is then all the more surprising that most respectable Western scholars concerned with problems of development omit to underline the crucial role of civic attitude in a society's progress, perhaps, as mentioned before, to avoid hurting leading circles in the developing world or to avoid giving new arguments to anti-Western fallacies about colonialism and imperialism. But now it is time to clearly state the importance of this destructive phenomenon.

It has to be added that a solution to this problem can only be found inside, and not from outside, of the concerned civilizations and cultures. There is no reason to suppose that a new attitude will not come forth, probably very soon; just to take one example: principles ordering individual behavior in public and social life according to the Prophet of Islam constitute a unique basis for reforming attitudes toward more responsibility and discipline in Muslim countries of Asia and Africa. Whoever knows the teachings of the *Qu'ran* cannot deny that.

Finally, in respect of the nature of underdevelopment, its third essential aspect, narrowly related to the former one, is sociological. It concerns *the abandon of objectives of development by those in power for their sole benefit*, i.e. the generalization of the attitudes described above in the ruling classes or dominant groups in the Third World. Some would say that this is a universal human phenomenon. It definitely is, but what makes it disastrous for the developing countries, that there are not, absolutely not, in-built legal and social mechanisms which could hinder or stop the general abandon of ideals, despite of commonly practiced prolific discourse about them, leading to an unbelievable extension of the pursuit of selfish interests among those in power, instead of serving the public interest, a better life for all people.

Once again, none or few public statements were made about this feature of underdevelopment because, in fact, it is a taboo not to be touched; and to speak of it is bringing on oneself the anathema of all, – politicians, scholars and idealists, – and, especially, of the interested governing or economically powerful people. Nevertheless, all those who were carrying out practical work in developing countries, realize the gravity of this situation and confirm it.

The selfishness of those in power ruins all efforts towards gradual development makes the rural poor as desperate as before independence and leads the urban masses, swelled by continuous migration from the

countryside, to intermittent revolts which might bring about changes in the government, in the ruling classes, tribes or groups, but does not modify the attitudes of the newcomers at all. One serious consequence of these periodic revolts is that those in power try to give a minimum satisfaction to the inhabitants of cities and provincial centers (there would be a nonsense to classify them as middle classes), as no menace is feared from the ignorant and unorganized peasants. In this way, large numbers are enrolled in civil or public services, where they even benefit of such 'sweeteners' as free or cheap distribution of food or other basic necessities which, of course, overburden the State's budget or public organisms' finances. In some developing countries, salaries and wages paid by the government and other public authorities represent eighty per cent or more of their total expenditure.

It is logical, in this context, that people serving in institutions which are the main pillars of a regime, – party, militia, in most cases the army, – receive four or five times more than an ordinary citizen, in addition to considerable benefits in kind. Profiteering becomes a normal way of life and even those who at the beginning have better intentions, in particular young, educated people, get corrupted after having served during a short period of time.

How can one expect in such circumstances that lofty objectives spelled out in national development plans or international development strategies, be attained at the benefit of all people? How national savings in a developing country could be then increased in order to lessen dependence on foreign aid? How present assistance policies could be continued at the prejudice of the taxpayers of donor countries – capitalist or socialist – during coming decades when it is evident that a major part of inflows are wasted or satisfy selfish interests?

The abandonment of development objectives by those who are responsible for their realization is a downright treason. It is not the colonialists, imperialists, capitalists, communists, multinationals, private investors or whoever else is accused, who are primarily responsible for the endless course towards development, for the pitiful results of all efforts undertaken since decolonization, for the increasing disparities between rich and poor nations, between the North and the South, – the main culprits are the leading elites of developing countries, their successive generations. And there can be no hope to break the vicious circle, to reverse the true tragedy of underdevelopment into a successful enterprise, until there will be no rulers, groups in power or responsible individuals who will honestly, unselfishly serve the public interest. Similarly, no foreign financial aid, no bilateral or international assistance will produce results, matching the efforts of donor countries, until this aid will be dilapidated, until programs will be badly conceived and carried out in a way that lead to dramatic failures – in the name of sovereignty and independence of the receiving countries.

3. FALLACIES ABOUT THE FUTURE OF DEVELOPMENT

The greatest fallacy about the future of developing countries is the proposal that more money and more assistance should be given to them by the rich, industrialized States, to be used but exclusively under the control of the recipient, ruling elites or dominating groups. This was the recommendation of the famous Jackson report (1966) which introduced in multilateral assistance – except that given by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund – the concept and practice that funds and technical assistance should be put at the disposal of governments which should use them according to their priorities, i.e., at their discretion.

Now, this is evidently a perfect non-sense:

– First of all, the sociological aspect of the nature of underdevelopment, as described above, makes it plain that corrupt and selfish elites would never use, even if they get more money and more assistance of which they can dispose of, in the interest of the majority of the people, in particular the exploited rural masses.

– Secondly, it is proven by historical evolution that leaders who were successful in fighting colonialism and achieving independence are, at the same time, not able to conduct to a successful end the complicated process of development.

– Thirdly, there is an obvious contradiction between the declared need of educating and training people from developing countries for responsibilities of various kind, an integral component of most assistance programs, and to suppose, at the same time, that the same people might be able to decide what to do in view of the development of their country. Of course, one would object to this argument that decisions setting development objectives and priorities are 'political,' i.e. they are decisions which must be taken by citizens of a country, but nobody can explain how nationals can assign priorities to their countries without understanding the complexities of such decisions. The failures of the past twenty years are nevertheless clearly showing that this contradiction is more than real. An amusing detail concerning this point is that it happened many times in the framework of international cooperation that assistance was extended to a given country in a given specialization, including extensive training of its nationals, but at the same time other nationals of the country were sent as experts or advisers in the very same specialization to other developing countries.

– Fourthly, in a good number of developing countries assistance is given in policy or development planning at the request of the authorities. How the same authorities could then decide beforehand about development objectives and priorities?

In sum, it is not suggested here at all that anybody else than nationals of a country should decide between such fundamental alternatives, for example, as to whether the country should choose the liberal or socialist path of development (if this option is offering a real choice), but to point out that once a country's rulers or elite are capable to decide about right development objectives and priorities, – then, there could be practically no need for assistance, except in some narrow technical or technological fields.

In effect, the only viable practice today appears to be the one of the World Bank or IMF the staff of which considers each assistance program requested by a government, negotiate its terms, control its implementation and, above all, set conditions in respect of national policies to be pursued before extending any assistance. All bilateral and multilateral financial and technical assistance programs should adopt the same procedure, – even at the expense of the respect of the doctrine of national sovereignty.


Another widely spread fallacy is that developing countries, with the exception of a few (not including oil-rich States or such particular cases as Singapor or Hong-Kong), could attain any specific growth targets in a definite span of time, for example, until the year 2000. Such targets are, for instance, to raise their share in world manufactured output to 25 per cent by the end of the century.

In other words, very little development will take place during the lifetime of our generation in most developing countries. This is not pessimism, but simply a realistic attitude based on experience. A moderate optimism could only be justified, if basic characteristics of underdevelopment as well as of the development process could be changed – the possibility of which seems in our days very remote.

ARTICLES PUBLIES DANS LE QUOTIDIEN DU MALI

L'ESSOR

[J'ai travaillé en République du Mali entre 1979 et 1983 comme Conseiller Principal en Relations Economiques Extérieures/Chef de Programme, d'abord au Centre Malien du Commerce Extérieur (CMCE), puis auprès du Ministre d'Etat de l'Economie et le Ministre des Finances et du Commerce. Au cours de 1983 le quotidien national, L'ESSOR – La voix du peuple, avait publié quelque de mes articles sur des sujets économiques ou des activités de coopération technique. Ces articles sont reproduits sur les pages qui suivent, mais auparavant figure une photo et un compte-rendu, paru dans le même journal, annonçant les activités du programme d'assistance technique que j'avais dirigé auprès du CMCE, afin de situer l'ambiance dans laquelle ces écrits avaient vu le jour.]



Sur la photo Victor Segesvary préside à l'ouverture du séminaire;
à sa droite se trouve le colonel, gouverneur de la région métropolitaine de Bamako,
à sa gauche l'expert de la FAO en conditionnement et emballage des fruits et légumes à l'exportation

CMCE — Bientôt un séminaire d'initiation aux méthodes de marketing*

[Premier compte-rendu dans *L'Essor* du programme concernant la promotion du commerce extérieur.]

Le Centre Malien pour le Commerce Extérieur (CMCE) organise du 2 au 7 juin 1980 un séminaire dont le thème est « méthodes et techniques de l'étude de marches ». Pendant près d'une semaine, des spécialistes du marketing dispenseront aux représentants des sociétés maliennes, choisies pour leur dynamisme, des cours sur la manière de sonder un marché, de cerner les besoins du client, ceci en vue de réaliser un bon placement des produits. Une initiative, selon les vœux de ses instigateurs, permettra à nos sociétés et commerçants de découvrir les ficelles du commerce moderne.

* Article paru le 30 mai 1980.

Il faut souligner que ce séminaire s'inscrit dans le cadre du projet de promotion commerciale dont le CMCE [Centre malien du commerce extérieur] a entrepris la réalisation avec l'assistance de M. Victor Segesvary, Conseiller Principal et Chef de projet du Centre du Commerce International CNUCED/GATT auprès du CMCE.

M. Segesvary, qui est au Mali depuis 6 mois, n'en est pas à son coup d'essai. Conférencier, en 1969, sur les problèmes d'information commerciale, il est nommé, entre 1971 et 1974, Directeur du premier projet intégré de promotion commerciale du CCI en Algérie. Programmation d'un projet d'expansion commerciale en Turquie, établissement de structures organisationnelles et du programme d'activités du Centre Marocain de Promotion des Exportations, préparation des activités du Conseil de l'Unité Economique Arabe au Caire sont entre autres, les missions accomplies entre 1974 et 1979, par M. Segesvary.

Le projet, qu'il a à charge de conduire au Mali vise « à promouvoir par tous les moyens possibles du marketing moderne, les exportations de la République du Mali ainsi qu'à rationaliser et à rentabiliser les importations du pays ».

Mais l'insuffisance de fonds qui ralentit les activités du CMCE depuis sa création et le non versement au Centre par le Gouvernement d'une partie du produit de la contribution pour prestations de services particuliers rendus (CPS) sont, entre autres des lacunes à combler pour permettre au CMCE de jouer pleinement le rôle qui lui est dévolu : promouvoir et développer, dans le cadre de la politique générale du Gouvernement, les échanges commerciaux entre le Mali et les autres pays et plus particulièrement l'exportation des produits maliens.

COMMERCE ET DEVELOPPEMENT (1^{ERE} PARTIE)

1980 : La décennie noire?*

Le *Rapport sur le commerce et le développement*, 1981 publié récemment par le Secrétariat de la Conférence des Nations Unies sur le Commerce et le Développement (CNUCED), est un document riche d'enseignement, de chiffres et de conclusions pour l'avenir.

Il ne serait pas possible de traiter dans ces articles tous les aspects du Rapport comme, par exemple, l'analyse de la situation actuelle de l'économie mondiale et ses perspectives à court terme, ou le survol du développement mondial dans le passé. Nous nous limiterons à exposer ici l'essentiel de ses conclusions, en particulier, les prévisions pour les années 1980 : l'économie mondiale en transition dont l'importance pour le développement économique du Mali est incontestable.

Crise. Les taux de croissance des pays en développement n'ont pas atteint les objectifs définis par la communauté internationale au cours des décennies passées. De plus, l'écart entre les objectifs et les taux de croissance réels s'est encore creusé ces dernières années et il a atteint « des proportions redoutables au seuil de la Troisième Décennie des Nations Unies pour le Développement ».

Ceci est d'autant plus inquiétant que le monde s'enfonce, sans aucun doute, dans une crise économique non pas cyclique, mais structurelle, reflétée par les débuts décourageants des années 80 avec un net ralentissement du commerce mondial en 1980.1.5% seulement contre 7% en moyenne par an pendant la période 1960-1979. Cette tendance est encore confirmée depuis et elle est accompagnée de tensions inflationnistes persistantes ; les prix des biens entrant dans les échanges mondiaux ont augmenté de 20% au cours de la seule année 1980. Ce tableau sombre est encore complété par l'aggravation des déséquilibres des balances de paiements et un haut degré d'instabilité monétaire, donc des taux de change et des taux d'intérêt.

Même si ce désarroi des échanges et des paiements internationaux et, en général, la crise économique peuvent s'expliquer en partie par la décélération de l'expansion de la production que l'économie mondiale connaît périodiquement, il est universellement reconnu qu'actuellement des facteurs de nature moins éphémères exercent une influence décisive. L'apparition des politiques protectionnistes dans certains pays industriels remettant en cause les fondements mêmes d'un système d'échanges libres prévalent depuis 1945, et la régression des taux de croissance à long terme des pays industrialisés a modifié dans un sens défavorable les perspectives du développement et des commerces mondiaux.

Dégradation. En conséquence, pour la plupart des pays en développement la décélération des taux de croissance constitue un indicateur generis de la détérioration de leur situation économique, en particulier pour les importateurs de pétrole. D'après les estimations, le taux d'accroissement de leur Produit Intérieur Brut (PIB) a été d'environ 3.6% en 1980, et probablement pas plus élevé depuis, ce qui signifie une stagnation du revenu réel par habitant pendant les années 1980-1982, tenant compte de l'accroissement de leur population et de la détérioration des termes de l'échange.

En effet, l'une des causes principales de l'aggravation considérable du déficit des opérations commerciales est la dégradation des termes de l'échange des pays en développement depuis le début de la décennie passée à quoi s'ajoute en ce qui concerne les déficits grandissants de leurs balances des paiements, la hausse très marquée des taux d'intérêt sur les marchés financiers. Le résultat est l'accroissement rapide de l'encours de leurs dettes extérieures qui s'approche maintenant du niveau des 400 milliards de dollars.

* L'article paru dans l'édition du 9 février 1983.

Ce qui est cependant particulièrement préoccupant, comme constate le Rapport, c'est que tous ces facteurs constituent un lourd handicap pour les programmes d'investissement de ces pays qui subiront inévitablement, de graves amputations. Il en résultera ainsi « un affaiblissement de l'aptitude de nombreux pays en développement à réaliser même le minimum de transformations structurelles nécessaire pour soutenir leur développement dans le climat économique actuel ».

Récession. L'évolution défavorable de la situation économique mondiale est, en grande partie, le résultat de la crise économique dans les pays industrialisés à économie de marché qui est engendré à la fois par des facteurs conjoncturels et des facteurs séculaires.

Parmi les facteurs conjoncturels le plus important est la RECESSION induite par les hausses de prix intervenues en 1979 et 1980, conséquence, entre autres, du second réalignement des prix pétroliers, et par la décision prise par la majorité des pays développés à économie de marché d'accorder la priorité à des mesures restrictives de régulation de la demande pour combattre l'inflation. Si une certaine modération de la hausse des prix a pu être obtenue par la suite, le coût de cette politique est considérable, qu'il s'agisse des capacités inutilisées ou de chômage. Le fait d'importance capitale pour les pays en développement est que le niveau d'activité économique dans les pays industrialisés à économie de marché demeure la condition principale dont dépendent leurs recettes d'exportation. C'est pourquoi, les pays en développement, ont intérêt que les pays développés à économie de marché puissent maintenir l'emploi et l'activité économique à un niveau élevé.

Aux effets de cette récession s'ajoutent l'impact des moyens adoptés par les pays industrialisés pour combattre les pressions inflationnistes, notamment les politiques monétaires ; l'incidence directe du niveau élevé des taux d'intérêt sur le service de la dette des pays en développement a été déjà indiqué plus haut. En outre, la compression des déficits budgétaires des Etats concernés apparaît plus qu'aléatoire et les allègements fiscaux en faveur des entreprises pour stimuler les investissements industriels ne produiront les effets escomptés qu'à moyen terme. Un prolongement de la période de stagnation est donc très probable.

Ralentissement. De toute évidence, l'évolution économique récente des pays industrialisés à économie de marché ne peut être entièrement attribuée à des cycles récurrents transitoires. Des facteurs à long terme semblent agir dans le sens d'un ralentissement de la croissance séculaire de ces pays, conformément à la théorie de Kondratiev de courbes ascendantes et descendantes dans l'intervalle de chaque demi-siècle. Deux phénomènes, entre autres, caractérisent ce renversement des tendances profondes :

— En premier lieu, il n'apparaît pas probable que les taux records de croissance de la productivité des années d'après guerre puissent être maintenus indéfiniment. En particulier, il faudrait garder à l'esprit que le taux d'augmentation de la productivité observé au cours des cent dernières années, entre 1870 et 1970, dans les pays aujourd'hui considérés comme des pays développés à économie de marché était d'environ 1.7% par an, ce qui contraste nettement avec la moyenne de plus de 3% enregistrée pendant la période 1950-1970.

— En second lieu, les projections relatives à la main d'œuvre dans les pays industrialisés indiquent qu'au cours des années 1980 et 1990 elle sera nettement inférieure aux taux précédents, un frein incontestable à une croissance rapide.

Il n'y a donc pas lieu d'espérer que les politiques conjoncturelles actuelles parviennent à ramener les économies des pays de l'OCDE sur le chemin de la croissance qui a caractérisé l'économie mondiale dans les années 50 et 60, on estime, tout au plus, la croissance économique de ces pays à 2.5% par an en moyenne dans les années 1980.

En fait, constate le Rapport de la CNUCED « si l'on prend pour base le rapport historique entre les taux de croissance des pays industrialisés et les pays en développement et à supposer que les tendances et les politiques concernant le commerce et le courant des capitaux ne subissent pas de modification majeure, on obtient par projection un taux annuel de croissance de l'ordre de 4.5% dans les années 1980 pour les pays en développement ». Même dans les hypothèses les plus optimistes, — apports de capitaux supplémentaires et

libéralisation des politiques commerciales, — les projections ne permettent d'escompter, pour la décennie à venir, qu'un taux annuel de croissance de 5.7%.

