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Contents

1. Secrecy of Diplomacy (London, Oct. 30th, 1851)
2. Monarchy and Republicanism (Copenhagen House London, Nov. 3d)
3. Communism and the Sibylline Books (Manchester, Nov. 12th)
4. Legitimacy of Hungarian Independence (Staten Island, Dec. 5th, 1851). Declaration of Independence by the Hungarian Nation
5. Statement of Principles and Aims (New York, Dec. 6th)
6. Reply to the Baltimore Address (Dec. 10th)
7. Hereditary Policy of America (New York, to the Corporation, Dec. 11th)
8. On Nationalities (New York, to the Press)
9. On Military Institutions (New York, to the Militia, Dec. 16th)
10. Conditions essential for Democracy and Peace (New York, Tammany Hall, Dec. 17th)
11. Hungary and Austria, in Religious Contrast (In a Brooklyn Church, New York, Dec. 18th)
12. Public Piracy of Russia (New York, to the Bar, on Dec. the 19th)
13. Claims of Hungary on the Female Sex (New York, to the Ladies, Dec. 21st)
14. Results of the Overthrow of the French Republic (Philadelphia, Dec. 26th)
15. Interest of America in Hungarian Liberty (Baltimore, Dec. 27th)
16. Novelties in American Republicanism (Washington, Legislative Banquet, Jan. 5th, 1852)
17. On the Merits of Turkey
18. Aspects of America toward England (Washington. Jan. 8th, day of battle of New Orleans)
19. Meaning of Recognizing Hungarian Independence (Washington, last speech)
20. Contrast of the American to the Hungarian Crisis (Annapolis, Maryland, Jan. 13th, to the Senate)
21. Thanks for his great Success (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, Jan. 14th, to the Legislature)
22. On the present Weakness of Despotism (Harrisburg, Legislative Banquet)
23. Agencies of Russian Ascendancy and Supremacy (Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, Jan. 26th)
24. Reply to the Pittsburgh Clergy (Jan. 26th)
25. Hungarian Loan (Cleveland, Ohio, Feb. 3d). Address to Kossuth from the State Committee of Ohio
26. Panegyric of Ohio (Columbus, Ohio, Feb. 5th)
27. Democracy Columbus, the Spirit of the Age (Columbus, Feb. 6th, to the Legislature)
28. The Miseries and the Strength of Hungary (Columbus, Feb. 7th)
29. Ohio and France Contrasted as Republics (Cincinnati, Ohio)
30. War a Providential Necessity against Oppression (Cincinnati)
31. On Washington's Policy (Cincinnati, Washington's Birthday, Feb, 24th)
32. Kossuth's Credentials (Cincinnati, Feb. 25th)
33. Harmony of the Executive and of the People in America (Indianapolis, at the State House, Feb. 27th)
34. Importance of Foreign Policy and of strengthening England (Louisville, March 6th, at the Court House)
35. Catholicism versus Jesuitism (St. Louis, Missouri)
36. The Ides of March (St. Louis, March 15th)
37. History of Kossuth's Liberation (Jackson, Mississippi, April 1st, address to the Governor)
38. Pronouncement of the South (Mobile, Alabama, April 3d)
39. Kossuth's Defence against certain Mean Imputations (Jersey City, April 20th)
40. The Brotherhood of Nations (Newark, New Jersey, April 22d)
41. The History and Heart of Massachusetts (Worcester, Massachusetts, April 25th)
42. Panegyric of Massachusetts (Faneuil Hall, Boston, April 29th)
43. Self-Government of Hungary (Faneuil Hall, Legislative Banquet, April 30th)
44. Russia the Antagonist of the U.S. (Salem, May 6th)
45. The Martyrs of the American Revolution (Lexington, May 11th)
46. Condition of Europe (Faneuil Hall, Boston, May 14th)
47. Pronouncement of all the States (Albany, May 20th)
48. Sound and Unsound Commerce (Buffalo, May 27th)
49. Russia and the Balance of Power (Syracuse, June 4th)
50. Retrospect and Prospect (Utica, June 9th)
51. The Triple Bond (New York, June 22d)
Appendices

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Preface

Nothing appears in history similar to the enthusiasm roused by Kossuth in nations foreign to him, except perhaps the kindling for the First Crusade by the voice of Peter the Hermit. Then bishops, princes, and people alike understood the danger which overshadowed Europe from the Mohammedan powers; and by soundly directed, though fanatical instinct, all Christendom rushed eastward, till the chivalry of the Seljuk Turks was crippled on the fields of Palestine. Now also the multitudes of Europe, uncorrupted by ambition, envy, or filthy lucre, forebode the deadly struggle impending over us all from the conspiracy of crowned heads. Seeing the apathy of their own rulers, and knowing, perhaps by dim report, the deeds of Kossuth, they look to him as the Great Prophet and Leader, by whom Policy is at length to be moulded into Justice; and are ready to catch his inspiration before he has uttered a word. Kossuth undoubtedly is a mighty Orator; but no one is better aware than he, that the cogency of his arguments is due to the atrocity of our common enemies, and the enthusiasm which he kindles to the preparation of the people's heart.

...