En comparaison, la Nouvelle Stratégie Internationale de Développement, qui, même s'il était réalisable, n'aboutira qu'à une réduction minime du taux de chômage urbain dans ces pays. Par conséquent, les taux projetés qu'ils soient de 4.5% ou de 5.7%, s'accompagneront d'une forte augmentation de taux de chômage surtout dans les centres urbains, avec toutes les difficultés sociales et politiques qui en résulteraient.

Car le ralentissement du rythme de développement, c'est aussi une répartition inégale des acquis entre les pays et les groupes de revenus différents à l'intérieur des pays, une part disproportionnée du fardeau étant supportée par les couches pauvres de la population. Ainsi, les taux de croissance des pays les moins avancés et des pays le plus gravement touchés par des facteurs climatiques ou autres, avaient été par le passé nettement inférieurs à ceux des pays en développement n'entrant pas dans ces catégories ; les estimations actuelles montrent que 75% de ces pays auront *enregistré un taux de croissance négatif*, tant en 1980 qu'en 1981. Certaines indications donnent également à penser que le ralentissement du développement a modifié la répartition des revenus dans un sens défavorable aux groupes les plus pauvres.

En conséquence, les répercussions des perspectives sombres de l'économie mondiale seront encore plus graves pour les pays les moins avancés et les plus gravement touchés dont le Mali, et il est impératif de prévoir les mesures à prendre afin de parer à cette éventualité.

COMMERCE ET DEVELOPPEMENT (2^{EME} PARTIE)

Quelques issues possibles d'une situation paradoxale*

Dans l'article précédent concernant le *Rapport sur le Commerce et le Développement, 1981* (voir l'Essor du 9/2/83) préparé par le Secrétariat de la CNUCED, deux sujets étaient traités : la crise de développement et les modifications intervenues dans les tendances de l'économie mondiale et les perspectives de développement.

A la suite de nombreuses analyses détaillées, le Rapport propose un nouveau paradigme du développement assurant l'accélération de la croissance des pays en développement dans un contexte de stabilité globale. Le point de départ est une situation conflictuelle qui découle des tendances actuelles, où l'équilibre correspond à la dynamique interne des pays en développement risque de soumettre le reste du monde à des pressions de plus en plus fortes, car elle nécessitera des transferts qui ont peu de chances d'être réalisés dans le cadre du système existant. Dans ces conditions, constate le Rapport « la lenteur de la croissance des pays en développement est inacceptable du point de vue de leur propre dynamique sociale, alors qu'une forte croissance de ces pays n'est pas réalisable dans le contexte du système économique international existant ».

Néanmoins, le Secrétariat de la CNUCED prévoit différentes possibilités pour sortir de ce paradoxe :

— Le volume important des transferts de ressources nécessaires pourrait être sensiblement réduit si des politiques appropriées concernant les produits (voir les négociations par produits et la constitution du Fonds Commun) conduisant à une amélioration substantielle des termes de l'échange des pays en développement.

— Même s'il apparaît que dans les premières phases d'accélération de la croissance des pays en développement les transferts financiers seraient d'une ampleur qui dépasserait peut-être les capacités du système financier actuel, il est aussi vrai que des excédents d'épargne seraient disponibles dans les pays en développement en tant que groupe autant que dans les pays industrialisés dont la croissance serait ralentie et, en partant, les capacités d'absorption des capitaux limitées. Donc, la difficulté ne semble pas tellement tenir à l'insuffisance de l'épargne potentielle en tant que telle, mais plutôt à la mise en place de mécanismes financiers nouveaux et plus efficaces capables d'équilibrer l'épargne et l'investissement au niveau mondial. Quoiqu'il en soit, le rôle des transferts financiers en termes relatifs aura sans doute tendance à diminuer avec le temps, à mesure que les transformations structurelles dans les pays en développement iront en s'accroissant.

Réduction des tensions. L'accélération initiale de la croissance devrait être suivie d'un ensemble de mesures destinées à améliorer la performance économique des pays en développement eux-mêmes. Le Rapport de la CNUCED met en évidence deux objectifs particulièrement importants dans ce contexte : d'abord d'assurer l'expansion du commerce entre pays en développement dans des proportions bien supérieures aux accroissements prévus, et réaliser un plus haut degré de substitution des importations (échanges Sud-Sud), car l'existence de vastes marchés potentiels à l'intérieur de ces pays offre la garantie d'une plus grande efficacité et d'une plus grande stabilité.

Ensuite, les pays en développement doivent se rendre compte et il faut souligner ceci avec force que « les politiques commerciales ne sont pas suffisantes pour obtenir de meilleurs résultats à l'exportation, mais elles doivent être complétées par un accroissement du taux de l'épargne intérieure et par une amélioration continue de la gestion dans tous les secteurs de l'économie ».

* Article paru le 10 février 1983.

On peut ajouter à ces possibilités, que la réduction des tensions au niveau mondial pourrait être facilitée si les pays développés adoptaient des politiques nationales de nature à favoriser la restructuration de l'économie industrielle mondiale. Des aménagements positifs permettant de réduire progressivement les mesures protectionnistes, dirigées contre les exportations des pays en développement seraient particulièrement bénéfiques.

Enfin, il est à supposer que le taux de croissance des pays développés dans les années 90 et au-delà pourrait commencer à s'accélérer, en particulier grâce à l'effet en retour que pourrait avoir sur eux la croissance des pays en développement.

Bien entendu, ces considérations n'épuisent pas toutes les possibilités, mais elles donnent une idée de quelques issus possibles de la situation internationale décrite plus haut au cas où l'accélération de la croissance des pays en développement est envisagée comme une question prioritaire et comme une tâche d'intérêt.

Scénario possible. Vu que le maintien des modes actuels de croissance dans le contexte des structures existantes des relations commerciales, financières et institutionnelles internationales ferait naître des tensions graves et cumulatives dans l'économie mondiale et pourrait conduire à une instabilité continue pendant une longue période, le Secrétariat de la CNUCED a élaboré un scénario assurant une accélération graduelle mais assez forte de la croissance dans les pays en développement avec ses répercussions sur les schémas de la production mondiale et du commerce international, tout en considérant que les pays développés à économie de marché continuaient à connaître une croissance lente.

Le modèle qui est à la base de ce scénario repose sur quinze sous modèles régionaux de croissance afin de refléter les diversités et les disparités entre les différentes composantes du monde en développement. Il a été suppose que les taux de croissance des pays en développement en tant que groupe augmenteraient graduellement au cours des années 80, pour atteindre 7% par an en 1990 ; tandis que pour les économies développées un taux annuel de croissance de 2.4% était prévu pour l'ensemble des années 80, dans l'hypothèque que les politiques restent inchangées et en tenant compte des tendances de la productivité et de l'offre de la main d'oeuvre (voir l'article précédent).

Première conclusion tirée par les auteurs du scénario *relative aux structures mondiales futures de la production* est que ces structures ne se modifieront que très lentement en confirmant les tendances du passé, quand malgré deux décennies de croissance plus rapide dans les pays en développement, leur PIB par habitant est resté Presque constant par rapport à celui des pays industrialisés. Ainsi, en projetant les hypothèses sur lesquelles le scénario était fondé jusqu'en l'an 2000, et supposant que le taux d'accroissement démographique des pays en développement devrait fortement diminuer, le PIB moyen par habitant de ces pays ne représenterait encore qu'environ 15% de celui des pays développés à économie de marché.

Néanmoins, les parts respectives des pays en développement et des pays industrialisés dans la production mondiale, évoluera plus favorablement pour les premiers en suivant, de nouveau, les tendances du passé. Dans le scénario envisagé la part des pays en développement dans la production mondiale augmenterait de 32% pendant les années à venir contre 24% au cours des deux dernières décennies.pour atteindre en l'an 2000 le quart de la production mondiale aux prix de 1975. Par contre, la part des pays développés à économie de marché diminuerait pour tomber de 72% environ en 1960 à 50% en l'an 2000.

2% du PIB. Pour ce qui est de l'évolution de la structure des échanges commerciaux, les modifications structurelles du commerce qui découleraient logiquement des modifications structurelles de la production, compte tenu de fortes contraintes sur le système commercial et financier international, portent à croire que le déséquilibre des échanges commerciaux serait très important d'ici à 1990. Il découle du scénario envisagé que les pays en développement pris globalement auraient un déficit commercial équivalent à 6.9% des exportations mondiales en 1990. Cela correspondrait à environ 2% du PIB des pays développés et représente le transfert net de ressources dont les pays en développement auraient besoin. A fin de comparaison, le déficit commercial correspondent des pays en développement se chiffrait en 1975 à environ 0.3% du PIB global des pays développés. En plus, si l'on considère le déficit dans la perspective de la croissance plus lente des économies développées, il faudrait que les transferts nets de ressources augmentent de plus de six fois par rapport au PIB de ces pays entre 1975 et 1990.

L'aggravation du déficit commercial global des pays en développement par rapport à leurs exportations est imputable à trois facteurs :

- Premièrement, leur fort excédent traditionnel correspondant aux produits primaires diminue pendant la période examinée, même s'il subsiste un excédent notable en 1990;
- Deuxièmement, la part des produits primaires dans le total des exportations recule de façon sensible;
- Troisièmement, le déficit correspondant aux articles manufacturés décroît. Leur part dans le total des exportations progresse sans, toutefois, compenser la régression constatée plus haut. Néanmoins, ceci implique la diminution graduelle du déficit commercial global à long terme.

Le scénario démontre toutefois que si entre 1985 et 1990 l'augmentation des exportations est dans tous les cas plus forte que pendant la période précédente, l'accentuation du déficit est par contre moins sensible pour l'Amérique de Sud, l'Amérique Centrale et l'Asie que dans d'autres régions en développement. De plus, en ce qui concerne l'Asie, l'augmentation des exportations des articles manufacturés pendant cette dernière période éponge l'accroissement du déficit commercial, toujours par rapport au commerce mondial.

On peut conclure donc qu'après l'aggravation très rapide des déficits commerciaux qui intervient dans un premier temps par rapport au niveau des exportations, le niveau des exportations augmentera plus vite, à plus long terme que celui des déficits commerciaux dont l'importance économique commencera à diminuer. D'autant plus si intervient l'essor des échanges entre pays en développement, facteur d'équilibre du commerce mondial, auquel correspondra une contraction de la part prise dans le commerce mondial par les échanges entre pays développés à économie de marché.

AIDE PUBLIQUE

Trois principales caractéristiques pour une conjoncture nouvelle*

Dans son dernier rapport intitulé : *Coopération pour le développement. Examen 82*, le président du comité d'aide au développement (CAD) de l'Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Economique (OCDE), M. Rutherglen M. Piats, constate que le total des ressources que les 17 pays membres du CAD ont mises à la disposition des pays en développement en 1981 au titre de l'aide publique au développement (A.P.D.) s'est élevé à 25.6 milliards de dollars EU, soit une baisse de 6% par rapport aux 27.3 milliards de dollars accordés en 1980.

En pourcentage du Produit National Brut (PNB) ces pays membres du CAD, les engagements nets d'aide publique au développement qui avaient atteint 0.38% de leur PNB total, sont tombés à 0.35% en 1981.

Le rapport suggère que le monde en développement est devenu beaucoup moins homogène au cours des six dernières années. Les pays nouvellement industrialisés, les pays exportateurs de pétrole et les pays à revenu intermédiaire se détachent d'un groupe de pays qui sont dans une situation plus difficile dont le taux de croissance économique n'a pas sensiblement progressé au cours des années 1970, et qui ont actuellement un besoin crucial d'aide au développement. Le rapport met en évidence trois principales caractéristiques de la situation de ces derniers pays :

— La poursuite de l'ajustement simultané, c'est-à-dire le nombre des pays obligés d'entreprendre une politique d'ajustement parallèle en divers domaines est plus élevé que jamais ; ces ajustements sont indispensables où il ne leur est plus possible d'accroître leur déficit budgétaire ni celui de leurs paiements extérieurs, du fait que leurs recettes d'exportation plafonnent, que le coût des prêts accordés par les banques commerciales augmente et qu'il est plus difficile d'obtenir des prêts ;

— L'arrêt du développement dans les pays d'Afrique à faible revenu : la production ne progresse pas au même rythme que la population dans les pays d'Afrique sub-saharienne. En fait, la production alimentaire par habitant y a baissé de 1.4% par an pendant toute la décennie 70, alors qu'elle ne diminuait que de 0.4% dans l'ensemble des pays à faible revenu. Il est donc évident que la région africaine est beaucoup plus touchée que les autres. confirme le rapport du président du CAD, — c'est à ce groupe de pays que les organismes chargés de distribuer l'APD devraient désormais canaliser l'essentiel de leurs ressources financières et intellectuelles, tout en incluant parmi les bénéficiaires les autres pays où la production par habitant est particulièrement lente et stagnante ;

— Economies de plus en plus tributaires du commerce extérieur : étant donné qu'un nombre croissant des pays en développement ont réussi, au cours de la décennie précédente, à accroître la fraction de leur production qu'ils exportent et à réorienter de façon substantielle leur économie vers le marché extérieur, l'interdépendance sur le plan international s'est particulièrement renforcée. De ce fait, la récession qui s'installe dans des pays industriels, composante importante de la production mondiale et des échanges internationaux, exerce actuellement des effets plus prononcés sur tous les autres pays que ce n'eût été le cas il y a seulement cinq ans.

Pour ce qui concerne, finalement, les perspectives des flux financiers, donc l'aide publique au développement, le président du CAD estime que l'apport global d'APD accordée par ses membres a légèrement augmenté en 82 et progressera en valeur réelle durant la période 1983-1985, mais à un taux qui ne dépassera pas la moitié environ de celui qui avait été enregistré à la fin des années 1970, 59% au moins de l'APD étant affectée aux pays en développement à faible revenu.

* Article paru le 24 février 1983.

COMMERCE ET DEVELOPPEMENT (3^{EME} PARTIE)

Ces exportations qui baissent*

Les diverses publications statistiques du Fonds Monétaire International (FMI) récemment publiées, corroborent dans une très large mesure les tendances de développement liées aux échanges internationaux, exposées dans les deux articles publiés dans l'ESSOR de mercredi 9 et de jeudi 10 février passés.

En effet, ces statistiques prouvent que la récession qui se prolonge dans les pays industriels s'est accompagnée, en 1982, d'une tendance à la baisse de la valeur des exportations et des importations de ces pays. Au cours des dix premiers mois de 1982, la valeur de leurs exportations a baissé de 4.3% par rapport à la période correspondante de 1981, autant que les valeurs unitaires à l'exportation pendant la même période. Il en résulte que le volume des exportations des pays industriels a lui aussi accusé une baisse comparable.

En ce qui concerne les importations de ces pays, leur valeur a fléchi de 5.2% pendant les dix premiers mois de 1982, toujours par rapport à la période correspondante de 1981, cependant que les valeurs unitaires des importations diminuaient de 5%. Ceci représente un retournement de la tendance observée en 1981, c'est-à-dire en 1982 les valeurs unitaires à l'importation ont baissé deux fois plus vite que les valeurs unitaires à l'exportation. Le volume des importations des pays industriels a donc également diminué durant les dix premiers mois de 1982.

Néanmoins, la réduction des importations des pays industriels en provenance des pays en développement a surtout touché les pays producteurs de pétrole dont les ventes ont régressé de 22.4% de janvier en octobre 1982 par rapport à la même période de 1981 (cette chute a été de 8.3% pour toute l'année 1981). Les importations des pays industriels en provenance des pays en développement non pétroliers ont diminué seulement de 11% (moins 2.1% en 1981) en raison du fléchissement continu de l'indice des prix de gros des 30 principaux produits de base exportés par les pays dont les ventes à l'étranger sont surtout constituées de produits primaires. D'ailleurs, cet indice a baissé de 14.7% en 1981 et de 12.6% au cours des dix premiers mois de 1982.

Finalement, il faut noter.vu la corrélation établie dans les précédents articles entre l'évolution de la production industrielle des pays industrialisés et leurs achats dans les pays en développement.que l'indice global de la production industrielle dans les pays développés à économie de marché a fléchi d'environ 4% au cours des dix premiers mois de 1982, en comparaison à la même période de 1981 ; en 1980 cet indice avait baissé d'environ 0.5% et n'avait pratiquement pas varié en 1981.

* Article paru le 4 mars 1983.

COMMERCE ET DEVELOPPEMENT (4^{EME} PARTIE)

Un ralentissement accentué*

Selon les données publiées dans le numéro de juin 1983 des Statistiques Financières Internationales (éditées par le Fonds Monétaire International), la tendance de ralentissement du commerce mondial s'est accentuée en 1983, en particulier concernant les pays industrialisés, après des contractions marquées dans les années 1981 et 1982.

Pendant le premier trimestre 1983, les échanges entre les pays industrialisés ont, en termes courants, fléchi : les exportations ont baissé de 5.6% par rapport à la période correspondante de 1982 (1.4% par rapport au dernier trimestre de l'année passée), et les importations par 7.5% (0.5% en comparaison aux mois d'octobre-décembre 1982). En conséquence, le déficit de leur balance commerciale globale est tombé de 20.4 milliards à 13.3 milliards de dollars EU, donc une réduction d'environ 30%.

En ce qui concerne les pays en développement, les chiffres globaux pour 1982 seulement sont disponibles. Une contraction nette de leurs échanges reflète les effets graves de la récession mondiale et les faibles prix des produits de base obtenus par leur commerce d'exportation, et une réduction très marquée de leurs importations est évidente en réponse à un environnement économique en détérioration constante.

Les exportations des pays en développement non producteurs de pétrole avaient atteint 304 milliards de dollars EU en 1982, 5.9% de moins qu'en 1981, constituant la première baisse de leurs ventes à l'étranger depuis 1975.

Ce fléchissement était généralisé dans toutes les régions géographiques, mais il a été le plus marqué pour les pays africains. Dans le cas des pays exportateurs de pétrole, la chute a été beaucoup plus importante, de 21.4% par rapport à 1981 (au total 214.7 milliards de dollars), à l'exception de la République Islamique d'Iran. Cette tendance concernant les exportations des pays producteurs de pétrole s'est confirmée au premier trimestre 1983, avec une baisse de 28.4% en comparaison à la même période de 1982 (23.9% par rapport au dernier trimestre de l'année passée).

Pour la première fois depuis 1958, la valeur en dollars des importations des pays en développement non producteurs de pétrole devaient être considérablement réduite en 1982, moins 1.6% qu'en 1981 (379.2 milliards de dollars); la chute était la plus brutale pour les pays de l'hémisphère occidentale, moins de 24.4% en moyenne (moins de 44.5% pour le Chili et moins de 39.5% pour le Mexique, par exemple). Les importations des pays producteurs de pétrole ont, d'autre part, peu fléchi au cours de l'année 1982, représentant 152.4 milliards de dollars (moins 0.3%), en raison surtout de la contraction des importations du Nigéria (moins 30.8%).

En conclusion, les modifications ont induit des changements importants dans leur balance commerciale. Les déficits des pays non producteurs de pétrole était réduit de 105.5 milliards à 75.2 milliards de dollars, donc de 30% environ, tandis que le surplus des pays producteurs de pétrole s'est amenuisé de presque de 50%, de 120.5 milliards à 62.3 milliards de dollars par rapport à 1981.

* Article paru le 4 août 1983.

Reports

RAPPORT DU SECRETAIRE GENERAL DE LA FIESP

M. Victor Segesvary

pour la période écoulée

entre

le Congrès de Berlin tenu du 3 au 6 novembre 1959

et

le Congrès de Genève tenu du 21 au 24 avril 1961

Ma tâche aujourd'hui est de vous rendre compte de l'activité de notre Fédération depuis le Congrès Constitutif de Berlin, de broser un tableau des événements passés, d'exposer ses problèmes et surtout de tirer les conclusions d'une année et demie d'existence. Quel que soit l'angle par lequel nous approchons les énormes difficultés et les minces résultats du passé, nous nous trouvons tout de suite au coeur du problème et celui-ci se résume ainsi : la FIESP a-t-elle, oui ou non, une raison d'être ? Répond-elle à un besoin réel d'une coopération entre étudiants en Sciences Politiques ou a-t-elle été créée par cette fièvre contagieuse de notre époque qui produit d'un jour à l'autre d'innombrables organisations artificielles par la seule folie d'organiser quelque chose ?

La réponse, à mon sens, ne peut qu'être affirmative : Oui, la FIESP doit exister. Oui, elle répond à un besoin réel et, si elle n'avait pas été créée à Berlin, il faudrait la créer aujourd'hui à Genève.

Cette Fédération a une mission à remplir dans ce monde ; contribuer à la formation d'une élite internationale, capable de surmonter les problèmes contemporains qui nous divisent en assurant un horizon élargi aux jeunes universitaires.

Si j'exprime une certaine déception au début de mon rapport et pose le problème de l'existence de la FIESP, ce n'est nullement pour suggérer une solution toute faite, mais, plutôt, pour attirer votre attention sur l'importance des considérations qui suivent, des délibérations que vous aurez, et de ce Congrès de Genève lui-même.

Après être entré *in medias res* en définissant la perspective de nos discussions. Je vous propose de traiter les problèmes de la FIESP dans les trois chapitres suivants :

- A. Activité proprement dite du secrétariat ;
- B. Décompte sur l'exercice passé ;
- C. Conclusions et suggestions pour l'avenir.

A. ACTIVITES DU SECRETARIAT

entre le Congrès de Berlin et le Congrès de Genève

(a) *L'extension de la Fédération*

La première tâche qui s'imposait au Secrétariat était de faire connaître la FIESP aux différentes Ecoles, Facultés, Instituts, d'informer ces établissements non membres de la Fédération de nos buts et de nos efforts et de les inviter à s'affilier officiellement à celle-ci. Le Congrès de Berlin avait chargé le Secrétariat de cette mission d'information dans sa 4ème résolution. (Cf. documents de Berlin.)

Les expériences des mois passés ont prouvé que l'extension de la Fédération est notre devoir le plus important dans le proche avenir. La reconnaissance de la FIESP par les organisations internationales, particulièrement par l'UNESCO, l'obtention de subventions importantes de la part de ces organisations ou de fondations intéressées à notre activité n'est possible que si l'on convertit la FIESP en une organisation non seulement européenne mais étendue à tous les continents, donc en une entité véritablement internationale.

C'est dans cet esprit que j'avais écrit dans le programme composé l'année passée : « La FIESP ne veut et ne doit pas être limitée géographiquement, ni axée sur une civilisation particulière ou sur une position idéologique quelconque. C'est une Fédération 'Internationale' et le Secrétariat considère ce point comme le plus important dans la phase actuelle de l'existence de la Fédération ». Au sein du Secrétariat, six secrétaires s'occupaient de l'intégration des Ecoles de différents continents dans le cadre de la FIESP.

Pour réaliser ce but, j'ai pris de nombreux contacts et j'ai demandé l'aide de diverses organisations et personnalités compétentes. En premier lieu, je me suis adressé à nos aînés : l'Association Internationale des Sciences Politiques, et j'ai transmis au Secrétaire Général précédent, Monsieur John Goormaghtigh, tous nos documents en quantité nécessaire pour qu'il puisse les communiquer aux membres de son Association. Par cette action, l'Université de Jérusalem, ainsi que son Association des Etudiants en Sciences Politiques, a pris connaissance de l'existence de la FIESP et a demandé son affiliation à notre organisation. En outre, j'ai considéré qu'il était essentiel d'avoir au sein de la Fédération les nombreuses Ecoles des Etats-Unis qui sont spécialisées en sciences politiques ou en relations internationales ou dans les problèmes d'administration publique. Aussi, je me suis adressé au Secrétaire Général de l'Association Américaine des Sciences Politiques, Monsieur le Professeur Evron Kirckpatrick, en lui demandant de prendre les charges financières et administratives d'une action intense de propagande pour la FIESP aux Etats-Unis. Nous n'avons pas encore reçu de réponse favorable malgré l'information qu'on a donné sur la FIESP aux représentations diplomatiques américaines.

Les secrétaires régionaux ont composé l'année passée des listes des Ecoles de sciences politiques, où existe cet enseignement, en ayant recours aux publications de l'UNESCO et à diverses autres sources, par exemple, des annuaires, ainsi qu'à leurs connaissances personnelles. Jusqu'en septembre dernier le Secrétariat avait adressé une lettre (annexe N° A 1) à la majorité des écoles, au nombre de 215 (liste des écoles ; Annexe N° A 2) en les invitant à prendre contact avec la FIESP et, éventuellement, à s'affilier à celle-ci. Ces lettres étaient toujours accompagnées de nos documents de bases, c'est-à-dire les statuts et les résolutions du Congrès de Berlin, etc.

Nous devons constater avec étonnement et une certaine déception qu'il y a très peu d'écoles qui répondent. Ce phénomène n'est pas explicable par le fait que nous n'avions pas les moyens de lancer une grande campagne de propagande dans la presse internationale pour faire connaître la FIESP et pour acquérir ainsi une acceptation et une réputation sur le plan international. Seuls des facteurs déjà trop connus ont contribué à cet immobilisme ; l'inertie de certains dirigeants estudiantins, la désillusion générale sur la coopération internationale, et, surtout, la situation politique de notre monde bipolarisé qui rend les jeunes eux-mêmes méfiants envers toute nouvelle initiative.

Nous pouvons cependant enregistrer un certain succès : La London School of Economics, l'Institut de Sciences Politiques de Lisbonne, l'Université de Bruxelles ont montré leur intérêt pour nos efforts ; nous avons reçu de la documentation sur l'enseignement de sciences politiques de Lund, de Stockholm, de l'Université de Liège, du University College of North Staffordshire, du University College of Wales in Aberystwith, de l'Ecole de Sciences Politiques de Helsinki et le Political Research Science Association de l'Université de Saugar aux Indes qui ont tous signalé leur intention de s'affilier à la FIESP.

Il n'y a que deux demandes concrètes qui nous soient parvenues pour l'affiliation à notre Fédération : celle de la Faculté de Sciences Politiques de l'Université Centrale de Madrid et celle du Comité FIESP d'Israel qui représente les Universités de Jérusalem et de Tel-Aviv.

Dans l'exécution de sa tâche d'extension de l'organisation, le Secrétariat essaya d'intéresser et d'associer les membres de la FIESP. Je cite ma deuxième lettre circulaire, datée du 29 juin 1960s :

« Le Secrétaire Général propose donc aux associations membres : que les membres fassent de la propagande dans leur pays auprès de leurs collègues d'autres Facultés., Instituts ou Ecoles pour qu'ils s'affilient à notre Fédération. Chaque membre pourrait prendre en charge 2 ou 5 écoles de leur pays, les visiter et les convaincre de l'utilité et même de la nécessité de leur participation à la vie commune des étudiants en sciences politiques ».

Une collaboration nous paraît d'autant plus importante que, en accord avec la Section Permanente, nous considérons qu'il faut tout d'abord inviter les Ecoles européennes à se joindre à nous. L'aide effective des associations membres pourrait rendre possible l'extension de notre Fédération sur le plan européen. Hélas, aucune réponse, aucune réaction ne nous est parvenue sur cette proposition. Sur ce point, je me permettrais de vous faire une suggestion concrète dans la troisième partie de mon exposé.

Il y a également deux éléments de caractère objectif qui ont rendu difficile notre travail.

Tout d'abord : l'état actuel et l'appréciation générale de notre domaine spécialisé, les sciences politiques. Il n'existe pas encore de définition universellement acceptée de cette discipline — en réalité une telle définition n'est guère concevable du fait du caractère synthétique de notre science lui-même — les branches qui en font partie sont très controversées et ses méthodes sont encore en état de gestation. Aussi, un problème pratique se pose : quels sont les Ecoles, Facultés ou Instituts qui doivent être invités à faire partie de la FIESP ? Seules les institutions de sciences politiques proprement dites et les instituts spécialisés, ou également d'autres écoles qui donnent un enseignement beaucoup plus large ou limité, respectivement, comme les Ecoles de sciences sociales, les Facultés dans les territoires anglo-saxons qui portent le nom de *Government*, *Civics*, etc. ? Une des premières tâches de notre Congrès est donc de donner des critères généraux qui puissent servir d'instructions précises au Secrétariat futur.

Le deuxième obstacle objectif qu'il faut mentionner dans ce contexte est le refrain permanent, le thème éternel : l'insuffisance de nos moyens financiers. L'oeuvre de propagande, d'information, les efforts pour prendre contact avec tous les intéressés, tout cela exige des dépenses considérables que le Secrétariat n'était pas en mesure d'effectuer pendant la période écoulée.

(b) *Problèmes des bourses, échanges d'étudiants, stages*

Dans sa 2^{ème} résolution, le Comité des directives du Congrès de Berlin chargea le Secrétariat, afin de trouver une solution au problème des bourses, de chercher un débouché aux étudiants titulaires d'un diplôme ; la 3^{ème} résolution traita des devoirs de l'organe exécutif de la Fédération quant aux échanges d'étudiants et, dans une motion voté par le Comité, mais non par l'Assemblée plénière, il fut proposé de nous occuper aussi des stages en contact direct avec l'AIESSEC.

Prenant point par point ces différents problèmes, je parlerai tout d'abord de celui des bourses :

Le Secrétariat avait rassemblé quelques publications relevant les possibilités de bourses offertes aux étudiants — et ceci au sens de la 2^{ème} résolution. Il concevait sa tâche comme organe de coordination entre les instances qui délivrent les bourses et les associations d'étudiants, en tant que représentants du corps estudiantin. Nous avons pensé prendre contact avec ces différentes instances (gouvernements, universités, fondations, etc.) en leur demandant de mettre à la disposition de la FIESP quelques bourses destinées aux étudiants en sciences politiques, ou aux étudiants en général, venant d'autres pays. Notre organisation se serait chargée ensuite du recrutement des candidats capables qui rempliraient les conditions exigées, tout cela, bien entendu, sur une base de mutualité en donnant la préférence aux étudiants appartenant à un pays « créditeur », c'est-à-dire qui aurait déjà accordé des bourses ou des facilités d'études.

Ces projets ne peuvent être réalisés sans une collaboration étroite avec nos membres. Dans les lettres circulaires, nous avons demandé aux membres de communiquer au Secrétariat les noms et adresses des organes et personnalités compétents pour l'octroi de bourses dans leurs pays respectifs et l'informer des possibilités d'exercer une pression sur ceux-ci. Il n'y a que l'Association de Berlin qui ait répondu à cette demande du Secrétariat, en nous référant à l'*Auslanddienst* du central universitaire. Mais même cette réponse, fort louable en elle-même car elle signale l'intérêt de nos amis berlinois, ne pouvait cependant nous aider. Il faut que les Associations servent elles-mêmes d'intermédiaire entre les organes compétents de leur pays et le Secrétariat de la FIESP. Nous ne sommes pas encore assez connus dans les milieux officiels pour que la réussite de nos démarches soit assurée sans l'appui des représentants estudiantins sur place. De même, nos demandes adressées à diverses fondations ont été repoussées, les gens ne nous connaissant pas suffisamment.

Malgré l'insuffisance des résultats actuels, il ne faut pourtant pas tirer de conclusions hâtives en considérant comme impossible le rôle coordonnateur de la FIESP. Une collaboration efficace entre les associations membres et l'organe central produira certainement des résultats décisifs.

Quant aux débouchés, nous avons considéré dès le début de l'activité du Secrétariat que de la part d'une Fédération à peine créée et se trouvant encore dans un état fragile, des initiatives auprès des Gouvernements, des Universités et des autres institutions académiques pour placer les étudiants de nos associations, seraient prématurée. Le Secrétariat n'avait pas non plus les moyens administratifs et financiers de répondre aux exigences d'une telle action.

La 3^{ème} résolution acceptée à Berlin chargea le Secrétariat — comme je l'ai déjà dit — de développer les échanges d'étudiants. Cette résolution prévoit six possibilités de ces échanges :

1. Echanges de quelques jours pour visiter une ville et prendre contact ;
2. Séminaires de certains professeurs réputés, organisés par les Instituts ;
3. Problème du 3ème cycle ;
4. Problème des thèses de doctorat ;
5. Echanges de professeurs à promouvoir ;
6. Echanges de longue durée (un à plusieurs semestres).

Le rôle du Secrétariat a été défini de la manière suivante :

- (i) Coordination des possibilités de l'échange, et
- (ii) Centralisation et transmission des demandes et offres.

En accord avec cette résolution, j'ai prié les associations membres de la FIESP au mois de janvier 1960, de me dire quelles étaient leurs disponibilités (logement, entretien, argent de poche, etc.) en vue d'échanges d'étudiants et quelles étaient leurs intentions pour l'année 1960. Dans la lettre circulaire de l'été passé, j'ai insisté de nouveau auprès d'eux afin qu'ils me fournissent des informations et des renseignements sur leurs possibilités.

Jusqu'à présent le Secrétariat n'a reçu aucune réponse, aucune offre, ni aucune demande, c'est-à-dire qu'il lui était impossible de remplir la tâche que lui avait été fixée par le Congrès de Berlin. Certes, il y avait des échanges entre membres de la FIESP et, également, entre membres de notre organisation et des associations, des écoles ou instituts qui ne font pas encore partie de notre Fédération. Il faut donc poser certaines questions, sans vouloir reprocher quoi que ce soit, mais pourtant avec insistance : Ne serait-il pas possible de placer ces échanges sur une base beaucoup plus large ? Ne serait-ce pas le devoir des grandes associations de faire profiter les plus faibles de leurs possibilités plus importantes ? Les membres fondateurs de la FIESP ne sentent-ils pas l'obligation de soutenir notre jeune Fédération en passant leurs échanges par son organe central et, par là, la faire connaître à des Ecoles qui sont encore en dehors d'elle ?

En ce qui concerne le problème des stages, le Congrès devrait prendre en considération la situation entièrement différente de la FIESP de celle de l'AIESSEC. Qu'est-ce qu'un stage de sciences politiques ?

Une expérience pratique dans les services gouvernementaux, dans l'administration locale, dans les Instituts et les Centres de recherches et, si l'on est particulièrement spécialisé en économie, dans l'industrie et les banques.

Les différentes instances susmentionnées ne sont pas habituées à une telle pratique qui jusqu'ici n'existait pas. Il faut d'abord les convaincre de sa nécessité, les amener ensuite à nous offrir des possibilités de stage. En outre, il paraît presque impossible d'obtenir des stages dans les services gouvernementaux, et même dans les administrations locales, pour des étrangers. Ainsi, l'organisation des stages se présente plutôt comme l'affaire des associations locales ou des fédérations nationales des étudiants en sciences politiques. Pour ceux qui sont plus spécialement orientés vers l'économie, ils peuvent se joindre aux activités de l'AIESSEC.

Suivant l'instruction du Comité des directives, je me suis rendu au Congrès de l'AIESSEC de Barcelone en 1960, où j'ai vu dès le début qu'il était impossible de réaliser une collaboration entre nos deux organisations. Le Congrès de l'AIESSEC est le lieu d'échange des stages acquis par les différents comités locaux et nationaux. Aussi le Secrétariat de la FIESP ne pouvait-il pas négocier sur une base équitable. Une collaboration éventuelle entre les deux organisations ne peut se réaliser que sur le plan local.

S'il y avait une possibilité dans l'avenir pour le Secrétariat de la FIESP d'organiser des stages, ce sera par les organisations internationales qui sont encore réticentes, mais qui seront peut être plus compréhensives à l'avenir.

(c) L'équivalence des diplômes

Le Secrétariat a été chargé de rassembler une documentation sur le problème de l'équivalence des diplômes.