Nearly all the points on which attempts have been made to misrepresent in England the cause of Hungary are cleared up in these speeches. On two subjects only does it seem needful here to make any remark; first, on the Republicanism of Kossuth; secondly, on the Hungarian levies against Italy in the year 1848.

1. Kossuth is attacked by his countrymen on opposite grounds: Szemere despises him for not becoming a republican early enough, Count Casimir Bathyanyi reproves him for becoming a republican at all. The facts are these. Kossuth, like all English statesmen, was a historical royalist, not a doctrinaire. When the existing reign had become treacherous and lawless, he was willing to change the line of succession, and make the Archduke Stephen king. When the dynasty had become universally detested and actually expelled, he approved most heartily the deposition of the Hapsburgs; but still held himself in suspense as to the future of the constitution. By his influence instructions were sent to his representative in England, which were equivalent to soliciting a dynasty from the British government. Meanwhile Szemere, his Home Secretary, took on himself to avow in the Diet that the government was republican, and no voice of protest was raised in either house. Indeed, Mr. Vucovics, who was Minister of Justice under Kossuth, states that the government and both houses responded unanimously to the republican avowal, and that the government removed the symbol of the Crown from the public arms and seal. The press of all shades assented. After this, it was clear (I presume) to Kossuth, or at least it soon became so, that all sympathy with royal power was gone out of the nation's heart. Hungarians may settle that amongst themselves: but as for Englishmen, - when for seven or eight months together the English ministry and English peerage would not stir, or speak, or whisper, to save constitutional royalty and ancient peerage for Hungary and for Europe while it was yet possible; with what face, with what decency, can Englishmen censure Kossuth for despairing of a cause, which was abandoned to ruin by ourselves, the greatest power interested to maintain it, - which the monarchs have waded through blood and perjury to destroy, -and which the millions of Hungary will not (in his belief) peril life and fortune to restore?

2. The ministry of Louis Bathyanyi and Kossuth have been attacked on opposite grounds, - because they did, - and because they did not, attempt to subdue the Italians by force of arms. The facts are rather complicated, but deserve here to be stated concisely.

When the ministry was appointed, there were already Hungarians in Italy with Radetzki, and Austrian soldiers in Hungary. The Viennese ministry promised to exchange them, as fast as could be done without encountering great expense or dislocating the regiments and making them inefficient. With this promise the Hungarian ministry was forced to content itself at the time. At a later period, when it discovered that the Austrian commanders in Hungary had secret orders not to fight against the Serbian marauders, and that the Austrian troops could not be trusted, the Hungarian ministry desired to get back their men from Italy for their own defence; which desire proved ineffectual, yet has been severely blamed by some of our monarchists. But meanwhile the Viennese ministry, as early as June, 1848, endeavoured to buy of the Hungarian ministry an increased grant of troops against Italy, by conceding a most energetic "King's Speech" against the Serbs, with which the Archduke Palatine was to open, and did open, the Diet on July 2d. A part of this speech is quoted in Appendix II, and indeed it is a loathsome exhibition of Austrian treachery. The Hungarian ministry were pressed by the arguments, that since Austria was attacked in Italy by the King of Sardinia, the war was not merely against the Lombards; and that the Pragmatic Sanction bound Hungary to defend the empire if assailed from without. This led them to acknowledge the principle, that they were bound to assist, if able; but they replied that Hungary itself must first be secured against marauders, and no troops could be spared until the Serbs were subdued. At the same time orders were sent to Radetzki from Vienna to offer independence to the Lombards, and constitutional nationality under the Austrian crown to the Venetians: hence the Hungarian ministry for a time fancied that they would not be fighting against the Italians, as they expected the terms to be accepted by them. When it was farther represented that the Italians had rejected them, - (for Radetzki, acting probably by secret orders, suppressed the despatches, and never offered independence to Lombardy, though the Austrian ministers made diplomatic capital of their liberality), - then the Hungarian ministry began to think the Italians unreasonable; yet they did not go beyond their abstract principle, that Hungary ought to grant troops for Austrian defence in Italy, provided, 1st, that rebellion in Hungary itself were repressed; 2d, that the troops should not act against the Italians, unless the Italians had rejected the offer of national liberties and a constitution coordinate to those of Hungary, under the Austrian crown.

The protocol on this subject was drawn on July 5th; the public speech of Kossuth concerning it was not until July 22d: and in this short interval the treachery of the dynasty had been so displayed, that Kossuth could no longer speak in the same tone as a few weeks earlier. For a fuller development of this, I refer the reader to Appendix III. The real object of the Austrian ministry, was, to ruin the popularity of Bathyanyi and Kossuth, if they could induce them to sacrifice Italian freedom; or else, to accuse them to all the European diplomatists as conspirators against the integrity of the Austrian empire, if they refused to oppress the liberties of Italy.

Finally, the reader has even here proof enough how false is the statement which has been current in English newspapers, that Kossuth's visit to America was "a failure." This was an attempt to practise on our prevalent disgraceful tendency to judge of a cause by its success. However, the end is not yet seen: America has still to act decisively, if she would win the lasting glory which we have despised, of rescuing Law and Right from lawless force, and establishing the future of Europe.

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