Le Comité a trouvé cette question si importante que sa résolution dit explicitement : « Le problème de l'équivalence des diplômes devra être traité en priorité au prochain Congrès ».

Nous avons rassemblé la documentation, particulièrement les accords déjà conclus par les membres du Conseil de l'Europe. Le responsable de ce domaine au sein du Secrétariat connaissait à fond ce problème et a eu de longues discussions avec les personnes compétentes de différentes organisations internationales. Mais, il a rencontré les mêmes difficultés que je vous ai indiquées concernant les autres points ; désintérêt, manque de collaboration des associations membres. Malgré nos demandes réitérées, un tiers seulement des membres nous a communiqué son plan d'études qui devaient servir de base de comparaison. Par conséquent, nous ne pouvions pas composer une documentation complète sur les Ecoles membres et ainsi donner suite à la première résolution du Congrès de Berlin.

Pourtant, c'est l'aspect de l'activité de la FIESP qui semblait le plus important aux yeux des autorités internationales. Les réactions des départements et des fonctionnaires intéressés de l'UNESCO et de l'Association Internationale des Universités, étaient des plus favorables. On avait constaté que nous étions la première organisation qui s'efforce de résoudre le problème intraitable de l'équivalence des diplômes dans un domaine spécialisé, toutes les autres initiatives s'attaquant seulement au problème du point de vue générale. Les deux organisations susmentionnées ne nous ont pas seulement encouragés, mais elles nous ont promis un soutien actif et concret.

Le premier pas à faire — c'est un conseil très précieux de Mr. Welling du Département des Universités de l'UNESCO — c'est de mener une enquête interne auprès des étudiants qui ont reçu une équivalence ou qui l'ont demandée et à qui on l'a refusée, au sujet de leurs expériences, de leurs difficultés, de leurs suggestions. Ces « témoignages » doivent être personnels, signés par les étudiants qui les ont faits en mentionnant les universités ou les lieux d'études précis afin que nous puissions présenter un document authentique et de valeur sûre aux organes compétents. Ce document démontrera la nécessité, le besoin urgent de la résolution du problème de l'équivalence des diplômes aux autorités universitaires et nationales qui sont encore extrêmement réticentes. L'UNESCO serait d'accord pour publier ce volume sous l'égide de la FIESP. De même, elle serait disposée à publier un document qui présenterait les systèmes d'enseignement des sciences politiques dans les différentes régions du monde. Ces travaux préparatoires ayant été faits, nous pourrions prendre contact avec

nos aînés, l'Association Internationale des Sciences Politiques, et présenter avec eux des propositions concrètes à des autorités nationales par l'intermédiaire des organisations internationales ou européennes. A ce moment là, les associations membres de la FIESP pourront exercer une pression sur les autorités de leurs pays respectifs afin d'obtenir leur accord à ces propositions.

(d) *Recueil des thèses en Sciences Politiques*

La 3^{ème} résolution du Congrès de Berlin mentionne le problème des thèses en science politique au niveau du doctorat.

Le Secrétariat ne tarda pas à s'attaquer à ce problème. L'un de mes collaborateurs qui s'est dévoué à la cause de la FIESP, non seulement comme membre du Secrétariat, mais également en tant qu'un des organisateurs du Congrès, Monsieur Francis Wagon, commença aussitôt les travaux préparatoires de cette entreprise de longue haleine.

Le travail des candidats au doctorat ès sciences politiques pourrait être simplifié dans une très importante mesure s'il nous était possible de publier un recueil des thèses, non seulement celles qui ont déjà paru, mais aussi tous les travaux en cours enregistrés aux Universités et aux Instituts. Les premiers sondages ont été faits, quelques vingtaines de lettres sont parties. Mais là aussi nous avons été arrêtés dans nos efforts par les difficultés financières considérables. Lors de la discussion en commission Mr. Wagon se tiendra à votre disposition pour vous donner de plus amples informations sur les perspectives et les modalités techniques de ce travail. Moi-même, je me bornerai ici à vous indiquer la possibilité offerte par l'UNESCO concernant cet effort. Le Département des Sciences Sociales est prêt à financer un projet concret de recueil à concurrence de 1'000 dollars, à la condition que la personne chargée de la direction de ce travail puisse justifier d'une certaine qualification. L'UNESCO est également d'accord de publier dans la série officielle, en un volume double, sous le nom de notre Fédération, ce travail. J'ai reçu des assurances les plus explicites à ce sujet, mais jusqu'ici nous n'avons pas eu l'argent nécessaire à constituer un dossier avec un projet concret qui nous était demandé.

(e) *Le Bulletin et la propagande en faveur de la FIESP*

La 5^{ème} motion du Comité des directives proposa au Secrétariat de publier un Bulletin afin de renforcer les liaisons entre les membres de la FIESP. Ce Bulletin n'est pas paru depuis Berlin. Pourquoi ? Même refrain ; crise financière, non collaboration des associations membres. Un financement par le budget déjà insuffisant était impossible. Couvrir les frais par la publicité aurait été une solution. Mais la FIESP n'est pas assez connue du public pour lui permettre d'acquérir un nombre suffisant d'annonces. De plus, le Secrétariat n'a pas reçu l'autorisation du Congrès de recourir à ce moyen. La Section Permanente s'est montrée, elle aussi, très réticente quand j'ai parlé de cette éventualité lors de sa réunion du juillet 1960. D'autre part, le Secrétariat — conformément à la résolution susmentionnée — a fait ronéotyper en quantité suffisante la documentation concernant le Congrès Constitutif et l'a fait parvenir aux associations membres. Il espérait obtenir des membres, des nouvelles, des récits d'échanges d'étudiants — par exemple ceux qui ont eu lieu entre Paris et Varsovie, Florence et Wrocław, etc. — des comptes rendus des Congrès comme celui de Toulouse qui rassemblait les étudiants en sciences politiques de France, ou de séminaires, afin de remplir les pages du premier bulletin. Mais, malgré mon insistance, rien ne nous est parvenu.

Il nous appartenait également (motion N° 6 de Berlin) de faire une propagande en faveur de la FIESP, de la faire connaître en tant qu'organisation internationale des étudiants en sciences politiques. Le Secrétariat était aussi chargé de faire reconnaître l'importance de la FIESP par les autorités des autres Facultés et des autres Universités. Je dois avouer que ces exigences dépassent les possibilités d'une jeune Fédération et de son Secrétariat. Particulièrement quand cette Fédération et ses organes exécutifs se trouvent dans une crise financière aiguë et permanente, qu'ils n'ont pas les moyens d'organiser une conférence de presse pour les

représentants de la presse internationale siégeant dans la même ville que le Secrétariat. C'est pourquoi, le Secrétariat s'est adressé aux membres de la Fédération en leur demandant de lancer une campagne de propagande dans leurs pays respectifs. Des actions sur le plan national pourraient seules nous faire sortir de l'impasse. Or, nous n'avons jamais reçu de tels articles ou de tels textes radiodiffusés.

En vue de la propagande, le Secrétariat a reproduit en français, anglais, allemand et espagnol la documentation complète du Congrès Constitutif., estimant qu'il faciliterait les prises de contacts si les statuts, les résolutions, les procès-verbaux, etc. étaient mis entre les mains des étudiants dans leur propre langue ou dans la langue la plus répandue dans leur région ou dans leur continent. En outre, nous avons fait traduire les statuts de la FIESP en russe et en chinois pour simplifier nos discussions avec les pays de l'Est.

(f) *Contacts internationaux et reconnaissance de la FIESP*

Pour une Fédération Internationale à peine créée comme la nôtre, il est très important de prendre des contacts personnels par ses représentants avec des fonctionnaires des organisations internationales et des autorités nationales, et d'être présente aux différents Congrès et Conférences. En effet, sa reconnaissance sur le plan international est fonction de ces contacts et participations. Nos difficultés financières ne nous ont pas permis de satisfaire ces exigences. Nous avons été obligés de renoncer à un grand nombre d'invitation, le temps nous manquant également maintes fois, du fait de nos obligations en tant qu'étudiants.

Cependant, certains contacts que nous avons pris ont permis de faire connaître la FIESP dans les milieux internationaux. Personnellement, j'ai rendu visite plusieurs fois aux différents départements et fonctionnaires de l'UNESCO à Paris, au Secrétaire Général de l'Union Internationale des Organisations Internationales à Bruxelles, au Directeur Adjoint de l'Office Européen des Nations Unies et aux organisations des étudiants ou de la jeunesse de Genève. La FIESP a été mise sur la liste des organisations non gouvernementales avec lesquelles l'UNESCO maintient des relations, mais on m'a exprimé clairement qu'il n'y a pas de possibilité d'obtenir le statut consultatif Cat.E. auprès de cette organisation tant que la FIESP n'est pas une fédération véritablement internationale, embrassant tous les continents, et tant qu'elle n'aura pas prouvé son efficacité par des résultats concrets. Avoir le statut consultatif signifie la reconnaissance sur le plan international et aussi le droit à des subventions. Mais sans subventions, pas de réalisations concrètes, nous sommes donc en plein cercle vicieux. Pour l'instant, il nous faut renoncer à un soutien financier de l'UNESCO, exception faite des projets de publications déjà mentionnés.

Au mois de mars de l'an dernier, j'ai participé au Congrès de l'AIESSEC à Barcelone et à Madrid. Ce fut une occasion très fructueuse du point de vue des contacts ; c'est là que j'ai rencontré pour la première fois des étudiants en sciences politiques d'Israël pendant et, après le Congrès, j'ai pu rencontrer les étudiants madrilènes — ce sont deux candidats à l'affiliation à la FIESP. J'ai eu l'occasion à Madrid de parler non seulement à un comité restreint, mais à toute une assemblée d'étudiants. Il a été convenu que la Faculté de Sciences Politiques de Madrid organiserait un séminaire pour la FIESP sur les problèmes du syndicalisme. Par la suite, des divergences de vue se sont manifestées entre les organisateurs et nous-mêmes. Aussi les Journées Internationales d'Etudes Syndicales de Madrid qui ont eu lieu au début de décembre 1960 ont été organisées sous les seuls auspices de la Faculté madrilène.

A la Table Ronde organisée par l'Union Nationale des Etudiants Suisses où notre Fédération fut la seule organisation de Faculté invitée, notre représentant était Mr. Adalbert Korff, membre de la Section Permanente. C'est également lui qui a participé, au nom de la Fédération, au Congrès annuel du COSEC à Klosters. Son rapport est dans nos archives, témoignant de la propagande très efficace qu'il a faite en faveur de la FIESP parmi les participants de ces deux réunions internationales. Il vous donnera d'ailleurs ses observations dans le rapport de la Section Permanente.

B. RAPPORT FINANCIER

Le Congrès de Berlin a voté un budget de Frs 1'850.- pour l'exercice suivant, selon le barème fixé dans nos statuts (l'article 33) comme suit :

jusqu'à 250 étudiants	50. - Frs
jusqu'à 500 étudiants	100. - Frs
jusqu'à 1'500 étudiants	150. - Frs
plus de 1'500 étudiants	200. - Frs

(ou une somme équivalente dans une autre monnaie)

Le barème est donc fixé selon le nombre d'étudiants qui font partie d'une Ecole membre de la FIESP ; c'est également la base de la répartition des voix au Congrès. J'ai souligné expressément ce rapport étroit entre les nombres de voix et la cotisation payée à propos d'un cas précis.

Sur ce mince budget de Frs 1'850.-, il a été versé, au 20 avril 1961, la somme de Frs 1'401.50, comme vous pouvez le voir sur le décompte ci-joint. Ainsi, les associations membres doivent encore Frs 454.13 au Secrétariat, l'organe exécutif de la Fédération.

Ce solde en faveur du Secrétariat se décompose de la manière suivante :

Les associations de Bordeaux et de Toulouse n'ont rien payé encore de leur cotisation	250. -- Frs
Paris doit encore sur 200.- Frs	112.82 Frs
Strasbourg doit encore sur 50.- Frs	42.31 Frs
Florence doit encore sur 150.- Frs	150. -- Frs
TOTAL	454.13 Frs

Florence justifia son attitude en disant qu'au moment du Congrès de Berlin il y avait plus de 500 étudiants inscrits à la Faculté — par conséquent il leur a été accordé 5 votes — mais ce chiffre ayant diminué au cours de l'année 1960 et étant descendu au-dessous de la limite, ils ne doivent payer pour cette année que selon la 2^{ème} catégorie du barème.

Cette procédure me semble assez fâcheuse. Au Congrès de Berlin on s'était mis d'accord pour prendre comme base de vote les barèmes annoncés et également pris comme base de cotisation. Les délégués avaient même pris l'engagement de fournir au Secrétariat l'attestation officielle de leur école sur le nombre exact des étudiants inscrits. La Section Permanente discuta de cette affaire au cours de sa réunion de juillet dernier et prit — son membre florentin s'est naturellement abstenu — une résolution par laquelle elle rappelle l'Association de Florence à son obligation en exigeant le paiement immédiat des Frs 50.-. J'ai transmis tout de suite cette prise de position de la Section Permanente à Florence, mais n'ai jamais reçu de réponse. A propos de cet incident, je demande avec insistance au Congrès de prendre des mesures, afin que de tels cas ne puissent se reproduire. Dans l'avenir

Je demande donc aux membres de prendre un engagement formel qu'ils reprendront comme base de leurs cotisations le barème selon lequel ils ont voté à ce Congrès.

Le Secrétariat a ainsi reçu la somme de Frs 1'401.50 comme cotisations versées par les associations membres de la Fédération. Déjà à première vue on s'aperçoit que cette somme est nettement insuffisante pour faire fonctionner le Secrétariat d'une Fédération Internationale, surtout si l'on considère que la plupart des cotisations sont arrivées durant les derniers mois avant ce Congrès.

C'est pourquoi nous avons cherché désespérément une aide financière supplémentaire auprès des autorités suisses, universitaires, internationales ainsi qu'auprès des Fondations.

Une délégation du Secrétariat de la FIESP s'est présentée au Département Politique Fédéral en sollicitant une subvention de la Confédération Suisse. L'organe compétent étant le Département de l'Intérieur, nous avons eu durant toute l'année des contacts fréquents avec ce dernier, et j'ai même été reçu en audience par le Conseiller Fédéral Tschudi pour lui demander son appui. Finalement, la Confédération décida de ne pas accorder une subvention à la FIESP, car ce geste pouvait créer un précédent et donner lieu à un afflux de requêtes de diverses organisations internationales siégeant à Genève ou en Suisse. Mais le Conseil Fédéral était d'accord de nous venir en aide dans un cas précis et qui intéressait plus particulièrement la Suisse. A la suite des conversations et des échanges de lettres que nous avons eus, la Confédération a décidé de contribuer pour une somme de Frs 4'000.- au budget de notre Congrès. Il m'appartient donc ici d'exprimer nos remerciements les plus chaleureux au Conseiller Fédéral Tschudi et à ses collaborateurs pour leur compréhension et leur bienveillance.

Nous nous sommes évidemment adressés en tout premier lieu aux autorités cantonales genevoises et aux autorités universitaires locales. Nous avons reçu tout l'appui de Monsieur le Conseiller d'Etat Alfred Borel, Président du Département de l'Instruction Publique, qui a compris nos difficultés et qui est venu autant que possible à notre aide. Le Canton de Genève nous a assuré un local, 5 avenue de Champel, pour héberger le Secrétariat et a équipé notre bureau avec tous les meubles nécessaires. La subvention financière ne nous a pas été accordée pour les mêmes raisons que nous avait données le Département Fédéral, mais nous avons obtenue une contribution de Frs 8'000.- pour le Congrès. Je tiens à exprimer à Monsieur le Conseiller d'Etat Alfred Borel et au Conseil d'Etat Genevois notre reconnaissance la plus sincère pour leur geste généreux envers notre Fédération.

L'Institut de Hautes Etudes Internationales, notre Ecole, contribua, contrairement aux instances susmentionnées, aux dépenses générales de Secrétariat, en lui accordant la somme de Frs 500.- et il héberge notre bureau depuis deux mois. Monsieur le Directeur Jacques Freymond a toujours été à nos côtés dans tous les moments critiques, nous encourageant et nous prodiguant de précieux conseils.

L'Université de Genève nous accorda, elle aussi, une somme de Frs 300.- pour l'installation du Secrétariat.

En outre, nous avons reçu un don de Frs 500.- d'une personnalité genevoise et un autre de Frs 200.- du Professeur Grottian de Berlin. Le Secrétariat les a vivement remerciés de leur geste généreux.

Enfin, une Fondation américaine dont j'ai moi-même obtenu pendant 3 ans et demi une bourse, nous a accordé, après mes nombreux appels désespérés, une subvention de 4'955.45 Francs suisses (1'150 dollars EU) qui a résolu nos problèmes immédiats et nous a permis de payer nos dettes qui, à la fin de l'année passée, étaient de l'ordre de Frs 2'000. —. L'expression de notre reconnaissance a été transmise au Directeur du Bureau Européen de la Fondation.

Avec la mention de cet appui inattendu, mais d'autant mieux venu, je suis arrivé à la fin de l'énumération de nos recettes.

Les recettes sont donc selon le décompte final : Frs 7'975.46.

Quant aux dépenses, elles se décomposent de la manière suivante :

Titre I	Frais extraordinaires de lancement de la FIESP, c'est-à-dire l'établissement de la documentation de base (traduction, travaux de dactylo, ronéo)	1'125.35 Frs
Titre II	Dépenses d'administration et de Secrétariat y compris l'achat des articles de bureau, les frais d'imprimerie des papiers à entête, des travaux ronéotypés, des envois postaux et des téléphones, la rémunération des secrétaires, l'acquisition de quelques manuels nécessaires et les frais de transport	3'406.80 Frs
Titre III	Frais des réunions de la Section Permanente avec la préparation des procès-verbaux de la réunion de juillet dernier en un volume de 110 pages	1'932.71 Frs
Titre IV	Voyages (représentations au Congrès, prises de contact nécessaires)	1'219.60 Frs
Titre V	Participation des membres des organes de la FIESP au Congrès de la FIESP de Genève	265. -- Frs
TOTAL		7'975.46 Frs

Le solde est donc de **304.99 Frs.**

C. CONCLUSIONS ET SUGGESTIONS

Tout mon rapport démontre que les facteurs fondamentaux de la crise actuelle de la Fédération — facteurs que j'ai appelés les thèmes éternels de cet exposé — sont l'insuffisance de nos moyens financiers et l'absence de collaboration des associations membres avec les organes centraux, plus spécialement le Secrétariat. Ces deux facteurs se chevauchent et l'un conditionne l'autre.

Le manque chronique d'argent vient tout d'abord de l'insuffisance du budget. Les gens de l'extérieur, représentants des autorités et des fondations auprès desquelles nous sollicitons une subvention, s'étonnent que les associations membres ne fassent pas un plus grand effort. Il leur paraît impensable de vouloir organiser une fédération sans assumer les charges qui s'imposent. Il est naturel qu'une organisation d'étudiants soit subventionnée, mais il est normal de demander un effort de la part des jeunes qui en profiteront. C'est pourquoi, je me demande si le Congrès ne devrait pas reconsidérer les cotisations fixées dans son statut.

D'autre part, il faut voir clairement que pour nous, étudiants en sciences politiques, il est extrêmement difficile de trouver des institutions qui s'intéressent à nous et à nos problèmes, au perfectionnement de notre formation, car notre science est jeune, mal connue, peu appréciée, les gens ne voient pas toujours l'utilité d'études faites en ce domaine. Les éventuels donateurs cherchent un profit plus immédiat, un investissement plus rentable à court terme que la formation d'une élite internationale chargée plus tard de trouver des solutions aux problèmes de la vie publique. Un étudiant de la pratique commerciale ou bancaire présente un intérêt beaucoup plus tangible pour les milieux industriels qu'un jeune homme qui s'occupe de l'interdépendance des aspects divers de la société. Alors que les étudiants en économie ou en génie civil peuvent s'adresser à une industrie, aux banques, aux compagnies aériennes ou aux diverses entreprises de transport, les candidats à la médecine aux cliniques, aux instituts ou à d'autres institutions, il ne nous reste à nous que les gouvernements, seuls organes compétents. Toutefois, accepter une subvention gouvernementale peut être un engagement politique qu'il nous faut éviter à tout prix. Je crois que la formule la plus heureuse serait de solliciter une subvention des pays où nous avons des associations membres. La Section Permanente a déjà pris une résolution dans ce sens l'été dernier et la présentera au Congrès actuel. Je ne peux que le soutenir en espérant la coopération très effective des associations membres dans ces efforts.

Pour le bon fonctionnement de la Fédération et pour la collaboration plus étroite des associations membres avec les organes centraux, je propose une série de changements structurels. Ces changements signifient la révision des statuts, mais cela ne doit pas nous effrayer. En effet, les statuts actuels ne sont pas satisfaisants et leur révision est tout à fait justifiée à la lumière des expériences passées.

Je propose donc :

(a) D'établir un Secrétariat permanent sous la direction d'un Secrétaire Général élu par le Congrès et avec une secrétaire payée ;

(b) De transformer la structure actuelle de l'organisation en élisant un Bureau exécutif à la place de la Section Permanente dont fera partie le Secrétaire Général. Ce bureau se composera comme suit :

Président

Deux Vice-présidents

Secrétaire Général

Rédacteur du Bulletin et des autres publications

Naturellement tous de différentes nationalités.

(c) D'établir, comme organes de coordination et d'administration, des secrétariats nationaux dans tous les pays où la FIESP a plus de 5 membres.

(d) De distribuer les tâches, en chargeant, par exemple, de la rédaction du Bulletin l'association membre qui délègue le 5ème membre du Bureau Exécutif.

Commentant le premier point, j'aimerais vous convaincre qu'il est impossible d'administrer une organisation internationale sans un centre permanent. La solution de nos statuts actuels — changement du Secrétariat chaque année — n'est pas viable. L'adresse de ce Secrétariat est envoyée partout, il est particulièrement incommode de la changer chaque année.

Le Secrétariat serait indépendant, créé par le Congrès, contrairement aux statuts actuels selon lesquels une Ecole — association membre — en est chargée. Il sera dirigé par le Secrétaire Général, poste qui restera honorifique. Cependant, il est absolument nécessaire de trouver les fonds pour s'engager une secrétaire payée qui fera les travaux de dactylo et de l'administration indispensables. Il est impossible de faire un travail correct et surtout continu avec des auxiliaires pleins de bonne volonté et d'enthousiasme, mais qui évidemment ne peuvent pas consacrer tout leur temps à ces tâches.

L'établissement de secrétaires nationaux est indispensable du point de vue administratif. Il est impossible au Secrétariat d'avoir un contact immédiat avec tous les membres, son appareil administratif étant insuffisant. Nous espérons dans l'avenir d'obtenir l'adhésion de grands Etats comme les Etats-Unis, l'Inde où il y a des dizaines d'écoles de sciences politiques. Ces secrétariats nationaux n'auraient pas de caractère représentatif. Le principe fondamental de notre Fédération reste, à savoir, que la base sont les associations des écoles membres et non des associations nationales. Le secrétariat national ne fera que centraliser les activités sur le plan national, maintenir le contact avec le Secrétariat international en lui transmettant les demandes et les directives des écoles membres et en communiquant les décisions du Bureau Exécutif à ces mêmes écoles.

La distribution des tâches spécifiques comme, par exemple, la publication du Bulletin, est une pratique courante dans les organisations internationales estudiantines. Nos amis qui sont présents ici comme observateurs peuvent en témoigner.

Je voudrais terminer ce rapport en renouvelant, au nom de la Fédération et en mon nom personnel, toute notre reconnaissance pour l'appui moral et financier qui nous a été accordé avec tant de compréhension et de générosité.

Je remercie particulièrement Messieurs Borel et Freymond pour les encouragements qu'ils nous ont toujours prodigués et grâce auxquels nous avons persévéré dans notre action malgré les problèmes souvent épineux que nous avons à résoudre.

Je n'oublie pas, enfin, mes collaborateurs et collaboratrices, toujours bénévoles qui n'ont jamais épargné leurs efforts et que j'ai toujours trouvés à mes côtés, chaque fois que j'ai fait appel à leur assistance.

Je demande maintenant que le Congrès veuille bien accorder au Secrétariat son quitus pour l'exercice passé qui va du Congrès de Berlin, 6 novembre 1959, à l'actuel Congrès de Genève, 21 avril 1961.

Je souhaite enfin, une longue vie à la FIESP, qu'elle atteigne bientôt tous les buts qu'elle s'est fixés pour notre bien à tous et en vue de participer à l'établissement d'une paix prompte et durable paix dans le monde.

Annexe N° A 1

Le 2 février 1960

Chers Amis,

Cette lettre sert pour vous communiquer la création de la Fédération Internationale des Etudiants en Sciences Politiques au Congrès Constitutif qui a eu lieu à Berlin, du 3 jusqu'au 6 novembre 1959.

En ce domaine, une coopération étroite et générale entre étudiants se faisait sentir d'une façon impérative. Aussi, la FIESP s'est-elle donné principalement les buts suivants (mentionnés d'ailleurs dans les statuts ci-joints) :

- Echange des informations ;
- Efforts mutuels pour l'équivalence des diplômes ;
- Défense des intérêts communs.

Ceci sans perdre de vue que le but fondamental et la raison d'être de notre Fédération est de favoriser les contacts entre les élites de formation politique des différents pays, contribuant ainsi à l'élaboration d'une élite internationale. Je suis convaincu que dans notre monde en devenir le rapprochement des jeunes intellectuels a autant d'importance qu'une conférence au sommet des chefs d'Etats. Leurs échanges de vue peuvent assurer dans l'avenir une compréhension mutuelle plus grande qu'à l'heure actuelle et des efforts plus concertés visant à la solution des problèmes contemporains. La collaboration étroite dans le cadre de la FIESP signifie que nous ne nous déroberons pas devant nos responsabilités et que nous les assumerons en toute conscience.

Chers Amis, prenez en considération tous ces arguments, et — ayant lu les documents de base ci-joints pour votre information — d'adhérer à la FIESP.

En cas d'une réponse affirmative, je serais heureux d'avoir une demande d'adhésion formelle de votre part, en nous envoyant sous le même pli votre plan d'études et une note détaillée sur l'enseignement des Sciences Politiques dans votre Ecole, Institut ou Faculté. Nous désirerions aussi avoir quelques renseignements concernant la vie et l'activité de votre Association.

Le Secrétariat, en tant qu'organe exécutif, n'a pas le droit d'admettre des affiliations à la FIESP; ainsi, votre demande sera soumise à la Section Permanente, et — après l'approbation de celle-ci — au Congrès annuel qui peut seul décider de l'admission des nouveaux membres. Bien entendu la Fédération compte sur la participation de vos délégués au prochain Congrès qui se tiendra à Genève en automne 1960 et jusque là nous vous tiendrons au courant de nos activités et sollicitons votre collaboration.

Parmi les documents ci-joints, vous trouverez la liste contenant les noms des membres du secrétariat chargés d'établir et de maintenir les contacts avec les différentes régions du monde.

En espérant une collaboration fructueuse avec votre institution, je vous adresse, chers Amis, mes salutations les plus cordiales.

Victor Segesvary
Secrétaire général

LISTE DES ECOLES, FACULTES OU INSTITUTS

informés de la création de la FIESP, priés de collaborer avec, et, éventuellement, s'affilier à celle-ci

I. Europe

Allemagne	Bonn	Mahrburg-Lahn
	Erlangen	Mainz
	Frankfurt	München
	Freiburg im Breisgau	Münster
	Göttingen	Saarbrücken
	Heidelberg	Tübingen
	Kiel	Wiesbaden
	Köln	Würzburg
Autriche	Graz	Wien
	Innsbruck	
Belgique	Bruxelles, Université Libre	Louvain-flamand
	Liège	
Espagne	Madrid	
Finland	Abo	Helsinki
France	Caën	Lyon
	Clermont-Ferrand	Montpellier
	Dijon	Nancy
	Grenoble	Poitiers
	Lille	Rennes
Grande-Bretagne	Aberdeen	Exeter
	Aberyswith	Glasgow
	University College of Wales	Hull
	Belfast	Leeds
	Birmingham	Leicester
	Bristol	Liverpool
	Cambridge	London
	Cork	Newcastle/Tyne
	Dublin	Oxford
	Durham	St. Andrews
	Edinburgh	Swansea

Italie	Milano	Perugia
	Padua	Siena
	Pavia	Turin
Portugal	Coimbra	Lisbon
Suède	Göteborg	Stockholm
	Lund	
Suisse	Bâle	Neuchâtel
	Fribourg	
II. Amérique du Nord		
Canada	Assumption University	New Brunswick
	Windsor	Ottawa
	British Columbia	Queen's University
	Carleton	Royal Military College of Canada
	Carleton	St. Francis Xavier St. Mary's University
	McGill	St. Mary's University
	Manitoba	Saskatchewan
	Memorial (Newfoundland)	Sir George Williams College
	Montreal	Western Ontario
	Mount Allison	
Etats-Unis	California	Southern California
	Denver	Florida
	George Washington	Notre Dame
	Georgetown	Louisiana
	Chicago	Tulane
	Illinois	Detroit
	John Hopkins University, Walter Hines Page School	Minnesota
	John Hopkins University, School of Advanced Int. Studies Maryland	Syracuse
	Tufts	North Carolina
	Princeton	North Dakota
	Virginia	Ohio State University
	Columbia	Oregon
	Lafayette College	Vanderbilt
	Washington and Lee University	Washington
	William and Mary, College of Wisconsin	Hunter College
	American Institute for Foreign Trade, Phoenix	Fordham
	Pennsylvania	

III. Amérique du Sud

Argentine	Cordoba	Mendoza
	Buenos Aires	
Bolivie	La Paz, Universidad Mayor de San Andrés	Sucre
	Potosi, Universidad autonoma « Tomas Frias »	
Brésil	Fortaleza	Rio de Janeiro
	Porto Alegre	
Chili	Santiago, Universidad de Chile	Santiago, Universidad catolico de Chile
Colombie	Bogotá	Cartagena
	Barranquilla	Medellin
Equateur	Quito	
Mexico	Mexico	
Panama	Panama City	
Pérou	Arequipa	

IV. Afrique

Ghana	University College of Ghana	
Sierra Leone	Freetown	
Nigeria	Ibadan	
Senegal	Dakar	
Maroc	Rabat	
Algérie	Alger	
Tunisie	Tunis	
R.A.U. (Egypte)	Cairo	Alexandrie
	Cairo, Ain Cham	
Soudan	Khartoum	
Rhodesia- Nyasaland	Salisbury	
Uganda	Makere College	
Union sud-africaine	Cape Town	Pretoria
	Durban	Grahamstown, Rhodes University
	Bloemfontein, University of Orange Free State	Johannesburg, University of Witwatersrand
	Potchefstroom	
Congo	Elisabethville	Léopoldville

V. Asie

Afghanistan	Kabul	
Burma	Rangoon	
India	Agra	Dharwar
	Aligarh	Lucknow
	Allahabad	Madras
	Andhara	Mysore
	Annamalai	Nagpur
	Banaras	Osmania
	Baroda	Punjab
	Bihar	Patra
	Bombay	Poona
	Calcutta	Rajputana
	Delhi	Saugar
	Gauhati	Travancore
	Gujarat	Utkal
	Kashmir	Vishwa-Bhaji
Lebanon	Beyruth	
Malaya	Singapore	
Pakistan	Dacca	Punjab
	Karachi	Peshawar
Philippines	Manila, Université Centrale	Manila, Université de St. Thomas
	Manila, Université	
Indonésie	Djakarta	
Iran	Tehran	
Iraq	Bagdad	
Israël	Jérusalem	Tel-Aviv
R.A.U. (Syrie) :	Damascus	Aleppo
Turquie	Ankara	

VI. Australie — Nouvelle Zélande

Australie	Canberra	Queensland
	Melbourne	Tasmania
Nouvelle—Zélande	Wellington	

Europe	70
Amérique du Nord	53
Amérique du Sud	19
Afrique	22
Asie	47
Australie	5
Nombre des universités auxquelles ont été envoyés une invitation à l'affiliation et au Congrès de 1960 ainsi que nos documents :	216

Annexe N° B 1

Décompte final

TITRE I	1'121.35 Frs
TITRE II	3'406.80 Frs
TITRE III	1'952.71 Frs
TITRE IV	1'229.60 Frs
TITRE V	265. -- Frs

Total des dépenses	7'975.46 Frs
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Total des recettes :	8.056.95 Frs
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Total des dépenses :	7.975,46 Frs
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Solde :	81.49 Frs
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CENTRE GENEVOIS POUR LA FORMATION DES CADRES AFRICAINS

RAPPORT ET PROPOSITIONS

par

Victor Segesvary

Secrétaire Général

Carouge-Genève, le 15 novembre 1961

Messieurs,

Ayant été chargé de présenter un programme d'enseignement pratique qui pourrait être adopté par le Centre genevois pour la formation de cadres africains j'ai pu me documenter, au cours d'enquêtes faites auprès des institutions genevoises, sur ce qui a été prévu pour une formation accélérée de cadres africains.

Le rapport que j'ai l'honneur de vous présenter comprend :

1. Une partie descriptive des cours de formation accélérée,
2. Des propositions générales concernant le programme établi par le Centre et
3. Quelques programmes-types assez approximatifs prévus en diverses disciplines,

I. LES PROGRAMMES DE FORMATION ACCELEREE ORGANISES ACTUELLEMENT A GENEVE A L'INTENTION DES CADRES AFRICAINS

1. *Programme pour la formation de jeunes Africains et Asiatiques, désireux de faire carrière dans les services diplomatiques.* Programmes établis conjointement par la Dotation Carnegie et l'Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales (voir [Annexe 1](#)).

A l'exception d'un ou deux participants tous ceux qui se sont inscrits pour suivre ce programme possèdent un degré universitaire. Ils ont pu donc sans difficultés suivre les cours donnés à l'Université ou les Instituts spécialisés.

Le programme comprend des cours réguliers et des séminaires à l'Université et à l'Institut, ainsi que des cours et séminaires spécialement organisés dans le cadre de cette formation accélérée.

L'horaire prévoit 18 à 20 heures de leçons par semaines, sans compter les recherches individuelles qu'exigent les travaux d'un séminaire.

C'est un programme très spécialisé qui se situe à un niveau complètement différent de celui de nos cours. Il est donc difficile d'en tirer une conclusion quelconque.

Toutefois, une remarque s'impose. Même au niveau de cette formation il est nécessaire d'organiser une série de cours et de séminaires destinés à compléter la formation antérieure des candidats.

2. *Programme prévu pour les huit boursiers des Nations Unies futurs inspecteurs scolaires,* Programme établi par le Bureau International de l'Education ([Annexe 2](#)).

Les fonctionnaires congolais bénéficiant de ce programme de formation accélérée ont tous terminé leurs études secondaires. Il ressort des renseignements que j'ai pu recueillir que leur formation est loin d'être homogène ; ils ont suivi diverses écoles dans différentes provinces de l'ancien Congo belge, les soi-disant Ecoles secondaires « moyennes », établies dans les territoires de nombreuses colonies. Le Baccalauréat délivré par ces Ecoles ne peut être considéré comme l'équivalent du baccalauréat délivré par nos institutions, sauf dans des cas exceptionnels.

Le programme prévu par le Bureau International de l'Education prévoit des cours à l'Université et à l'Institut Rousseau. Les cours prévus traitent de pédagogie générale, expérimentale et comparée, de questions concernant les relations internationales, c'est-à-dire de cours purement théoriques conçus dans le cadre académique et se poursuivant quelque fois plusieurs semestres.

Pour approfondir les connaissances acquises, le professeur Lederman a été chargé d'un cours donné chaque soir de 18 à 19 heures aux boursiers, au cours duquel les étudiants peuvent poser des questions et demander toutes explications qu'ils pourraient désirer, équivalant finalement à une sorte de répétition générale de leurs divers cours.

Les candidats sont astreints à un horaire de 26 heures hebdomadaires, leur laissant que peu de temps et de loisir pour suivre des cours prévus le soir, par exemple.

3. *Programme de formation accélérée de bibliothécaires*, suivi actuellement par deux boursiers de l'UNESCO, ressortissants du Niger (voir programme de l'Ecole de bibliothécaires de l'Ecole sociale).

Les deux boursiers n'ont pas fait d'études secondaires, mais lors de l'indépendance du Niger (anciennement colonie française), ils étaient fonctionnaires de l'administration et le gouvernement les avait désigné comme pouvant bénéficier de bourses offertes par l'UNESCO.

Ils suivent les cours réguliers prévus au programme de l'Ecole sociale, section bibliothécaires. Aucun programme n'a été spécialement établi pour eux. Ils assistent toutefois à un ou deux cours accélérés, le « cataloguement », par exemple, avec d'autres élèves inscrits à ces cours. Désirant compléter leurs connaissances comptables, ils se sont également inscrits à des cours de comptabilité.

Un sérieux problème se pose pour ces deux boursiers dont la formation avait été prévue en dix mois, car leurs bourses ont été accordées pour une telle période, mais il est clair d'ores et déjà que leur formation devra durer 18 mois. Les élèves réguliers doivent suivre pendant 4 semestres les cours de l'Ecole et faire un stage d'un an dans différentes bibliothèques. Il était difficile d'organiser des cours spéciaux pour ces deux boursiers seulement et il semble exclu de leur donner une formation complète en un temps si court et sans le stage prévu pour les étudiants réguliers. La Direction est placée devant un problème difficile à résoudre, quel certificat pourra-t-elle donner à ces deux étudiants qui attendent d'elle une attestation pouvant être présentée aux autorités de leurs pays, mentionnant les cours suivis et leur qualification de bibliothécaire, alors qu'il est parfois difficile d'accorder à des étudiants ayant suivi tout le programme, un diplôme de l'Ecole ? Mlle Cornaz, la directrice de l'Ecole, est en pourparlers avec le Département politique fédéral pour que soit étudiée la possibilité de délivrer, par les institutions qui organisent une formation accélérée, un « Certificat fédéral ».

4. *Programme pour assistants de laboratoire* pour la formation accélérée de 8 boursiers de l'Organisation Mondiale de la Santé.

Ce programme placé sous la Direction du Dr A.B. DuBois a été spécialement préparé pour les Congolais (Annexe 3).

Ces 8 boursiers sont des infirmiers diplômés ayant suivi l'école primaire, puis, pour la plupart d'entre eux, 1 ou 2 ans d'études secondaires, et finalement, ils avaient tous bénéficié de la formation dans une école d'infirmiers pendant 5 ans. Ce sont des hommes de 25 à 35 ans qui ont tous pratiqué pendant plusieurs années leur métier d'infirmiers et ont même remplacé souvent les médecins après le départ des médecins belges.

Ils suivent des cours théoriques choisis à l'Ecole de Laborantines de 8 à 9 heures par semaine. En outre, ils travaillent dans des laboratoires spécialement organisés pour eux, dirigés par une laborantine diplômée qui est, en même temps, responsable de leur formation complète.

Ce programme bien organisé nous montre combien il est important de donner une formation pratique dans le cadre de la formation accélérée et illustre aussi la nécessité de mettre sur pied un programme spécial à la seule intention des cadres africains.

5. *Programme de technicien dentiste* pour des boursiers de l'Organisation Mondiale de la Santé.

M. le professeur Fernex a été chargé de cette formation accélérée fixée à partir du début de janvier 1962, mais des difficultés administratives avaient empêché le commencement du programme. Un projet de programme est en cours de préparation, il faut donc attendre pour en pouvoir connaître sa teneur.

6. *Programme de l'Union, mondiale des sociétés pour le développement du travail artisanal, industriel et agricole parmi les Juifs, l'O.R.T.*

L'ORT-Union est une organisation puissante couvrant la plupart des pays de l'Europe, des Etats-Unis, de l'Afrique au Nord et l'Israël. Elle a ouvert partout des écoles de formation professionnelle et a ainsi accompli un immense travail au cours des années de l'après-guerre. L'ORT a contribué énormément à la réadaptation des réfugiés ou émigrés juifs et, surtout, au cours de ses activités elle collabore avec les gouvernements des pays arabes de l'Afrique du Nord, une coopération très significative même sur le plan politique. Ces écoles de formation professionnelle envoient les élèves particulièrement doués à Genève au Centre Mondial d'Anières, où ils reçoivent un enseignement complémentaire théorique leur permettant plus tard de remplir dans les écoles de l'O.R.T. des postes d'instructeurs.

La conception de l'organisation de l'O.R.T. explique pourquoi elle pouvait faire suivre des cours au 18 Congolais venus au Centre d'Anières pour une formation accélérée dans le domaine de la technique industrielle et artisanale. L'O.R.T. a établi un programme spécial à l'intention de ces jeunes Africains à Genève depuis déjà 9 mois. (Tout l'équipement technique du Centre d'Anières est à la disposition des élèves à la formation accélérée). A l'heure actuelle l'ORT est l'organisation qui a su concevoir le programme le mieux adapté à cette formation accélérée.

Les élèves qui suivent ce programme ont tous bénéficié dans leur pays d'une formation technique, et une fois les cours terminés, ils rentrent dans leur pays où ils pourront enseigner leur métier, même s'ils doivent utiliser des machines de marques et de construction différentes. Ce programme est très chargé, car les élèves doivent, en plus des cours, faire des stages.

Ce programme de formation accélérée est si spécialisé qu'on ne saurait en tirer des conclusions pratiques. La formation de jeunes techniciens se situe en dehors de la compétence du Centre africain. Toutefois, je tiens à souligner que si le programme que présente l'O.R.T. est le meilleur dans notre ville et le plus adapté aux besoins des élèves, c'est bien parce que les organisations ont été contraintes de mettre sur pied un programme particulier en dehors des cours existants.

II. PROPOSITIONS GENERALES CONCERNANT NOTRE PROPRE PROGRAMME

Après avoir étudié les programmes de formation accélérée qui m'ont été signalés et avant de proposer des programmes-types définitifs, je considère qu'il est indispensable de définir certains principes de base de nos activités.

Lors de l'établissement du Centre, il s'agissait surtout de créer une sorte d'école d'administration publique. Cependant, au cours des mois qui suivirent, on proposa d'accepter des candidats à une formation accélérée dans n'importe quel domaine. A mon avis, il faudrait limiter notre activité à la formation de cadres administratifs et subalternes, dans les domaines du service public, de l'économie et de l'éducation. S'engager dans la formation des cadres dans d'autres domaines pourrait entraîner le Centre dans des complications imprévisibles. Je me permettrai de citer, par exemple, le cas des assistants médicaux. Dans les colonies françaises il avait été créé, et cela existe encore, un système d'assistants médicaux ou « médecins africains ». Ceux-ci reçoivent une

formation plus complète que celle des infirmiers, ils doivent suivre des cours pendant 1 à 2 années, mais il est exclu de les considérer comme médecins de plein droit et leur pratique doit être limitée. Ce système permet-il en quelque sorte de parer à la pénurie de médecins spécialisés et certains Etats indépendants ont conservé ce système.

M. Avaro, Ministre du Travail de la République du Gabon, a entrepris les démarches en vue d'obtenir 3 bourses fédérales à l'intention d'infirmiers qui viendraient à notre Centre et suivraient une formation accélérée d'assistants médicaux. L'admission de tels candidats posera au Centre un problème technique, car la formation d'assistant médicaux est inconnue en Suisse, mais la France a établi des programmes spécialisés pour une telle formation (je me réfère ici à l'entretien que j'ai eu avec M. le professeur Montant, Doyen de la Faculté de médecine, et avec Madame Fischer de l'OMS). De même, le Centre sera vis-à-vis de l'OMS dans une situation délicate, car l'OMS a l'intention, selon les informations recueillies, de supprimer ce système considéré comme insatisfaisant. L'OMS étudie la formation académique complète des médecins au lieu de former des assistants médicaux. (L'Ecole d'assistantes médicales de Genève prépare des assistantes capables de seconder des médecins et non des médecins possédant une connaissance limitée de leur profession).

(a) *La formation doit être spécifique et pratique.* Je ne contesterai pas la nécessité des cours élargissant l'horizon culturel des candidats. Je suis certain que la plupart des gouvernements de l'Afrique Noire ne seront pas disposés à faciliter les études à un étudiant désirant compléter, par exemple, sa connaissance d'une langue étrangère, à l'exception, bien entendu, de ceux qui se destinent à l'enseignement. L'Afrique d'aujourd'hui a besoin par dessus tout, de la formation des cadres, même subalternes, qui soient capables d'assurer, au moment de la relève de l'administration coloniale, remplacer les fonctionnaires africains, actuellement en fonction, peu compétents.

(b) Le principe énoncé jusqu'ici était d'utiliser, autant que possible, les institutions genevoises et les cours existants, et y ajouter ceux du Centre qui pourraient combler les lacunes de l'enseignement de ces institutions. Il faudrait remplacer ce principe par un autre : *l'utilisation des personnes qualifiées se trouvant sur place dans l'organisation des programmes spécifiques et indépendants des différentes institutions existantes.* A l'appui de cette conception, je me permets d'avancer les arguments suivants :

(i) Le plan d'enseignement de l'Université et des institutions spécialisées est en général conçu pour une période de 6 à 8 semestres, il en résulte qu'un candidat à la formation accélérée ne pourrait en tirer tout le profit voulu ;

(ii) Les cours universitaires sont en général théoriques et atteignent parfois un niveau élevé, tandis que les cadres administratifs ont surtout besoin d'une formation pratique se référant plus aux aspects techniques que théoriques d'un problème. A titre d'exemple, je citerai le cas des Congolais venus à Genève pour y recevoir une formation de 8 mois en tant qu'administrateurs ou inspecteurs scolaires. Il est fort douteux que les cours universitaires de pédagogie générale, expérimentale et comparée leur seront d'une grande utilité dans l'avenir ;

(iii) Les éléments qui viendront à notre Centre seront des plus disparates. La base de notre sélection ne peut être uniquement leur éducation antérieure ou leur qualification professionnelle, mais aussi — et c'est naturel. — la recommandation de leurs gouvernements respectifs. Il faudrait donc avoir un enseignement spécialisé s'adaptant au niveau d'éducation des participants et qui résumerait l'essentiel des disciplines ou des techniques enseignées, complété par un système de moniteurs bénévoles. Ceux-ci, — me semble-t-il — pourraient être facilement trouvés parmi les assistants et les étudiants genevois des différentes branches académiques.

Cette façon de voir la mission de notre Centre a rencontré l'approbation de la plupart de mes interlocuteurs, et plus spécialement M. le professeur C. Terrier, Doyen de la Faculté des SES, qui juge, comme une perte de temps, l'admission aux cours des Facultés des candidats à la formation accélérée. Il m'a assuré que les assistants et privat-docents seront tous à notre disposition pour donner des cours spéciaux à notre Centre et, après une discussion du programme avec lui, il pourra le présenter au Conseil de la Faculté. Il m'a donné aussi l'assurance, étant donné la nécessité de la formation accélérée de cadres africains, que les collaborateurs dont nous aurions besoin, seront disponibles d'accepter des honoraires modestes.

Je ne voudrais pas exclure la possibilité d'utiliser quelques cours choisis de l'Université ou de l'Ecole sociale, mais comme l'a très justement fait remarqué M. le professeur Berenstein, Doyen de la Faculté de droit, il serait préférable d'intégrer dans le programme du Centre trois cours introductifs de la Faculté de droit : « L'introduction à l'étude du droit » du Prof. Pierre Lalive, ainsi que les cours de M. Christian Dominici : « Droit constitutionnel comparé » et « Eléments de droit international public ». Il faudrait également ne pas oublier le cours de droit administratif fédéral qui sera donné pendant un semestre par an. (En ce qui concerne ces cours il est à prévoir des complications, car le cours du professeur Pierre Lalive ne sera donné qu'à partir de l'année universitaire 1962/1963 (semestre d'hiver), il s'en suivrait donc que les étudiants commençant leur formation au printemps 1962 ne pourraient en bénéficier. Il en sera de même pour l'Ecole Sociale. Nous pourrions attirer l'attention de nos étudiants sur certains cours de cette Ecole, par exemple sur ceux traitant des systèmes politiques ou de l'économie politique, mais la formule des cours facultatifs entre le semestre d'hiver et le semestre d'été compliquera notre collaboration avec les institutions dont j'ai parlé.

(c) Si le Centre genevois pour la formation de cadres africains devait se développer en une véritable école il serait indispensable d'y centraliser tous les efforts qui se font pour la formation accélérée de ces cadres et d'éliminer l'élément de compétition, les discussions sur les compétences des diverses institutions. Pour l'instant, l'activité en faveur des Africains me semble assez désordonnée. Le problème du Certificat et du Diplôme qui pourraient être accordés aux étudiants d'une formation accélérée en Suisse ne peut être résolu sans une telle centralisation. Une institution — tel notre Centre — devrait être autorisée par les autorités compétentes à délivrer ces documents et obtenir par voie diplomatique la reconnaissance de ceux-ci par les gouvernements des Etats africains.

(d) Je tiens à souligner encore une fois que le programme établi par le Centre devrait prévoir à part égale des cours et des stages. Les stages pourraient être assurés par le Centre après des accords conclus avec les organisations et établissements genevois. Je suis convaincu qu'une formation accélérée ne peut être une réussite si elle n'assure pas aux candidats l'expérience des travaux pratiques.

(e) Les cours théoriques devraient être approfondis par un travail individuel sous surveillance de moniteurs. Je ne pense pas que des cours de répétition, comme ceux du professeur Lederman pour les boursiers de l'ONU, puissent suppléer à une collaboration d'étudiants plus avancés ou de jeunes travaillant dans leur profession avec notre Centre. Ces moniteurs, bénévoles, s'occuperaient d'un ou deux étudiants, se mettraient à leur disposition et discuteraient avec eux des problèmes les intéressant. Par des relations amicales et sincères un lien se créerait et faciliterait l'échange de vues sur des problèmes qu'ils ne pourraient peut-être pas discuter avec les professeurs qui, humainement, leur peuvent paraître trop éloignés d'eux.

La nécessité d'avoir des moniteurs découle aussi d'un aspect technique : il se pouvait que des étudiants possédant bien la langue française soient au début handicapés par le manque d'habitude de prendre des notes lors des cours ; c'est certainement un problème purement temporaire, l'habitude aidant ils surmonteront cette difficulté, mais ceci prouve la nécessité d'avoir des moniteurs ou assistants.

Après ces propositions d'ordre général, je me permets d'exprimer une pensée qui me vaudra, peut-être, d'être considéré comme un hérétique, mais au cours des conversations avec mes amis Africains, j'ai pu me familiariser avec les problèmes que pose la formation accélérée des cadres administratifs, je me demande donc si ne serait pas mieux de la faire sur place, en Afrique même, dans des centres de formation établis dans différentes régions de cet immense continent.

Tant au point de vue, humain, éducatif et financier, ce serait, me semble-t-il, la formule la plus heureuse. J'éviterai d'entrer dans des détails, ce problème ne relevant pas de ma compétence, je mentionne seulement cette idée, car la recherche d'un programme de formation accélérée dans le cadre de notre Centre est un peu aussi la recherche de la meilleure solution, de la justification de ce que nous proposons de faire.

III. LES PROGRAMMES-TYPES EN ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE

1. Domaine juridique

Prof. Pierre Lalive : Introduction à l'étude du droit	3 h.
M. Christian Dominicé : Droit constitutionnel comparé	2 h.
Droit administratif général	3 h.
Notions de droit civil	2 h.
Notions de droit des obligations	<u>2 h.</u>
soit leçons par semaine, <u>plus</u>	12 h.
cours généraux et linguistiques, <u>plus</u>	6 h.
stage	<u>20 h.</u>
TOTAL	38 h.

2. Domaine économique

Economie politique	1 h.
Finances publiques	1 h.
Éléments de l'activité bancaire	1 h.
Organisation commerciale et financière	1 h.
Comptabilité	2 h.
Problèmes de développement	2 h.
Problèmes de planification	2 h.
Statistique	1 h.
Droit commercial	1 h.
Correspondance commerciale	<u>2 h.</u>
soit leçons par semaine, <u>plus</u>	14 h.
cours généraux et linguistiques, <u>plus</u>	4 h.
stage	<u>20 h.</u>
TOTAL	38 h.

3. Domaine social

Sociologie	2 h.
Législation sociale comparée	1 h.
Droit du travail	1 h.
Assurances sociales	1 h.
Organisation de l'assistance sociale	3 h.
Evolution sociale contemporaine	2 h.
Hygiène sociale	1 h.
Problèmes sociaux du développement	<u>1 h.</u>
soit leçons par semaine, <u>plus</u>	12 h.
cours généraux et linguistiques, <u>plus</u>	6 h.
stage	20 h.
TOTAL	<u>38 h.</u>

4. Domaine de l'éducation

Pédagogie	2 h.
Diactique	1 h.
Sociologie	2 h.
Psychologie de l'enfant et de l'adolescent	1 h.
Administration scolaire, problèmes relatifs à l'organisation des écoles	<u>2 h.</u>
soit leçons par semaine, <u>plus</u>	10 h.
cours généraux et linguistiques, <u>plus</u>	8 h.
stage	<u>20 h.</u>
TOTAL	38 h.

A ce programme je dois encore ajouter deux remarques :

Tout d'abord, j'aimerais souligner que cette esquisse des programmes que je donne ici est très approximative et rigide, elle représente plutôt une certaine approche au problème. Il me semble essentiel de maintenir notre principe, défendu jusqu'ici, d'organiser individuellement les programmes de chaque candidat en appliquant ces indications générales selon sa personnalité, ses études précédentes et les responsabilités futures auxquelles sera appelé l'étudiant.

En outre, on pourrait se demander pourquoi je n'ai pas présenté un programme sur l'enseignement des langues, d'autant plus que certains candidats voudront venir à Genève pour apprendre le français. Je pense, toutefois, qu'une personne désireuse d'étudier le français (ceci sans intention précise) pourrait participer à nos cours de langues, qui me semble-t-il devraient être plus nombreux, ou aller à l'Ecole pratique de langue française. D'autre part, un candidat désirant une formation de maître supérieur en une langue, ne pourrait être admis au Centre, car, à mon avis, il me paraît difficile de former des professeurs de langue par une formation accélérée.

Victor Segesvary
Secrétaire général

INSTITUT UNIVERSITAIRE DE HAUTES ETUDES INTERNATIONALES

PROGRAMME DE FORMATION DIPLOMATIQUE

Tous les membres du corps enseignant de l'Institut, et tout spécialement ceux qui donneront un cours ou un séminaire spécial à l'intention de votre groupe, seront toujours heureux de discuter avec vous les problèmes soulevés au cours de vos études.

Le programme établi à votre intention se compose comme suit :

(a) vous aurez à choisir deux des séminaires ordinaires de l'Institut chaque semestre. J'attire votre attention sur les dispositions du règlement de l'Institut relatives à ces séminaires, que vous trouverez en pages 4 et 5 de la brochure. Votre présence à ces séminaires implique une participation active pendant la durée du semestre. Vous pouvez également suivre tout autre cours enseigné à l'Institut ;

(b) vous aurez aussi à suivre les cours ordinaires suivants enseignés à l'Institut ou à l'Université :

- International Organization, par le professeur A.B. Overstreet (1 heure par semaine, à l'Institut),
- Droit international public, par le professeur P. Guggenheim (3 heures par semaine, à l'Université),
- Les relations internationales entre 1939 et 1945, par le professeur J. Freymond
(1 heure par semaine, à l'Université), ou
- Histoire diplomatique, par le professeur L. Monnier (1 heure par semaine, à l'Université),
- Economie politique générale, par le professeur J. L'Huillier (3 heures par semaine, à l'Université) ;

(c) des cours spéciaux seront organisés à votre intention à l'Institut. Ils seront d'une durée de six semaines chacun et auront lieu deux fois par semaine. Ces cours auront lieu dans l'ordre suivant :

- Eléments de droit diplomatique, par M. C. Dominicé, chargé de cours,
- Eléments de droit consulaire, par M. P. Frochaux, du Département politique fédéral,
- Principes de développement économique et social, par M. G. Etienne, chargé de cours,
- Problèmes des échanges économiques internationaux, par M. G. Curzon, chargé de cours,
- Questions diplomatiques choisies — le secrétariat international, par M. J. Siotis, chargé de cours.

(d) les connaissances acquises dans les cours sous chiffres (b) et (c) seront évaluées à la fin de chaque semestre ;

(e) Quatre séminaires spéciaux ont été organisés à votre intention. Le premier sera d'une durée de deux semestres, le deuxième aura lieu uniquement pendant le semestre d'hiver et les deux derniers pendant le semestre d'été :

- Séminaire sur les origines des idées politiques contemporaines, par M. Y. Collart, chargé de cours, et le professeur L.J. Halle,
- La Charte et la pratique des Nations Unies, par M. B. Lukac, ancien directeur au Département économique des Nations Unies, chargé de recherches à l'Institut,
- Appréciations de situations politiques, par M. H. Burgelin, chargé de cours,
- Appréciations de situations économiques, par M. G. Curzon et M. G. Etienne.

COURS DE FORMATION POUR DIRIGEANTS DE L'EDUCATION

	LUNDI	MARDI	MERCREDI	JEUDI	VENDREDI
8 à 9	U. 49 M. GIROD Sociologie générale	U. 48 M. ROLLER Pédagogie expérimentale	U. 48 M. ROLLER Pédagogie expérimentale	U. 52 M. LEDERMAN Relations internationales	ISE M. ROSSELLO Pédagogie comparée
9 à 10	U. 49 M. GIROD Sociologie générale		U. 51 M. LEDERMAN Relations internationales		ISE M. ROSSELLO Pédagogie comparée
10 à 11	U. 7 M. DOTTRENS Pédagogie générale				U. 48 M. DOTTRENS Pédagogie générale
11 à 12		U. 59 M. BABEL Histoire économique	U. 59 M. FREYMOND Politique internationale		U. 59 M. BABEL Histoire économique
14 à 15	U M. GIROD Séminaire spécial				ISE M. ROSSELLO Pédagogie compare et M. GRANDJEAN Administration scolaire
15 à 16	U M. DOTTRENS Séminaire spécial				ISE M. ROSSELLO Pédagogie compare et M. GRANDJEAN Administration scolaire
16 à 17	U. 48 M. DOTTRENS Organisation scolaire			Département. d'Instruction publique M. Grandjean Séminaire	

18h à 19h : M. LEDERMANN, tous les jours à la Bibliothèque BIE-ISE

INSTITUT D'HISTOLOGIE ET D'EMBRYOLOGIE

GENEVE

Infirmiers congolais

Boursiers de l'OMS.

Nous avons organisé pour eux ce cycle d'études de la manière suivantes : ils suivent les cours théoriques avec les élèves laborantines, soit par semaine pendant le semestre d'hiver : 2 h. de chimie médicale, 1 h. d'anatomie physiologique, 2 h. de pathologie, 1 h. de biologie générale, 2 h. d'histologie : au semestre d'été ils suivront : 2 h. de sérologie, 2 h. d'histologie et 4-5 h. de bactériologie.

Du 20 octobre 1961 au 20 janvier 1962, ils apprennent sous ma direction, la technique histologique, confection et coloration de coupes pour le microscope, une technique dont ils n'ont aucune notion ; les cours d'infirmiers qu'ils ont suivi ne comportent pas cette matière. Ils ont 4 demi-journées de laboratoire proprement dit avec une monitrice, 4 h. d'explication théorique avec exercices pratiques des techniques de coloration données par un assistant du laboratoire et 2 h. de diagnostic de coupes (reconnaître sur coupes les différents organes) données par un autre assistant et 2 h. de laboratoire qu'ils suivent avec les étuants en médecine.

Du 20 janvier à Pâques ils suivront le laboratoire de chimie médicale où le Dr Sanz leur enseignera les micro-méthodes modernes qui ne sont pas encore utilisées partout en Suisse, mais qui seront celles d'un pays neuf comme le Congo qui aura avantage à utiliser dès le débuts dans des laboratoires nouvellement créés. Le nombre d'heures par semaine sera le même que pour le laboratoire d'histologie.

Nous avons prévu un laboratoire d'hématologie le samedi matin, mais je me suis aperçue après une séance déjà qu'ils avaient tous déjà fait beaucoup d'hématologie et qu'ils savaient déjà ce que nous avions prévu au programme. J'attends le retour du Dr Petitpierre à la fin du mois pour organiser, avec son accord, des cours théoriques d'hématologie spéciale.

En ce qui concerne la microbiologie (bactériologie et virologie) qui doit avoir lieu au semestre d'été les Congolais m'ont communiqué les cours qu'ils ont suivi dans leur école d'infirmiers et je me suis aperçue également que dans cette branche aussi ils ont déjà une solide formation et que le cours prévu n'est pas adéquate. Nous reverrons la chose en temps et lieu avec le Dr Petitpierre et le Professeur Regau.

Je suis en contact journalier avec ces infirmiers congolais et c'est un plaisir de travailler avec eux. Ils sont intelligents, pleins d'enthousiasme et avides d'apprendre. Ils travaillent fort et sont adroits du point de vue technique. En ce qui concerne l'histologie, je pense que ce cours sera un succès et que cela valait la peine de faire venir ces jeunes gens à Genève.

Dr A. M. DuBOIS

SOUVENIRS ET ANECDOTES

La vie estudiantine
à l'Institut de Hautes Etudes Internationales
entre 1958 et 1963

par

Victor Segesvary

Novembre 2001

QUELQUES ANECDOTES

Je commence à raconter mes souvenirs en évoquant quelques anecdotes dont la seconde me concerne.

Le professeur *Maurice Beaumont*, de l'Académie française, enseignait l'histoire politique et économique récente (19^{ème} et 20^{ème} siècles), y compris, bien sûr, les relations internationales. Etant donné qu'il s'agissait de l'histoire politique et économique, il y avait toujours un parmi les trois professeurs qui examinaient les candidats au doctorat dont la spécialité était l'économie.

Le professeur Beaumont avait l'habitude de poser aux candidats des questions, lors des examens de doctorat, qui n'avaient strictement rien à faire avec le sujet ou qui concernaient l'un ou l'autre des personnages de l'époque, mais sans lien avec le sujet du candidat. C'était évidemment pour désorienter les candidats.

Ainsi nous a-t-on raconté qu'au cours des années 1950, un candidat devait répondre à des questions relatives au déroulement du Congrès de Vienne de 1815. Tout à coup, le professeur Beaumont, qui était le principal examinateur, posait cette question : « Monsieur, est-ce que vous pouvez me dire quelle est la profondeur du Danube à Vienne »? Le candidat, je n'ai jamais su qui était-ce, avait une présence d'esprit formidable après un interrogatoire d'une ou deux heures, a répliqué en demandant, lui, au professeur Beaumont : « Monsieur le Professeur, sous quel pont vous entendez »? Naturellement, il y avait une grande hilarité dans l'audience. Le professeur Beaumont, il faut admettre qu'il s'amusait beaucoup, lui a donné la meilleure note en récompensant sa vivacité d'esprit.

Moi, je n'avais malheureusement pas cette chance de trouver une réplique si formidable. A mon examen de l'histoire politique et économique récente, le comité étant composé des professeurs Freymond, Beaumont, Röpke et autres, je devais répondre aux questions sur le sujet des mouvements socialistes en Allemagne dans la seconde moitié du 19^{ème} siècle. Le professeur Beaumont n'avait pas manqué de me poser également une peau de banane : « Monsieur », a-t-il demandé, « comment était mort Ferdinand Lassalle (le leader socialiste allemand le plus en vue à l'époque) »? Heureusement, je pouvais répondre : « En duel, Monsieur le Professeur ». Mais ensuite j'étais perdu, car le professeur Beaumont avait continué : « Et où avait-il lieu ce duel »? Je n'en savais rien. « Ici, à côté de Genève, sur le Salève », avait-t-il révélé le secret. Il avait réussi à me confondre malgré les efforts du professeur Freymond qui présidait et qui, comme d'habitude, avait essayé de dissiper la désorientation des candidats. Si je me rappelle bien, je n'avais pas obtenu la meilleure note en dépit du fait que j'avais pensé maîtriser entièrement mon sujet.

[Il faut le dire que le professeur Beaumont n'était pas le seul dans le monde d'utiliser cette « technique » pour mettre à l'épreuve les candidats. Je me rappelle une autre histoire — mais, cette fois-ci, de la faculté de droit de l'Université de Budapest où j'avais commencé mes études universitaires — concernant un grand juriste, spécialiste du droit constitutionnel. Entre les deux guerres mondiales, cette branche du droit était très particulière en Hongrie. L'empire Habsbourg ayant disparu, le pays était indépendant, mais gardait la « fiction » constitutionnelle du royaume, et le chef de l'Etat, l'amiral Horthy, était appelé « régent » (au nom d'un roi non existant). Cette explication était nécessaire pour faire comprendre l'anecdote concernant le professeur du droit constitutionnel. Il avait l'habitude de poser la question : « Combien de fois tire-je dans mon livre »? Il fallait répondre que quatre ou cinq fois, et énumérer les occasions, lors du couronnement du roi, etc. etc. Néanmoins, le professeur avait posé cette question assez régulièrement, donc les candidats avaient tous appris la réponse correcte.

Tandis que chez le professeur Beaumont, c'était toujours un nouveau fait anecdotique à quoi il s'était référé, ainsi on ne pouvait pas se préparer à l'avance. Mais, en tout état de cause, son habitude était une preuve éclatante de sa grande culture et de ses vastes connaissances, même concernant les détails des plus petits.

MES PROFESSEURS

JACQUES FREYMOND

Parmi mes professeurs à l'Institut ma préférence va, sans aucun doute, au Professeur *Jacques Freymond*. Non seulement qu'il m'a marqué le plus, mais une véritable amitié nous avait liés, qui a duré jusqu'à sa mort. Il faut le dire que nos relations étaient beaucoup plus que celles d'un professeur et d'un étudiant, car il a participé dans beaucoup d'aspect de ma vie privée, il a partagé beaucoup de mes problèmes. Même quand je travaillais déjà pour les Nations Unies en dehors de l'Europe, lors de mes passages à Genève (où se trouvaient les agences des Nations Unies dont je dépendais, la CNUCED et le Centre du Commerce International) j'essayais, la plupart du temps, de le voir. Nous avons fixé un rendez-vous ou dans l'Institut ou dans un restaurant ou je le visitais dans son chalet au Canton de Vaud. Lors de sa dernière visite à New York, au début des années quatre vingt dix, ma femme et moi nous avons un déjeuner avec lui au restaurant des délégués des Nations Unies, ensuite nous nous sommes promenés, le Professeur Freymond et moi, dans une New York ensoleillée. Mais il faut le dire que nos relations étaient conditionnées par les circonstances dans lesquelles je venais de m'inscrire à l'Institut — l'époque qui suivait notre révolution de 1956 en Hongrie, — car le Professeur Freymond nous a reçus avec sympathie et nous avait assuré un accueil chaleureux, puisqu'il a entièrement partagé nos idées et nos convictions.

Dés mon arrivée en Suisse j'étais au courant des activités de l'Institut, au camp des réfugiés dans les casernes de Bière, et naturellement beaucoup plus encore dès mon installation à Genève où je servais, pendant dix mois, comme aumônier des réfugiés hongrois protestants en Suisse Romande, dépendant du Centre Social Protestant de Genève. Ainsi, je me présentais à l'Institut en demandant de voir le Professeur Freymond, qui m'avait cordialement reçu. Je lui exposais mon cas, en spécifiant que j'avais fait trois semestres de droit à l'Université de Budapest avant d'être exclus pour association illégitime des étudiants (Association des Etudiants Chrétiens), et ensuite j'avais fait des études en théologie protestante, couronnées par une licence en théologie. Le Professeur Freymond avait arrangé que mes années d'étude à Budapest fussent reconnues sous condition que je fasse des examens d'équivalence dans des matières principales qu'étaient l'économie, le droit ainsi que les relations internationales. C'est ainsi que ma carrière à l'Institut avait commencé menant à l'obtention d'un doctorat en sciences politique (mention d'études internationales) en 1968. Le directeur de ma thèse était, bien sûr, le Professeur Freymond.

Sa personnalité et sa vision du rôle et des objectifs de l'Institut avaient été entièrement liées. Il avait une forte personnalité, ouverte sur le monde, quoique ancrée profondément dans ses origines suisses et dans ses convictions en tant que libéral — dans le meilleur sens de ce terme, aujourd'hui, malheureusement, passablement discrédité. Il avait un esprit vif, perçant, et je qualifierai son style d'enseignement dialectique, car il provoquait la contradiction dans ses étudiants pour les faire réfléchir sur les problèmes de l'histoire et des relations internationales.

En tant que directeur, il était, parfois, autoritaire et nous avons eu quelques escarmouches lors j'étais président de l'association des étudiants. Néanmoins, je dois reconnaître, en rétrospective, que dans beaucoup de cas il avait raison. Notre coopération, entre directeur et président du corps estudiantin, était fructueuse ; il faut y associer aussi le président de l'association des anciens à l'époque, Paul Ladame.

L'une des grandes qualités du Professeur Freymond était qu'il s'intéressait sincèrement aux problèmes personnels des étudiants, ainsi que sa compréhension et sa disponibilité de s'engager personnellement pour résoudre leurs problèmes. En ce sens, mon cas est un éloquent témoignage. Le seul défaut que je lui connais, et dont je me suis rendu compte beaucoup plus tard, car même quand j'étais loin de l'Europe j'entendais ce qui s'est passé à l'Institut, c'était sa confiance évidente dans tous les hommes, dans tous les étudiants, particulièrement ceux qu'il avait aidé de faire leur carrière, et qui lui avaient réciproqué sa générosité par une ingratitude et un comportement incompréhensible.

La vision du Professeur Freymond concernant le rôle et les objectifs de l'Institut était donc simple : il voulait en faire un centre d'étude des relations internationales — relations internationales englobant tous les aspects des relations entre les Etats — qui rayonnait dans le monde entier. Il avait réussi à réaliser son projet (dont témoignait, à l'époque, l'appréciation de l'enseignement de l'Institut reflété par le grand nombre d'étudiants qui y venaient des Etats-Unis ou des trois continents dits en développement) pour plusieurs raisons :

(i) Ces excellents contacts en Suisse, particulièrement au niveau fédéral et avec les capitaines d'industrie, facilités par le fait qu'il était l'une des personnalités la plus en vue du parti libéral et qu'il était colonel d'état-major dans l'armée ;

(ii) Ces excellentes relations avec les grandes fondations américaines assurant à l'Institut un financement confortable complétant la contribution des autorités suisses. Il avait des contacts non seulement professionnels, mais aussi amicaux, avec les dirigeants de ces fondations qui avaient hautement apprécié ses prises de position en général, et l'orientation qu'il avait donnée à l'enseignement de l'Institut. De par ses relations avec les dirigeants des fondations européennes ou américaines, le Professeur Freymond avait aussi pu aider les étudiants pour trouver des moyens de réaliser, par exemple, un voyage d'étude nécessaire à leur travail académique : ainsi, il m'avait trouvé des fonds pour entreprendre un voyage au Proche-Orient pour chercher du matériel, faire des interviews, etc., tout indispensable à la préparation de ma thèse que j'avais faite sous sa direction.

(iii) Le rayonnement de l'Institut qui lui a permis de collaborer étroitement avec les centres d'enseignement similaire dans le monde entier. Il faut rappeler, comme exemple, les liens amicaux qu'il avait avec le Professeur Jacques Duroselle de l'Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris ou les contacts étroits avec les grandes universités américaines ainsi que le fait que les professeurs de ces établissements, de par les relations maintenues par le Professeur Freymond avec leurs universités, étaient volontiers venus de donner des cours temporaires à Genève ou même d'y enseigner, parfois régulièrement, pendant un semestre par an, comme les professeurs Maurice Bourquin, Maurice Beaumont ou Hans Wehberg de Paris ou Robert Triffin de Yale ;

(iv) La diversité du corps estudiantin créant une atmosphère très particulière. Il suffit seulement d'évoquer le souvenir des soirées organisées par un groupe du même pays ou de la même région, en offrant aux invités leurs plats nationaux. Je peux témoigner moi-même des amitiés solides, liées à l'Institut, avec des collègues de provenance la plus diverse que j'avais retrouvé partout dans le monde entier où mon travail avec l'organisation internationale m'avait amené.

Pour terminer, je voudrais revenir à mes relations avec le Professeur Freymond pour démontrer, à travers deux exemples, combien il était réceptif aux problèmes de ses étudiants. Le premier cas concerne mon état de réfugié d'un pays à régime totalitaire, où dès ma jeunesse j'avais souffert de la cruauté du régime. En effet, pendant la première année de mon existence à Genève, la police secrète hongroise m'avait contacté pour me proposer de rencontrer l'un de ses agents, une demande assortie, bien sûr, des menaces habituelles en ce qui concerne ma famille restée en Hongrie. J'étais affolé, et tout de suite j'étais allé chez le Professeur Freymond en lui demandant ce que je dois faire. Sans perdre un moment, il avait téléphoné au chef de la police genevoise, Monsieur Vieux, pour arranger un rendez-vous avec ce dernier. Il était convenu avec Monsieur Vieux que je devais aller au rendez-vous fixé, en compagnie des agents civils suisse que je ne connaissais naturellement pas, pour qu'ils puissent identifier la ou les personnes appartenant à la police secrète hongroise et qu'ils puissent les tenir sous observation afin d'apprendre plus sur leurs activités illicites en Suisse. Toutefois, d'une façon ou d'une autre, ces agents avaient appris qu'ils étaient surveillés et n'étaient pas venus ni au premier, ni au second rendez-vous qu'ils m'avaient fixé. Ce qui est sûr qu'ils étaient là, car je reconnaissais la façon comme ils s'habillaient, par exemple le manteau de cuir d'une certaine coupe bien redouté en Hongrie. Ils ne m'avaient plus contacté. Mais pendant quelques mois on avait cassé la fermeture de ma boîte aux lettres, à l'entrée de la maison de la Place Chevelu où j'habitais, et mon courrier avait disparu.

Au début des années soixante, lors j'avais préparé ma thèse de doctorat de l'Institut, le Professeur Freymond m'avait proposé le poste de directeur adjoint, transformé plus tard en secrétaire général résidant, de

l'Institut Africain de Genève qu'il a créé (cet Institut est devenu plus tard l'Institut Genève-Afrique, puis l'Institut d'Outremer). Le premier directeur était Monsieur Junod, ancien missionnaire en Afrique australe. Très vite, après quelques mois, un conflit sérieux s'est développé entre le directeur et moi, car nous avons eus des idées totalement différentes sur la conduite de la vie de l'Institut hébergeant des étudiants africains. Par exemple, un jour Monsieur Junod venait dans mon bureau, bouleversé par ce qu'il avait vu : un étudiant camerounais avait lu Voltaire dans sa chambre. Parce que j'étais résidant dans le bâtiment de l'Institut, il m'avait tenu responsable de tout ce qui s'était passé entre les murs. Il m'avait demandé si j'étais au courant du fait que les étudiants lisaient de tels auteurs. Je lui avais répondu que je ne voyais pas pourquoi on ne pouvait pas lire Voltaire. Je savais que Monsieur Junod était un chrétien d'un autre âge, mais je ne voyais pas pourquoi ménager ses sensibilités que je trouvais ridicules. Une autre fois, il était tout rouge en me demandant de le suivre pour parler avec l'une des femmes de ménage qui avait trouvé des préservatifs dans les salles de bain. De nouveau, je devais fermement refuser d'intervenir auprès des étudiants, car j'avais considéré que ce sont des hommes adultes, la plupart ayant laissé leur famille à la maison, donc ils avaient des besoins biologiques à satisfaire. Finalement, pour citer encore un cas pour illustrer la détérioration de mes relations avec le directeur, lorsque l'un de ses anciens disciples de l'époque où il était missionnaire, Eduardo Mondlane, le premier président de la Mozambique indépendante, plus tard assassiné, est venu visiter l'Institut, je les avais invités pour boire un verre dans mon appartement. A cette occasion, Monsieur Junod tombait tout à coup sur ses genoux, et demandait à Eduardo Mondlane et à moi de le suivre pour prier là, à côté de la table, pleine de verres et de boissons. Je n'en pouvais plus. Je lui avais dit, moi qui étais aussi pasteur, préparant un doctorat en théologie aussi, que je refusais de prier avec un homme comme lui. Je ne pouvais pas lui donner un coup plus grave que de l'humilier devant quelqu'un qui l'avait connu comme missionnaire (au fait, Junod était le premier homme blanc vu par Eduardo Mondlane dans sa prime jeunesse), la rupture était ainsi inévitable.

J'étais allé chez le Professeur Freymond en lui annonçant que je dois quitter l'Institut Africain, car le directeur et moi nous ne pouvons plus travailler ensemble. Je l'avais placé dans une situation délicate, car Monsieur Junod était d'une vieille famille genevoise et il était très respecté par des gens qui ne le connaissaient point, donc Monsieur Freymond devait agir avec prudence. Il était d'accord que je devais quitter l'Institut dès que j'avais trouvé avec ma femme un appartement, et il avait éloigné Junod quelques mois plus tard, en faisant nommer directeur par le Conseil d'Administration, le regretté Pierre Bungener.

PAUL GUGGENHEIM

Je voudrais raconter deux de mes souvenirs concernant le Professeur *Paul Guggenheim* avec qui je n'avais fait qu'un examen d'équivalence, puis un travail de séminaire obligatoire en vue du doctorat.

Lorsque j'avais vu le Professeur Guggenheim pour discuter quel sujet à choisir concernant le travail de séminaire lui, le grand représentant du droit positif, m'avait proposé quelque chose. Ayant vu mes antécédents, il m'avait dit que ce qui lui ferait plaisir sera une étude sur les fondements théologiques de *ius gentium* chez Grotius et Pufendorf. J'étais très étonné, mais j'avais vite compris que mon professeur avait une vue très large et qu'il représentait la meilleure tradition académique de la liberté de recherche et de réflexion.

L'autre souvenir que j'avais gardé du Professeur Guggenheim témoigne de son humanisme profond et aussi de son caractère de s'engager en faveur des étudiants dont il avait apprécié le travail. C'était en 1958. En Hongrie la persécution de ceux engagés dans la révolution de 1956 battait son plein, Imre Nagy, le premier ministre du gouvernement révolutionnaire avait été exécuté. J'avais appris qu'István Bibò, professeur, penseur, politologue et ministre d'Etat dans le gouvernement d'Imre Nagy, était condamné à des longues années de prison. Bibò était d'un courage exceptionnel car il était le seul pour attendre, quand tout était perdu déjà, l'occupation du bâtiment du Parlement, siège du gouvernement, par les soldats soviétiques, tout en protestant au nom d'un pays souverain avant de se rendre.

Je connaissais István Bibò à Budapest, même avant les journées révolutionnaires, donc la nouvelle m'avait profondément touché. Je réfléchissais ce que je pouvais faire pour lui. Je m'étais rappelé qu'il était étudiant de l'Institut au début des années quarante, lors que le Professeur Guggenheim y enseignait déjà. J'avais demandé au Professeur s'il avait connu Bibò. Il m'avait répondu non seulement oui, mais avait précisé qu'il était l'un de ses étudiants les plus brillants au cours de toute sa carrière de professeur. A ce moment-là, je lui avais raconté quelle nouvelle j'avais eu de la Hongrie, et je l'avais demandé s'il pouvait faire quelque chose en faveur de István Bibò. Il avait décidé de se donner quelques jours pour y réfléchir ; en effet, il m'avait avisé 2-3 jours plus tard qu'il avait écrit au premier ministre hongrois, János Kádár, en lui demandant d'épargner cet homme dont il avait pu, lui-même, apprécié les qualités humaines et scientifiques. Nous n'avons plus parlé de cette affaire. Néanmoins, j'avais appris quelque temps après que Bibò serait libéré et casé comme un petit bibliothécaire d'une université au sud du pays. J'avais toujours eu le sentiment que l'intervention de Paul Guggenheim, ancien juge à la Cour Internationale et juriste de réputation mondiale, y était pour quelque chose.

WILHELM RÖPKE

J'avais, bien entendu, suivi les cours du Professeur *Wilhelm Röpke*, car déjà en Hongrie, encore tout jeune, j'étudiais et j'acceptais ses idées, en particulier en ce qui concernait « la troisième voie » entre le capitalisme et le socialisme-communisme. Donc, dès le début il y avait une parenté intellectuelle entre nous. En outre, c'était un homme charmant, de très grande culture et un être extrêmement sensible.

Je savais qu'il s'était très tôt opposé au national-socialisme, qu'il devait, à cause de ses prises de position, s'enfuir de l'Allemagne, et qu'il était professeur à l'Université d'Istanbul. Si je me rappelle bien, c'est de là qu'il était venu à Genève sur l'invitation de l'Institut. Il était jusqu'au fond de lui-même un anti-totalitaire comme moi, et c'était ce trait de caractère commun qui nous avait liés le plus. Nous étions tous les deux à la fois contre le nazisme et le communisme, comme d'ailleurs le Professeur Jacques Freymond, contre la tendance, devenue beaucoup plus marquée depuis, qui condamnait sans appel le nazisme, mais admettait le communisme ou au moins trouvait des excuses pour l'idéologie marxiste-léniniste.

Le Professeur Röpke m'avait invité plusieurs fois chez lui, ensemble avec d'autres étudiants, et m'avait donné quelques-unes de ses publications, dédicacées. Il est resté dans ma mémoire comme un homme extraordinaire, rare à notre époque dans son honnêteté et fidélité à ses idées.

MICHAEL HEILPERIN ET ROBERT TRIFFIN

En économie je m'intéressais surtout à l'économie monétaire et financière ; même le sujet pour lequel j'avais opté pour l'examen de doctorat était de ce domaine, « Les problèmes monétaires des pays en développement ». C'est pour cela qu'en cette matière j'avais surtout travaillé avec le Professeur *Michael Heilperin*, spécialiste des questions monétaires. Toutefois, j'avais aussi suivi les cours ainsi que les séminaires, chaque année quand il était venu pour enseigner à l'Institut pendant un semestre, du Professeur *Robert Triffin*, considéré à l'époque comme l'un des grands connaisseurs des questions monétaires. Il faut préciser aujourd'hui qu'à l'époque il n'y avait pas de question encore du « monétarisme », le grand courant créé par le Professeur Milton Friedmann n'avait pas encore existé. L'économie monétaire signifiait tout simplement politique monétaire, problèmes et techniques bancaires, et le rôle des marchés financiers.

Avec le Professeur Heilperin j'avais des contacts sans problèmes, mais je n'avais pas avec lui des relations comme avec les Professeurs Paul Guggenheim ou Wilhelm Röpke, c'est-à-dire un attachement à sa personnalité. C'était tout différent avec le Professeur Robert Triffin avec qui j'avais des conversations sur les questions relevant de l'économie monétaire et financière, donc nous avons eu un lien intellectuel et je lui étais aussi attaché, car il avait une façon très humaine de traiter les étudiants et une grande patience pour leur expliquer les subtilités du fonctionnement des marchés monétaires et financiers.

AFFAIRES ESTUDIANTINES

La Fédération Internationale des Etudiants en Sciences Politique

En automne 1958, si ma mémoire ne me trompe pas, j'étais élu président de l'association des étudiants de l'Institut contre Mike (Manocher) Gandji, futur recteur de l'Université de Téhéran et ministre de l'éducation du shah, puis l'un des leaders de l'opposition contre le règne des ayatollahs. Toutefois, non seulement nous étions restés de bons amis, mais Mike était aussi entré dans mon comité comme responsables des questions académiques. Je dois aussi mentionner que la secrétaire du comité n'était autre que Rosemarie, la future épouse du Professeur Abi-Saab ; le responsable des relations publiques était Marc Schindler, futur directeur de la radio et télévision Suisse Romande. Un autre membre du comité était Marcel Boisard, jusqu'à aujourd'hui directeur de l'UNITAR, l'Institut de formation de l'Organisation des Nations Unies.

L'événement le plus mémorable de mon exercice en tant que président de l'association des étudiants était la création de la *Fédération Internationale des Etudiants en Sciences Politiques* (FIESP). C'est à cause de cela que je consacre quelques lignes aux affaires estudiantines, car la création de la FIESP était une initiative extraordinaire même si elle n'avait abouti, car après quelques années d'existence l'organisation avait disparue, quoique d'autres associations internationales similaires, par exemple l'Association des Etudiants en Sciences Economiques et Commerciales (l'AIESEC), existent maintenant depuis presque un demi-siècle.

Au début de 1959, nous avons reçu une invitation de participer au congrès constitutif d'une fédération internationale des étudiants en sciences politiques, l'invitation ayant été lancée par nos collègues de l'Université de Lausanne et leur président, Adalbert Korff. L'initiative avait été soutenue par un certain nombre d'instituts ou d'unités d'enseignement en sciences politiques, entre autres, la Freie Universität de Berlin, l'Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, l'Université d'Aix-en-Provence, l'Université de Florence, et encore beaucoup d'autres de l'Europe continentale. Je n'ai connaissance à présent du destin que d'un seul membre fondateur de la FIESP : c'est Bruno Etienne, professeur à l'Université Aix-en-Provence-Marseille I, spécialiste internationalement connu des questions relatives à l'Islam et aux sociétés musulmanes.

Le congrès avait lieu à la Kongresshalle de Berlin, les statuts de la FIESP étaient élaborés et adoptés, et un secrétaire général était élu. Le candidat était Adalbert Korff de Lausanne, mais il n'a pas fait l'unanimité ; ainsi, à la proposition d'un grand nombre de représentants présents, j'étais élu premier secrétaire général de l'organisation estudiantine internationale, pour une période d'un an (cette période était finalement un peu plus longue à cause des problèmes d'organisation du futur congrès). Comme c'était prévu dans les statuts, le siège de l'organisation était toujours l'université à laquelle appartenait le secrétaire général, l'Institut devenait ainsi le siège de la FIESP pendant la période que j'étais son secrétaire général.

L'existence de la FIESP, comme celle de toute autre organisation, dépendait du financement de ses activités indispensables. Les dépenses devaient être couvertes par les cotisations des associations membres, mais le revenu n'était pas suffisant, d'autant plus que pour payer ces cotisations, les associations devaient recourir à la subvention de leurs écoles respectives, ce qui posait beaucoup de problèmes. Je me rappelle les difficultés de trouver des fonds pour financer ma participation au congrès de l'AIESEC en Espagne, organisation sœur avec laquelle nous avions prévu une coopération au bénéfice des étudiants, je devais couvrir moi-même, de ma bourse mensuelle, une partie des frais de voyage et du séjour. Je pense qu'il aurait été mieux d'établir un siège permanent de l'organisation auprès d'une université laquelle aurait pu assurer les frais de fonctionnement et des activités, même si la charge du secrétariat général devait changer de main chaque année. Je pense qu'à l'époque, la Freie Universität aurait pu servir comme siège, mais Berlin était alors à la périphérie de l'Europe, et la fin de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale n'était pas loin.

Au congrès de Genève, mon collègue Baldacci de Florence était élu prochain secrétaire général, ainsi le siège de l'organisation était transféré en Italie. Dans les années soixante, encore une fois un président de l'association des étudiants de l'Institut, Paul Kukorelly, était élu secrétaire général, et c'est lui qui pourrait donner les informations nécessaires en ce qui concerne les événements menant à la disparition de la FIESP.

L'Institut devenu le siège de la Fédération International des Etudiants en Sciences Politiques, et son représentant élu premier secrétaire général de cette organisation estudiantine internationale, représentent une page bien oubliée de l'histoire de l'Institut dans les années de 1950.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Born in Hungary, he left the country after the 1956 Revolution. Victor Segesvary worked during twenty-five years with the United Nations in the field of economic and social development. His experiences in Asia and Africa familiarized him with the existence of different human worlds and taught him the necessity of understanding and tolerance in human relations.

He obtained a PhD in Political Science and International Relations from the Graduate School for International Studies, and a D.D. from the Faculty of Protestant Theology, both at the University of Geneva (Switzerland). His vast knowledge covers such diverse fields as political science, sociology, economics, history, and philosophy as well as the "new" science of comparative analysis of civilizations. He published many books and articles, among them *Inter-Civilizational Relations and the Destiny of the West. Dialogue or Confrontation?* reflecting his lifelong experience in the interface of great civilizations; *From Illusion to Delusion. Globalization and the Contradictions of Late Modernity*, linking the phenomenon of globalization to the dialogue of civilizations; as well as *Existence and Transcendence. An Anti-Faustian Study in Philosophical Anthropology*, exploring the relationship between biological and cultural developments. Victor Segesvary is chronicled in Marquis' WHO IS WHO IN AMERICA and WHO IS WHO IN THE WORLD.